LAURIE J. MICHELSON, District Judge.
In September 2015, Plaintiff Dawan Pierce Thurmond, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint and an amended complaint in this Court, asserting various claims against a multitude of defendants. (Dkts. 1, 16.) Several of those defendants—Oakland County and its Prosecutor's Office, jail, and Sherriff's Department—filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 21.) In a December 2015 order, the Court dismissed each of the Oakland County defendants, except for the county itself. (Dkt. 64.) The Court later referred all pretrial matters to Executive Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen (Dkt. 88), who recommends granting Oakland County's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 120, R. & R.). Thurmond objects. (Dkt. 121, Obs.)
Having performed a de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which Thurmond has objected, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985), the Court will adopt the recommendation of the magistrate judge for the reasons explained below.
Thurmond first objects on this basis:
(Obs. at 3.) Thurmond does not explain how the ruling is erroneous. This appears to be an objection not to the report and recommendation but rather to the Court's prior orders dismissing certain defendants and claims sua sponte. As the Court explained in those orders (Dkts. 30, 64), when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis (as Thurmond has here), the Court is required to perform an initial screening of the claims and dismiss any that fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court will not revisit its findings from those orders. This first objection therefore is overruled.
Thurmond's second objection is as follows:
(Obs. at 4-5.) Like the first objection, this objection again mostly appears to contest something outside the scope of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. Specifically, the magistrate judge recently struck from the record numerous "exhibits" that Thurmond improperly filed in this case. (Dkt. 115.) To the extent that Thurmond challenges that order, the Court will not consider this objection. Moreover, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a finding of judicial bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
To the extent that Thurmond objects to the magistrate judge's recommendation to dismiss Oakland County as a defendant, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge. As the magistrate judge noted, while Thurmond's amended complaint contains allegations that Oakland County sheriff's deputies beat him at the county jail, denied him emergency medical treatment, and wrongfully arrested him, Thurmond "has not alleged, nor can it be plausibly inferred from his amended complaint, that any of these individuals was acting pursuant to a formal, or even an informal policy of Oakland County." (R. & R. at 4.)
For the reasons stated, having reviewed the report and recommendation (Dkt. 120) and Thurmond's objections (Dkt. 121), the Court will ADOPT the report and GRANT Defendant Oakland County's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 21).
SO ORDERED.