REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND PURSUANT TO SENTENCE FOUR (DE 15) and GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 17)

ANTHONY P. PATTI, Magistrate Judge.

I. RECOMMENDATION:

For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff's motion for remand pursuant to Sentence Four (DE 15), GRANT Defendant's motion for summary judgment (DE 17), and AFFIRM the Commissioner's decision.

II. REPORT

Plaintiff, Robert Hoon, Jr., brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his applications for disability insurance (DI) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's motion for remand pursuant to Sentence Four (DE 15), the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment (DE 17), Plaintiff's reply (DE 18) and the administrative record (DE 10).

A. Background and Administrative History

Plaintiff alleges his disability began on September 10, 2013, at the age of 35. (R. at 164.) He lists several conditions (low back pain, degenerative disc disease (DDD), lumbar spondylosis, sacroiliac joint dysfunction of right side, and nerve damage in right leg) that limit his ability to work. (R. at 191.) His applications for DI and SSI were denied in July 2014. (R. at 87-112.)

Plaintiff requested a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (R. at 118-121.) ALJ Stephen Marchioro held a hearing, and, on January 13, 2016, determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 22-86.) On January 24, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (R. at 1-7, 21.) Thus, ALJ Marchioro's decision became the Commissioner's final decision.

Plaintiff timely commenced the instant action on February 15, 2017. (DE 3.)

B. Plaintiff's Medical History

The administrative record contains approximately 412 pages of medical records, of which Exhibits 1F through 17F were available to the ALJ at the time of his January 13, 2016 decision. (R. at 38, 257-668.) These records will be discussed in detail, as necessary, below.1

C. Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff testified at the December 2, 2015 hearing, when he was 37 years old. (R. at 47-78.) As Plaintiff is expressly challenging the ALJ's credibility assessment in the instant appeal, the Court will refer to Plaintiff's testimony as necessary below. Vocational expert (VE) Kenneth Browde testified at the hearing, providing answers to several hypothetical questions, at least one of which is directly at issue here and which will be discussed below. (R. at 78-84, 231-236.)

D. The Administrative Decision

On January 13, 2016, ALJ Marchioro issued his decision. (R. at 22-38.) At Step 1 of the sequential evaluation process,2 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 10, 2013, the alleged onset date. (R. at 27.) At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: DDD of the lumbar spine and obesity. (Id.) At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (R. at 27-28.) Between Steps 3 and 4 of the sequential process, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC")3 and determined that Plaintiff had the RFC:

(R. at 28-31.) At Step 4, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. at 31-32.) At Step 5, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (R. at 32-33.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 10, 2013, through the date of the decision. (R. at 33.)

E. Standard of Review

The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court "must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it `is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.'" Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. at 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ."). Under this standard, "substantial evidence is defined as `more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the court does "not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility." Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 ("It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.").

Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must "`take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight'" of the Commissioner's decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, "if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers to that finding `even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.'" Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally, even if the ALJ's decision meets the substantial evidence standard, "`a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.'" Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).

F. Analysis

1. Discrepancy between hypothetical and RFC

Plaintiff claims the underlying sedentary hypothetical "was defective and contrary to the RFC stated in the unfavorable decision." (DE 15 at 15.) The Court notes that the ALJ's first hypothetical was less restrictive than the second hypothetical as to exertional, postural and environmental limitations; as to each, the VE testified there were jobs such an individual could perform. (R. at 80-82.) At Step 5, in finding that Plaintiff could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, the ALJ mentioned those positions that the VE referenced in his answer to the second, more restrictive hypothetical. (R. at 32-33, 81-82.) This second hypothetical was as follows:

(R. at 82.)

