ANDERSON, Justice.
A jury found respondent Carlos Harris guilty of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Appellant State of Minnesota petitioned for review, asserting that the court of appeals erred in its application of the law and asking us to abandon the separate standard of review for convictions based on circumstantial evidence. We conclude that the court of appeals correctly applied the law and we decline the invitation to overrule our precedent. We therefore affirm the court of appeals.
On March 4, 2014, a police officer working with a United States Marshals task force was looking for J.A. based on an arrest warrant. The officer began surveillance in an area where information indicated that J.A. could be found. The officer observed J.A. get into the passenger seat of a Cadillac car and watched the car drive away. Police later learned that Harris was driving the car; J.A. was in the front passenger seat; and another person, K.E., was seated behind Harris. They also learned that the car was owned by Harris's brother.
The officer followed the car in an unmarked police vehicle. He did not immediately attempt to stop the car because he was concerned about possible danger to bystanders and was waiting for additional police support.
Eventually, after additional law enforcement arrived, the officer activated his lights and siren in an attempt to stop the car. The emergency lights were more noticeable than normal and were described as lighting up the officer's vehicle "like a Christmas tree." The car continued traveling between 30 and 35 miles an hour for approximately three blocks. The officer saw movement inside the car. As the car
Several police officers then approached the car and ordered the occupants to show their hands. Although Harris initially complied with this command, at some point he lowered his hands below the window. However, when commanded to raise his hands again, he did so. Harris was removed from the car first.
J.A. was less cooperative. When police told J.A. to show his hands, J.A. refused to do so. He also made furtive movements in his lap and near the glove compartment. Eventually, J.A. complied with police commands to get out of the car; but after getting out of the car, J.A. reached his hand into the car again.
The backseat passenger, K.E., was the last person removed from the car. Police then secured Harris, J.A., and K.E. in three separate squad cars and inspected the Cadillac to ensure that nobody else was hiding in it. When police looked up, to the right of, and slightly behind the driver's seat, they saw that the headlining of the car had been altered.
The firearm was a .45-caliber Springfield model 1911 with a "huge" magazine attached to it. There were "quite a few" rounds in the magazine and one in the chamber. The firearm was cocked and ready to fire.
The State charged Harris with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). At trial, the parties stipulated that Harris was ineligible to possess a firearm, so the only issue the jury considered was whether Harris possessed the firearm. The State introduced forensic evidence at trial showing that the firearm contained a mixture of male and female DNA from five or more people. Approximately 75.7% of the general population could be excluded as contributors to this DNA mixture, but Harris, J.A., and K.E. could not. The State presented circumstantial evidence that Harris possessed the firearm, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict Harris of the offense. State v. Harris, No. A15-0711, 2016 WL 1396689 (Minn. App. Apr. 11, 2016). We granted the State's petition for review.
As an initial matter, we turn to the standard of review. The State argues that the court of appeals erred by engaging in "fine-grained factual parsing" of the evidence and that this error demonstrates that our standard of review for convictions based on circumstantial evidence is unnecessarily complicated, confusing, misleading, and difficult to apply. The State urges us to abandon this standard of review and adopt in its place a unified standard of review that applies to all evidence, circumstantial or otherwise.
This circumstantial-evidence standard dates back to at least 1928, and possibly earlier. Johnson, 217 N.W. at 684 ("[A]ll the circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt." (citing State v. Johnson, 37 Minn. 493, 35 N.W. 373, 376 (1887)). It has remained our law ever since. See State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 411 (Minn. 2016) ("To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt."); State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002) ("Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt."); State v. Scharmer, 501 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Minn. 1993) (reversing convictions because "[t]he evidence did not form a complete chain leading so directly to appellant's guilt as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt"); State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Minn. 1989) (reversing a conviction because "[t]he circumstantial evidence was not inconsistent with rational hypotheses other than guilt").
We are "extremely reluctant" to overrule our precedent absent a compelling reason to do so. State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005).
