ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT BABUBHAI PATEL'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B) [#418]

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States ("the government") commenced this in rem civil forfeiture action on December 12, 2011 to recover properties of Defendant Babubhai Patel as a result of his involvement in a criminal scheme. See Dkt. No. 1. Over two years after the United States commenced this action, Defendant Patel filed a Motion to Dismiss the government's Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction on April 23, 2014. See Dkt. No. 342. On June 19, 2014, Defendant Patel's Motion to Dismiss was denied by this Court. See Dkt. No. 353. Also on June 19, 2014, this Court entered a Default Judgment and Final Order of Forfeiture against Defendant Babubhai Patel. See Dkt. No. 354.

On February 25, 2015, over eight months after this Court entered the Default Judgment and Final Order of Forfeiture against Defendant Patel; Defendant Patel filed the present Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 418. The government filed a Response to Defendant Patel's Motion, but Defendant Patel failed to file a Reply in accordance with the Court's Local Rules. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2).

Defendant Patel fails to address the government's argument that he lacks standing to challenge the Default Judgment. Moreover, Defendant Patel fails to identify the means for which he is requesting relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). Defendant Patel does not even set forth a basis for this Court to grant him relief from the Court's Default Judgment and Final Order of Forfeiture. Consequently, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will DENY Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [#418].

II. DISCUSSION

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005).1 The Sixth Circuit has recognized that, "[a]s a prerequisite to relief under Rule 60(b), a party must establish that the facts of its case are within one of the enumerated reasons contained in Rule 60(b) that warrant relief from judgment." Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing In re Salem Mortgage Co., 791 F.2d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 1986)).

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

After reviewing the briefing of the parties, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment for the following three reasons: Defendant Patel lacks standing, Defendant Patel's Motion did not follow the proper procedures, and Defendant Patel's Motion is substantively deficient.

1. Defendant Patel Lacks Standing

As an initial matter, Defendant Patel lacks standing to challenge this Court's Default Judgment and Final Order of Forfeiture. On June 19, 2014, Defendant Patel's Motion to Dismiss was denied by this Court, and the Court found that "Babubhai Patel received proper notice of the Complaint for Forfeiture." See Dkt. No. 353. Because Defendant Patel received proper notice of the Complaint for Forfeiture, he was required to timely file a claim in order to assert an interest in the property at issue. See Supp. Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule G(5)(a)(i)-(ii)(A)-(B).

Here, Defendant Patel did not file verified claims for any of the defendants in rem despite the requirements of Supplemental Rule G(5). Because Defendant Patel received proper notice and failed to comply with the requirements to assert an interest in the property in this action, he is without standing to challenge the government's motion for default. See United States v. One 2001 Cadillac Deville Sedan, 335 F.Supp.2d 769 (E.D. Mich. 2004).

2. Defendant Patel's Motion Did Not Follow The Proper Procedures

Assuming Defendant Patel had standing, his Rule 60(b) Motion still fails to satisfy the prerequisites for obtaining relief. Even though Defendant Patel lacks standing, the Court still reviewed Defendant Patel's Motion. In so doing, the Court notes that Defendant Patel failed to satisfy the Sixth Circuit's stated prerequisite for relief under Rule 60(b): establishing "that the facts of [his] case are within one of the enumerated reasons contained in Rule 60(b) that warrant relief from judgment." Lewis, 987 F.2d at 396.

Here, Defendant Patel fails to identify any basis for his requested relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). Thus, aside from his lack of standing, this Court would still deny Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion because Defendant Patel failed to follow the appropriate procedure and specify under which provisions of Rule 60(b) he is requesting relief.

3. Defendant Patel's Motion Is Substantively Deficient

Ignoring the aforementioned deficiencies with Defendant Patel's Motion, the Motion is still deficient as a matter of law. In the interest of finality, this Court will address Defendant Patel's contention that "[t]his case presents exceptional circumstances" warranting review. See Dkt. No. 418 at 5. Defendant Patel asserts that this case presents an exceptional circumstance, so this Court will construe his Motion as a Motion brought under the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6). See Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[C]ourts should apply Rule 60(b)(6) only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the first five numbered clauses of the Rule.").

The Court begins its Rule 60(b)(6) analysis by noting that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is "rare." See McCurry ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 595 (6th Cir. 2002). The Sixth Circuit has stressed that "parties may not use a Rule 60(b) motion as a substitute for an appeal or as a technique to avoid the consequences of decisions deliberately made yet later revealed to be unwise." Hopper, 867 F.2d at 294. Thus, the Court can only "apply Rule 60(b)(6) relief in `unusual and extreme situations where principles of equity mandate relief.'" Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Combined Ben. Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original).

Here, principles of equity do not mandate relief. As the government aptly points out in its Response to Defendant Patel's Motion, nothing unusual or extreme has occurred in this action so that principles of equity mandate relief:

Dkt. No. 421 at 12.2 This being the case, even after ignoring all the other deficiencies presented by Defendant Patel, the Court would still deny Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion. See Blue Diamond Coal Co., 249 F.3d at 524 (quoting Waifersong Ltd., Inc. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir.1992), to state that "relief under Rule 60(b) is `circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation.'").

III. CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court has stated: "There must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from." Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L. Ed. 207 (1950). The Court will not relieve Defendant Patel from the result of his deliberate choices. For the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [#418].

SO ORDERED.