TERRENCE G. BERG, District Judge.
This case concerns a mortgage on a condominium owned by Plaintiff Dana Glenn ("Plaintiff"). Essentially, Plaintiff claims that the mortgage on her condo was assigned between Defendants and that those assignments were faulty and should be set aside. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that certain mortgage payments that she made to Defendants should be refunded to her, due to the alleged defects in the mortgage assignments. Plaintiff's Complaint also requests an accounting of her mortgage payments to Defendants (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1) and injunctive relief. Specifically, she is seeking an order prohibiting Defendants from commencing any mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Id. Finally, Plaintiff seeks money damages from Defendants. Id.
To summarize, Plaintiff alleges that the first mortgage
So far as the Court can surmise, the crux of Plaintiff's Complaint relates to a broken chain of title between "National City Mortgage Services, Co." and "National City Mortgage Co." Specifically, Plaintiff appears to allege that the transfer on June 24, 2009 from "National City Mortgage Services, Co." to Kondaur Capital Corp. is null and void, because "National City Mortgage Services, Co." had previously transferred the mortgage to "National City Mortgage, Co." and, thus, the "Services" company had nothing left to transfer to Kondaur.
Most pertinent to the present posture of this case, Plaintiff experienced difficulties serving process on three Defendants — Oumrow Roy Singh, Nasscond, Inc. and Notes Forever, Inc. (the "Nasscond Defendants"). As a result, Plaintiff filed a motion for alternate service (Dkt. 19). In this motion, Plaintiff states that the address for each of these Defendants is
It is unclear in the record before the Court where Plaintiff obtained the Roosevelt, New York address for the Nasscond Defendants. Plaintiff's motion for alternate service claims that this address is listed as an "address for notice" in the mortgage at issue in this litigation (Dkt. 19 ¶ 1). However, the assignment purporting to transfer Plaintiff's mortgage to Defendant Nasscond lists Nasscond's address as —
The Court held a status conference in this case on November 13, 2015, in which the Court indicated that it was inclined to grant Plaintiff's motion for alternate service. Furthermore, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff's motion on December 3, 2015 during which the Court again indicated that it was inclined to grant Plaintiff's motion. Specifically, the following exchange appears in the transcript:
The Court had not, however, entered an order formally granting Plaintiff's motion for alternate service. In the lieu of such an order, Plaintiff went ahead and mailed the summons and complaint to the Nasscond Defendants. The Nasscond Defendants did not answer the complaint. Thus, Plaintiff applied for — and received — clerk's entries of default again the Nasscond Defendants (Dkts. 36, 37, 38). Those entries of default are hereby set aside, pending service on the Nasscond Defendant as outlined below. Finally, Plaintiff also filed a number of requests for the clerk to enter default for a "sum certain" ($22,030.59) (Dkts. 44, 45, 46). The Court denied these requests, pending resolution of Plaintiff's motion for alternate service.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) provides that "an individual — other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a judicial district of the United States by following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction." The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, accordingly, provide that state law is the guide for serving notice to Defendants. Michigan Court Rule 2.105(I)(1) states that "[o]n a showing that service of process cannot reasonably be made as provided by this rule, the court may by order permit service of process to be made in any other manner reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard." New York, where the Nasscond Defendants are allegedly located, has a similar rule for alternate service.
As previously indicated by the Court during the hearing on Plaintiff's motion for alternate service (Dkt. 47), Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to be permitted to serve the Nasscond Defendants by alternate means. Thus, Plaintiff's motion for alternate service (Dkt. 19) will be granted. However, Plaintiff's alternate previous service attempts — regular mail to the Roosevelt, New York address only — are not sufficient. As previously indicated, the assignment of Plaintiff's mortgage to Defendant Nasscond listed an address in Freeport, New York for Nasscond. Furthermore, the Court located a December 2014 bankruptcy filing in the Eastern District of New York for an "Oumrow R. Singh," that listed a residential address of
Finally, as noted earlier, Plaintiff filed requests for "sum certain" default judgments against the Nasscond Defendants. However, the relief requested in Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1) is not for a sum certain. Rather, Plaintiff's Complaint requests injunctive relief (precluding Defendants from foreclosing on Plaintiff's condo), ordering an accounting, and a money judgment "in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars." Id. Therefore, it is not appropriate for the Clerk to enter a default judgment in a sum certain amount pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). If the Nasscond Defendants fail to respond to the Complaint after Plaintiff serves them as outlined above, then Plaintiff may then file a motion for entry of default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), and the Court will schedule a hearing in this matter to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment against the Nasscond Defendants and, if so, what type of relief that judgment should award.
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's motion for alternate service (Dkt. 19) is hereby