R. STEVEN WHALEN, Magistrate Judge.
This case has a lengthy procedural history. On January 6, 2013, Plaintiff Mark Anthony Reed-Bey, a prison inmate in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"), filed a pro se civil complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 14, 2015, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss [Dkt. #44]. Following proceedings on appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed in part this Court's dismissal of the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and remanded for further proceedings, limited to Plaintiff's First Amendment claim of retaliation against Defendants Lewis and Fettig [Dkt. #50]. Those Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies before filing his complaint, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) [Dkt. #51]. The Court denied that motion on September 20, 2016 [Dkt. #70].
This leaves us with a single claim (First Amendment retaliation) against a single Defendant (Fettig). Being nothing if not persistent, Defendant Fettig has now filed a second motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #101] and a motion for leave to file a second motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #105]. Plaintiff has filed a motion to strike the second motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #102].
Under E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(b)(2), "[a] party must obtain leave of court to file more than one motion for summary judgment." "The reason for the local rule is straightforward—the orderly, timely administration of justice. `Parties are generally expected to set forth all their arguments in support of summary judgment in a single dispositive motion; piecemeal litigation at the summary-judgment stage is disfavored.'" Hescott v. City of Saginaw, 2012 WL 13005302, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2012), quoting Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 514 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
Defendant's proposed second motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #101] raises three arguments: (1) Plaintiff has not established the three elements of a retaliation claim, i.e., that he was engaged in protected conduct, that he suffered an adverse action, and that there is a causal relationship between the two; (2) Defendant Fettig is entitled to immunity as an MDOC hearings officer; and (3) Defendant Fettig is entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court has already ruled on the first two issues. First, as I pointed out in my MJRR recommending denial of the first summary judgment motion, the Sixth Circuit already found "that Plaintiff `engaged in protected conduct by filing a complaint against Fettig and informing Fettig that he had done so,' and that `Fettig subjected him to an adverse action when she determined that none of his property would be returned.'" See Dkt. #87, at 15, Pg. ID 736, quoting Sixth Circuit Decision [Doc. #50] at 6-7. In overruling Fettig's objections to my MJRR, the Court stated:
In addition, the Court accepted the MJRR's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to show a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action.
Also, the Court rejected Fettig's argument that he was entitled to immunity as a hearings officer, stating, "Fettig's argument that she is entitled to immunity as the hearing officer for the misconduct hearing lacks merit." Id. at p. 4.
Because the first two issues in Fettig's proposed second summary judgment motion have already been ruled upon, she is barred from re-raising them under the doctrine of law of the case, which provides that "when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d 565, 569-70 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)). The doctrine precludes a court from reconsideration of issues "decided at an early stage of the litigation, either explicitly or by necessary inference from the disposition." Hanover Ins. Co. v. Am. Eng'g Co., 105 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Coal Res., Inc. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 865 F.2d 761, 766 (6th Cir.1989)).
Fettig raises her third issue-qualified immunity-rather late in the game. Consideration of qualified immunity should be "made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided." Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). Moreover, "[t]he intent of Local Rule 7.1(b) is for the party to raise all of its arguments in one motion to avoid piecemeal litigation." Bar's Prod., Inc. at *2; see also Hescott v. City of Saginaw at *2. This case has been pending since 2013. It has been up to and back from the Sixth Circuit twice.
Accordingly, Defendant Fettig's Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #105] is DENIED.
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #102] is GRANTED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #101] is STRICKEN.
IT IS SO ORDERED.