WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. Walter Williams was the public works director for the City of Belzoni until the board of aldermen voted not to renew his employment. Williams did not exercise his statutory right to appeal the board's decision to circuit court. Instead, more than a year later, he filed an independent lawsuit against the city and one alderman (Gary Farmer) in circuit court, asserting claims for defamation and "wrongful termination." Williams purported to proceed under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), Mississippi Code Annotated sections 11-46-1 to -23 (Rev. 2012 & Supp. 2016). The circuit court dismissed the entire action without prejudice, reasoning that it was without jurisdiction because Williams failed to file a timely appeal from the board's decision not to renew his employment.
¶ 2. The circuit court properly dismissed Williams's wrongful termination claim because he failed to file a timely appeal, which is the exclusive remedy for a party aggrieved by such a decision of a municipal authority. In addition, Williams's defamation claim against the city is barred by sovereign immunity, and his defamation claim against Farmer is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint; however, as we explain infra, the dismissal should be with prejudice. Therefore, we modify and render the judgment as a dismissal with prejudice.
¶ 3. On August 6, 2013, the city's board of aldermen divided 2-2, with one member indicated "not present," on a motion to renew Williams's employment as public works director for the city. The mayor voted against the motion, thereby breaking the tie and effectively terminating Williams's employment.
¶ 4. On August 29, 2013, Williams wrote a letter to the mayor and board requesting a hearing on his termination. The city did not respond and no hearing was held.
¶ 5. On July 14, 2014, Williams served the city with a notice of claim pursuant to the MTCA. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Rev. 2012). Williams alleged that he was terminated because Farmer, who had voted against the motion to renew his employment, made a false and defamatory accusation that he had stolen one of the city's lawnmowers. Williams also alleged that his termination was procedurally improper and that Farmer was not qualified to be an alderman because he lived outside of the Belzoni city limits. On October 29, 2014, Williams filed suit in Humphreys County Circuit Court against Farmer and the city. Williams asserted claims for defamation, slander, and slander per se (Count I) and "wrongful termination" (Count II).
¶ 6. The city and Farmer answered the complaint and subsequently filed a joint motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. They argued that Williams's claims against the city were barred by sovereign immunity. They also argued that Williams's claims were barred because he failed to appeal the city's decision not to renew his employment within ten days, as
¶ 7. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion, finding that the court was "without jurisdiction to hear this matter due to [Williams's] failure to file a [timely] notice of appeal" pursuant to section 11-51-75. In its final judgment, the circuit court stated that it was granting summary judgment for the defendants and that the action was dismissed "without prejudice" because Williams's claims were "barred procedurally" and thus could not "properly be reviewed by [the court]."
¶ 8. On appeal, Williams argues that (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing his defamation claim against Farmer; (2) his case should not have been dismissed due to his failure to appeal the board's decision because "there was no final action or decision from which [he] could have appealed"; and (3) "the board induced [him] into sleeping on his rights." We consider these arguments below in the course of addressing Williams's claims for "wrongful termination" and defamation/slander.
¶ 9. At the outset, it should be understood that Williams's "wrongful termination" claim is not a "McArn claim." See McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603, 607 (Miss. 1993) (recognizing "a narrow public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine": an employee who is terminated because he "refuses to participate in an illegal act" or "report[s] illegal acts of his employer" may bring an action in tort for wrongful termination). Rather, Williams's complaint and subsequent pleadings make clear that his claim is simply that his termination was "wrongful" because, allegedly, Farmer was not a resident or qualified alderman, the city failed to follow unspecified rules and regulations, and he should not have been terminated based on an "unsubstantiated allegation."
¶ 10. Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-51-75 permits a party aggrieved by such a decision of a municipal authority to appeal to circuit court by filing a bill of exceptions within ten days. "The statute's ten (10) day time limit in which to appeal the decision of a [b]oard is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Where an appeal is not perfected within the statutory time constraints no jurisdiction is conferred on the appellate court; and the untimely action should be dismissed." Newell v. Jones Cty., 731 So.2d 580, 582 (¶ 10) (Miss. 1999) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Claiborne Cty. v. Parker, 26 So.3d 1078, 1080 (¶ 4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the board's decision to terminate an employee where the employee failed to appeal within ten days). An appeal to circuit court pursuant to section 11-51-75 is the "exclusive remedy" for a party aggrieved by the decision of a municipal authority. E.g., Malone v. Leake Cty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 841 So.2d 141, 145 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2003). Williams's complaint was filed more than fourteen months after the board's decision. Therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed his wrongful termination claim for failure to comply with section 11-51-75's mandatory time limit.
¶ 11. Williams argues that, despite his failure to file a timely appeal, the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider his claim based on his allegations that the
¶ 12. As noted above, Williams also argues that section 11-51-75's ten-day time limit does not apply because "there was no final action or decision from which [he] could have appealed." The argument under this heading essentially repackages Williams's unsupported claim that Farmer is not a bona fide alderman. He contends that a decision that depends on the vote of an unqualified alderman is not "final." For the same reasons discussed above, this argument is without merit. The board's action was final on its face. If Williams desired to challenge the action taken, he was required to comply with section 11-51-75.
¶ 13. Finally, Williams argues that his failure to file a timely appeal should not bar his claim because "the board induced [him] into sleeping on his rights." The only evidence that he cites in support of this claim is his August 29, 2013 letter to the board requesting a hearing on his termination. In a proposed amended complaint,
¶ 14. In summary, because Williams failed to comply with section 11-51-75's mandatory ten-day time limit, the circuit court properly dismissed his wrongful termination claim. See Newell, 731 So.2d at 582 (¶ 10). Furthermore, because an appeal pursuant to section 11-51-75 was the exclusive remedy available to Williams to challenge the board's decision, the dismissal of his wrongful termination claim should have been with prejudice. Hood v. Perry Cty., 821 So.2d 900, 902 (¶¶ 5-10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); accord Pratt v. City of Greenville, 918 So.2d 81, 83 (¶¶ 5-12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006); Lucas v. Williamson, 852 So.2d 67, 68-69 (¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
¶ 15. Pursuant to the MTCA, "an employee shall not be considered as acting within the course and scope of his employment and a governmental entity shall not be liable or be considered to have waived immunity for any conduct of its employee if the employee's conduct constituted ... slander [or] defamation ...." Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5(2) (Rev. 2012). Thus, the city is immune from liability on any claim that Farmer slandered or defamed Williams.
¶ 16. "Defamation is divided into two torts, including libel for written defamations and slander for oral ones." Funderburk v. Johnson, 935 So.2d 1084, 1101 (¶ 45) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). All such claims must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrued. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (Rev. 2012). Williams's complaint alleges that Farmer defamed him at the August 6, 2013 board meeting by accusing him of stealing a lawnmower. Williams's complaint was not filed until October 29, 2014, beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations as it relates to any alleged slander on the date of the board meeting.
¶ 17. In his reply brief on appeal, Williams argues that his slander claim is not time-barred because his proposed amended complaint (see supra n.2) alleged that "Farmer ... continued to defame and otherwise slander [him] throughout the year." By "throughout the year," Williams apparently means that Farmer slandered him on at least one occasion within the applicable limitations period. It is true that "[e]ach repetition of slanderous words is a distinct cause of action," so the statute of
¶ 18. For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court properly dismissed the complaint. However, the dismissal should have been with prejudice because Williams failed to avail himself of the "exclusive remedy" available to him with respect to his wrongful termination claim; because his defamation claim against the city is barred by sovereign immunity; and because his defamation claim against Farmer is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint, but we modify and render the judgment of the circuit court as a dismissal with prejudice.
¶ 19.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.