PETERSON, Judge.
In this maintenance-modification dispute, appellant-husband argues that the district court erred by invalidating the parties' mediated agreement that any
The parties' marriage was dissolved by a stipulated judgment in November 2006. Under the judgment, respondent-wife is the primary caretaker of the parties' three children. The judgment required appellant-husband to pay $1,500 per month for child support and pay for the children's health and dental insurance and required each party to contribute $803 monthly to a joint account to cover expenses for the children. The judgment also required husband to pay $6,600 per month for spousal maintenance until April 2021 and provided that maintenance would be reviewed in 2010 and 2016.
In November 2007, husband was laid off from his job. Husband received severance pay equal to his salary until May 2008 and continued to pay his spousal-maintenance and child-support obligations until January 2009, when husband requested that the parties begin mediation to modify husband's maintenance and support obligations.
At first, the parties were not represented by counsel during mediation. But they retained counsel in March 2009, and both parties were represented by counsel at a mediation session on May 28, 2009, when they signed a one-page document, which states:
The parties continued to mediate.
In May 2010, wife filed a motion to enforce the maintenance and support provisions of the dissolution judgment and requested a judgment in the full amount of the maintenance and support arrearages. Following two continuances, a hearing on the motion was scheduled for October 28, 2010. On October 18, 2010, husband served a motion requesting that his maintenance obligation be terminated or suspended and that the suspension be retroactive to June 1, 2009. At the October 18 motion hearing, husband orally amended his motion to request suspension or modification of maintenance, not termination, and the court accepted the oral modification.
The district court reduced husband's maintenance obligation but rejected husband's argument that under the May 2009 mediation agreement, the modification is
The district court made the maintenance modification retroactive to the date of the hearing (October 28, 2010) and awarded wife $104,100 in maintenance arrearages.
Husband filed a motion for amended findings, in part with regard to the district court's ruling on the retroactivity of the maintenance modification. Regarding the retroactivity of the maintenance modification, the district court construed husband's motion as a motion for reconsideration, and confirmed its previous order. This appeal followed.
Did the district court have authority to make the maintenance modification retroactive to June 1, 2009?
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Beecroft v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 798 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Minn.App.2011), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2011). "When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit." Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010). The maintenance-modification statute provides:
Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 1 (2010) (emphasis added).
One of the exceptions in section 518A.39 from the district court's authority to modify maintenance provides:
Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e).
This court construed the language of this exception as it applies to a modification of child support in Buntje v. Buntje, 511 N.W.2d 479 (Minn.App.1994).
Unlike the present case, the parties in Buntje did not agree to make any modification of child support retroactive to a date before notice of the modification motion was served. The issue in this case is whether the parties' agreement regarding retroactivity permitted the district court to modify maintenance retroactively to June 1, 2009, despite the language in Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e), that explicitly prohibits awarding retroactive support for periods before notice of a modification motion has been served. We conclude that the retroactivity agreement could not give the district court this authority.
This court has stated:
Gatfield v. Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. Sept 29, 2004). But neither Gatfield nor the authorities it cites for the principle that parties are free to bind themselves to obligations that a court could not impose involved a stipulation like the stipulation in this case, in which the parties agreed that the district court may do what it is explicitly prohibited by statute from doing.
This court's interpretation of the statute in Buntje applies to husband's motion to modify spousal maintenance just as it applied to the custodial parent's motion to modify child support in Buntje. Husband makes meritorious policy arguments that note the strong preference of Minnesota courts to encourage resolution of dissolution matters through mediation. But this court may not disregard unambiguous statutory language. The district court can adopt a stipulation that the court may do something that the legislature has not prohibited, but the parties cannot by stipulation confer on the court authority to do something that the legislature has explicitly prohibited.
The district court did not err by concluding that under Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e), it had no authority to make the maintenance modification retroactive to a date before the date that husband served notice of his modification motion on wife.