ARTHUR J. TARNOW, Senior District Judge.
At Defendant's sentencing, the government successfully moved to reduce Defendant's sentence to reflect substantial assistance he provided to a government investigation. The government also acknowledged that it might file a motion to further reduce Defendant's sentence in the future, to account for separate assistance that was then ongoing. The government never filed the latter motion. On January 29, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel the Government to File a Rule 35(b) Motion [Doc. #100]. The government filed a Response [101] on February 14, 2014.
For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion to Compel the Government to File a Rule 35(b) Motion [100] is
On appeal from Defendant's sentence, the Sixth Circuit summarized the background of this case, in part, as follows:
United States v. Garcia, 436 F. App'x 446, 447-48 (6th Cir. 2011). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence on August 11, 2011. Id. at 448-49.
Where a plea agreement affords the government complete discretion in determining whether to file a motion for a downward departure, a court may review the government's decision only for an unconstitutional motive—not for bad faith. United States v. Villareal, 491 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2007). However, where a plea agreement provides that the government will file a motion upon a finding of substantial assistance, a court will enforce that obligation. See id. at 609-10. To enable such enforcement, the government must "advise the court and defendant of its factual determination of whether defendant provided substantial assistance." Id. at 610. The government may not simply leave the court to infer a negative finding from the government's inaction. Id.
Here, the parties' plea agreement provides that the substantial assistance determination "is exclusively within the government's discretion." However, the agreement further provides that the government "will" seek a downward departure "[u]pon the government's determination that the defendant's cooperation amounts to substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of others." Thus, the government's discretion under the agreement is limited to determining whether the motion "trigger" has been sprung—that is, determining whether Defendant has provided substantial assistance. Once the government acknowledges substantial assistance, it must move for a downward departure. See Villareal, 491 F.3d at 609-10.
In its Response, the government asserts that it decided not to file a Rule 35(b) motion on Defendant's behalf "because no additional arrests resulted from his cooperation that was not already accounted for in his Section 5K1.1 motion, and because Garcia lied to the DEA and the U.S. Attorney's Office about his own drug trafficking activities." The government does not explicitly state that it determined Defendant's additional assistance was not substantial—the only permissible rationale, under the plea agreement, for failing to move for a downward departure. Nor does the government state that Defendant breached the plea agreement, which might excuse the government from moving for a downward departure even if it determined Defendant's assistance was substantial.
The Court does not construe Villareal to require the government to use precise language when delivering notice of its substantial assistance finding. The import of the government's Response is that because Defendant diminished his credibility by lying about his own involvement in the case and because Defendant's assistance did not yield results in the form of further arrests, the government found that Defendant's further assistance was not substantial. The plea agreement left this determination in the government's exclusive discretion. Because Defendant has not alleged any unconstitutional motive for the determination, it is beyond the Court's review. Villareal, 491 F.3d at 608. In other words, the Court lacks authority to compel the government to file a Rule 35(b) motion as Defendant requests. Accordingly,