ANTHONY P. PATTI, Magistrate Judge.
Aubrey Christian (#722265) is currently incarcerated at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility (ARF). See
This case was reassigned from Magistrate Judge Komives to me on January 13, 2015 and has been referred to me for all pretrial matters (DE 54). Since then, this Court has entered several orders (DEs 55-61, 68), among which is an order (DE 57) granting Plaintiff's motions requesting order to enforce MDOC PD 05.03.116 (DE 52) and to provide copies of amended complaint (DE 26).
1. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's March 9, 2015 motion (DE 62) requesting clarification and amendment of the Court's February 12, 2015 order (DE 57). Within this motion, Plaintiff states:
DE 62 at 2 ¶ 3. In conclusion, Plaintiff asks the Court to make its February 12, 2015 order (DE 57) applicable "to all photocopies and the loaning of funds for photocopying being filed, suc[h] as for all Briefs, Motions, Discovery requests, any other photocopies Plaintiff might need to adequately litigate this claim." DE 62 at 3.
The MDOC Defendants filed a response (DE 65) on March 10, 2015. Attached to the response is a copy of MDOC PD 05.03.116 ("Prisoners' Access to the Courts"), effective Oct. 17, 2014. DE 65-2. In part, that policy provides:
MDOC PD 05.03.116, ¶ N (emphasis added). Relying upon ¶ N of that policy, the MDOC Defendants state, "the MDOC would loan funds to copy any exhibits and notary pages necessary to file the amended complaint." Moreover, the MDOC Defendants contend, "since Plaintiff can reproduce his own amended complaint, complying with the Order would cause an unnecessary burden on MDOC resources." DE 65 at 2. Therefore, the MDOC Defendants request that the Court's February 12, 2015 order (DE 57) be modified to "allow the MDOC to make copies of Plaintiff's exhibits and any notarized pages." DE 65 at 3.
The following day, on March 11, 2015, the MDOC Defendants filed a motion (DE 67) to amend their response (DE 65). Among the attachments to this motion is the MDOC Defendants' amended response (DE 67-2 at 1-6) to Plaintiff's motion (DE 62) requesting clarification and amendment. Therein, they interpret "can otherwise be reproduced by the prisoner" as "either writing out duplicates of the legal documents, or by using carbon paper — provided to the prisoner and charged to his account — to reproduce the necessary copies." DE 67-2 at 3. Here, the MDOC Defendants ask the Court to "instead require the Plaintiff to reproduce his amended complaint by hand — as well as any other documents he can reproduce by hand — which is in accordance with MDOC PD 05.03.116 ¶N." DE 67-2 at 5.
On March 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a reply. DE 70. Among other things, he claims that Defendants' responses (DE 65, DE 67) are untimely to the extent they are objections under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). DE 70 at 1-2. Also, citing his October 22, 2014 request for relief, which concerned photocopying "pleadings necessary for filing with the Court[,]" DE 52 at 3, Plaintiff notes that he construes the Court's February 12, 2015 order (DE 57) "as applying to all pleadings being filed with the [C]ourt[.]" DE 70 at 2. Citing E.D. Mich. LR 5.1, Plaintiff notes that he will also be required to serve two (2) copies of the amended complaint upon the Clerk of the Court, as well as a copy upon each defendant or his/her counsel. He then addresses the practicality of using carbon paper or manually retyping eighteen (18) copies of an amended complaint that is fifty-three (53) pages long. DE 70 at 4. Then, Plaintiff responds to Defendants' burdensome argument by citing ¶ C of MDOC PD 04.02.110 ("Prisoner Benefit Fund") and ¶¶ G & I of MDOC PD 04.02.120 ("Indigent Prisoners").
2. Also before the Court is Plaintiff's March 17, 2015 motion (DE 69 at 1-4) for an extension of time within which to provide copies of his amended complaint. Among other things, Plaintiff describes his March 9, 2015 submission of his amended complaint and Librarian Deborah Foster's alleged March 11, 2015 response. DE 69 ¶¶ 4-5. He also alleges a conflict of interest (DE 69 ¶ 6), contends that sanctions are proper (DE 69 ¶ 7) and requests that the Court "address the issue of the blatant violation of the Court's Order[,]" DE 69 at 4.
3. Just days ago, on March 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion (DE 71) requesting sanctions against MDOC Defendants and the Attorney General. Plaintiff explains his effort to photocopy what eventually became his March 9, 2015 motion to extend (DE 63) and his effort to photocopy his forthcoming amended complaint. DE 71 at 2-3 ¶¶ 3-7. Plaintiff argues that sanctions are proper in light of "dilatory motive," "malicious intent," obstruction of proceedings and violation of this Court's February 12, 2015 order (DE 57). DE 71 at 3-4 ¶¶ 8-11. Plaintiff contends that the actions of Melody Wallace, Deborah Foster and the Office of the Attorney General, particularly Assistant Attorney General Robert J. Jenkins, "amounts to retaliation against Plaintiff for accessing the [courts], and denial of access to the [courts], which is a clear violation of the United States Constitution." DE 71 at 4 ¶ 12. In sum, Plaintiff asks the Court to "impose sanctions against all parties involved for violating the Court's Order [DE 57], by entering default judgment against parties involved, allow Plaintiff to submit pleadings to the Court for photocopying, and have the [MDOC] billed by the Court to pay for these photocopies, or whatever sanctions the Court feels proper in this case." DE 71 at 6; see also DE 71 at 5 ¶ 16.
Setting aside, for the moment, the issue of whether any such amended complaint "can otherwise be reproduced by the prisoner," the Court finds the results of its order — which require the MDOC to loan Plaintiff funds to make "adequate copies of the amended complaint for service of process upon those defendants who have yet to appear[,]" — is expressly permitted by MDOC PD 05.03.116 ¶ N's phrase, "as otherwise required by court order for service of a federal lawsuit." This is so, even if, as the MDOC's March 11, 2015 memorandum attempts to distinguish, "[t]he language . . . was written to implement an agreement with the federal district courts on serving newly filed Section 1983 lawsuits after initial screening." DE 69 at 5.
While acknowledging what the MDOC offers as the "legislative history" of this sentence of MDOC PD 05.03.116, this Court will not modify its February 12, 2015 ruling (DE 57), as Defendants request. DE 67-2 at 5. To the extent that the MDOC's March 10, 2015 and March 11, 2015 filings (DE 65, DE 67-2) can be characterized as a motion for reconsideration, they were not filed within fourteen (14) days, no palpable defect has been demonstrated and there has been no showing that the alleged defect would result in a different disposition of the case. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(1), (3). The Court's February 12, 2015 order (DE 57)
The Court understands that MDOC PD 05.03.116 "limits indigent loans to circumstances where the copies are necessary to protect a prisoner's right of access to the courts[,]" and that "[t]he prison's decision to limit the copying expenses it will incur to support Plaintiff's litigation activities [may be] rationally related to the legitimate state interest of managing prison expenses, and rationing limited staff resources." Moore v. Unknown Part(y)(ies), No. 1:13-cv-669, 2014 WL 2115245, 9 (W.D. Mich. May 21, 2014). The Court also recognizes that Plaintiff Christian is not the first prisoner to have been denied a loan for photocopying expense. See Dudley v. Fuqua, No. 1:11-cv-447, 2011 WL 3555585, 4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2011) (on an access to courts claim, "Plattie denied Plaintiff's request for a copy of the form in accordance with MDOC policy because it was something that Plaintiff could reproduce himself[,]" and "Plaintiff does not allege that he was unable to fill out a second form or copy the form by hand.").
However, three (3) additional copies of the anticipated amended complaint will be required for Plaintiff to comply with the Court's February 12, 2015 order and the Court specifically finds that these copies, and those specified in the preceding section, "are necessary to protect [this] prisoner's right of access to the courts."
In expectation of Plaintiff's amended complaint and the following service of process as to those defendants who have yet to appear, the Court refers to its February 13, 2015 order (DE 61), whereby the MDOC was required to provide the U.S. Marshal with certain information as to Defendants Daniel L. Ducatt, Kenneth Jordan, Anil Prasad, Judy Gracik, Margaret Ouellette, Donna Croston and Randy Lindstrom. DE 61 at 5. It is not clear to the Court whether this has occurred.
The undersigned's authority regarding a request for sanctions depends upon the type of relief sought. For example, "[i]f a District Judge contemplates that the disposition of discovery disputes by a Magistrate Judge may involve sanctions that are dispositive of pending claims or defenses, such as those provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v) and (vi), then the District Judge would direct the Magistrate Judge to propose findings of fact and recommendations for action to be taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)[.]" Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 499 n.2 (D. Md. 2010). However, here, the Court need not concern itself with whether the sanctions Plaintiff seeks would result in dispositive relief. This is so, because, having considered the foregoing arguments, the Court concludes that sanctions are not warranted at this time. Although Plaintiff has been granted some of the relief sought by his March 9, 2015 motion (DE 62), the Court's order (DE 57) is not as broadly worded as Plaintiff had thought (DE 70 at 5): in the opposite vein, the Court's order is not as limited as the MDOC likely hoped (DE 65, DE 67-2).In light of these mutual misunderstandings, the Court concludes that the parties' briefing has assisted it in crafting the appropriate conclusion, and that MDOC's request for clarification, while not completely on the mark, was likewise not made in bad faith, with "dilatory motive," "malicious intent,"or for the "obstruction of proceedings." (c.f., DE 71 at 3-4, ¶¶8-11).
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
