HUGH W. BRENNEMAN, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
Plaintiff was born on December 11, 1964 (AR 97).
This court's review of the Commissioner's decision is typically focused on determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cutlip v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). A determination of substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1990).
The scope of this review is limited to an examination of the record only. This Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact that the record also contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as there is substantial support for that decision in the record. Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). Even if the reviewing court would resolve the dispute differently, the Commissioner's decision must stand if it is supported by substantial evidence. Young, 925 F.2d at 147.
A claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in order to be entitled to benefits. A disability is established by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505 and 416.905; Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). In applying the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a five-step analysis:
Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work through step four. Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). However, at step five of the inquiry, "the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant's residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile." Id. If it is determined that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in the evaluation process, further review is not necessary. Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).
The federal court's standard of review for SSI cases mirrors the standard applied in social security disability cases. See Bailey v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., No. 90-3265, 1991 WL 310 at * 3 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 1991). "The proper inquiry in an application for SSI benefits is whether the plaintiff was disabled on or after her application date." Casey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff's claim failed at the fifth step of the evaluation. The ALJ initially found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of September 18, 2006 and met the insured status requirements under the Act through September 20, 2012 (AR 15). Second, the ALJ found that plaintiff had a severe impairment of right shoulder glenohumeral degenerative arthritis (AR 15). At the third step, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (AR 11). In this regard, the ALJ reviewed Listing1.02B ("Major dysfunction of a joint(s)") (AR 17). The ALJ decided at the fourth step that plaintiff had:
(AR 17). The ALJ also found that plaintiff could not perform any of his past relevant work (AR 19).
At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could perform a significant number of unskilled, light jobs in the national economy (AR 19-20). Specifically, plaintiff could perform 49,000 jobs in the regional economy such as security guard (10,000 jobs), guide/greeter (14,000 jobs), and retail salesperson (25,000 jobs) (AR 19-20). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 18, 2006 through the date of the decision (February 1, 2010) (AR 20).
Plaintiff has raised one issue on appeal:
In evaluating plaintiff's medical condition, the ALJ noted that plaintiff had a history of right shoulder degenerative disease and that on May 7, 2009, his orthopedic surgeon, