THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, District Judge.
On October 8, 2014, Petitioner James Nathaniel Norman was indicted on three counts involving possession and distribution of illegal drugs. ECF No. 1. Norman pled guilty to one count of possession cocaine base and heroin with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 151 months of imprisonment on April 23, 2015. ECF No. 20. Norman was assigned career offender status under the Armed Career Criminal Offenders Act because he had two previous serious drug offenses. See Sent. Mem. at 5, ECF No. 19. See also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). On October 12, 2016, Norman filed a letter which requested leave to file a 28 U.S.C § 2255 challenging his conviction under Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). Norman's letter will be construed as a motion requesting leave to file a § 2255 motion and will be denied.
A motion seeking relief under § 2255 is untimely if it is not filed within a "1-year period of limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). "That limitation period shall run from the latest of"
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
Id. at (f)(1)-(4).
Norman did not appeal his conviction. Accordingly, his conviction became final for the purposes of § 2255(f)(1) on April 30, 2015. Johnson v. United States, 457 F. App'x 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a conviction becomes final for § 2255 purposes ten days after entry of judgment if the conviction is not appealed to the Sixth Circuit). Because more than a year has passed since that date, any motion for relief under § 2255 would be untimely if § 2255(f)(1) was relied upon. In his letter, Norman mentions Mathis v. United States, which was decided on June 23, 2016. Thus, he appears to be relying on § 2255(f)(3) as the basis for timeliness of the § 2255 motion he wishes to file. Mathis involves the question of whether a prior conviction could qualify as a violent felony offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act if an element of the crime of conviction is broader than an element of the generic offense under the Act. 136 S. Ct. at 2248. Mathis was interpreting § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) of the Armed Career Criminal Act, which Norman was not sentenced under. For that reason, the Supreme Court's decision is Mathis is not relevant to the determination of whether a potential § 2255 motion by Norman would be timely. Absent other reasons why a § 2255 motion would be timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), filing a § 2255 motion would be futile.
Accordingly, it is