DAVID R. GRAND, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Teresa Long ("Long") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). Both parties have filed summary judgment motions [19,
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") conclusion that Long was disabled for the closed period from October 11, 2007, through September 22, 2010, but was no longer disabled beginning on September 23, 2010. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [20] be GRANTED, Long's Motions for Summary Judgment [11, 16, 19] be DENIED, and that, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
On May 8, 2006, Long filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging a disability onset date of June 6, 2005. (Tr. 88-96). These applications were denied initially on September 6, 2006. (Tr. 45-53). Following a hearing on September 18, 2008, ALJ Paul Armstrong issued a written decision on January 20, 2009, finding that Long was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 10-18). On August 27, 2009, the Appeals Council denied review of ALJ Armstrong's decision. (Tr. 1-3). Thereafter, Long filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and on March 31, 2011, this Court reversed the ALJ's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. (Tr. 361-81).
After the case was remanded,
Under the Act, DIB and SSI are available only for those who have a "disability." See Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). The Act defines "disability" as the:
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner's regulations provide that a disability is to be determined through the application of a five-step sequential analysis:
Scheuneman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 6937331, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520); see also Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001). "The burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four steps. . . . If the analysis reaches the fifth step without a finding that claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the [defendant]." Preslar v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
If a claimant is found to be disabled during this five-step process, the ALJ must determine whether her disability continues through the date of the decision or whether the claimant is instead only entitled to a closed period of disability. This is accomplished by applying the "medical improvement" standard articulated at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 (for DIB claims) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.994 (for SSI claims). See, e.g., Love v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 605 F.Supp.2d 893, 903-04 (W.D. Mich. 2009); Long v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 45 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 1994).
With one exception,
At the time of the 2011 administrative hearing, Long was 51 years old. (Tr. 722-23). She lived alone in an apartment. (Tr. 722). She completed the twelfth grade but had no college education. (Tr. 712, 723). Long indicated that she has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and she has not worked since 2006, when she was "let [] go because of [her] illness." (Tr. 707, 723-24, 732). Specifically, she experienced panic attacks and anxiety, and was often short-tempered with customers, when working as a waitress. (Id.).
Long testified that she still experiences panic attacks (when her heart races and she becomes confused) at least ten times a week. (Tr. 725). Crowds, "new people," and confusion trigger these attacks. (Tr. 731). She is able to perform chores such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry, however, and she shops for groceries in a small store near her home. (Tr. 651-52, 725-26). She testified that she visits her sister and brother and, on good days, bowls on a team with family and friends. (Tr. 726-27). She enjoys reading and is able to drive, but has difficulty sleeping. (Tr. 650, 652, 727, 733). She has difficulties with memory, completing tasks, concentration, understanding, and following directions, and she does not finish what she starts. (Tr. 654, 732). At the time of the hearing, Long was taking several medications, including Prozac, Lamictal, Wellbutrin, Abilify, and Klonopin. (Tr. 728).
The Court has thoroughly reviewed Long's medical record. In lieu of summarizing her medical history here, the Court will make references and provide citations to the record as necessary in its discussion of the parties' arguments.
Stephanie Leech testified as an independent vocational expert ("VE") at the 2011 administrative hearing. (Tr. 741-46). The ALJ asked the VE to imagine a claimant of Long's age, education, and work experience, who could perform work at all exertional levels, with the following nonexertional limitations: as a result of her moderate impairment in concentration, persistence, or pace, she was limited to performing simple, routine, repetitive work involving one- and two-step tasks; limited to low stress work (no fast-paced work, no work that involves quotas, no assembly line work); no interaction with the public or more than occasional and superficial contact with co-workers and supervisors; supervision should be limited to routine interactions and routine reminders about work tasks; there should be no more than average production standards; and speed should not be critical. (Tr. 741-42). The VE testified that the hypothetical individual would not be capable of performing Long's past relevant work. (Tr. 742). However, the VE testified that the hypothetical individual would be capable of working as a packer (4,000 jobs in Michigan's lower peninsula), and in food preparation (2,100 jobs), bench assembly (2,000 jobs), and material mover positions (1,100 jobs). (Tr. 742-43).
Following the analyses described above, the ALJ found that Long was disabled under the Act for the closed period from October 11, 2007, through September 22, 2010. At Step One, the ALJ found that Long has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 6, 2005, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 323). At Step Two, the ALJ found that Long has the severe impairments of bipolar disorder and an anxiety-related disorder. (Id.). At Step Three, the ALJ found that, from October 11, 2007, through September 22, 2010, Long's mental impairments met the criteria of Listing 12.06 (anxiety-related disorders). (Tr. 323-27). The ALJ further concluded, however, that beginning on September 23, 2010, medical improvement occurred such that Long's mental impairments no longer met the requirements of Listing 12.06. (Tr. 328-29).
