OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS (Dkts. 61, 67)

MARK A. GOLDSMITH, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff David Alan Smith brought this case pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and obtained a favorable jury verdict awarding him $75,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. On Defendant's motion, the Court reduced the punitive damages award by half — to $150,000 — on constitutional grounds. Under FCRA, in addition to actual or punitive damages recovered, a defendant is also liable to a successful plaintiff for the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees. Id. §§ 1681n(a)(3), 1681o(a)(2). Pursuant to the statute, Plaintiff has filed motions for attorney fees and costs (Dkts. 61, 67). As detailed below, the Court will grant the motions in part, sustaining some of the defense objections and also allowing Plaintiff to supplement his submissions to substantiate amounts that are not sufficiently documented.

II. ANALYSIS

Determining what constitutes a reasonable fee begins with a simple calculation: "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see also Grove v. Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 582 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the lodestar analysis to a FCRA case); Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009) (same). The resulting product — the "lodestar" — carries a strong presumption of reasonableness. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clear Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). The requesting party is responsible for "submit[ting] evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Defendant challenges both the reasonableness of the hours and the rate. Certain objections are well-taken; others are not.

A. Plaintiff's First Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Dkt. 61)

1. Hours Expended

Hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" should be excluded from the lodestar analysis. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see also Paeth v. Worth Twp., 483 F. App'x 956, 966 (6th Cir. 2012) ("The district court also offered adequate explanation for why it reduced the hours worked, explaining that it found some of the hours billed excessive, redundant, or unnecessary, all factors that allow a district court to find hours not to be reasonable."). Defendant's general argument is that Plaintiff's counsel's time entries should be reduced, because they "reflect over-lawyering or over-billing." Def. Resp. at 11 (Dkt. 62). The Court disagrees with Defendant as to the bulk of the challenged entries, and concludes that, except as detailed below, the expenditures of time were reasonable.

Plaintiff's counsel attributes approximately 75 hours in attorney time — 66 hours for attorney John Soumilas and 8.8 hours for attorney Lauren KW Brennan — plus ten hours of paralegal time to trial preparation.1 See Ex. 1 to Soumilas Decl. at 3 (cm/ecf page) (Dkt. 61-2). Trial in this matter lasted approximately four days, just two-and-a-half of which involved picking and impaneling the jury, opening and closing arguments, presenting proofs, and instructing the jury; the remainder of that time was associated with jury deliberation. During trial, there was testimony from just four witnesses. The Court agrees with Defendant that Mr. Soumilas's 66 hours for trial preparation is excessive for such a relatively short trial. Given the relatively small number of witnesses and the straightforward issues involved, reasonable preparation for trial should not have consumed more than 32 hours.

The Court also agrees with Defendant's argument that Plaintiff's counsel spent excessive time — 21.2 hours — propounding document requests, reviewing objections, and reviewing the documents produced. Def. Resp. at 11. Given that the document requests and objections were standard, and that the total production consisted of some 161 documents (of which 85 pages were pay records that were largely irrelevant to the crux of the case), 15 hours should have been sufficient to perform these undertakings, even taking into account additional tasks (such as preparation of the O'Connor affidavit) included in the time expended. The Court will deduct two hours each from Ms. Brennan and Geoffrey Baskerville, with the balance (2.2) deducted from Mr. Soumilas's time.

The Court will also sustain Defendant's objection to Ian Lyngklip's billed time with respect to a settlement conference. See id. at 13. Mr. Lyngklip's contention that he spent 14 hours traveling to and attending an unspecified settlement conference appears excessive, particularly considering that he is local counsel. Lyngklip Decl. at 2 (cm/ecf page) (Dkt. 61-8). Defendant asserts that the conference lasted less than four hours and reimbursement for those four hours would be appropriate. Def. Resp. at 13. Nothing has been offered to substantiate Mr. Lyngklip's claimed time or to rebut Defendant's objection. Accordingly, the Court will permit Mr. Lyngklip to recover five — four for the conference and one hour allowed for travel to and from the conference — of the 14 hours claimed.2

The Court rejects the balance of Defendant's arguments for reducing hours. Defendant's contention that 32 hours billed for depositions in this case — which included preparation, travel, and the actual taking or defending of the depositions — is excessive — on the theory that the depositions themselves took just nine hours in total — fails to appreciate that time spent preparing for a deposition may very well exceed the actual time spent in the deposition.3 Id. at 12. Defendant's argument regarding time spent on the Court's October 15, 2014 conference suffers from the same flaw. See id. at 14 (suggesting that allowing eight, instead of ten, hours for a four-hour pre-trial conference "would be generous").

