GERSHWIN A. DRAIN, District Judge.
This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Soonejoo Kim Graham ("Petitioner") was convicted of first-degree home invasion, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110a(2), following a jury trial in the Jackson County Circuit Court. He was sentenced, as a third habitual offender, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.11, to 15 to 40 years imprisonment in 2017. In his current pleadings, he raises claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence; the admission of other acts evidence; and the validity of his sentence. For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, denies a certificate of appealability, and grants leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Petitioner's convictions arise from a home invasion in Jackson, Michigan during the early morning hours on July 2, 2014. The Michigan Court of Appeals described the relevant facts, which are presumed correct on habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009), as follows:
People v. Graham, No. 337780, 2018 WL 1832095, *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. April 17, 2018) (unpublished).
Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals essentially raising the same claims as presented on habeas review. The court denied relief on those claims and affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Graham, 503 Mich. 911, 919 N.W.2d 405 (2018).
Petitioner thereafter filed his initial pro se habeas petition raising the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of other acts evidence claims that he raised on direct appeal in the state courts. ECF No. 1. Respondent filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied for lack of merit. ECF No. 8. Petitioner filed a reply to that answer. ECF No. 10. Additionally, he recently filed an amendment to his habeas petition to include the sentencing claim that he raised on direct appeal in the state courts, but had neglected to include in his original petition. ECF No. 11.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") sets forth the standard of review that federal courts must use when considering habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging their state court convictions. The AEDPA provides in relevant part:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
"A state court's decision is `contrary to' ... clearly established law if it `applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it `confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "[T]he `unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to `grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, "[i]n order for a federal court find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent `unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been `objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. The "AEDPA thus imposes a `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and `demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit "precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103; see also White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419-20 (2014). Federal judges "are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong." Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). A habeas petitioner cannot prevail as long as it is within the "realm of possibility" that fairminded jurists could find the state court decision to be reasonable. Woods v. Etherton, 136 S.Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court "has held on numerous occasions that it is not `an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law' for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court") (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 123 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Section 2254(d) "does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been `adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Furthermore, it "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The requirements of clearly established law are to be determined solely by Supreme Court precedent. Thus, "circuit precedent does not constitute `clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court'" and it cannot provide the basis for federal habeas relief. Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012) (per curiam). The decisions of lower federal courts, however, may be useful in assessing the reasonableness of the state court's resolution of an issue. Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003)); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F.Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
A state court's factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, habeas review is "limited to the record that was before the state court." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
Petitioner first asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that he committed the first-degree home invasion. Specifically, he asserts that DNA evidence alone was insufficient to support his conviction. The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (internal citation and footnote omitted). The sufficiency of the evidence standard "must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law," Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16, and through the framework of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 617 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, under the AEDPA, challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence must survive "two layers of deference to groups who might view facts differently" than a reviewing court on habeas review — the factfinder at trial and the state court on appellate review — as long as those determinations are reasonable. Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009).
Additionally, "it is the responsibility of the jury — not the court — to decide what conclusions should be drawn from the evidence admitted at trial." Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (per curiam). A federal court may not re-weigh the evidence or re-determine the credibility of the witnesses. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983); Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir. 2003). A habeas court must defer to the factfinder at trial for its assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Id.
Under Michigan law, the elements of first-degree home invasion are: (1) that the defendant either broke and entered a dwelling or entered a dwelling without permission; (2) that defendant either intended when entering to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling or at any time when entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling committed a felony, larceny, or assault; and (3) while the defendant was entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling either the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon or another person was lawfully present in the dwelling. People v. Wilder, 485 Mich. 35, 43, 780 N.W.2d 265 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110a(2).
As with any offense, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged offense. People v. Kern, 6 Mich.App. 406, 409, 149 N.W.2d 216 (1967). Direct or circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of an offense, People v. Jolly, 442 Mich. 458, 466, 502 N.W.2d 177 (1993), including the identity of the perpetrator, Kern, 6 Mich. App. at 409, see also People v. Johnson, 146 Mich.App. 429, 434, 381 N.W.2d 740 (1985), and the defendant's intent or state of mind. People v. Dumas, 454 Mich. 390, 398, 563 N.W.2d 31 (1997).
The Michigan Court of Appeals considered this claim on direct appeal, applied the Jackson standard, and denied relief finding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence—including DNA evidence—to support Petitioner's first-degree home invasion conviction. The court explained in relevant part:
Graham, 2018 WL 1832095 at *2-4.
The state court's decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. The testimony of the residents, as well as the DNA evidence from the cigarette found in the home, provide sufficient evidence to establish that Petitioner committed the first-degree home invasion. Petitioner challenges the inferences the jury drew from the cigarette DNA evidence and the other testimony presented at trial. However, it is the job of the fact-finder at trial—not a federal habeas court—to resolve evidentiary conflicts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Martin, 280 F.3d at 618; see also Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[A] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution."). The jury's verdict was reasonable. The evidence presented at the trial, viewed in a light favorable to the prosecution, established beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed the first-degree home invasion.
Lastly, to the extent that Petitioner contests the Michigan Court of Appeals' interpretation of state law, he is not entitled to relief. It is well-settled that "a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus." Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Sanford v. Yukins, 288 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 2002). State courts are the final arbiters of state law and federal courts will not intervene in such matters. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 1987). Habeas relief does not lie for perceived errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Habeas relief is therefore not warranted on this claim.
