IRVING, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. Joshua Seymour, administrator of the estate of Brenda F. Seymour, appeals the judgment of the Jackson County Chancery Court, arguing that the parties' joint tenancy was terminated by Brenda's filing of her partition suit, and that the chancellor erred in failing to award Brenda's estate with one-half of the ad valorem tax payments made on the property from 2008-2012. Joshua is not alleging that the chancellor's decision was an abuse of discretion, since he finds no fault with the chancellor's factual rulings, but, rather, his position is that the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard in regard to the circumstances giving rise to this appeal brought about by Brenda's death.
¶ 2. Finding no error, we affirm.
¶ 3. In light of the chancery court's succinct statement of facts in its final order, Appellee Richard Turner's
¶ 4. On February 26, 2015, Joshua filed an application to the clerk for an entry of default and a supporting affidavit. A clerk's entry of default was entered on February 26, 2015. On February 11, 2016, the matter came on for trial. Counsel for Brenda's estate was present. Richard was also present and proceeded pro se. As Richard failed to answer the complaint in this matter, a default judgment was also entered. With respect to the default judgment, the complaint and all of the allegations were taken as admitted and confessed, except that the court would determine all questions of law. At trial, Joshua testified that the taxes on the property had been paid by Nancy Grimes, Brenda's mother, and that, later, Nancy assigned her rights to reimbursement of those payments to Brenda's estate. Richard admitted at trial that he did not make the payments. Ultimately, the court found that upon Brenda's death, the subject property — which was held by Brenda and Richard as joint tenants with the right of survivorship — automatically vested in
¶ 5. "An appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless we can say with reasonable certainty that the chancellor abused his discretion, [the decision] was manifestly wrong [or] clearly erroneous, or [the chancellor] applied an erroneous legal standard." Jones v. Graphia, 95 So.3d 751, 753 (¶ 6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
¶ 6. Joshua points out that four unities — time, title, interest, and possession — must be present in a joint tenancy, and if one of the four unities is eliminated or terminated, the joint tenancy defaults into a tenancy in common. He argues that when Brenda filed the lawsuit on February 3, 2011, the filing terminated the joint tenancy existing between the parties and rendered it a tenancy in common, because the unity of possession had been severed. "Unity of possession" means that each joint tenant must have an undivided share in the property. See Wilder v. Currie, 231 Miss. 461, 474, 95 So.2d 563, 566 (1957). He contends that that was no longer the case upon the filing of the petition to partite, as once the partition suit was filed, Brenda was requesting either a division in kind or a division by sale. Consequently, he argues that the joint tenancy was transformed into a tenancy in common, which is not accompanied by a right of survivorship. Therefore, according to him, Brenda's death did nothing to deprive her estate of its ownership interest in the property.
¶ 7. We do not disagree with Joshua's contention that "[t]here must be unity of title, time, interest[,] and possession in a joint tenancy." Thornhill v. Chapman, 748 So.2d 819, 828 (¶ 30) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). The question here is, did the joint tenancy convert to a tenancy in common at the time that Brenda filed her suit to partite the property, vesting her interest in the property and eliminating the right-of-survivorship provision? We find that it did not. This Court has held:
Jones, 95 So.3d at 753-54 (¶¶ 7-8) (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). Appropriately, the court in Jones ruled that upon the death of one joint tenant, the right of survivorship automatically transfers the whole property to the surviving joint tenant.
¶ 8. Joshua, in an attempt to distinguish Jones, argues that "[i]f Jones enjoyed ownership of the whole prior to the proceeding and lost this enjoyment when Graphia filed, then her death afterward would be at a time after she lost this enjoyment." We disagree. The filing of Brenda's complaint had no effect on the status of the property as a joint tenancy. At that point, no rights had been lost, but became merely subject to loss depending on the trial and the chancellor's ultimate ruling. If Joshua's analysis were the rule of law, all a party would have to do is file a complaint to partite to convert the property from a joint tenancy to a tenancy in common and defeat the right of survivorship, effectively rendering the court's ultimate disposition of the case futile.
¶ 9. Although merely persuasive, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed this very issue in Jackson v. Estate of Green, 484 Mich. 209, 771 N.W.2d 675, 677 (2009), as follows:
For clarity, at the time that Brenda filed her complaint, the joint tenancy was still intact, and when she died, the property automatically transferred to Richard through the right of survivorship. There had been no final order issued at the time of her death, so the tenancy was never severed.
¶ 10. Joshua argues that Brenda's estate is entitled to a reimbursement of ad valorem taxes paid on the property from 2008-2012. The record reflects that the property was sold for taxes for each of the years in question, that Brenda redeemed it from the tax sale for two of those years, and that Nancy redeemed it from the tax sale for the other three years. Later, Nancy assigned to Brenda's estate her rights to reimbursement of the payments that she had made. Brenda's deposition was also read into the record, in which she testified that she had paid some of the taxes. Richard admitted at trial that he did not make the payments. The chancellor noted in her order that since Richard "failed to answer the [c]omplaint in this matter, a [d]efault [j]udgment was also entered ... [and] the
¶ 11. Joshua does not cite any authority to support his proposition — that the estate is entitled to a reimbursement of those payments. "Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)([7]), an appellant's brief must contain ... citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. [F]ailure to cite any authority is a procedural bar, and a reviewing court is under no obligation to consider the assignment." In re Estate of Forrest, 165 So.3d 548, 550 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). As such, we decline to address this issue any further. For the reasons discussed, we find no error in the judgment rendered by the chancery court.
¶ 12.
LEE, C.J., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.