CHUTICH, Justice.
Respondent Anibal Sanchez sued appellant Dahlke Trailer Sales, Inc. (Dahlke) under the antiretaliation provision of the Minnesota workers' compensation statute. Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1 (2016). The district court granted summary judgment to Dahlke, concluding that Sanchez had not raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether Dahlke discharged him because he sought workers' compensation benefits. The court of appeals reversed. Sanchez v. Dahlke Trailer Sales, Inc., No. A15-1183, 2016 WL 3129352 (Minn.App. June 6, 2016). Before this court, Dahlke asserts that the court of appeals unduly expanded the scope of the workers' compensation antiretaliation statute and that Sanchez's claim is preempted by federal immigration law. We affirm the court of appeals. We hold that Sanchez raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dahlke discharged him and as to whether the discharge was motivated by Sanchez seeking workers' compensation benefits. We further hold that federal immigration law does not preempt Sanchez's claim. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for further proceedings.
The summary judgment standard requires us to view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Sanchez. State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Aquila Inc., 718 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. 2006). Anibal Sanchez was born in Mexico. He entered the United States in 1998, with a tourist visa, and he has lived here without documentation since the visa expired. Sanchez bought a false social security number with the intention to apply for jobs. He presented the false social security number to Dahlke when he was hired in early 2005. Sanchez worked for Dahlke as a body shop assistant for about eight years, until December 20, 2013.
Sanchez alleged that his managers at Dahlke knew for the majority of his employment that he was not authorized to work in the United States. He testified that people at Dahlke started to ask him about his "legal situation" about two years after he was hired. He described several instances in which managers at Dahlke
On September 23, 2013, Sanchez injured himself while operating a sandblaster at work. Dahlke sent him to the hospital and made a first report of injury to its workers' compensation insurance carrier. Sanchez missed work and incurred medical expenses. He testified that, after he went back to work, he was told that he had to submit copies of his medical bills before he could receive lost-wages benefits.
Sanchez hired a lawyer to give him advice about the process. He testified that when he told Doug Smithers, a part-owner and service manager at Dahlke, that he had a lawyer, Smithers responded that he hated lawyers and said, "[T]he bridge between us [is] broken." Through his lawyer, Sanchez filed a workers' compensation claim petition on November 6, 2013. That claim has since settled.
During a deposition about his workers' compensation claim on December 11, 2013, Dahlke's lawyer asked Sanchez whether he was legally authorized to work in the United States. Sanchez responded that he was not. One or two days later, when he returned to Dahlke, Doug Smithers asked to see Sanchez's social security card and asked Sanchez whether he was "illegal." Sanchez responded: "Douglas, you know that." Sanchez testified that Smithers told him that he could not work for Dahlke anymore "because of [his] legal situation."
About one week later, Sanchez and two part-owners, Brian Dahlke and Doug Smithers, signed a letter stating:
Sanchez later testified that he read the letter "without being aware of what [he] was signing." He also testified that he would "absolutely" go back to work at Dahlke if he could get legal authorization. Sanchez returned to Dahlke only once, to pick up his tools.
Sanchez brought suit in Anoka County District Court, raising a claim under the workers' compensation antiretaliation statute.
The court of appeals reversed. Sanchez v. Dahlke Trailer Sales, Inc., No. A15-1183, 2016 WL 3129352, at *3 (Minn.App. June 6, 2016). The court held that undocumented workers are protected by the antiretaliation provision of the workers' compensation law. Id. at *2 (citing Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Minn. 2003)). The court of appeals also held that Sanchez had raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether he had established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Id. at *2-3. The court of appeals concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Sanchez's claim "that must be further developed and determined in the first instance by the district court," and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at *4. We granted Dahlke's petition for review.
The district court may grant summary judgment if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" so that one party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. Our court reviews the district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn. 2005). We consider two questions: "whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, and whether an error in the application of the law occurred." Fairview Hosp. & Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1995). Again, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Sanchez. See Aquila Inc., 718 N.W.2d at 883.
Minnesota Statutes section 176.82, subdivision 1, prohibits an employer from "discharging ... an employee for seeking workers' compensation benefits." Dahlke is entitled to summary judgment, then, if it establishes that no genuine dispute exists as to the material facts: (1) whether Dahlke discharged Sanchez within the meaning of the statute, and (2) whether Dahlke did so in retaliation for Sanchez seeking workers' compensation benefits.
