SEAN F. COX, District Judge.
In this action, Defendants Wilfred Griffith ("Griffith" or "Defendant"), along with Zia Hassan ("Hassan") and Nathan Miller,
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Griffith's Motion in Limine to Exclude 404(b) Evidence (Doc. #100). The Government filed a response to Defendant Griffith's Motion (Doc. #107) and the Court heard oral argument on January 16, 2014. Because the Court finds that the Government's proffered evidence constitutes res gestae evidence, the Court shall DENY Defendant Griffith's motion.
In this action, Defendant Griffith is charged in a first superceding indictment with Health Care Fraud Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Pay and Receive Kickbacks. (Superceding Indictment, Doc. #39). The Government alleges that Defendant Griffith was paid by Defendant Hassan to refer Medicare beneficiaries to Hassan's company, Cherish Home Health Services, LLC ("Cherish"), even though Griffith was not a licensed physician. (Doc. #39 at 10). The Government further alleges that Hassan paid Griffith to sign medical documentation ordering physical therapy and other unnecessary medical services that were purportedly provided and billed to Medicare by Cherish. (Doc. #39 at 10). The Government claims it has evidence that Hassan paid Griffith a $2,000 check for his patient referrals to Cherish. (Doc. #39 at 15).
The Government has filed a Supplemental Discovery Notice (Doc. #70) as to Defendant Griffith. In its Notice, the Government states that it intends to offer evidence that "the patient information that defendant Griffith sold to defendant Hassan was obtained by defendant Griffith in his capacity as an employee" of Dr. Dwight Smith ("Dr. Smith") at Phoenix Visiting Physicians ("Phoenix"), Smith Medical Center ("SMC") and Trinity Homecare Physicians ("Trinity"). (Supplemental Discovery Notice, Doc. #70).
The Government maintains that Griffith "impersonated Dr. Smith" by writing prescriptions and ordering medical services using pre-signed prescription pads. (Doc. #70 at 2). The Government further alleges that "Griffith, posing as Dr. Smith, referred Medicare patients to home health companies, including Cherish, for medically unnecessary home health services." (Id.). The Government claims that "Phoenix, Trinity, and [SMC] also submitted false claims to Medicare for health care services provided to such patients that were medically unnecessary, were provided by unlicensed medical professionals, and/or were not provided." (Id.).
The Government also states that it has evidence that Defendant Griffith "participated in fraud schemes involving other home health agencies, including, but not limited to, Swift Home Health Care LLC ("Swift")." (Doc. #70 at 2). The Government claims that Griffith worked as a beneficiary recruiter at Swift, and also solicited and received kickbacks for beneficiary referrals to Swift. (Id. at 2-3).
The Government intends to prove that Griffith committed these acts through the testimony of Tausif Rahman ("Rahman"), documentary evidence, Medicare data, and defendant Griffith's confession. (Gvmt. Resp., Doc. #107, at 10). According to the Government, Rahman was co-owner of Phoenix with Dr. Smith; Rahman also helped Dr. Smith set up SMC. (Rahman Stmt., attached to Gvmt. Resp. at Ex. A). Rahman also had an ownership interest in Physician's Choice Home Health Care LLC ("Physician's Choice"), First Care Home Health Care LLC ("First Care"), and Quantum Home Care, LLC ("Quantum").
Apparently, at some point Rahman and Griffith "had a falling out." (Gvmt. Resp. at 107). The Government claims that Griffith retained patient information from Phoenix and SMC, and later sold this information to Cherish. (Gvmt. Resp. at 5). However, instead of signing Dr. Smith's name to the referrals, Griffith used the names of other physicians, including Dr. Ruben Benito and Dr. Johnkay Nwadlnobl. (Gvmt. Resp. at 5-6).
Defendant Griffith has a filed a motion in limine to exclude all of this evidence from being admitted, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. (Doc. #100). The Government has filed a response. (Doc. #107).
