BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN, Senior District Judge.
This matter is presently before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment [docket entries 14 and 15]. Pursuant to E.D. Mich. 7.1(f)(2), the Court shall decide these motions without a hearing. For the reasons stated below, the Court shall deny plaintiff's motion and grant defendant's motion.
Plaintiff has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to challenge defendant's final decision denying the application she filed on behalf of her minor daughter, "L.M.P.," for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits. An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing in September 2015 (Tr. 14-38) and issued a decision denying benefits the same month (Tr. 78-93). This became defendant's final decision in February 2017 when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1-3).
Under § 405(g), the issue before the Court is whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, which is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). In making this determination the Court does not review the record de novo, and it may not weigh the evidence or make credibility findings. If supported by substantial evidence, defendant's decision must be upheld even if substantial evidence may support a contrary decision and even if the Court may have decided the case differently in the first instance. See Engebrecht v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App'x 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2014).
At the time of the ALJ's decision, L.M.P. was ten years and ten months old and she was in the fifth grade in school (Tr. 18, 84). Plaintiff claims that L.M.P. has been disabled since March 15, 2012, due to a learning disability (Tr. 81, 248). The ALJ found that L.M.P.'s learning disability is a severe impairment (Tr. 84), but that she is not disabled under the Social Security Act because this impairment is not severe enough to meet or equal a listed impairment, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d) (stating that for children seeking SSI benefits, "[y]our impairment(s) must meet, medically equal, or functionally equal the listings.").
Having carefully reviewed the administrative record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision in this matter is supported by substantial evidence. While L.M.P. clearly has a learning disability that affects her ability to read, the ALJ reasonably concluded that this impairment is not sufficiently severe to meet or equal any of the listings.
There is no childhood listing that covers learning disabilities specifically. Nonetheless, a child with a learning disability qualifies as disabled if she has "marked and severe functional limitations." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C). Under 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1), the extent of a child's functional limitations is determined by assessing her functioning in the following six "domains": (i) acquiring and using information, (ii) attending and completing tasks, (iii) interacting and relating with others, (iv) moving about and manipulating objects, (v) caring for yourself, and (vi) health and physical well-being.
To be deemed disabled, the child must have a "marked" limitation in at least two of these domains or an "extreme" limitation in one domain. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). The regulations define the terms "marked" and "extreme" limitation as follows:
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e).
In the present case, the ALJ found that L.M.P. has "less than marked limitation" in the first domain (acquiring and using information) and no limitation in the other domains (Tr. 88-93). Plaintiff appears to concede that the only domain in which L.M.P. is limited is the first. She does not challenge the ALJ's finding that L.M.P. has no limitation in domains two through six. Therefore, the narrow issue before the Court is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that the degree of L.M.P.'s limitation in this domain is "less than marked." In fact, as L.M.P. is limited in only one domain, to prove she is disabled plaintiff must show that the limitation in this domain is extreme. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a).
The following regulation explains what is meant by a child's ability to acquire and use information:
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a.
After summarizing the evidence, the ALJ gave the following explanation for finding that plaintiff's limitation in the domain at issue is "less than marked":
(Tr. 89).
As the above-quoted regulation makes clear, the inquiry in this domain is whether the claimant can do such things as "read[ing], writ[ing], and do[ing] math, and discuss[ing] history and science"; reading about various subjects and producing oral and written projects, solving mathematical problems, taking achievement tests, doing group work, and entering into class discussions"; reading street signs, telling time, and making change"; and using language "to share information and ideas with individuals or groups, by asking questions and expressing your own ideas, and by understanding and responding to the opinions of others." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(2)(iv). The evidence in this matter simply does not show that L.M.P.'s learning disability seriously interferes with her ability to do such things. While L.M.P. clearly has difficulty with some subjects in school and is reading below grade level, the record nonetheless supports the ALJ's finding that she is not markedly impaired in this domain.
To begin, the ALJ's decision is supported by the opinion of Dr. Khademian, M.D., a child and adolescent psychiatrist, who reviewed L.M.P.'s school records and test scores for the Disability Determination Service through July 2013 and concluded that she has a less than marked limitation in acquiring and using information (Tr. 71-76). Specifically as to this issue, Dr. Khademian noted:
(Tr. 74). There is no other professional opinion, psychiatric or otherwise, in this record. The ALJ is entitled to rely on an expert's opinion such as this.
The referenced "teacher's report," dated May 23, 2013, indicates that L.M.P. received "special ed. services" five times per week, but that she had either "no problem" or only "[a] slight problem" in all areas relating to acquiring and using information (Tr. 259-60). The teacher commented that L.M.P. "understands and comprehends as most other 2nd grade students do" (Tr. 260).
In August 2013 a school official reported that L.M.P. "had been struggling with reading" but that "[s]he is now at grade level in reading and also math and language usage" (Tr. 338). This report noted that L.M.P. has a learning disability "in reading only" and that she was "[r]eceiving resource room services for reading 5 hrs. per week" (Tr. 337).
Individualized Education Programs devised in March 2014 and March 2015 noted L.M.P.'s learning disability in reading (Tr. 339, 364) and directed that she be provided with the following modifications and support: adjustment of written assignments, modification of assignment length, provisions for breaking large assignments into smaller steps and for retaking reading tests if her grade is lower than 60%, and allowing her to take reading tests and quizzes in the resource room (Tr. 343, 366).
In the first two quarters of the 2014-2015 school year, L.M.P. earned C's and B's in reading, writing, and language (Tr. 351). In the spring of 2014 she tested in the 5th percentile in reading (Tr. 352), but in the fall of 2014 she tested in the 25th percentile (Tr. 375).
In April 2015, L.M.P.'s special education teacher, Alexandra Balog, indicated on a questionnaire that she worked with L.M.P. for one hour per day to assist her with reading, and that L.M.P. has a "serious problem" reading and comprehending, and an obvious/serious/very serious problem, depending on the subject, in understanding vocabulary and expressing ideas in written form (Tr. 309). She also indicated that L.M.P. has no problem, or a slight problem, in comprehending oral instructions, understanding and participating in class discussions, providing organized oral explanations and descriptions, learning new material, recalling and applying previously learned material, and applying problem-solving skills (Tr. 310). Ms. Balog commented:
(Tr. 310).
The Court concludes that the ALJ's decision in this matter is supported by substantial evidence. While L.M.P. clearly has a learning disability and is reading below grade level, the evidence simply does not show that she is markedly limited — to say nothing of extremely limited — in her ability to acquire and use information. There is scant evidence to suggest that L.M.P. has limitations of the sort noted in 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(3) as examples of an impaired ability to acquire and use information. Nor has plaintiff identified standardized test scores assessing L.M.P.'s functioning in this domain that are more than two standard deviations below the mean. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e). Rather, the evidence demonstrates that L.M.P. has struggled with reading and has therefore needed, and received, additional support in this area. However, despite this learning disability, overall she is an average student who is doing well in school. This is plainly not a case of a disabled child, i.e., one with marked and severe functional limitations. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.