The court of appeals determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Dahlke subjected Sanchez to an "adverse employment action"
The workers' compensation statute does not define "discharge" or "discharging." See Minn. Stat. §§ 176.001-.862 (2016). To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether Sanchez was discharged, we must first determine the word's meaning within the workers' compensation antiretaliation statute. When interpreting a statute, "we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning." Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC, 785 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2016)).
The American Heritage Dictionary defines "discharge," in part, as "[t]o release, as from confinement, care, or duty" or "[t]o remove from office or employment." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 514 (5th ed. 2011); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 644 (2002) (defining "discharge," in part, as "to dismiss from employment: terminate the employment of," or "to end formally the service of: release from duty"). Interpreting the term in an employment contract, our court has defined "discharge" as "the termination of employment at the will of the employer with prejudice." Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 250 Minn. 167, 84 N.W.2d 593, 598-99 (1957). In Anderson, we concluded that a layoff was not a discharge because it was only temporary. Id. at 599; see also Neid v. Tassie's Bakery, 219 Minn. 272, 17 N.W.2d 357, 358 (1945) (interpreting "discharge" in an employment contract and finding that a "temporary cessation of operations was not a discharge").
These sources show that the plain and ordinary meaning of discharge includes an aspect of permanence. See Neid, 17 N.W.2d at 358 ("A discharge presumptively means that the employer no longer needs or desires the employee's services; that he is done with him; and that all contract relations between them are at an end."); see also Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 5 (2016) (defining discharge in the unemployment compensation context as occurring "when any words or actions by an employer would lead a reasonable employee to believe that the employer will no longer allow the employee to work for the employer in any capacity"). This determination does not mean that a revival of the employment relationship must be impossible or inconceivable — any employer that discharges an employee could conceivably hire him back, and this possibility would not change the nature of the initial discharge.
The actual intent of the employer is key in deciding whether a discharge
Dahlke asserts that it did not discharge Sanchez when it placed him on unpaid leave, because Sanchez can return to his job once he presents legal authorization to work in the United States. As support, it points to the letter — signed by Sanchez and two part-owners of Dahlke — stating that Sanchez "can come back to work at Dahlke" once he provides adequate documentation.
But, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sanchez, there is reason to doubt that Dahlke ever intended to rehire Sanchez, regardless of any change in his work status.
The dissent submits that "an employer's subjective desire that an employee never return to work" is irrelevant in the context of a contractual employment relationship. This argument misses the point. Even if Sanchez were to obtain legal work status, Dahlke would still have the ultimate choice whether to re-employ him. Dahlke's promise to rehire Sanchez once he gains legal work status did not include mutual consideration
In the end, the question of whether Dahlke intended Sanchez's unpaid leave to be permanent is a factual dispute, to be resolved by a factfinder. Thus, Sanchez has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was discharged.
The second element of a workers' compensation retaliatory discharge claim is whether Dahlke discharged Sanchez "for seeking workers' compensation benefits." Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1. Sanchez testified that, after he retained a lawyer for his workers' compensation case, part-owner and service manager Smithers said he hated lawyers and that their "bridge" was "broken." Again, Dahlke asserts that in placing Sanchez on leave it was motivated only by its discovery that Sanchez did not have legal authorization to work in the United States. Sanchez claims that Dahlke had been aware of his immigration status for years. Viewed in the light most favorable to Sanchez, the evidence in the record raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding Dahlke's motivation for placing Sanchez on unpaid leave.
Dahlke also contends that the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act required it to place Sanchez on leave and that Dahlke cannot be held liable for taking an action required by federal law. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (the IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (2012), is codified as amended in various sections of Title 8 of the United States Code. As a part of "a comprehensive scheme that made combating the employment of illegal aliens in the United States central to the policy of immigration law," the IRCA establishes an extensive employment verification system. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 138, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002); see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012).
The IRCA requires employers to check citizenship or immigration status by requesting and examining the documentation of all employees. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). The IRCA prohibits employers from knowingly hiring undocumented workers and from continuing to employ workers whom the employer knows to be undocumented. Id. § 1324a(a). Employers that unlawfully employ undocumented workers are subject to civil and criminal sanctions. Id. §§ 1324a(e)(4)-(5), (f). The federal act also makes it unlawful for any applicant to subvert the verification system by submitting fraudulent documentation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (2012).
