ARTHUR J. TARNOW, Senior District Judge.
On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff Erika Lee, through counsel, filed this prisoner civil rights action on behalf of her father, Joseph Lee, who was incarcerated at the Genesee County Jail at the time of his death. Defendants Genesee County and Deputy Steve Little filed this Motion for Summary Judgment [56] on November 14, 2017. On August 15, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") [66] recommending that the Court grant summary judgment and dismiss the case. Plaintiff filed Objections [67] to the R&R on August 29, 2018.
For the reasons stated below, the R&R [66] is
The Court adopts the facts of this case as set forth in the R&R:
[R&R at 2-9] (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff Erika Lee commenced this action on behalf of her father's Estate against Defendants Genesee County, Deputy Steve Little, and Nurse John Bexton alleging deliberate indifference to Mr. Lee's medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law claims of gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant Bexton [25] on April 21, 2017.
Remaining Defendants filed this Motion for Summary Judgment [56] on November 14, 2017. Plaintiff filed a Response [58] on December 14, 2017. The Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the Motion on March 6, 2018.
On August 15, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued this R&R [66] recommending that the Court grant Defendants' Motion. Plaintiff filed Objections [67] to the R&R on August 29, 2018.
This Court reviews de novo the portions of the R&R to which objections have been filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court must construe the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court focuses on Section III of the R&R in which the Magistrate Judge analyzes Plaintiff's claims for relief. The R&R first assesses Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims that Deputy Little was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Lee's serious medical needs. In Section III-B-1, the R&R sets forth the legal framework which guides the Court's analysis of deliberate indifference claims. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, this framework requires that Plaintiff allege both an objective component — a "sufficiently serious" medical need; and, a subjective component — that the officer subjectively perceived a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk.
The R&R concluded that Plaintiff had satisfied the objective component because a jury could reasonably find that, viewing the facts in Plaintiff's favor, Mr. Lee had a serious medical need that obviously warranted attention. Nonetheless, the R&R went on to conclude that Plaintiff had not satisfied the subjective component because no reasonable jury could find that, before 10:25 a.m., Deputy Little made the inference that Mr. Lee was subject to a substantial risk of harm and ignored that risk. [R&R at 24].
The R&R mentions a few facts of record to support its finding that Deputy Little could not have perceived a risk of harm. First, that Mr. Lee was typically weak and walked slowly; second, that defecation in one's pants was not out of the ordinary at the Jail; and third, that Deputy Little usually called healthcare only when an inmate was unresponsive, having breathing difficulties, or complaining of chest pain. [R&R at 25]. Because Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the subjective component of its deliberate indifference claim, the R&R also found that Plaintiff could show no violation of a constitutional right for purposes of overcoming qualified immunity and establishing municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
With respect to Plaintiff's state law claims, the R&R concluded that Plaintiff's gross negligence claim fails because "claims of gross negligence and deliberate indifference rise or fall together," [R&R at 38], and further concluded that Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails because Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' argument for dismissal. Ultimately, the R&R recommended that the Court grant summary judgment for Defendants and dismiss the case.
The Court adopts the portions of the R&R setting forth the applicable standard of review and legal standards, namely Sections III-A and B-1. The Court further adopts the first part of Section III-B-2, in which the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff alleged a serious medical need for purposes of satisfying the objective prong of the deliberate indifference framework. Finally, the Court adopts the R&R's recommendation to dismiss the gross negligence claim against the County and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in its entirety.
However, the Court declines to adopt the second portion of Section III-B-2 in which the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff had failed to satisfy the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference framework. As explained further below, this is because the analysis errs in one chief respect — the Magistrate Judge did not construe the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as required under Rule 56. As such, the Court cannot adopt the conclusions in Section III-C, D, and E.
In Objections #1, #2, and #5, Plaintiff objects on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge failed to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the Estate in analyzing its deliberate indifference claim. Specifically, Plaintiff submits that it was entitled to the reasonable inference that Mr. Lee was tied to the restraint chair (Objection #1) and that Mr. Lee could have survived had Deputy Little sought medical assistance before 10:25 AM (Objection #2). Plaintiff further submits that, at a minimum, a fact question exists as to whether Deputy Little appreciated the urgency of Mr. Lee's serious medical needs (Objection #5).
Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge seems to have required direct evidence of Deputy Little's culpable state of mind to demonstrate deliberate indifference, notwithstanding the fact that circumstantial evidence is sufficient. See Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that "a factfinder may infer actual knowledge through circumstantial evidence, or may conclude a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted))).
The Court agrees. In its analysis, the R&R asks the appropriate question — "whether at any time before 10:25 a.m., i.e. the time when he summoned [N]urse Bexton, Deputy Little made the inference that Mr. Lee was subject to a substantial risk of harm, and ignored it." [R&R at 24]. However, based on all of the facts presented, the Court finds that the R&R erred in answering this question.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Deputy Little was aware of Mr. Lee's serious need for medical attention long before 10:25 AM. In fact, sometime between 8 AM and 9 AM on July 21, 2015, Mr. Lee had signaled for help. He told Trustee Paul Miller that he was having trouble, and shortly thereafter, Miller informed Deputy Little of the situation. Interview with Paul Miller, Observation Holding Unit of the Genesee County Jail (July 21, 2015).
