DAVID R. GRAND, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Robert Rizzo ("Rizzo") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). Both parties have filed summary judgment motions (Docs. #14, 15), which have been referred to this Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") conclusion that Rizzo is not disabled under the Act. Accordingly, the Court
Rizzo was 49 years old at the time of his alleged onset date of February 13, 2014, and at 5'8" tall weighed approximately 175 pounds. (Tr. 46, 147, 171). He completed the eleventh grade but had no further education. (Tr. 49, 172). Over the years, he worked as a truck driver and in a warehouse, before stopping work when he injured his back on February 13, 2014. (Tr. 50, 171-72). He now alleges disability primarily as a result of back pain, neck pain, and diabetes. (Tr. 171).
After Rizzo's application for DIB was denied at the initial level on February 17, 2015 (Tr. 89-92), he timely requested an administrative hearing, which was held on April 28, 2016, before ALJ Crystal White-Simmons (Tr. 40-76). Rizzo, who was represented by attorney Randall Mansour, testified at the hearing, as did vocational expert Amelia Shelton (the "VE"). (Id.). On June 14, 2016, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Rizzo is not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 10-21). On July 12, 2017, the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-5). Rizzo timely filed for judicial review of the final decision on September 1, 2017. (Doc. #1).
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the transcript in this matter, including Rizzo's medical record, Function and Disability Reports, and testimony as to his conditions and resulting limitations. Instead of summarizing that information here, the Court will make references and provide citations to the transcript as necessary in its discussion of the parties' arguments.
Under the Act, DIB are available only for those who have a "disability." See Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). The Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner's regulations provide that a disability is to be determined through the application of a five-step sequential analysis:
Scheuneman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 6937331, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520); see also Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001). "The burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four steps .... If the analysis reaches the fifth step without a finding that claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the [defendant]." Preslar v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
Following this five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Rizzo is not disabled under the Act. At Step One, the ALJ found that Rizzo has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 13, 2014 (the alleged onset date). (Tr. 12). At Step Two, the ALJ found that he has the severe impairments of cervicalgia with cervical radiculopathy, lumbago with lumbar radiculopathy, and diabetes mellitus. (Id.). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Rizzo's impairments, whether considered alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. (Tr. 15).
The ALJ then assessed Rizzo's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), concluding that he is capable of performing light work, with the following additional limitations: no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; and frequent reaching. (Id.).
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Rizzo is not capable of performing his past relevant work. (Tr. 19). At Step Five, the ALJ determined, based in part on testimony provided by the vocational expert in response to hypothetical questions, that Rizzo is capable of performing the jobs of toll collector (400,000 jobs nationally), marker (161,000 jobs), and routing clerk (59,000 jobs). (Tr. 20-21). As a result, the ALJ concluded that Rizzo is not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 21).
The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review under this statute is limited in that the court "must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the court does "not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility." Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).
When reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings, the court is limited to an examination of the record and must consider the record as a whole. See Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). The court "may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council," or in this case, the ALJ. Heston, 245 F.3d at 535; Walker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ or this court discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. See Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[A]n ALJ can consider all evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party.") (internal quotations omitted). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, "it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion." Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
As set forth above, the ALJ determined that Rizzo has the RFC to perform a limited range of light work. (Tr. 15). In his motion, Rizzo argues that this RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence because it "falls short of including the entirety of [his] documented limitations."
To begin with, the ALJ thoroughly explained the rationale for her RFC determination, citing and discussing the evidence of record that relates to the limitations she imposed. (Tr. 15-19). For instance:
Rizzo does not challenge the weight assigned to any of these medical opinions, nor does he challenge the ALJ's evaluation of his subjective complaints. Thus, any such challenges are waived. See, e.g., Seiler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 992062, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 1, 2018) (citing Hollon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 447 F.3d 477, 491 (6th Cir. 2006)). Rather, Rizzo argues only that the "medical evidence of record clearly supports a disabling RFC," pointing to certain physical examination findings and diagnostic reports from March 2014 to October 2015. (Doc. #14 at 11, 12). Specifically, Rizzo claims that these "objective findings support a finding of disability" in the sense that they demonstrate that he "cannot sit or stand/walk for the required periods demanded in competitive work situations."