First, the State argues that many other jurisdictions have abandoned a separate circumstantial-evidence standard of review, opting instead for a unified standard of review that applies to all convictions. See Easlick v. State, 90 P.3d 556, 557 & n.1 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (listing states that apply a unified standard of review when examining the sufficiency of both direct and circumstantial evidence). Although previously we have considered the practice of other states in deciding whether to overrule our precedent, see Cargill, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 784 N.W.2d 341, 352-53 (Minn. 2010) (noting that our precedent was "the minority view" among other courts), we never have held that the extent to which other jurisdictions have adopted a different approach is, by itself, a compelling reason to overrule our precedent. We are similarly unpersuaded by the State's argument here.
Next, the State argues that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review rests on outdated views of the differences between direct and circumstantial evidence. We have defined circumstantial evidence as "evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist." State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 354 n.3 (Minn. 2012) (quoting 1 Barbara E. Bergman & Nancy Hollander, Whartons Criminal Evidence § 1:8 (15th ed. 1997)). In contrast, direct evidence is "[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption." State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d 412, 421 n.4 (Minn. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11 (Minn. 2004)). Thus, circumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 604 (Stras, J., concurring). This basic characteristic of circumstantial evidence is not outdated; it is the same today as it was when we decided Johnson in 1928. Our circumstantial-evidence standard of review appropriately balances our need to defer to the jury's credibility determinations and our duty to ensure that defendants not be convicted based on insufficient evidence.
Finally, the State argues that our standard of review creates confusion for appellate courts, noting that the court of appeals has said it can sometimes be difficult to identify the "circumstances proved," State v. McCormick, 835 N.W.2d 498, 505-06 n.2 (Minn. App. 2013), and has suggested that juries are in the best position to determine which inferences are reasonable, State v. Seavey, No. A13-0138, 2013 WL 5976070, at *5 (Minn. App. Nov. 12, 2013) (Smith, J., concurring specially). We believe our case law addresses these concerns.
Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to reaffirm what we have already stated about the circumstantial-evidence standard of review. As the fact finder, the jury is in a unique position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before it. State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 144 (Minn. 2011). It "is free to accept part and reject part of a witness's testimony." State v. Landa, 642 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. 2002). To be clear, the first step of our circumstantial-evidence test protects these principles — it requires an appellate court to winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury's verdict, resulting in a subset of facts that constitute "the circumstances proved." See State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 670 (Minn. 2011) (disregarding evidence inconsistent with the verdict).
Having preserved the jury's credibility findings, the appellate court considers at the next step whether a reasonable inference of guilt can be drawn from the circumstances proved, viewed as a whole, and whether a reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt can be drawn from the circumstances proved, again viewed as a whole. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474-75, 478-79 (Minn. 2010). This second step does not encroach on the jury's credibility determinations because the act of inferring involves the drawing of permissible deductions, not actual fact finding by
In sum, the State has not established a compelling reason for us to overrule an approximately century-old rule governing the review of convictions based on circumstantial evidence. We therefore decline the State's invitation to abandon the circumstantial-evidence standard.
Having resolved the standard-of-review question, we next address whether, under the circumstantial-evidence standard, the evidence in this case is sufficient to support a guilty verdict. Our "first task is to identify the circumstances proved." Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329 (citation omitted). In determining the circumstances proved, we disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the jury's verdict. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d at 669-70. The second step is to independently consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d at 871 (considering whether "[w]hen viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved support[ed] a rational inference that Robertson was the shooter"). We give no deference to the jury's choice between reasonable inferences at this second step. Fox, 868 N.W.2d at 223. To sustain the conviction, the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, must be consistent with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Id.
To convict Harris of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, the State was required to prove in relevant part that he knowingly possessed the firearm. State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 161 (Minn. 2015). A defendant may possess an item jointly with another person. State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 317 n.7 (Minn. 2004); State v. Lorenz, 368 N.W.2d 284, 285-86 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to infer that the defendant jointly possessed the marijuana found in the defendant's bedroom with the owner of the house). Possession may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 159. There are two methods by which the State may prove constructive possession. Id. The State may show that the police found the item in a place under the defendant's exclusive control to which other people normally did not have access. State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1975). Alternatively, if police found the item in a place to which others had access, the State must show that there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the time the defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and control over it. Id.