Thus, Deputy Little was aware — as early as 8 AM — that Mr. Lee was in trouble. Nonetheless, he did not visit Mr. Lee in his cell until nearly 10 AM, and this was only after Mr. Lee had yelled for help. Steve Little Dep. 46:5-10, Sep. 28. 2017. At that point, Deputy Little observed that Mr. Lee had defecated in his pants. Deputy Little asked Trustees Andrew Farley and Paul Miller help Mr. Lee to the shower. When Mr. Lee fell attempting to get out of the shower, Farley sat Mr. Lee in a chair next to the shower. When Mr. Lee fell again, this time off of the chair, Deputy Little told Farley and Miller to use the restraint chair to wheel him back to his cell. Interview with Andrew Farley, Observation Holding Unit of the Genesee County Jail (July 21, 2015). According to Deputy Little's deposition, Mr. Lee was returned to his cell by 10 AM, at which time Farley had to help Mr. Lee into his bed.
Despite having observed that Mr. Lee had defecated in his pants, required the assistance of two men to get to and from the shower, fallen twice and as a result, needed to be tied to a restraint chair for transportation to back his cell, and needed help to get into his bed, Deputy Little left Mr. Lee alone in his cell. Notably, notwithstanding these warning signs, Deputy Little made the conscious decision not to call for medical assistance from the nurse's station, located a mere thirty steps away. John Bexton Dep. 9:10-14, Aug. 21, 2017. Only after he circled back at 10:25 AM, not necessarily to check on Mr. Lee, but to perform a routine floor check, did Deputy Little note that Mr. Lee did not "seem like himself" and contacted Nurse Bexton.
A reasonable jury could conclude that Deputy Little knew of a substantial risk of harm the minute he saw that Mr. Lee, a grown man, had defecated in his pants. Despite Deputy Little's testimony that this is an ordinary occurrence in jail, common sense tells us that this is an abnormal incident warranting medical attention. This is especially so where, as here, Deputy Little had no information to suggest that Mr. Lee previously experienced difficulty using the toilet. He did, however, have information that Mr. Lee was 77-years-old and had not been feeling well over the past few days, both factors which would have justified heightened observation of Mr. Lee. Because a fact question exists as to whether Deputy Little disregarded a substantial risk of harm to Mr. Lee in deciding to wait until 10:25 AM to call for medical assistance, summary judgment is not warranted. Objections #1, #2, and #5 are sustained.
In Objection #7, Plaintiff maintains that the R&R erred in finding that Deputy Little was entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
Qualified immunity analysis involves two questions: (1) whether the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would know that the conduct complained of was unlawful. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001).
First, as stated previously, there is at least a question of fact as to whether Deputy Little violated Mr. Lee's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, the constitutional right of a prisoner to be free from an officer's deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs has been clearly established for decades. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983). Moreover, a reasonable officer in Deputy Little's position would know that Mr. Lee had a constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, including deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Accordingly, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Deputy Little is not entitled to qualified immunity. Objection #7 is sustained.
In Objections #3, #4, #6, #8, Plaintiff objects to the R&R's finding that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C § 1983. Plaintiff maintains that the validity of the Jail's policy and quality of officer-training, including the training of Deputy Little in particular, were questions for the jury.
A municipal party may only be sued under § 1983 if a claimant is harmed by execution of an unconstitutional policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Relying on City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), Plaintiff argues that Defendant Genesee County should be liable for its failure to train Deputy Little on addressing the medical needs of inmates at the Jail.
To prevail on a failure to train or supervise theory, Plaintiff must establish that: "(1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality's deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury." Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006).
The Court is troubled by the fact that Defendant Genesee County, admittedly, does not have a written policy instructing its officers how to address the medical needs of its inmates. Nonetheless, in a sworn Affidavit, Jason Gould, Captain in the Genesee County Office of the Sheriff, stated that although not written, the Genesee County Jail has a policy in place for addressing prisoners' medical needs. According to Gould, the policy, on which the officers receive training, requires a deputy to notify Corizon when he becomes aware of a medical problem.
Corroborating this evidence is Deputy Little's testimony that the Jail has a policy that provides that deputies are supposed to notify medical when an inmate complains about, or when a deputy observes, a medical problem. Little Dep. 54:1-6. Deputy Little further testified that he was trained on how to recognize when someone needs medical attention and how to identify severe medical problems such as breathing difficulties and chest pains. Id. at 57:19-25; 58:1-3.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, does not point to any evidence to demonstrate that Deputy Little's training was somehow inadequate or that the alleged inadequacy was due to the County's deliberate indifference. To prevent summary judgment, there must be some genuine dispute of fact. Plaintiff simply asserts that the issue of the adequacy of training should be decided by the jury. But without any deposition or other evidence to support its argument, Plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim. See, e.g., Nallani v. Wayne Cnty., 665 F. App'x 498, 513 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that deposition evidence that deputies at the jail did not receive any formal training on how to deal with psychological problems may be sufficient to establish a genuine fact issue for purposes of Monell liability). Plaintiff seems to be proffering a respondeat superior liability theory, which is unavailable for § 1983 claims. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. As such, Objections #3, #4, #6, and #8 are overruled.
In Objection #9, Plaintiff contends that because the R&R erred in ruling against it on the deliberate indifference claim, the R&R similarly erred in ruling against Plaintiff on its gross negligence claim.
The Court agrees. The standard for deliberate indifference is more stringent than the standard for gross negligence. Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d 935, 947 (6th Cir. 2010). Given that Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim against Deputy Little, Plaintiff clearly satisfies the lower standard for gross negligence at this stage. Therefore, Objection #9 is sustained.
For the reasons stated above, the Court
This ruling has the effect of dismissing Counts II and VI and dismissing Defendant Genesee County. Remaining in this action are Counts I and III against Deputy Little.
Accordingly,