Moreover, Defendant's suggestion that attorney time on certain tasks should be disallowed just because the billing attorney did not appear at specified conferences, see id. at 12 (referring to Ms. Brennan's 1.3 hours on depositions even though she did not attend them), 13 (referring to Mr. Soumilas's 5.2 hours spent in connection with a December 2013 settlement conference despite not attending), 13-14 (referring to Mr. Baskerville's four hours and Ms. Brennan's 1.4 hours spent on settlement discussions and an August 2014 settlement conference despite not attending), ignores that non-appearing attorneys may play a valuable and necessary behind-the-scenes role.

Defendant also argues that, because the October 17, 2014 submissions required by the Case Management Order (Dkt. 10) were "streamlined" versions of Plaintiff's initial July 21, 2014 submissions, 14.5 hours of associate time on the October 17 submissions was excessive. Def. Resp. at 14. The Court rejects this argument. Judging from Plaintiff's counsel's time records, the July 21 submissions consisted of the parties' proposed joint pretrial order, joint proposed jury instructions, a statement of claims and defenses, and a special verdict form; the October 17 submissions consisted of a neutral case summary, proposed voir dire, a stipulation of facts, and proposed jury instructions. Ex. 1 to Soumilas Decl. at 2-3 (cm/ecf pages). According to Plaintiff, many of these submissions were new, and some required multiple drafts with detailed revisions exchanged between the parties. Pl. Reply at 6 (Dkt. 64). While the October 15, 2014 conference with the Court may have narrowed the issues that the parties needed to revise and/or revisit, there were a number of submissions to be submitted to the Court — some of which did not appear to have been previously submitted — including a short brief setting forth the appropriate legal authority underlying each party's preferred version of the remaining disputed jury instructions. The Court-ordered brief required legal research and drafting, which took additional time.

Moreover, Defendant's argument that Plaintiff's post-trial briefing should be cut in half because it consisted largely of "cutting and pasting," as opposed to "researching and writing," is without merit. Def. Resp. at 16. It is certainly true that attorneys at a law firm specializing in consumer law are likely familiar with many of the leading cases and strategies available to plaintiffs who file consumer-related claims. However, applying precedents and principles to the context-specific facts of each case cannot be accomplished through a rote "cut and paste" process. In addition, Defendant also challenges Plaintiff's counsel's 20.3 attorney hours — ten hours attributed to Mr. Soumilas and Ms. Brennan each — on Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief regarding Rule 50(a) and the entry of judgment, because the resulting brief was approximately six pages, only half of which contained legal argument. Id. While the end product of an attorney's billed time is something to bear in mind, focusing exclusively on that end product — in this case, a short brief — risks ignoring or otherwise diminishing extensive time attorneys may legitimately spend on exploring research avenues that do not necessarily translate into voluminous pages in a brief.

Accordingly, with the stated exceptions above — the reduction of Mr. Soumilas's trial preparation time from 66 to 32 hours, the reduction of time allowed for written discovery from 21 to 15 hours, and the reduction of Mr. Lyngklip's hours for traveling and attending a settlement conference from 14 to five hours — the hours claimed by Plaintiff's counsel were reasonably expended and may be included within the lodestar calculation.

2. Reasonableness of the Rates Claimed

A reasonable hourly rate is measured against "the prevailing market rate, defined as the rate that lawyers of comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to command within the venue of the court of record." Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004). The fee should be "one that is adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers." Id. (quoting Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiff's counsel requests an hourly rate of $423 for Mr. Soumilas and Mr. Baskerville, $180 for Ms. Brennan, and $148 for paralegal work. Pl. Mot. at 15. These proposed rates reflect a 10% reduction from counsel and staff's standard rates, accounting for differences in the Philadelphia and Detroit legal markets, as demonstrated by the 2010 National Law Journal Billing Survey. Id. at 14-15; see also 2010 National Law Journal Billing Survey, Ex. 3 to Soumilas Decl. (Dkt. 61-4). Plaintiff's counsel submits that these rates are commensurate with what experienced consumer law attorneys in Michigan charge — approximately between $300 to $500 per hour — as evidenced by the 2014 Attorney Income and Billing Rate Summary Report issued by the State Bar of Michigan (hereinafter "State Bar Report"). Pl. Mot. at 15; see also 2014 State Bar Report, Ex. 4 to Soumilas Decl. (Dkt. 61-5). Plaintiff's counsel further requests an hourly rate of $400 for Mr. Lyngklip. Pl. Mot. at 15. These rates appear reasonable.

