PETERSON, Judge.
In this appeal challenging the district court's ruling that respondent has an interest in real property, appellant argues that the district court (1) misapplied caselaw interpreting Minnesota anti-palimony statutes; and (2) erred in finding that, as a joint tenant, respondent is entitled to a one-half interest in the property. We affirm.
Respondent Taras Lendzyk and appellant Laura Lee Wrazidlo began dating in 2006. At that time, respondent owned a home on Blackman Avenue in Duluth, and appellant owned a home on Roosevelt Drive in Hermantown. In August 2007, appellant sold her home, and she and her two children moved into respondent's home.
After appellant moved into respondent's home, the parties decided to have a new home built in the Hermantown area. In the spring of 2008, appellant bought a lot on LaVaque Junction Road in Hermantown. Appellant used her money to buy the lot, title to the lot was recorded in her name, and she financed a construction loan for the home.
After construction was completed, the parties arranged to refinance the construction loan. The application for the new loan identified the parties as joint tenants, and both parties attended the closing on the new loan. At the closing, both parties signed a mortgage that identified them as joint tenants, and appellant signed a quitclaim deed that conveyed her interest in the property to herself and respondent as joint tenants.
The parties' relationship ended in 2010, and in 2012, respondent brought this partition action claiming a one-half interest in the property and requesting a judgment ordering that the property be sold and the proceeds divided between the parties. The case was tried to the court. Respondent testified as follows about the parties' decision to build a home together:
Once the new home was built, it was our agreement that I was going to take care of the re-financing cost and then pay for the mortgage. I was also to hold the insurance for the property as well.
Respondent paid $10,532 in closing costs, paid for and provided labor for improvements to the home, paid the monthly mortgage payments from November 2008 through September 2009, made partial mortgage payments from October 2009 through June 2010, and paid for property insurance from 2008 through 2010. Respondent's payments totaled $77,323. Appellant presented evidence that she contributed $201,171 toward purchasing the property and improvements to the home.
The district court concluded that Minnesota anti-palimony statutes did not bar respondent's claim to an interest in the LaVaque property and found that appellant and respondent, as joint tenants, were each entitled to a one-half interest in the property. The court ordered the property sold and the proceeds divided between the parties. This appeal followed.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Halvorson v. Cnty. of Anoka, 780 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. App. 2010). But we review the district court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. In re Pamela Andreas Stisser Grantor Trust, 818 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Minn. 2012). In applying that standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's findings and defer to the district court's assessment of witness credibility. Id. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is "manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole." Hemmingsen v. Hemmingsen, 767 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), review dismissed (Minn. Feb. 1, 2010).
Minnesota's anti-palimony statutes restrict a cohabitant's ability to claim an interest in the property of another cohabitant. Minn. Stat. § 513.075 (2014) states:
Minn. Stat. § 513.076 (2014) states:
In In re Estate of Eriksen, the supreme court concluded that the anti-palimony statutes do not prohibit claims between cohabitants when a "claimant does not seek to assert any rights in the property of a cohabitant but to preserve and protect [his or] her own property, which [was] acquired for cash consideration wholly independent of any service contract related to cohabitation." 337 N.W.2d 671, 673-74 (Minn. 1983). The supreme court construed the anti-palimony statutes as applying "only where the sole consideration for a contract between cohabiting parties is their `contemplation of sexual relations . . . out of wedlock.'" Id. at 674 (omission in original) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 513.076). The supreme court held that, even though the cohabitants had not signed an agreement detailing their financial arrangements regarding a home and the home was titled solely in one cohabitant's name, the probate court properly exercised jurisdiction over the other cohabitant's unjust-enrichment claim to a one-half interest in the home when each cohabitant equally contributed money to the expenses of purchasing and maintaining the home and to the purchase of a mortgage-protection life-insurance policy. Id. at 672, 674.
In re Estate of Palmen involved two cohabitants, Schneider and Palmen, who orally agreed to build a log cabin on property solely owned by Palmen. 588 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 1999). After Palmen's death, Schneider claimed an interest in the cabin, asserting that Palmen promised her that if their relationship ended, he would reimburse her for her labor and financial contributions to the cabin's construction. Id. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the case under the anti-palimony statutes, and this court affirmed, but the supreme court reversed. Id. at 495-97. The supreme court explained that the anti-palimony statutes do not bar "enforcement of all unwritten agreements between individuals living together in contemplation of sexual relations out of wedlock." Id. at 496.
Id. (quotations omitted).
Respondent presented evidence that he and appellant agreed that they would own the home together and that he paid the closing costs for refinancing the construction loan, contributed money and labor to improving the home, paid the monthly mortgage payments from November 2008 through September 2009, made partial mortgage payments through June 2010, and paid for property insurance from 2008 through 2010. Under Eriksen and Palmen, this evidence is sufficient to support the district court's finding that respondent's "claim is asserted to his own property interest and is not a claim based solely on the contemplation of sexual relations." Because respondent's claim was based on an agreement that was supported by consideration independent of any service contract related to cohabitation, sought to protect respondent's own property, and did not assert any rights in appellant's property, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the claim.
Appellant's argument that respondent's interest in the property should be limited to the amount of his contributions toward it ignores the presumption that named grantees in a deed hold equal property interests. "Where two persons are named grantees in a deed, the presumption is that their interest in the land conveyed is equal. This presumption, however, is not conclusive, and the true interest of each may be shown." Dorsey v. Dorsey, 142 Minn. 279, 281, 171 N.W. 933, 934 (1919). Intent is determined by reference to the written documents "and to all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction." Gagne v. Hoban, 280 Minn. 475, 479, 159 N.W.2d 896, 899 (1968). Intent is a question of fact. Id. at 480-81, 159 N.W.2d at 900.
After noting that the fact that the parties were married was not relevant to its analysis, the Dorsey court stated:
Dorsey, 142 Minn. at 281-82, 159 N.W. at 935.
Appellant testified at trial that respondent pressured her to put his name on the deed and mortgage, but the district court found that this testimony was not credible. The only other evidence that appellant presented to rebut the presumption of equal ownership was that appellant made greater contributions toward the property. Under Dorsey, this evidence, if accepted by the district court, was insufficient to overcome the presumption. Therefore, on this record, appellant has not shown that the district court erroneously ruled that appellant failed to rebut the presumption that respondent is entitled to a one-half interest in the property.