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Under this principle, Congress has the power to preempt state law.
A preemption analysis starts from the assumption "that `the historic police powers of the States' are not superseded `unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 400, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 S.Ct. 1447 (1947)). Standing at the intersection of labor law and tort law, workers' compensation laws firmly qualify as an area of traditional state power. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
Federal law may preempt state law in three ways: (1) by express provision, (2) by occupying the entire regulatory field, or (3) by conflicting with state law. See id. at 399-400, 132 S.Ct. 2492. Dahlke's argument focuses solely on the third form, conflict preemption.
Conflict preemption can occur in two ways. First, a state law conflicts with a federal law when it is "impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements." English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). Second, a state law conflicts with federal law when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 S.Ct. 581 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The mere fact of `tension' between federal and state law is generally not enough to establish an obstacle supporting preemption, particularly when the state law involves the exercise of traditional police power." Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984)).
Dahlke's main preemption argument is that, if the workers' compensation antiretaliation statute requires it to continue to employ Sanchez even after becoming aware of his immigration status, then the statute requires exactly what the IRCA prohibits: knowingly employing an undocumented worker. Dahlke's argument rests on a flawed premise, however. The workers' compensation antiretaliation statute does not require that Dahlke continue to employ an employee after becoming aware that he is undocumented. Rather, it prohibits Dahlke from discharging an employee because he sought workers' compensation benefits. Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1. The retaliatory discharge provision does not require employment, but instead focuses on of a particular motivation: the employer is liable only if it discharged the employee "for seeking workers' compensation benefits." Id.
Because of this retaliatory-motive requirement, it is possible for an employer in Dahlke's position to comply with the workers' compensation antiretaliation statute without running afoul of the IRCA. Dahlke would have followed the IRCA without violating the antiretaliation statute if it discharged Sanchez because of his immigration status, and not because of his protected activity.
The dissent agrees that Dahlke's compliance with both statutes is "theoretically possible," but determines that federal preemption law requires more. We disagree. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 620, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 180 L.Ed.2d 580 (2011)
Finally, the workers' compensation antiretaliation statute does not stand as an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399. The IRCA is premised on the conclusion that "[e]mployment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally." H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 46 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650. To reduce the pull of that magnet, the IRCA uses criminal and civil penalties to discourage employers from hiring unauthorized aliens. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155, 122 S.Ct. 1275 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
In Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., we considered whether the IRCA, "or the policy behind it, prevents unauthorized aliens from conducting a diligent job search," a requirement for receipt of temporary total disability benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. 664 N.W.2d at 327; see Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 1(g) (2016) (conditioning temporary total disability benefits on a diligent search "for appropriate work within the employee's physical restrictions"). Correa was not authorized to work in the United States, and the employer argued that this status prevented him from conducting a diligent search for appropriate work as a matter of law. Correa, 664 N.W.2d at 327. We rejected the employer's argument, holding that the workers' compensation statute covers undocumented workers and that the IRCA "is not aimed at impairing existing state labor protections." Id. at 329.
The Correa court noted in dicta that "to the extent that denying unauthorized aliens benefits predicated on a diligent job search gives employers incentive to hire unauthorized aliens in expectation of lowering their workers' compensation costs, the purposes underlying the IRCA are not served." Id. at 331 n.4. Enforcing labor laws against employers that employ undocumented workers does not stand as an obstacle to the purpose of the federal immigration law.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Affirmed.
Dissenting, Anderson, J., Gildea, C.J., Stras, J.
ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).
Respondent Anibal Sanchez testified under oath, on the record, and in the presence of attorneys representing himself and his employer, that he was not legally authorized to work in the United States. Shortly thereafter, he confirmed this fact directly to the ownership of his employer, appellant Dahlke Trailer Sales, Inc. It is undisputed that at that point, Dahlke's duty was clear: consistent with federal law, it could not actively employ Sanchez. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2) (2012) (prohibiting employers from continuing to employ workers whom the employer knows to be undocumented). To do so would incur civil and criminal sanctions under federal immigration law. Id. §§ 1324a(e)(4)-(5), 1324a(f) (2012). Dahlke obeyed federal law and informed Sanchez that he could not report to work until he was authorized to do so. In my view, that action did not constitute a "discharge" under the antiretaliation provision of Minnesota's workers' compensation law, Minn. Stat. § 176.82 (2016). Regardless, to the extent that Dahlke's actions subject it to liability under Minnesota law, it is liable only because it was impossible for Dahlke to comply with both the antiretaliation provision and federal immigration law. Moreover, granting Sanchez a remedy for Dahlke's compliance with federal law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of federal immigration law. I would therefore conclude that federal law preempts Minnesota's antiretaliation provision. Accordingly, I dissent.