To establish that a defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and control over a firearm at the time in question, the State must prove more than the defendant's mere proximity to the firearm. See Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611 ("Because defendant did not have exclusive possession of the automobile, one could not automatically infer from the mere fact that cocaine was found in the automobile that the cocaine belonged to defendant."); see also Lee, 683 N.W.2d at 316 (explaining evidence that showed defendant "exercis[ed] dominion and control
Here, the State's theory at trial was that Harris constructively possessed the firearm found in the car, individually or jointly, with his two passengers. Consequently, the issue is whether the circumstances proved, viewed as a whole, are consistent with a reasonable inference that Harris knowingly exercised dominion and control over the firearm and inconsistent with a rational hypothesis that he did not knowingly exercise dominion and control over the firearm.
The circumstances proved that implicate Harris include: (1) on the night of March 4, 2014, Harris was driving a car, J.A. was sitting in the front passenger seat, and K.E. was sitting in the rear seat; (2) there was an active warrant for J.A.'s arrest; (3) after securing backup assistance, the police officer assigned to execute the arrest warrant activated the lights and siren on his vehicle; (4) Harris continued driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour for about three blocks after the officer activated his lights and siren; (5) the officer saw movement in the car; (6) when the police officer searched the car, he noticed that the headlining had been pulled down near the sunroof, to the right and slightly behind the driver's seat, creating a small void; (7) the officer saw an object, which he clearly recognized as the butt end of a silver handgun, wedged in this void between the headlining and roof of the car; (8) a mixture of male and female DNA from five or more people was recovered from the firearm; and (9) subsequent DNA testing concluded that none of the occupants of the vehicle could be excluded as contributors to the DNA mixture found on the firearm, but 75.7% of the general population could be.
The State contends that, when viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
Because the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with a reasonable inference that Harris did not know the firearm was in the car, we agree with the court of appeals that the State presented insufficient evidence to support Harris's conviction of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
LILLEHAUG, J. (dissenting).
Every week in at least one of Minnesota's 87 counties, a district court instructs a jury that a fact may be proven by direct evidence, or by circumstantial evidence, or by both. The district court admonishes the jury that the law does not prefer one form of evidence over the other.
But, on appellate review, we do not follow that admonition. Our standards of review
This confusing dichotomy between how we expect juries to decide cases and how we review their decisions has existed for almost 90 years. Nine decades of confusion is long enough. Evidence is evidence. Minnesota should join the appellate courts of the United States, 41 other states, and the District of Columbia in adopting a unified standard of review. I respectfully dissent.
Before discussing the antiquated notion that circumstantial evidence is inherently different and less reliable than direct evidence, let me discuss the doctrine on which the majority grounds its decision: stare decisis. What weight should we give to our prior decisions?
The answer, according to both our court and the United States Supreme Court, is that it depends on the subject matter. Stare decisis is at its "acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved ...; the opposite is true in cases ... involving procedural and evidentiary rules."
In this case, we do not address a matter of substantive law; we address a standard of review. A standard of review is an internal appellate method of analysis. Unlike when we interpret and apply statutes, separation of powers considerations are not present. Our standards of review are not even official rules of the judicial branch, which are promulgated (usually with public notice and comment) pursuant to our rule-making authority. That is why, as one scholar puts it, "stare decisis is less relevant when deciding standards of review than in perhaps any other area of law."
In practice, we have been open to changing standards of review based on logic and experience. One example is how we review a conviction when there has been unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct. In State v. Brown
Ramey recognized that our plain-error standard of review had been "clarified" in State v. Griller.
Whether our precedents are substantive or procedural, we have made clear that "stare decisis does not bind us to unsound principles."
In our district courts, juries and judges are not supposed to prefer direct evidence to circumstantial evidence, or vice versa.
For a conviction based on direct evidence, we apply the traditional standard whereby we assume that "the jury believed the State's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary."
But for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a different standard. We first identify the "circumstances" proved by the State, accepting the State's evidence and rejecting any evidence to the contrary.
The different standards of review seem to have their roots in an 1887 case that was not about the standard of review, but about a jury instruction. State v. Johnson
This form of jury instruction was turned into a standard of review in another case called State v. Johnson.
Regardless of its exact origin in Minnesota law, the idea that we must have separate standards of review depending on the type of evidence involved is unsound, for three reasons. First, as a matter of logic, the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is arbitrary. Second, the notion that direct evidence is necessarily more reliable than circumstantial evidence is outdated. Third, the differing standards of review are confusing and difficult to apply. These three reasons are why the federal courts and most other states have adopted a unified standard of review.