To the extent Plaintiff takes issue with the discrepancy between the hypothetical's and the RFC's postural limitations — namely, "occasionally climb ramps or stairs," versus "able to climb ramps and stairs frequently[,]" (compare R. at 81, 28 (emphases added)) — Plaintiff acknowledges that the hypothetical was "more restrictive" than the RFC. (DE 15 at 16.) Thus, notwithstanding Plaintiff "calling into question the process and the support for the RFC . . . [,]" (id), the jobs identified in response to the more restrictive hypothetical, which are the same jobs mentioned by the ALJ at Step 5, constitute substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's RFC, which is less restrictive. As this Court has noted, "an ALJ typically asks hypothetical questions that are more limiting than the plaintiff's ultimate RFC because the ALJ needs a broad basis under which to make a determination." Powers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-10575, 2014 WL 861541, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2014) ("Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ must adopt an RFC based on any one hypothetical question presented to the VE has no basis in law[.]") (DE 17 at 18-19.) I find no error in this regard.

2. Opinion evidence

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly assigned "great weight" to the opinion of a "one time examining insurance company physician" and improperly discounted the opinions of "treating physicians." (DE 15 at 15.) The Social Security Administration (SSA) will evaluate every medical opinion it receives. "Unless we give a treating source's medical opinion controlling weight under paragraph (c)(2) of this section, we consider all of the following factors in deciding the weight we give to any medical opinion[:]" (1) examining relationship; (2) treatment relationship; (3) supportability; (4) consistency; (5) specialization; and (6) other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) ("How we weigh medical opinions."). See also SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996); see also Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). However, while an ALJ must "always give good reasons in [the ALJ's] notice of determination or decision for the weight [the ALJ] give[s] your treating source's opinion," 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2), and "must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight," Friend v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-3889, 375 F. App'x 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation omitted), there is no per se rule that requires a written articulation of each of the six regulatory or "Wilson factors" listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). Tilley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 394 F. App'x 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2010). In other words, the regulations do not require "an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis." Francis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 414 F. App'x 802, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Moreover, the failure to discuss the requisite factors may constitute harmless error: (1) if "a treating source's opinion is so patently deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it;" (2) "if the Commissioner adopts the opinion of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion;" or (3) "where the Commissioner has met the goal of [§ 1527(c)]—the provision of the procedural safeguard of reasons-even though she has not complied with the terms of the regulation." Nelson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App'x 462, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547). See also, Betty v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-CV-10734, 2016 WL 1105008, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-CV-10734-DT, 2016 WL 1090554 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2016).

For the reasons stated below, I find that the ALJ's opinion gives good reasons for discounting the medical opinions at issue and that the Commissioner has met the goal of § 1527(c). See Francis, 414 F. App'x at 805. I also find that the opinion "`permits the claimant and [this] reviewing court a clear understanding of the reasons for the weight given [to each] treating physician's opinion[.]'" See id. (quoting Friend, 375 F. App'x at 550).

a. Asit K. Ray, M.D.

The ALJ acknowledged Dr. Ray as having conducted an independent medical examination (IME). (R. at 30-31, 651-657.) The ALJ assigned Dr. Ray's opinions "great weight" as to Plaintiff's "functioning." (R. at 30.) In so doing, the ALJ stated that "Dr. Ray's opinions regarding the claimant's functioning is consistent with his own examination findings at Exhibit 16F and is also consistent with the findings at Exhibits 8F and 9F." (R. at 30.) In other words, the ALJ acknowledged the examining relationship and found Dr. Ray's functional opinions not only internally consistent but also consistent with certain records from the office of Dominador Laynes, M.D., Plaintiff's primary care physician. (R. at 443-466, 467-495). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1),(4).

b. Dominador Laynes, M.D.

The ALC acknowledged Dr. Laynes as Plaintiff's primary care physician. (R. at 29.) Among other things, the ALJ observed:

(R. at 31 (emphases added).) As such, in assigning little weight to these opinions, the ALJ: (i) acknowledged the examining relationship; (ii) having cited Exhibits 1F, 10F, 15F, and 17F, as well as Exhibits 8F and 9F (which, according to the transcript index, are attributable to Dr. Laynes and have date ranges from 2012 through 2015), acknowledged the treatment relationship; and (iii) considered them inconsistent with certain of Dr. Laynes's other office treatment records (R. at 443-466, 467-495), as well as Dr. Ray's March 17, 2014 opinion. (R. at 651-657). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1),(2),(4). Moreover, work slips which are devoid of specific functional limitations do not obligate assessment by the ALJ to the extent suggested by Plaintiff. See Bass, 499 F.3d at 510 ("Since Dr. Naum made no medical judgments, the ALJ had no duty to give such observations . . . controlling weight or provide good reasons for not doing so."). To the extent there were conflicts in the record evidence, it was the ALJ's function to resolve them, not for this Court to do so on appeal. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971) ("We therefore are presented with the not uncommon situation of conflicting medical evidence. The trier of fact has the duty to resolve that conflict."); see also Haun v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 107 F. App'x 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2004).

c. Babu Nahata, M.D.

As noted below, the ALJ's review of the documentary evidence expressly cited Dr. Nahata's November 25, 2013 notes (albeit not by name) and December 2013 EMG study. (R. at 29, 279, 282-284 [Ex. 2F].) Dr. Nahata also wrote "off work" letters in February and March 2014. (R. at 660-661 [Ex. 17F].) On April 16, 2014, Dr. Nahata restricted Plaintiff to "not lifting, pulling or pushing more than 10 [pounds], no sitting mo[r]e than 30 minutes in one position, no standing more than 15 minutes in one position." Dr. Nahata also restricted Plaintiff to "[n]o crawling," and "no climbing on stairs." (R. at 659 [Ex. 17F].) In considering Exhibit 17F, the ALJ stated:

(R. at 31) (emphasis added). Thus, as to Dr. Nahata, the ALJ's opinion considers the examining and treatment relationships. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1),(2). Moreover, the ALJ found certain of Dr. Nahata's opinions inconsistent with: (i) Dr. Ray's March 17, 2014 opinion (from one month prior), which did not identify any residuals from Plaintiff's automobile accident (R. at 651-657); (ii) certain physical therapy notes from 2015, which were not consistent with Dr. Nahata's proposed functional limitations and contain multiple exercise log sheets showing that Plaintiff was able to complete various exercises and was improving (R. at 558-587, 588-630); and, (iii) certain records from Dr. Laynes's office (R. at 443-466, 467-495). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). Additionally, the ALJ accurately observed that "upon discharge from physical therapy, the claimant reported much improved functioning" (R. at 29), and the discharge note itself stating that Plaintiff "is now able to do many of his daily ADL's with less difficulty compared to when he started his therapy program." (R. at 366.)

d. Lakshmana Madala, M.D. and Recap

Dr. Madala treated Plaintiff on December 31, 2013. (R. at 498-503, 513.) The musculoskeletal exam revealed, among other things, antalgic gait, painful heel walking, bilateral positive straight leg raising test, some areas of moderate pain in the lumbosacral spine, as well as mild paraspinal tenderness. (R. at 500.) On January 9, 2014 and January 23, 2014, Dr. Madala performed lumbar epidural steroid injections and facet join injections. (R. at 504-507.) Plaintiff contends these records "further confirm the presence of pain and symptomatology[.]" (DE 15 at 23-24.)

