GRIFFIS, P.J., for the Court:
¶ 1. In this slip-and-fall case, Joseph Jones alleges that he sustained injuries when he tripped and fell on a misaligned "parking bumper" while he was a patron at the Imperial Palace Casino in Biloxi, Mississippi. The circuit court determined that Jones had failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed and held that the premises owner, Imperial Palace of Mississippi LLC, was entitled to summary judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2. On September 3, 2006, Jones had finished playing blackjack on the first floor of the Imperial Palace Casino, and decided to go eat dinner at the restaurant on the second floor. As he walked toward the elevator, Jones noticed the elevators were very crowded. Jones decided to walk up the stairs into the parking garage to the second floor.
¶ 3. When he entered the parking garage, he attempted to avoid the vehicular traffic and walked down a walkway that
¶ 4. Employees of Imperial Palace completed an incident report and photographed the parking bumper after Jones's fall. There were no witnesses to the fall.
¶ 5. On August 8, 2007, Jones filed a complaint against Imperial Palace. The complaint asserted a negligence or premises-liability claim. Imperial Palace filed its responsive pleading, and discovery ensued.
¶ 6. On July 23, 2010, Imperial Palace filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion included an itemization of material facts relied upon and not genuinely disputed, the complaint, excerpts of Jones's deposition, and Jones's interrogatory responses. Imperial Palace offered no other testimony, including expert testimony, to support the motion. Imperial Palace's motion argued that Jones could not prove his premises-liability claim. Jones responded and offered excerpts from his deposition, the Imperial Palace incident report, photographs, excerpts of Paul Dillon's deposition, and excerpts of Imperial Palace's Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) deposition, among other exhibits.
¶ 7. On February 10, 2012, the circuit court heard arguments on the motion for summary judgment. On February 23, 2012, the circuit court entered an order that granted Imperial Palace's motion. The order was prepared and submitted by Imperial Palace's counsel. Jones now appeals from this judgment.
¶ 8. The grant of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Karpinsky v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 109 So.3d 84, 88 (¶ 9) (Miss.2013). We view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made." Id.
¶ 9. The supreme court has held:
Id. at 88-89 (¶¶ 10-11) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
¶ 10. The court succinctly clarified this standard in a manner in which we can relate to the parties here:
Id. at 89 (¶ 13). In this appeal, we will consider whether Jones produced sufficient evidence of the essential elements of his premises-liability claim.
¶ 11. In Mississippi, a premises-liability claim is reviewed in three steps. Haggard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 75 So.3d 1120, 1124 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2011). First, the court "must determine whether the injured party was an invitee, licensee, or a trespasser at the time of the injury." Id. Second, the court "must determine what duty was owed to the injured party by the business owner/operator." Id. Third, the court "must determine whether that duty was breached." Id.
¶ 12. An invitee is a person who enters the premises of another in response to an "express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage." Leffler v. Sharp, 891 So.2d 152, 156 (¶ 11) (Miss.2004). Jones was a business invitee of Imperial Palace.
¶ 13. The premises owner "owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition...." Jerry Lee's Grocery, Inc. v. Thompson, 528 So.2d 293, 295 (Miss.1988). However, the operator of a business "is not an insurer against all injuries." Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Miss.1992). "Proof merely of the occurrence of a fall on a floor within a business is insufficient to show negligence on the part of the proprietor...." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Tisdale, 185 So.2d 916, 917 (Miss.1966).
¶ 14. To prevail on his premises-liability claim, Jones must prove by a preponderance of the evidence one of the following: (1) Imperial Palace's own negligence created a dangerous condition that caused Jones's injury; (2) Imperial Palace had actual knowledge of a hazardous condition that it did not cause, but failed to adequately warn Jones of the danger he faced as an invitee; or (3) based upon the passage of time, Imperial Palace should have known of the dangerous condition caused by another party, i.e., constructive knowledge of the condition should be imputed to Imperial Palace. Downs v. Choo, 656 So.2d 84, 86 (Miss.1995).
¶ 15. In granting summary judgment, the circuit court determined that Jones failed to meet any of the three-prongs of a premises-liability claim.
¶ 16. The circuit court found that Jones "was not able to say that [Imperial Palace] caused the parking curb to be out of place." Indeed, Jones does not argue that Imperial Palace, as the premises owner, caused or created the hazardous condition.
¶ 17. The circuit court found that Jones "has not set forth any evidence to show that [Imperial Palace] had actual knowledge of the misalignment of the parking curb [Jones] tripped upon. As such, this argument also fails." Jones argues that this was error.
¶ 18. To prove Imperial Palace had actual knowledge of the hazardous condition but failed to warn of or remedy the condition, Jones offered excerpts from Dillon's deposition. At the time of Jones's incident, Dillon was employed by Imperial Palace as the shift security manager; he was no longer employed there at the time of his deposition. Dillon investigated Jones's incident.