As the court did, and as the summary judgment standard requires, I review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Minn. 1995). Born in Mexico, Sanchez entered the United States in 1998 under a tourist visa. Since the visa expired, he has lived in the United States without authorization. He has never applied to the United States government for documentation allowing him to work legally.
Sanchez worked for Dahlke for almost nine years. Sanchez alleges that for most of this period, Dahlke was aware of his status as an undocumented worker, but nevertheless continued to employ him. In opposing Dahlke's motion for summary judgment he presented evidence in support of that contention. Taken in the light most favorable to Sanchez, that evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact about whether Dahlke was aware that Sanchez was not authorized to work in the United States.
In 2013, Sanchez was injured while operating a sandblaster at work. A Dahlke employee drove Sanchez to the hospital and, on the same day, filed a workers' compensation claim for him with Dahlke's insurer. After the accident, Sanchez missed some work. He contacted Dahlke's workers' compensation insurer, which told him that he must first send the bills for his treatment before it could process the disability request. Sanchez did not know whether the insurer was advising him accurately, so he retained a lawyer.
Through his counsel, Sanchez filed a workers' compensation claim petition. The insurer retained defense counsel and adjusted the claim. Dahlke was upset that Sanchez retained counsel; one of Dahlke's owners stated that he hated lawyers and that "the bridge between us [is] broken." Sanchez was deposed, and during that deposition Sanchez was asked whether he was authorized to legally work in the United States. He testified under oath that he was not.
Shortly thereafter, two of Dahlke's owners confronted Sanchez with his deposition transcript. Sanchez told them that he did not lie during his deposition. Sanchez told one of the owners to "do what you have to do." Sanchez then met with one of Dahlke's owners and the company bookkeeper, who had copies of documentation Sanchez had previously provided to Dahlke. Sanchez indicated that the social security card he had provided was no good, and confirmed that he had no legitimate paperwork.
Dahlke provided Sanchez with a letter, stating that he was being "sen[t] ... home on an unpaid leave of absence." The letter further stated: "Once you provide us with legitimate paperwork showing that you can legally work in the United States, you can come back to work at Dahlke Trailer Sales." Sanchez signed the letter. Sanchez claims that he was required to sign the document without knowing what he was signing, and without being given time to take the statement home to review it. Sanchez then filed this action.
In his deposition, Sanchez testified that he understands that if he provides Dahlke with legitimate paperwork, he can return
Sanchez claims that Dahlke has violated Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1, which in relevant part prohibits an employer from "discharging ... an employee for seeking workers' compensation benefits." Dahlke argues, and the district court concluded, that by putting Sanchez on unpaid leave, it did not "discharge" him. By contrast, Sanchez argues — and the court agrees — that under the circumstances of this case, it is a jury question whether putting Sanchez on unpaid leave amounted to "discharging" him. As the court notes, the workers' compensation statute does not define "discharge" or "discharging." But we have. The meaning of "discharge" in this context is provided by our decision in Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 250 Minn. 167, 84 N.W.2d 593 (1957), which arose in the context of a labor agreement. We noted that the word "discharge," which appeared in the agreement, "in common parlance and in industrial parlance ha[s] a normal meaning" that is distinct from the meaning of the term "layoff." Id. at 597-98. We defined "discharge" to mean "a termination of employment at the will of the employer with prejudice." Id. at 598-99. By contrast, a layoff is a termination of employment without prejudice. See id. at 598-99.