The notion that direct evidence can be easily and logically differentiated from circumstantial evidence is wrong. Traditionally, circumstantial evidence is thought to be that which requires an inference.
Second, not only is the distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence faulty as a matter of logic, it rests on an antiquated notion that direct evidence is more reliable than circumstantial evidence. Unlike fine wine, this notion gets worse over time.
As numerous courts have recognized, circumstantial evidence is not as weak as previously thought.
Confessions are a classic example of direct evidence. Yet we know that they are not always reliable. As we recognized in State v. Scales,
Another form of confession, admissions to fellow inmates, may be less than reliable. Because they are eager to strike a deal, and have a natural incentive to concoct a narrative, "jailhouse informants are considered among the least reliable witnesses in the criminal justice system."
Indeed, there is "empirical data strongly indicating that at least some types of circumstantial evidence are actually more reliable than familiar categories of direct evidence."
Our standard of review should not be governed by "classes" of evidence. Even so, circumstantial evidence as a class is at least as reliable as direct evidence as a class.
Finally, the different standards of review are confusing and difficult to apply, in at least two respects.
First, for convictions based on circumstantial evidence, it is a confusing task to determine precisely the "circumstances proved." What, precisely, is a "circumstance"? Is it a fact, an inference, or both? Further, juries deliver verdicts of "guilty" or "not guilty"; they do not tell us exactly which facts they found and which inferences they drew. And precisely how does one decide which hypotheses are "rational" and which are not? I have a very hard time applying the circumstantial evidence standard of review.
Second, what are we supposed to do when the State's proof of an element of a crime consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence? What is the standard of review in such a case — is it some kind of hybrid of the two standards? The court of appeals does not know.
For these reasons, most appellate courts have adopted a single standard of review, not tethered to whether convictions and elements are supported by evidence that is direct, circumstantial, or both. The federal test is unitary.
Applying a unitary standard,
"Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the fact finder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution."
The evidence presented to the jury was as follows. Harris was driving the vehicle containing the firearm. He continued to drive after a police officer activated the squad car lights and siren, and the officer had to force the vehicle to the curb. When police officers ordered Harris to show his hands, he failed to fully comply. The firearm was visible and accessible to Harris, as the butt of the firearm was sticking out of the headliner and poking into the cabin of the vehicle. And Harris's DNA could not be excluded from the mixture found on the firearm, even though approximately 75.7% of the general population could be excluded.
Based on that evidence and the trial court's instructions, the jury unanimously concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris had possessed the firearm. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, I cannot say that the evidence was insufficient to permit the jurors to reach their verdict.
Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals and affirm Harris's conviction for possession of a firearm by an ineligible person.
I join in the dissent of Justice Lillehaug.
The dissent also argues that previously we have been willing to overrule our standards of review, citing State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006) and State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 2016). Neither of these decisions supports the dissent's conclusion.
In Ramey, we noted that our jurisprudence had been inconsistent on which standard should apply to unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct. 721 N.W.2d at 298. Because of this inconsistency, we needed to abrogate some of our previous decisions to provide clarity in the law. This concern is not present here.
In Lugo, we explained "what we meant in [State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn. 1977)]." 887 N.W.2d at 481. We concluded that "our decision in Webber was not intended to, nor did it, announce a rule of deference to district court pretrial legal conclusions that the State has appealed." Id. at 485 (emphasis added). To make our decision absolutely clear, we added: "To the extent ... Webber suggests the contrary, it is overruled." Id. But because we held that Webber did not announce a deferential rule, there was nothing to overrule. Lugo therefore does not support the dissent's argument.
A Minnesota attorney, Edward Cassidy, was recently successful in freeing an innocent man who had been wrongfully convicted in a 2002 death penalty case based on the testimony of two jailhouse informants. See Wearry v. Cain, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1002, 1002-03, 1008, 194 L.Ed.2d 78 (2016). The State "presented no physical evidence at trial," instead relying on the informants' "dubious" and "suspect testimony." Id. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 1003, 1006.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state postconviction court's denial of Wearry's petition for postconviction relief. Id. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 1008. The Court characterized the State's trial evidence as "a house of cards, built on the jury crediting [the jailhouse informant's] account." Id. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 1006.
