SMITH, Judge.
We affirm appellant's presumptive guidelines sentence for her conviction of first-degree assault because the district court considered circumstances for and against a downward dispositional departure.
On December 21, 2010, approximately two weeks before her twentieth birthday, appellant Kanishka Shereal Molina gave birth to her fourth and fifth children, premature twins. The twins stayed in the hospital for about one month, then moved home with Molina, their father, and their older siblings. Molina was the children's primary caregiver and, to assist with the situation, she was offered in-home services by a nurse and a social worker; the record does not establish whether Molina ever utilized these services.
On May 1, 2011, Molina brought one of the twins to the hospital, seeking medical attention for his arm. During the medical examination that followed, hospital staff discovered an acute fracture in the infant's arm, as well as several healing fractures in his arms and legs. Hospital staff contacted police, who responded and went to Molina's home. There, officers observed small bruises on the other twin's face. A subsequent medical examination revealed acute fractures in the second infant's clavicle and jaw, and healing fractures in her ribs and leg.
On June 27, 2011, respondent State of Minnesota charged Molina with two counts of first-degree assault and two counts of third-degree assault.
The PSI report prepared by community corrections found that Molina is not amenable to probation and recommended a presumptive guidelines sentence of 86 months' imprisonment.
Molina argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing the presumptive guidelines sentence of 86 months' imprisonment when there are substantial and compelling mitigating factors warranting a dispositional departure. In particular, Molina asserts that the district court failed to consider the requisite factors regarding her amenability to probation.
We review a district court's sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion and will not interfere "as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a determination." State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985); see also State v. Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 2000). "[I]t would be a rare case which would warrant reversal" of a presumptive sentence, State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981), and appellate courts should modify presumptive sentences only under "compelling circumstances," State v. Freyer, 328 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. 1982).
"The district court must order the presumptive sentence provided in the sentencing guidelines unless substantial and compelling circumstances warrant a departure." State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011). Generally, durational departures must be supported by offense-related factors, while dispositional departures can be supported by offender-related factors. See State v. Chaklos, 528 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1995) (stating that "the offender-related factor of particular unamenability to [probation] may be used to justify a dispositional departure" but that "offense-related aggravating factors may be used to support" both dispositional and durational departures); State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983) (stating that when considering "only a dispositional departure, the [district] court can focus more on the defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for [the defendant] and for society"). "[A] defendant's particular amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary setting will justify" a downward dispositional departure. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
Molina asserts that she "should be placed on probation" because the district court failed to address the Trog factors, and she "was an excellent candidate for probation." In Trog, the supreme court stated that "[n]umerous factors, including the defendant's age, [her] prior record, [her] remorse, [her] cooperation, [her] attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family, are relevant" to determining whether a dispositional departure is justified. Id. But we have explicitly held that when the district court elects not to depart, it need not discuss the Trog factors. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 254. Rather, when imposing a presumptive sentence, the district court must "deliberately consider[] circumstances for and against departure and exercise[] its discretion." Id.
Here, before imposing sentence, the district court heard information from a community corrections representative and argument from both attorneys. It then stated:
Because the record demonstrates that the district court carefully considered circumstances for and against departure and deliberately exercised its discretion when denying Molina's departure motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the presumptive guidelines sentence.