As support for this proposition in Anderson, we referred to a number of authorities, including Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 287 n.11, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 90 S.Ct. 1230 (1946). Fishgold in turn cited to the Oxford English Dictionary, which defined a layoff, in part, as "[a] period during which a workman is temporarily dismissed or allowed to leave his work." Id. Anderson emphasized that, unlike a discharge, a layoff is impermanent. 84 N.W.2d at 598 ("A removal implies permanent separation from the service, while a suspension or layoff implies a temporary separation from the service." (quoting State ex rel. Ausburn v. City of Seattle, 190 Wn. 222, 67 P.2d 913, 921 (Wash. 1937))). And, most notably for the current distinction, we quoted at length from International Ass'n of Machinists v. State ex. rel. Watson, 153 Fla. 672, 15 So.2d 485 (1943). That case distinguished "discharge" — which it defined as "termination of employment at the will of the employer, with prejudice," id. at 490 (emphasis added) — from "lay-off," defined as "termination of employment at the will of the employer, without prejudice to the worker," id. (emphasis added). The court purports to accept this definition.
Even taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Sanchez, all the evidence in the record demonstrates that when Dahlke put Sanchez on an unpaid leave of absence, it ended his employment without prejudice; Sanchez was permitted to return to employment with Dahlke when he met the most basic of conditions: legal eligibility to work. The letter Dahlke provided to Sanchez, which was signed by two of Dahlke's owners, spells this out:
(Emphasis added.) In addition, Sanchez testified that he understands that if he provides Dahlke with legitimate paperwork, he can start actively working for Dahlke again.
In short, all the evidence in the record indicates that Dahlke is willing to continue to employ Sanchez if he can demonstrate his eligibility to return to active employment. The court's protestations to the contrary are unpersuasive.
First, the court might mean that an employer who wishes to discharge an employee could do so pretextually by placing the employee on leave, subject to an impossible or unreasonable condition for the leave to end. "Any form of words which conveys to the servant the idea that his services are no longer required is sufficient to constitute a discharge." Neid v. Tassie's Bakery, 219 Minn. 272, 17 N.W.2d 357, 358 (1945) (citing Johnson v. Crookston Lumber Co., 100 N.W. 225 (Minn. 1904)). As an extreme example, an employer might place an employee on leave, with the condition that the employee can return to work when the employee can perform a double back flip. For nearly all employees, this condition would be impossible and completely unrelated to their job duties. Under such circumstances, a condition of this type might amount to a discharge.
But those circumstances are clearly not present here. The requirement that Sanchez be authorized to legally work in the United States before being allowed to return his job is, of course, linked inextricably to his job. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more foundational qualification for any employee. And regardless of whether Sanchez faces "major obstacles" to obtaining legal work status (as the court describes it), the record does not support a claim by Sanchez that it was impossible for him to obtain legal status, or, even
Second, in asking whether the employer "intends that the leave should never end," the court may be suggesting that an employer's subjective desire that an employee never return to work is somehow relevant. But there is no reason to believe that an otherwise legitimate layoff somehow becomes a discharge because of an employer's hope about some future event. The employment relationship is contractual, and the difference between a layoff and a discharge turns on whether the contract relationship is over. Neid, 17 N.W.2d at 358 ("A discharge presumptively means that the employer no longer needs or desires the employe's [sic] services; that he is done with him; and that all contract relations between them are at an end." (citing Stitt v. Locomotive Eng'rs' Mut. Protective Ass'n, 177 Mich. 207, 142 N.W. 1110, 1113 (1913))). In Minnesota, as in most states, issues of contract formation are governed by the objective conduct of the parties, not their subjective intent. See SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011) ("Whether mutual assent exists is tested under an objective standard."); Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d 213, 221 (1962) ("Expressions of mutual assent, by words or conduct, must be judged objectively, not subjectively."). Even if Dahlke secretly hoped that Sanchez would never be able to produce legal authorization to work — because it had a retaliatory animus against Sanchez, or for some other reason — neither Sanchez nor the court provides reason to believe that that secret hope would somehow nullify Dahlke's offer to Sanchez.
Put simply, Sanchez has pointed to no record evidence of anything Dahlke said or did that conveyed to Sanchez the idea that his services were no longer required. See Neid, 17 N.W.2d at 358. Accordingly, I would hold that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Dahlke on the basis that Sanchez did not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was discharged from employment.
Even if one characterizes Dahlke's actions toward Sanchez as a discharge, however, Dahlke was required to take those actions by federal immigration law. Penalizing Dahlke for complying with federal law would create an irreconcilable conflict between the antiretaliation provision of the workers' compensation statute and federal immigration law. I would therefore hold that the antiretaliation provision is preempted.
The Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (2012) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324) (IRCA), presents a "comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States." Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002). "IRCA `forcefully' made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to `[t]he policy of immigration law.'" Id. (quoting INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 & n.8, 112 S.Ct. 551, 116 L.Ed.2d 546 (1991)). Under IRCA, an employer is forbidden from hiring an employee who is
When Sanchez testified in his deposition that he was not authorized to work in the United States, and subsequently confirmed to Dahlke that his deposition testimony was truthful, Dahlke certainly knew that Sanchez was "an unauthorized alien with respect to ... employment" at Dahlke. Id. § 1324a(a)(2). Dahlke was therefore "compelled," Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148, 122 S.Ct. 1275, to cease "continu[ing] to employ" him, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2). Any other action would have violated IRCA. The court acknowledges this fact but nevertheless holds that it is a jury question whether Dahlke can be liable under our workers' compensation antiretaliation law for taking an action that was required by federal law. Because I believe IRCA preempts Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1, under these circumstances, I disagree.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides the basis for federal preemption of state law, declares that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. As the court recognizes, the relevant type of preemption is implied preemption, which comes in two forms. First, when it is "impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements," the state and federal laws conflict, and the state law is preempted. Angell v. Angell, 791 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995)). Second, "when state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,'" the state law is preempted. Id. (quoting Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483). Both situations obtain here.
First, after Dahlke learned, without any room for doubt, that Sanchez was not authorized to work in the United States, it was impossible for Dahlke to continue to actively employ Sanchez and still comply with IRCA. This is true regardless of its actual motives. Whether it secretly had desired to end Sanchez's employment and was simply seeking an excuse; whether it was infuriated by Sanchez's pursuit of a workers' compensation claim and seized upon his lack of work authorization as a fig leaf; or whether it very much wished to continue employing Sanchez and would have done so if its duty under ICRA had not been made crystal clear — in any and all of these situations, Dahlke was required under federal law to end its active employment of Sanchez. To penalize it for doing so under the workers' compensation antiretaliation law demonstrates the impossibility of complying with both laws at once.
The court attempts to find daylight between IRCA and the workers' compensation antiretaliation statute, suggesting that Dahlke may comply with both laws if it "discharged Sanchez because of his immigration status, and not because of his protected activity," i.e., seeking workers' compensation benefits. Although this distinction is theoretically possible, it defies reality. Dahlke was required by federal
The parties argue that Dahlke made its decision for a single reason — either retaliatory animus (as Sanchez would have it) or the requirements of federal law (as Dahlke argues). The court tacitly endorses this binary approach, correctly noting that Sanchez has not argued that Dahlke had a mixed motive for discharging him, and therefore deeming it appropriate to isolate a single motive for the decision. But as we have noted, "[t]o some extent, every claim of disparate treatment raises questions of mixed motives." Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 401 N.W.2d 75, 81 (Minn. App. 1987)). That is surely true in this case involving retaliation, in which there can be no question that Dahlke was prompted by the requirements of federal law. In cases under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, we have dealt with mixed motives by assigning liability if a forbidden motive is a "substantial causative factor entering into the decision," id. at 624, even if the employer would have made the same decision absent the unlawful motive, id. at 626. Assuming a similar approach to workers' compensation antiretaliation cases, an employer will violate the antiretaliation provision of the workers' compensation law if a desire to retaliate is a substantial causative factor of the decision.
Assuming, as we must on review of a grant of summary judgment, that Dahlke was upset by Sanchez's pursuit of a workers' compensation claim and fired him because of the claim, then it was not possible for Dahlke to comply with both state and federal law. If Dahlke indulged its desire to retaliate against Sanchez and discharged him, then on the court's theory the antiretaliatory animus is a "substantial causative factor entering into the decision," id. at 624, and Dahlke has likely violated the antiretaliation provision of our workers' compensation laws, but is compliant with federal law by continuing to employ Sanchez. This presents a classic case of conflict preemption.