While Defendant challenges Plaintiff's reliance on each of the sources, proposing alternative hourly rates of $275 for Mr. Soumilas, Mr. Baskerville, and Mr. Lyngklip, and $190 for Ms. Brennan, Def. Resp. at 7, Defendant's arguments are unconvincing.4 Because the local market is the Eastern District of Michigan, Defendant would disregard the National Law Journal Survey in favor of the State Bar Report. Id. at 5-6. However, the National Law Journal Survey identifies each surveyed firm by its market, and Plaintiff's counsel relies on the survey to examine the differences among markets to come up with an appropriate downward reduction that accommodates the relevant market — Detroit — where this action was brought. See Pl. Mot. at 14-15. This is an appropriate use of a national survey.5

In any event, Plaintiff's counsel's proposed rate of $423 does fall just above the 75th percentile for consumer law lawyers in Michigan, according to the State Bar Report. See 2014 State Bar Report at 6 (identifying the billing rate for 75th percentile of consumer law lawyers as $400). Placing Plaintiff's counsel slightly above the 75th percentile seems reasonable in light of counsel's experience and the firm's overall reputation and specialty in consumer law practice.6 Plaintiff's counsel's skill in litigating these types of cases is evidenced by Plaintiff's favorable jury verdict, awarding both actual and punitive damages, further demonstrating that an hourly rate slightly higher than the 75th percentile is appropriate. Finally, Mr. Lyngklip's hourly rate of $400 also appears reasonable in light of the State Bar Report and his specialty in consumer law for approximately the last 15 years. See Lyngklip Decl.7

The Court declines Defendant's invitation to ignore the mean rate for consumer law specialists contained in the State Bar Report in favor of the mean rate for general civil litigation. Def. Resp. at 6-7.8 While Defendant contends that the consumer law specialist sample is too small to provide an accurate benchmark, id., the number of lawyers surveyed (44) appears adequate to provide a reliable estimate of what lawyers practicing in that area earn, see 2014 State Bar Report at 6. Aside from a brief citation to a case in which the court declined to adopt the consumer law figures because of the sample size, Defendant offers no reason for why the number of lawyers surveyed is too small to provide a reliable estimate. See Def. Resp. at 6-7. Nor does Defendant provide any explanation for why the more general "civil litigation" category is the appropriate substitute benchmark. As Defendant itself recognizes, the case it cites, Hazzard v. Schlee & Stillman, LLC, No. 13-10038, 2014 WL 117411, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2014), report and recommendation adopted by 2014 WL 634205 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2014), considered the billing rates for other specialties, namely "lawyers with reasonably comparable (or greater) levels of skill, including criminal lawyers and employment lawyers." See Def. Resp. at 7. Absent concrete evidence to the contrary, the State Bar Report data for consumer law lawyers is likely the most accurate representation of what such lawyers in this market charge.9

3. Costs Are Not Limited to Those Enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920

Plaintiff's counsel also requests reimbursement for costs incurred in the litigation of this suit. See Pl. Mot. at 16; Ex. 5 to Soumilas Decl. (Dkt. 61-6). Defendant challenges three categories of these costs: (i) travel; (ii) postage and shipping; and (iii) research/records. Def. Resp. at 17. The crux of the disagreement amounts to whether the "costs of the action" recoverable under FCRA are limited to costs as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Def. Resp. at 17; Pl. Reply at 9-10. The Court concludes that they are not.

Many circuits — including this one — have found that an award of "reasonable attorney fees" "include[s] the authority to award those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services." Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Sch., 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Gradisher v. Check Enforcement Unit, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-401, 2003 WL 187416, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2003) (statutes authorizing award of attorney fees permit recovery of "expenses not defined as `costs' in the costs statute, if they are of a type billed separately to the client"); see also Grove v. Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 580-582 (9th Cir. 2010) (reasonable attorney fees provision in FCRA includes recovery of certain non-taxable costs).

Such expenses may include travel, reasonable photocopying, computer-assisted research, and postage and courier services. Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639 (travel and reasonable photocopying); Smith v. Serv. Master Corp., 592 F. App'x 363, 367-368 (6th Cir. 2014) (describing the uncertainty within the Sixth Circuit as to whether costs of electronic research should be separately awarded, and declining to adopt "an absolute rule that the cost of computer research is or is not recoverable"); Fleming v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Div. of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 08-11457, 2011 WL 900036, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2011) (allowing computer-assisted research); Gradisher, 2003 WL 187416, at *8 ("Courts have found that expenses ordinarily charged to clients include photocopying, travel, telephone costs, postage, and computer-assisted legal research."); Grove, 606 F.3d at 580 (travel, courier, and copying costs).10 Although Defendant claims that courts in the Third Circuit follow a different practice, by considering those costs to be part of an attorney's overhead and subsumed within the charged hourly rate, see Def. Resp. at 17, the Court rejects that approach as inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit practice described above.

