JOHN CORBETT O'MEARA, District Judge.
This matter came before the court on defendant Tricon Security Group's January 13, 2017 motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Neyokii Q. Eubanks filed a response February 24, 2017; and Defendant filed a reply brief March 22, 2017. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), no oral argument was heard.
Plaintiff Neyokii ("Nikki") Eubanks was employed by defendant Tricon Security Group for eight years. Tricon provides event security and on-call personnel for various events in Michigan and elsewhere.
Plaintiff was in a long-term, consensual relationship with her supervisor Antoine Willis. The two maintained the relationship for approximately six years, and they resided together with Plaintiff's children. Plaintiff and Willis were regularly scheduled to work the same events, including the annual Electronic Forest Festival, a multi-day concert even in Rothbury, Michigan, each June.
On June 27, 2015, Plaintiff and Willis were again working at the event where, as usual, they shared a tent as their living space during off hours. Late that evening Plaintiff began celebrating her birthday with other co-workers while Willis was still working. There is no dispute that at approximately 3:00 a.m. on June 28, 2015, Willis returned to the tent area to find Plaintiff's belongings outside the tent of Donald Mitchell, who also worked at the event but for another employer. From all accounts, Willis became enraged and caused a scene in the tent area, cursing and yelling loudly. Defendant ordered Willis to leave the event and return home the following day. Plaintiff claims she was terminated following the incident because of Willis' jealousy, as she was never assigned to work a day afterward. Defendant contends that she was terminated because she failed to show up for work and failed to call in to work on June 28, 2015.
Plaintiff filed this suit alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Her state law claims were previously dismissed by the court.
In
To support a prima facie case of sex discrimination, a plaintiff "must produce evidence which at a minimum establishes (1) that he [or she] was a member of a protected class and (2) that for the same or similar conduct he [or she] was treated differently than similarly-situated non-minority employees."
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
In this case plaintiff Eubanks' claim of sex discrimination is based solely on her belief that she was terminated because of Willis' jealousy. Eubanks dep. at 126; Compl. at ¶ 27 ("After Willis suspected Plaintiff of cheating on him with Mitchell, Willis discriminated against Plaintiff by taking her off the schedule, effectively terminating her employment with Tricon, solely because of his belief that she was in a sexual relationship with Mitchell.").
Plaintiff's allegations, even if true, however, fail to establish evidence of discriminatory conduct based on her sex. Federal courts "have consistently held that sex-based discrimination prohibited in Title VII refers to the conduct of requiring an employee to submit to sexually-based harassment as a condition of employment or discrimination based on gender, not discrimination based on sexual affiliations or relationships."
Even if Eubanks could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, defendant Tricon has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination-her failure to report to work or to call in ("no show/no call" or "NSNC") on June 28
In an effort to establish that Tricon's proffered reason for termination is mere pretext to mask discrimination, plaintiff Eubanks challenges the factual basis underlying her termination. She claims that Andy Bernardi, another Tricon supervisor, told her not to report to work June 28, presumably because of the tent incident that had occurred early that morning. To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate that Tricon's proffered reason has no basis in fact, "it is well settled that `as long as an employer has an honest belief in its proffered nondiscriminatory reason,' the employee cannot establish pretext simply because the reason is ultimately shown to be incorrect."
In addition, Eubanks cannot establish pretext by attempting to establish that Tricon's proffered reason was insufficient to warrant discharge. "To do so, a plaintiff must produce evidence that other individuals, particularly individuals not in the protected class, were not treated the same way, even though they engaged in substantially identical conduct to that which the employer contends motivated its discharge of the plaintiff."
Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff Eubanks has failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination; and that even if she had presented such a case, she has failed to show that Tricon's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination was mere pretext to mask sex discrimination. Accordingly, defendant Tricon is entitled to summary judgment.
It is hereby