The ALJ then assessed Long's RFC, concluding that, as of September 23, 2010, Long had the RFC to perform work at all exertional levels, with the following nonexertional limitations:
(Tr. 329-31). At Step Four, the ALJ determined that, at all relevant times, Long has been unable to perform her past relevant work. (Tr. 331). At Step Five, however, the ALJ concluded, based in part on the VE's testimony, that, since September 23, 2010, Long has been capable of performing a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy. (Tr. 331-32). As a result, the ALJ concluded that Long's disability ended on September 23, 2010. (Tr. 332).
The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review under this statute is limited in that the court "must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[I]f an agency has failed to adhere to its own procedures, we will not remand for further administrative proceedings unless the claimant has been prejudiced on the merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency's procedural lapses.") (internal quotations omitted). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the court does "not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility." Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 ("It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.").
When reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings, the court is limited to an examination of the record and must consider the record as a whole. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). The court "may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council," or in this case, the ALJ. Heston, 245 F.3d at 535; Walker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ or this court discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. See Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[A]n ALJ can consider all evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party.") (internal quotations omitted). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, "it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion." Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted); Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) ("if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers to that finding `even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion'").
It is difficult to discern Long's specific arguments in support of her motion for summary judgment. Her motion consists almost entirely of a compilation of quotations of black letter case law, with little accompanying analysis or application of that law to the facts of her case. Long does assert (in a heading in her brief) that the ALJ erred in "assessing [her] credibility and by failing to properly evaluate the medical records of evidence and, thereby, forming an inaccurate hypothetical that did not accurately portray [her] impairments." (Doc. #19 at 6). But, Long does not explain with any particularity whatsoever
Indeed, although Long provides a factual recitation of certain portions of her testimony and medical record (Id. at 10-11), she does not actually allege that the ALJ erred in evaluating any specific piece of evidence. Long's brief is similar to one her counsel filed in another matter, Burger v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 2285375 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2013), which the court found to present no non-waived issue. And, on March 24, 2014, Chief Judge Rosen issued a scathing commentary on Long's counsel's approach to his clients' summary judgment briefs:
Fielder v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 1207865, at *1, n. 1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2014) (internal citations omitted). The Court notes that Long's brief in the instant case — which was filed
As set forth above, the ALJ found that, from October 11, 2007, through September 22, 2010, Long's impairments met the criteria of Listing 12.06 and, thus, she was disabled under the Act. (Tr. 323-27). The ALJ further concluded, however, that beginning on September 23, 2010, Long experienced medical improvement such that she no longer met or medically equaled the requirements of Listing 12.06 (or any other Listing). (Tr. 328-29). The ALJ further concluded that, as of that date, Long was not disabled because she had the RFC to perform work at all exertional levels, with the following nonexertional limitations: as a result of moderate impairment of functioning in the area of concentration, persistence or pace, Long was limited to performing simple, routine, repetitive work involving 1- and 2-step tasks; she was limited to performing low stress work (no fast-paced work, no work that involves quotas, no assembly line work) that does not involve interaction with the public, or more than occasional and superficial contact with co-workers and supervisors; supervision should be limited to routine interactions and routine reminders about work tasks; there should be no more than average production standards; and speed should not be critical. (Tr. 329-31). Based in part on the VE's testimony, the ALJ concluded that, since September 23, 2010, Long has not been disabled, because she has been capable of performing a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy. (Tr. 331-32).
In her motion, Long argues that the ALJ should have found that her disability continued after September 22, 2010.
As the Sixth Circuit has held, determinations of credibility related to subjective complaints of pain rest with the ALJ because "the ALJ's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the claimant `is invaluable, and should not be discarded lightly.'" Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Beavers v. Sec'y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978)). Thus, an ALJ's credibility determination will not be disturbed "absent compelling reason." Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001). The ALJ is not simply required to accept the testimony of a claimant if it conflicts with medical reports and other evidence in the record. See Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). Rather, when a complaint of pain or other symptom is in issue, after the ALJ finds a medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's alleged symptoms, she must consider "the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence, the individual's own statements about symptoms, statements and other information provided by treating or examining physicians . . . and any other relevant evidence in the case record" to determine if the claimant's claims regarding the severity of her symptoms are credible. Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7, 1996 WL 374186, at *1 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.