Second, penalizing Dahlke under the antiretaliation provision of the workers' compensation law certainly stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in passing IRCA, as the Supreme Court of the United States explained in Hoffman. The Hoffman Court considered whether federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA, foreclosed the National Labor Relations Board from awarding backpay to an undocumented alien who, like Sanchez, had presented fraudulent
Id. at 140, 122 S.Ct. 1275. In reaching its decision, the Court discussed its previous decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 104 S.Ct. 2803, 81 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), in which it "affirmed the Board's determination that the NLRA applied to undocumented workers." Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 144, 122 S.Ct. 1275 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892, 104 S.Ct. 2803). But it observed that with the enactment of IRCA,
Id. at 149, 122 S.Ct. 1275 (footnote omitted). The Court concluded that awarding backpay to the unauthorized employee would "recogniz[e] employer misconduct but discount[] the misconduct of illegal alien employees" and thereby "subvert[]" IRCA. Id. at 150, 122 S.Ct. 1275. The Court concluded "that allowing the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA." Id. at 151, 122 S.Ct. 1275.
In this case, the remedy sought is not an award of backpay to an undocumented worker by the Board, but rather damages awarded by a court. But the availability of a damages remedy has nearly the same effects.
Of course, Hoffman involved the interaction of immigration law with the Board's authority under the NLRA, rather than the interaction of immigration law and state law, and so preemption principles were not directly in play. But the Court's conclusion — that "allowing the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA," id. at 151, 122 S.Ct. 1275 — makes it clear that an award of damages to an employee who was not authorized to work in the United States would "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" as expressed in IRCA, Angell, 791 N.W.2d at 535 (quoting Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483). The court's analysis not only ignores Hoffman, but it also stands at the opposite pole from it.
The court instead relies on our decision in Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 2003). But nothing in Correa addresses the situation we face here. Like Sanchez, Correa was unauthorized to work in the United States, but nevertheless found employment and suffered an injury on the job. Id. at 325-26. Like Dahlke, Correa's employer learned that Correa's eligibility information was false and requested valid documentation of his eligibility to work in the United States. Id. at 326. But unlike Sanchez, who was placed on an unpaid leave, when Correa informed his employer that he could not provide the requested information, it terminated his employment. Id. And unlike here, the issue in Correa was not whether the discharge was retaliatory, but rather whether Correa could conduct a "diligent job search," as required to receive temporary total disability benefits under Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 1(g) (2016). Correa, 664 N.W.2d at 327.
As the court correctly notes, we stated in Correa that we were to consider whether IRCA "or the policy behind it, prevents unauthorized aliens from conducting a diligent job search." Id. But we never considered the policy behind IRCA. Instead, we analyzed IRCA's text and concluded that there was nothing that explicitly "prohibit[ed] unauthorized aliens from receiving state workers' compensation benefits generally or temporary total disability benefits conditioned on a diligent job search specifically." Id. at 329. And we analyzed the text of the workers' compensation law, again finding no explicit restriction. Id. at 329-30. We did not address the question of whether this court should adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hoffman and conclude that the federal immigration policy articulated in IRCA prohibits such an award. Id. at 330. Instead, after describing the reasoning of the Hoffman majority, id., and its dissent, id. at 331, we stated:
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We "left to the legislature" the job of considering "the policy questions raised by" the employer. Id.
Whether the policy expressed by Congress in IRCA will be impeded by enforcement of Minnesota law is, of course, the
Notably, the employer's incentive at the time of hiring is not the only policy to consider. To be sure, there may be some incentive effect of the kind described by the court today (and in the Hoffman dissent): it makes economic sense that, at the thinnest edge of the margin, an employer may be more likely to hire an unauthorized employee that it knows it can fire without liability if the employee files a workers' compensation claim.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
GILDEA, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Anderson.
STRAS, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Anderson.
The court also argues that evidence in the record suggesting that Dahlke's decision to place Sanchez on leave was retaliatory also suggests that Dahlke's layoff decision was pretextual. I disagree. The evidence is Sanchez's testimony (contradicted by Dahlke) that Dahlke knew of his immigration status long before he filed his worker's compensation claim. Even accepting that evidence as true (as we must in this posture), Dahlke's unwillingness to continue to turn a blind eye to Sanchez's lack of work authorization does not suggest that Dahlke would terminate Sanchez if he actually obtains proper authorization. To the contrary, it suggests that Dahlke would be willing to have Sanchez work again once he obtains appropriate authorization. The leap in logic here is by the court, not the dissent.