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Ray's opinion is "inconsistent with the hypothetical[,]" and, presumably, the RFC. (DE 15 at 17.) Plaintiff contends that the October 10, 2013 Oswestry score is inconsistent with Dr. Ray's March 17, 2014 findings and that the October 22, 2013 physical therapy note found "a severe degree of impairment." (DE 15 at 21-22; R. at 347, 356, 651-657.) Plaintiff further contends that the validity of his complaints and limitations is supported by "overwhelming evidence," such as "[t]he records of Drs. Laynes, Nahata and Madala," as well as, "the physical therapy records spanning the years 2013, 2014 and 2015. . . ." (DE 15 at 24.) Nonetheless, as shown above, the ALJ appropriately considered the opinion evidence and provided explanations for doing so based on the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). It is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence, and in the absence of legal error, the ALJ should not be reversed, "`even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion,'" Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406 (internal citation omitted), and even if this Court would have reached a different conclusion in its own interpretation of the facts. Biestek v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017) ("[A] decision supported by substantial evidence must stand, even if we might decide the question differently based on the same evidence.") (citing Wright-Hines v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 597 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 2010). See also, Mullins v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Claimant's argument rests solely on the weight to be given opposing medical opinions, which is clearly not a basis for our setting aside the ALJ's factual findings.") The ALJ was permitted to adopt the opinion of the independent medical examiner over that of the treating sources. Indeed, "the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4). See also Blakley, 581 F.3d at 409 ("Certainly, the ALJ's decision to accord greater weight to state agency physicians over Blakley's treating sources was not, by itself, reversible error."). Moreover, lack of congruency within a treating source's own records, lack of support for his or her conclusions, and inconsistencies with the records of other health professionals who performed examinations or provided treatment are legitimate bases for discounting a treating source's opinion. See Leeman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 449 F. App'x 496, 497 (6th Cir. 2011) ("ALJs may discount treating-physician opinions that are inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record, like the physician's own treatment notes.").

3. RFC

Plaintiff claims the RFC "did not incorporate all of the Plaintiff's severe impairments or limitations. . . ." (DE 15 at 16.) Citing SSR 96-8p ("Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims"), Plaintiff contends the hypothetical was defective because "it had no support in the record." (DE 15 at 17.)

a. Exertional and postural limitations

As noted above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform the exertional limitations of sedentary work, except that he can "operate foot controls bilaterally occasionally." (R. at 28.) In arriving at this determination, the ALJ explained:

(R. at 29.) After generally referencing Plaintiff's September 10, 2013 motor vehicle accident (see R. at 314-324) and Dr. Laynes's October 3, 2013 through April 18, 2014 records (R. at 257-273), the ALJ referenced the objective evidence contained in the September 10, 2013 lumbar spine CT scan (R. at 316-317, 322-323) and December 18, 2013 lumbar spine MRI (R. at 304, 375, 512), and stated:

(R. at 29 (emphases added).)

The ALJ also assessed the postural limitations of "never able to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds," but "able to climb ramps and stairs frequently[,]" and concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to "balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl occasionally." (R. at 28.) The ALJ's review of the documentary evidence included mention of records from April 2014 through summer 2015, including physical therapy discharge notes indicating "considerable progress with pain and radicular symptoms[,]" (see R. at 620-630 (emphasis added)),4 after which the ALJ explained:

(R. at 30 (emphasis added).)

Plaintiff appears to take issue with the exertional and postural limitations, as he claims the hypothetical, and, presumably, the RFC, "ignored the severe impairments of bilateral sacroiliac joint pain, radiculopathy, lumbar stenosis and right sural neuropathy[,]" as well as limitations "noted in the medical histories." Also, pointing to his severe impairments of lumbar spine DDD and obesity, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ "did not appropriately take into account [Plaintiff's] significant symptomatology . . . [,]" nor did the ALJ "address in any way the finding of sural neuropathy[,] which was confirmed by an EMG evaluation." (DE 15 at 17.) To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that any of these conditions — whether the lumbar spine DDD or obesity found to be severe at Step 2 or one of the others — were ignored, "not appropriately take[n] into account," or unaddressed, this portion of his brief does not show either: (i) an error in the ALJ's consideration of the documentary evidence, which, as italicized above, expressly cites some of these conditions; or (ii) how the RFC's exertional and postural limitations fail to account for Plaintiff's physical impairments.

b. Environmental limitations and recap

Finally, the ALJ assessed environmental limitations — "must avoid all exposure to excessive vibration, the use of unguarded moving machinery, and all exposure to unprotected heights[,]" which the Court assumes was intended to accommodate the potential side effects of prescriptions for Norco 5 and cyclobenzaprine. (R. at 28; R. at 319, 320, 444.) Plaintiff does not appear to contest these environmental limitations, nor does he appear to argue that a manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental limitation should be assessed. Plaintiff not having shown reversible error in the ALJ's assessment of exertional and postural limitations, the RFC should be affirmed. See Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997) ("during the first four steps, the claimant has the burden of proof; this burden shifts to the Commissioner only at Step Five.").