Here, the ALJ adequately discussed the objective medical evidence regarding Long's impairments and reasonably explained why such evidence compelled a finding that, beginning on September 23, 2010, her allegations of disability were not fully credible. (Tr. 328-30). For example, the ALJ noted that treatment records from Hurley Mental Health Associates ("Hurley"), dated September 23, 2010, indicate that Long had a "positive response" to medication changes, that her anxiety was stable, that she had had no panic attacks, and that her mood was euthymic. (Tr. 329, 458). The ALJ also considered subsequent treatment notes from Hurley, from November 2010 to February 2011, which showed that Long did not report any panic attacks, had experienced "no bad mood swings," and that her mood was "stable" and "euthymic." (Tr. 330, 452-56). Moreover, the ALJ noted that, despite the fact that the record was left open after the hearing for the submission of additional medical evidence, there are no mental health treatment records from Hurley after February 2011. (Tr. 329-30).
The ALJ also considered the fact that May 2011 treatment records from Hamilton Community Health Network ("Hamilton") document that Long had not been to that clinic in 1½ years. (Tr. 330, 414). The ALJ further noted that, at a May 2011 examination, Long had an appropriate mood and affect, her insight and judgment were intact, she had intact recent and remote memory, and she was alert and fully oriented. (Tr. 330, 414-15). And, the ALJ noted that a July 2011 treatment note from Hamilton did not refer to any psychiatric abnormality. (Tr. 330, 412-13). Finally, the ALJ considered the fact that, after September 2010, no treating or examining source opined that Long was disabled or had limitations that exceed those described in the ALJ's RFC. (Tr. 331). See, e.g., Price v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App'x 172, 177 (6th Cir. 2009) ("As the ALJ's review of the administrative record indicates, no other treating or consultative physicians concluded that Price was disabled."). In light of the foregoing evidence, the ALJ's post-September 22, 2010 RFC finding adequately accommodated Long's mental impairments. (Tr. 329-31).
In the face of all of this evidence, Long relies primarily on her own testimony and her subjective complaints to physicians. (Doc. #19 at 10-11). However, even where there is "objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition . . . an ALJ is not required to accept a claimant's subjective complaints and may properly consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability." Jones v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2003). Long does point to two medical source statements, in which treating sources opined that she was extremely limited in the ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex job instructions, and markedly limited in other areas. (Doc. #19 at 11 (citing Tr. 417-18)). However, both of these medical source statements were completed
Moreover, the mere fact that certain aspects of the medical record are consistent with the claimant's alleged impairment does not necessitate a finding that the claimant was fully credible regarding the extent of her symptoms caused by the impairment. This is precisely why the ALJ must consider and weigh "the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence, the individual's own statements about symptoms, statements and other information provided by treating or examining physicians . . . and any other relevant evidence in the case record" to determine if the claimant's claims regarding the severity of her symptoms are credible. Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7, 1996 WL 374186, at *1 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. Here, the ALJ determined, based on a review of all of the medical evidence, as well as Long's testimony, that, after September 22, 2010, Long was partly credible to the extent her claimed level of impairment did not exceed the RFC determined by the ALJ. (Tr. 329-31). Again, Long has not shown that the ALJ's overall evaluation of the evidence is in any way erroneous.
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Long has not shown a "compelling reason" to disturb the ALJ's credibility determination. Smith, 307 F.3d at 379. Here, where the ALJ gave a reasonable explanation for discounting Long's credibility after September 23, 2010, and that explanation is supported by substantial evidence, her credibility finding should not be disturbed.
Long also asserts in her brief that "for a response to a hypothetical question to constitute substantial evidence, each element of a hypothetical must accurately describe the Claimant." (Doc. #19 at 10 (quoting Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994)). Then, however, Long simply states in conclusory fashion that "because each element of the [ALJ's] hypothetical does not accurately describe [her] in all significant, relevant respects, the VE's testimony at the hearing should not constitute substantial evidence." (Id.). Although Long phrases this as a Step Five finding, the Court concludes that Long is attempting to refute the RFC finding via a purported Step Five error. See Kirchner v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5913972, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2013) ("Kirchner's Step Five argument is a veiled attack on the ALJ's underlying RFC finding" because "this is not a scenario where the ALJ's hypothetical failed to match up to the RFC he ultimately imposed.").
To the extent Long argues that the ALJ's hypothetical was deficient, it appears she believes it should have included a requirement that she would be absent from work more than one day per month. (Doc. #19 at 12). The VE testified that this limitation would preclude all competitive work. (Tr. 743). The problem, however, is that Long has not pointed to any medical evidence supporting this limitation, and the Court has found none. Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to include such a limitation in the hypothetical question she posed to the VE. See Bartyzel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 74 F. App'x 515, 524 (6th Cir. 2003) (an ALJ is only required to pose those hypothetical limitations that he finds credible); see also Cookman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 6631463, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2013) (same). As such, Long's argument that the ALJ formed an inaccurate hypothetical lacks merit.
For all of the above reasons, and upon an independent review of the entire record, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