Defendant also asserts that the challenged charges were not properly documented, and recovery is precluded on those grounds, as well. Id. at 18. The Court shares Defendant's concerns. Plaintiff's counsel's expense sheet consists only of a cost breakdown by category, with the "travel" section further broken down by the event necessitating the travel. See Ex. 5 to Soumilas Decl. This is plainly insufficient to permit any meaningful review by either Defendant or the Court.

By way of example, while the Sixth Circuit permits recovery of electronic research fees, that recovery is limited to the actual cost of the online service "incurred for specific research directly relating to the case," when "the general practice in the local legal community is to pass those charges on to the client." Smith, 592 F. App'x at 368 ("If the lawyer or firm pays a blanket access fee, rather than per search, there is no reason to distinguish the on-line research cost from the cost of the books that at one time lined the walls of legal offices, which was treated as overhead."). Unlike here, it appears counsel in Smith provided specific entries documenting the electronic charges, which included the timekeeper, the date, a vague narrative (e.g., "Westlaw charges"), and the total charges incurred for that session. Id. at 369. While an explanation of the firm's internal billing practices permitted the Sixth Circuit to infer that the charges were specifically incurred in connection with the subject-litigation, it found the descriptions accompanying the charges insufficient to demonstrate that "each charge was reasonably related to the issues raised in the case." Id. Conversely, here, the Court has no information allowing it to address (i) whether the charges were incurred in connection with this particular litigation; or (ii) whether each charge was reasonably related to the issues raised. Similarly, the breakdown of costs for the remaining categories (postage/shipping and travel) fails to provide any detail as to how the charges were incurred.

Accordingly, the Court will defer considering Plaintiff's counsel's request for costs, subject to Plaintiff's counsel submitting an itemized list of charges — containing sufficient detail for the Court to determine that the charges were reasonably incurred in connection with this litigation — by January 8, 2016.11 At that time, the Court will review the list of charges and make any necessary deductions. Failure to submit the appropriate supporting information may result in denial of the request for costs.

B. Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Dkt. 67)

Litigation continued in this case after the submission of Plaintiff's original fee petition, necessitating additional time and resources for which Plaintiff's counsel also seeks reimbursement.

Plaintiff's counsel submits an additional 21.2 hours of work at the rates requested in the original fee petition. Suppl. Soumilas Decl. at 3 (Dkt. 67-1). Plaintiff's counsel further requests additional costs for travel to a mediation session and the mediation itself. Ex. 2 to Suppl. Soumilas Decl. (Dkt. 67-3). In response, Defendant "does not dispute the amount of time that Counsel spent on the August 6, 2015 mediation" as currently documented, nor does it dispute that it is liable for Plaintiff's share of the mediator fees. Def. Resp. to Pl. Suppl. Mot. at 2-3 (Dkt. 68). However, Defendant continues to protest the hourly rate requested, as well as Plaintiff's counsel's request to be separately reimbursed for travel expenses. Id.12

As explained in detail, supra, Plaintiff's counsel's requested hourly rate is reasonable. The Court has also already determined that travel costs, generally, may be awarded as part of granting reasonable attorney fees and costs. As with Plaintiff's counsel's previous costs submission, however, there is insufficient detail for the Court to conclude that such fees were reasonably expended and related to the present litigation. More information is needed, and Plaintiff's counsel has until January 8, 2016 to submit that information to the Court. Again, a failure to submit the appropriate documentation will result in the denial of expenses claimed.

There is one additional issue: Plaintiff's counsel requests reimbursement for Plaintiff's travel expenses. See Ex. 2 to Suppl. Soumilas Decl. (claiming "Client Driving Reimbursement"). However, the logic underlying Plaintiff's counsel's recovery of travel expenses — that it is an out-of-pocket expense typically charged to a fee-paying client — is inapplicable to the client's travel expenses, because such costs are typically incurred by the client in the first instance, and would not show up on an attorney's bill. See Calderon v. Witvoet, 112 F.3d 275, 276 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding client's travel costs are not reimbursable as part of an award for attorney fees "because the expense of a litigant's travel does not appear on an attorney's bill."). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff's counsel's request for travel expenses encompasses costs attributed to Plaintiff's travel, not his counsel's, that request is denied.13

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's motions for attorney fees (Dkts. 61, 67) are granted in part and denied in part, as explained above. Plaintiff has until January 8, 2016 to file a supplemental submission regarding the deficiencies described above; Defendant may file a response within one week after the filing of Plaintiff's supplemental submission. Each submission is limited to five pages, exclusive of attachments. An order with the precise amount of attorney fees and costs to be awarded in this matter will be issued after receipt of any further submissions.

SO ORDERED.