Petitioner next asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court erred in admitting other acts evidence, namely the evidence of his prior 2004 home invasions. A federal court may only grant habeas relief to a person who is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Alleged trial court errors in the application of state evidentiary law are generally not cognizable as grounds for federal habeas relief. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 ("it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions"). "Trial court errors in state procedure or evidentiary law do not rise to the level of federal constitutional claims warranting relief in a habeas action, unless the error renders the proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to deprive the petitioner of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment." McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 69-70); see also Wynne v. Renico, 606 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Bey v. Bagley, 500 F.3d 514, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2007)); Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003).
The Michigan Court of Appeals considered this claim on direct appeal and denied relief; it found that the other acts evidence was properly admitted at trial for the purpose of establishing Petitioner's identity as the perpetrator and as evidence of his common scheme or plan, which was to break into homes during the early morning hours while people slept to steal things in order to support his substance addiction, and then to flee if and when the residents awoke. The court further noted that the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury about the proper consideration of the evidence, which jurors are presumed to follow. Graham, 2018 WL 1832095 at *4-5.
The state court's decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or the facts. First, to the extent that Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence under Michigan law, he merely alleges violations of state law which do not justify federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Bey, 500 F.3d at 519. As discussed, state courts are the final arbiters of state law and the federal courts will not intervene in such matters. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780; Oviedo, 809 F.2d at 328.
Second, Petitioner fails to establish that the admission of the other acts evidence resulted in a federal due process violation. As to the admission of other acts evidence, the Supreme Court has declined to hold that similar "other acts" evidence is "so extremely unfair" that its admission violates "fundamental conceptions of justice." Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1990). Thus, "[t]here is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent which holds that a state violates due process by permitting propensity evidence in the form of other bad acts evidence." Bugh, 329 F.3d at 512. Consequently, there is no Supreme Court precedent that the state court decisions could be deemed "contrary to" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 513; Adams v. Smith, 280 F.Supp.2d 704, 715 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Petitioner thus fails to state a claim upon which habeas relief may be granted as to such matters.
Moreover, even if Petitioner states a cognizable claim as to the other acts evidence, he is not entitled to relief on federal habeas review. He fails to show that the admission of the other acts evidence rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The other acts evidence was relevant and admissible on the issue of identity and common plan or scheme. The prosecutor did not make a character or propensity argument; further, the risk of unfair prejudice was mitigated by the trial court's instructions to the jury about the proper consideration of the other acts evidence. Jurors are presumed to follow a court's instructions. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 (2001) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984) ("Jurors ... take an oath to follow the law as charged, and they are expected to follow it."). Petitioner fails to show that the admission of the other acts evidence was erroneous or, more importantly for purposes of habeas review, that it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Habeas relief is thus not warranted on this claim.
Lastly, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court erred in scoring Offense Variable 9 ("OV 9") of the state sentencing guidelines. A sentence imposed within the statutory limits is generally not subject to federal habeas review. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); Cook v. Stegall, 56 F.Supp.2d 788, 797 (E.D. Mich. 1999). Claims which arise out of a state trial court's sentencing decision are not cognizable upon habeas review unless the petitioner can show that the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory limits or is wholly unauthorized by law. Lucey v. Lavigne, 185 F.Supp.2d 741, 745 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Petitioner's sentence of 15 to 40 years imprisonment is within the statutory maximum of life imprisonment. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.110a; 769.11. Consequently, his sentence is insulated from habeas review absent a federal constitutional violation.
Petitioner raised this issue on direct appeal and the Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief finding that OV 9 was properly scored under the state sentencing guidelines. See Graham, 2018 WL 1832095 at *6.
The state court's decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. Petitioner's claim that the trial court erred in scoring OV 9 (or any other portion) of the Michigan sentencing guidelines is not cognizable on habeas review because it is a state law claim. See Tironi v. Birkett, 252 F. App'x 724, 725 (6th Cir. 2007); Howard v. White, 76 F. App'x 52, 53 (6th Cir. 2003) ("A state court's alleged misinterpretation of state sentencing guidelines and crediting statutes is a matter of state concern only."); Cheatham v. Hosey, 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WL 478854, *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 1993) (departure from state sentencing guidelines is a state law issue which is not cognizable on federal habeas review); see also Kissner v. Palmer, 826 F.3d 898, 904 (6th Cir. 2016); McPhail v. Renico, 412 F.Supp.2d 647, 656 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Alleged errors in scoring offense variables and determining the sentencing guideline range do not warrant federal habeas relief.
Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner contests the state court's interpretation of state law regarding the offense variables and the application of that law, he is not entitled to relief. As explained, "a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting on habeas review." Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76; Sanford, 288 F.3d at 860. State courts are the final arbiters of state law and the federal courts will not intervene in such matters. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780; Oviedo, 809 F.2d at 328. Petitioner thus fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to this issue.
A sentence may violate federal due process, however, if it is carelessly or deliberately pronounced on an extensive and materially false foundation which the defendant had no opportunity to correct. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741; United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 1990) (defendant must have a meaningful opportunity to rebut contested sentencing information). To prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must show that the court relied upon the allegedly false information. United States v. Polselli, 747 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1984); Draughn v Jabe, 803 F.Supp. 70, 80 (E.D. Mich. 1992). Petitioner makes no such showing. Rather, the record shows that he had a sentencing hearing before the state trial court with an opportunity to challenge the sentencing information. Further, he challenged his sentence on direct appeal in the state courts. Petitioner fails to establish that the state trial court relied upon materially false or inaccurate information in imposing his sentence-which he had no opportunity to correct. Habeas relief is therefore not warranted on this claim.
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims. Accordingly, the Court
Before Petitioner may appeal the Court's decision, a certificate of appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court denies habeas relief on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the court's assessment of the claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that ... jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Petitioner makes no such showing. Accordingly, the Court
Lastly, the Court
IT IS SO ORDERED.
