UNPUBLISHED OPINION

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

RODENBERG, Judge.

Appellant Tony Dejuan Jackson challenges the district court's denial of his motion to correct a sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, arguing that the Ramsey County District Court's life sentence was not authorized by law. We affirm.

FACTS

In May 1997, appellant sexually assaulted three people in Ramsey, Washington, and Dakota counties. He was convicted of crimes in all three counties.

In Washington County, appellant was convicted of first-degree burglary and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The Washington County District Court sentenced appellant to 182 months in prison, based on both aggravating factors and a finding that appellant was a patterned sex offender under Minn. Stat. § 609.1352 (1996).

Appellant was subsequently convicted in Ramsey County of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (1996). Because the Washington County District Court had previously found appellant to be a patterned sex offender, the Ramsey County District Court imposed a mandatory life sentence under Minn. Stat. § 609.346, subd. 2a(a) (1996).

Appellant has frequently appealed both of these convictions and sentences. In this appeal, appellant challenges the Ramsey County District Court's denial of his motion to correct the life sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, and argues that the sentence was not authorized by law. The district court denied appellant's motion, both because it concluded that his sentence was authorized by law, and because it considered his action to be a postconviction petition that is time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (2016), and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976).

This appeal followed.

DECISION

Appellant argues that his life sentence was unauthorized by law because it was based on the earlier Washington County sentence under section 609.1352, which appellant argues was not supported by sufficient findings.1

A district court "may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law." Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. "[F]or a sentence to be unauthorized, it must be contrary to law or applicable statutes." Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Whether a sentence is authorized by law is a legal question that we review de novo. Vazquez v. State, 822 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. App. 2012).

Appellant was sentenced in Ramsey County under Minn. Stat. § 609.346, subd. 2a(a)(1), (2)(i), which requires a sentencing court to impose a life sentence if the person is convicted under section 609.342 and that person was previously sentenced as a patterned sex offender under section 609.1352. The Ramsey County District Court correctly found that both of these factors were met. Appellant had been previously convicted under section 609.342, and he had earlier been sentenced as a patterned sex offender by the Washington County District Court under section 609.1352. As such, the Ramsey County sentence is authorized by law.

Appellant fails to identify error by the Ramsey County District Court. Instead, he argues that the Washington County District Court's sentence under section 609.1352 was not supported by sufficient findings.2 It is not the proper role of the sentencing court in Ramsey County to review the Washington County District Court's earlier sentencing orders for error.3 State ex rel. Minn. Nat'l Bank of Duluth v. Dist. Court, 195 Minn. 169, 173-74, 262 N.W. 155, 157 (1935) ("Our district courts have concurrent jurisdiction. In spite of the theory that they constitute but one court, they yet function as independent tribunals. . . . [w]hen one acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties to an ordinary lawsuit that jurisdiction is exclusive." (citation omitted)). The Ramsey County District Court correctly found that appellant had previously been sentenced under section 609.1352, and it therefore properly declined to further review the Washington County District Court's earlier sentencing order. The district did not err in denying appellant's motion under rule 27.03, subdivision 9.

Appellant makes additional arguments by way of a separate pro se brief. These arguments mostly restate counsel's arguments concerning whether appellant's sentence was legally authorized. Appellant's additional pro se arguments provide no discernable basis for appellate relief.

Because the district court correctly denied the motion on substantive grounds, we need not address whether appellant's motion was time barred or procedurally barred.

Affirmed; motion denied.