In advancing this argument, Rizzo first cites to medical records from January 2014, close in time to when he injured his back at work. (Id. at 12 (citing Tr. 224, 225, 235, 249)). A January 15, 2014 physical examination revealed tenderness to palpation over the mid-thoracic and lower lumbar regions, but the remainder of his musculoskeletal exam was unremarkable, and he was diagnosed with only a thoracic strain. (Tr. 224-25). Similarly, records from late January and early February 2014 reflect complaints of increased pain affecting his lower back, but it was noted that, with physical therapy, Rizzo was tolerating increased sitting and driving. (Tr. 235, 249). Rizzo next cites to a March 17, 2014 MRI of his thoracic spine, which showed a probable hemangioma within the T7 vertebral body and an additional lesion within the right T6 transverse process.
Additionally, Rizzo references physical therapy records from May 2, 2014, which he claim reveal the following functional deficits: "an inability to work; exacerbating pain with reaching overhead and sitting; and waking up from pain 4-5 times per night." (Doc. #14 at 12 (citing Tr. 277)). But these "deficits" were merely Rizzo's own subjective complaints, which the ALJ did not fully credit (a finding that Rizzo does not challenge, as explained above). (Tr. 16-19). Rizzo also cites a June 3, 2014 report from Medicus Pain and Spine, which he asserts "noted back pain, upper abdominal pain, and right lower extremity pain." (Doc. #14 at 11 (citing Tr. 258)). While this is true, at the same visit, Rizzo reported a 50 percent decrease in his usual pain, saying he was gradually improving and that the episodes of radiating pain into his right abdominal region were decreasing in frequency with time and therapy. (Tr. 258). And, while Rizzo also cites physical examination findings from a visit to Fawad Rizvi, D.O. on September 15, 2014, including decreased trapezius bulk on the right, positive facet loading maneuvers, and limited range of motion of the upper extremities bilaterally in abduction (Doc. #14 at 11 (citing Tr. 321-22)), the Commissioner correctly points out that Dr. Rizvi did not recommend any functional limitations, and the only reference to sitting or standing in those treatment records is Rizzo's own subjective complaint of worsening pain with prolonged sitting or standing. (Doc. #15 at 11 (citing Tr. 321-22)).
Rizzo next recites findings from his January 23, 2015 visit to Dr. Rahman, who found, on physical examination, atrophy of the muscles over the superior aspect of the right scapula, limited range of motion of the right shoulder, and that Rizzo was unable to raise his right arm above his shoulder. (Doc. #14 at 12 (citing Tr. 327)). As noted above, however, Rizzo has not specifically challenged the ALJ's RFC assessment as it relates to the limitation to frequent reaching and, thus, any such challenge is waived. See Berry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 7664225, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2016). Moreover, even if the Court were to review the ALJ's decision to limit Rizzo to frequent reaching, this restriction is supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, in declining to impose a greater restriction, the ALJ specifically discussed Dr. Rahman's findings (Tr. 17 (citing Tr. 327)), noting that a more restrictive reaching limitation (i.e., occasional reaching with only the right upper extremity, as opined by state agency physician Tariq Mahmood, M.D. (Tr. 77-85)) was not supported by the evidence. (Tr. 19). In arriving at this conclusion, the ALJ acknowledged that the October 30, 2015 EMG report — which Rizzo cites — showed right and left cervical radiculopathy.
In summary, Rizzo asks the Court to second-guess the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence in determining his RFC. But that is not an appropriate role for this Court. See Ashby v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL 9482460, at *9 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2017) ("The Court will neither re-weigh the evidence, ignore substantial evidence relied upon by the ALJ, nor secondguess an ALJ's findings which are well within the reasonable outcomes supported by the record as a whole."). And, although Rizzo cites to various medical records in support of his argument, for the reasons stated above, he has failed to sustain his burden of showing that he requires a more restrictive RFC than that imposed by the ALJ. See Hammer v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 1328190, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2014) ("Although another factfinder perhaps could have reviewed the record and reached a different conclusion as to [what] limitations [] should be incorporated into Plaintiff's RFC, it suffices that the determination made by the ALJ here is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Jordan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (claimant bears the burden of demonstrating need for more restrictive RFC).
For all of the above reasons, and upon an independent review of the entire record, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