¶ 19. Dillon testified that Jones walked down a walkway that was authorized for use by Imperial Palace patrons. Dillon admitted that he and other patrons had used the walkway. Dillon also testified that he knew some of the parking bumpers in the parking garage were out of place prior to the incident. Dillon admitted that such misaligned parking bumpers could pose a tripping hazard. Specifically, he testified:
¶ 20. Jones argues that Dillon's testimony was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Imperial Palace's actual knowledge of the hazard posed by the misaligned parking bumpers prior to Jones's incident. See Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So.2d 1267, 1276 n. 9 (Miss.2007) ("An employee's knowledge is imputed to his employer.") (citations omitted). As a result, since Imperial Palace had actual knowledge that the parking bumpers throughout its garage were misaligned and posed a tripping hazard, Jones
¶ 21. In Drennan v. Kroger Co., 672 So.2d 1168, 1169 (Miss.1996), the supreme court considered an incident where a plaintiff slipped and fell in a puddle of water that accumulated on the floor of the defendant's premises during a rain storm. The court held that the plaintiff was not required to offer evidence that the defendant had knowledge or notice of the specific leak or puddle at issue because the defendant had knowledge of ongoing issues with roof leaks at its store. Id. at 1172. The court held that "evidence that the roof was prone to leak during periods of rain" allowed the jury to "infer ... that the collection of water on the floor was not completely unexpected...." The court reasoned that even if the plaintiff was required to establish notice of the water on the floor, she had done so because the evidence "created an inference that the Kroger store should have been aware of the leaks in the roof. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient as well to create a jury issue as to whether Kroger was negligent...." Id.
¶ 22. Imperial Palace provided no evidence to the contradict Dillon's testimony. For the purpose of summary judgment, Dillon's testimony is sufficient to find that there is a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute as to whether Imperial Palace had actual knowledge of the hazard posed by the misaligned parking bumpers. Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to this issue.
¶ 23. The circuit court held:
¶ 24. To prove that Imperial Palace had constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition and that such knowledge should be imputed to Imperial Palace, Jones offered excerpts from Dillon's deposition:
Dillon testified that he knew about the hazard posed by the misaligned parking bumpers five months before Jones's trip-and-fall incident on September 6, 2006. Dillon also testified that he reported the misaligned parking bumpers to his superiors. The circuit court seized upon the following words in Dillon's testimony to conclude that it did not provide evidence of constructive knowledge:
(Emphasis added).
¶ 25. The use of the words "once upon a time" are certainly ambiguous. However, for purposes of summary judgment, Dillon's testimony was sufficient to establish that Imperial Palace (through its employee) knew or should have known of the hazard posed by the misaligned parking bumpers for five months before Jones's incident.
¶ 26. As a result, we find that there is a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute as to this issue. Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to this issue.
¶ 27. Jones also argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment without even considering the evidence that established Imperial Palace breached its duty to conduct reasonable inspections of its premises.
¶ 28. Mississippi premises-liability law provides that "an operator of business premise[s] owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition." Jacox v. Circus Circus Miss., Inc., 908 So.2d 181, 184 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). "[T]he operator of a business is not an insurer against all injuries." Id. In order for a premises owner to discharge its duty of reasonable care, Mississippi law requires the premises owner "to warn of any dangerous conditions not readily apparent, [of] which the owner knew, or should have known," and "to conduct reasonable inspections to discover dangerous conditions existing on the premises." Pigg v. Express Hotel Partners, LLC, 991 So.2d 1197, 1200 (¶ 5) (Miss.2008) (emphasis added).
¶ 29. Jones offered the deposition testimony of Imperial Palace's Rule 30(b)(6) corporate representative, Peter Burns, to establish that Imperial Palace had failed to conduct reasonable inspections of its premises for potential hazards. Burns testified that no repairs or other maintenance with respect to the parking bumpers was done between September 2003 and September 2006:
¶ 30. Burns also testified that Imperial Palace did not conduct safety meetings during the time period between June 27, 2005, and September 2006; that Imperial Palace had no safety or risk-management procedures or handbook at that time; and that Imperial Palace had no policies or procedures concerning maintenance or repairs for the parking-garage bumper blocks:
¶ 31. As set forth in Pigg, Imperial Palace had a duty to warn Jones of any dangerous condition that was not readily apparent, of which it knew or should have known upon reasonable inspection, and to conduct reasonable inspections of its premises for dangerous conditions. Pigg, 991 So.2d at 1200 (¶ 5). Imperial Palace's Rule 30(b)(6) representative established that Imperial Palace: (1) conducted no safety meetings during the time period of June 27, 2005, to September 2006; (2) had no safety or risk-management procedures or handbook at the time of Jones's accident; (3) had no policies or procedures concerning maintenance or repairs of the misaligned parking bumpers; and (4) failed to inspect, make repairs to, or conduct maintenance on the parking bumpers between September 2003 and September 2006. Although the circuit court did not address Imperial Palace's duty to conduct reasonable inspections, we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether or not Imperial Palace breached its duty to conduct reasonable inspections of its premises.
¶ 32. As a result, we find that there is a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute as to this issue. Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to this issue.
¶ 33. This case is remanded for further proceedings.
¶ 34.
LEE, C.J., ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., AND BARNES, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. CARLTON, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