At oral argument, the Government made an offer of proof setting forth Rahman's expected testimony:
(1/16/15 Hearing, Rough Trans.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 404(b) prohibits the admission of "evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act" at trial when that evidence is used to "show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence is admissible for other purposes, however, such as to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). "On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must: (A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and (B) do so before trial. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
Defendant Griffith objects to the admission of the evidence identified in the Government's Supplemental Discovery Notice on two grounds. Griffith argues that the proffered evidence should be excluded because the Government did not give proper notice, and because it constitutes character and propensity evidence in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
First, Defendant Griffith argues that the Notice is deficient because it does not identify to whom Griffith made illegal patient referrals, for whom Griffith worked as a recruiter, or from whom Griffith received illegal kickbacks. (Doc. #100 at 2-3).
The Government first states that it does not intend to offer evidence of Griffith's conduct involving either Swift or Trinity in its case in chief. The Government further responds that Defendant Griffith had proper notice of the other acts evidence that it intends to offer at trial. The Government states that, in addition to the Supplemental Discovery Notice (Doc. #70), its Trial Brief (Doc. #81) provides a summary of the expected testimony of Tausif Rahman as well as a summary of evidence relating to Phoenix and SMC. (Gvmt. Resp. at 13).
The Court finds that Griffith had "reasonable notice of the general nature" of the evidence the Government intends to offer at trial. The Government produced Rahman's interview statement to Griffith's counsel in November 2014. Rahman's statement contains information about the identity of all of his health care companies, Griffith's alleged role in the fraudulent scheme, as well as information about Rahman's interactions with Griffith, Hassan, and Smith. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, Rule 404(b)'s "reasonable notice" requirement does not require the Government to provide "specific evidentiary detail" such as "dates, times, places and persons involved in such acts; the statements of each participant; [or] any documents that contain evidence of such other crimes or acts...." U.S. v. Stoecker, 920 F.Supp. 876, 883 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Thus, the Court finds the Government's notice to Defendant Griffith is reasonable and sufficient.
Next, Griffith challenges admission of Rahman's testimony regarding health care companies other than Phoenix and SMC because he argues that the evidence is being offered to prove his character and propensity to commit the charged offenses. (Doc. #100 at 3).
The Government responds that the proffered evidence is not "other acts" evidence at all—rather, it is "evidence of what defendant Griffith did to commit the crimes charged in the indictment. These are the acts charged." (Gvmt. Resp. at 3). The Government maintains that its proffered evidence is part of the "res gestae" because it is necessary to complete the story of the charged offenses. (Gvmt. Resp. at 7). The Government explains that this evidence does not just complete the story, "it is the story." (Gvmt. Resp. at 8).
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that res gestae evidence is admissible as an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). U.S. v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 697 (6th Cir. 2012). Res gestae evidence "consists of those acts or items which are `inextricably intertwined with the charged offense or those acts, the telling of which is necessary to complete the story of the charged offense.'" United States v. Olender, 338 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2003), quoting United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000). Typically, res gestae evidence "is a prelude to the charged offense, is directly probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness's testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense." Hardy, 228 F.3d at 748. "Proper background evidence has a causal, temporal, or spatial connection with the charged offense." Id.
The Court finds, based on the Government's offer of proof, that the Government's proffered testimony of Rahman constitutes res gestae evidence and should not be excluded. Rahman's testimony appears to be temporally and causally related to Griffith's participation in the charged fraudulent scheme. Further, Rahman's testimony appears to explain, among other things, how Griffith obtained patients to refer to Hassan. The Court finds that Rahman's testimony on these topics is necessary to "complete the story" of the charged offenses. U.S. v. Olender, 338 F.ed 629, 637 (2003) (citation omitted).
Additionally, as the Government points out, "Defendant Griffith's work at Phoenix with Mr. Rahman and Dr. Smith is conduct forming part of the charged offenses." According to the Government, Griffith obtained patient information through Phoenix and SMC, and used Doctors Smith, Benito, and Nwadlnobl to "refer" these patients to Hassan and Cherish. All of this evidence appears related to the manner and means by which Griffith obtained Medicare patient information to sell to Defendant Hassan. Therefore, the Court finds that Rahman's proffered testimony is also directly probative of the charged offenses.
Based on the parties' representations as well as the Government's offer of proof, the Court finds that the Government's proffered evidence constitutes res gestae evidence and is therefore admissible as an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Griffith's Motion in Limine to Exclude 404(b) Evidence (Doc. #100) is DENIED.