4. Credibility

The ALJ found that Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely credible for the reasons explained in the decision. (R. at 29.) Plaintiff challenges this conclusion, preliminarily contending that the hypothetical, and, presumably, the RFC, "ignored Plaintiff[']s absent[eeis]m required by his medical treatment and therapies[,]" as well as limitations "described in his testimony. . . ." (DE 15 at 17, 26-28.)

Plaintiff's statement of error cites SSR 96-7p ("Assessing The Credibility of an Individual's Statements"), which provides, in pertinent part:

SSR 96-7P, 1996 WL 374186, at *3 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996).

Plaintiff disputes the ALJ's statement that "[t]he documentary evidence does not demonstrate disabling back pain or any associated disabling functional limitations." (R. at 29; see also R. at 31 ("[t]he documentary evidence does not show that the claimant is incapable of performing all work, but it is consistent with his ability to perform sedentary work.").) Plaintiff contends this is "contrary to the evidence of record," and further contends that "there is no cogent analysis of the evidentiary record whatsoever in relation to the findings." (DE 15 at 26.) The Undersigned begs to differ. The ALJ's opinion, on its face, reveals significant cogent analysis of the evidentiary record, as described above and below in this report.

Plaintiff contends that objective evidence — such as a positive EMG evaluation, "numerous clinical evaluations," and Oswestry Scores — support Plaintiff's complaints, while only the opinion of Dr. Ray supports the ALJ's credibility assessment. (DE 15 at 27.) Here, the Court assumes Plaintiff is referring to, at least: (a) the December 11, 2013 electrodiagnostic report (R. at 284); (b) Dr. Nahata's various diagnoses of "cervical strain and spasm," (R. at 279, 280, 289, 294, 298); (c) Dr. Laynes's June 9, 2015 assessment of "significant paraspinal spasm," (R. at 454); and, (d) the October 10, 2013 physical therapy initial examination rating of 52% disability in Oswestry Low Back pain (R. at 347) and/or the July 21, 2015 goal to "[d]ecrease [O]swestry from 58 to 45 in order to improve ability to lift objects and work[,]" (R. at 523). (DE 15 at 19, 20, 21, 23, 24). However, in his consideration of the documentary evidence, the ALJ expressly considered the EMG report, as well the fact that Plaintiff participated in physical therapy during October and November 2013, and also the June 2015 assessment of spasm. (R. at 29-30.)

To the extent Plaintiff claims the ALJ "did not sufficiently articulate his opinion concerning Plaintiff[']s credibility[,]" the Court should not conclude that Plaintiff's credibility was discounted "solely based upon a paucity of objective medical evidence." (DE 15 at 27-28). At the outset of his RFC analysis, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff "testified that his ability to function daily including performing exertional and postural activities is greatly reduced because of back pain." (R. at 29.) Along the way, he noted things such as Plaintiff's reports of: (a) "exercising at Planet Fitness" (R. at 416); (b) "increased back pain after sitting at a casino for five hours[,]" (R. at 458) (emphasis added); and (c) an ability to walk one mile (R. at 453, 483). (R. at 30.) Thus, beyond the ALJ's consideration of the documentary and opinion evidence, the ALJ took into consideration Plaintiff's "daily activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). Again, it is not for this Court to "try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility." Bass, 499 F.3d at 509.

G. Conclusion

"Substantial evidence supports a decision if `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion' backs it up." Biestek, 880 F.3d at 783 (quoting Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401). Here, there is such evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion, and the ALJ adequately and unerringly explained how he relied upon and applied it in reaching his decision. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff's motion for remand pursuant to Sentence Four (DE 15), GRANT Defendant's motion for summary judgment (DE 17), and AFFIRM the Commissioner of Social Security's decision.

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.

Any objections must be labeled as "Objection No. 1," and "Objection No. 2," etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as "Response to Objection No. 1," "Response to Objection No. 2," etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.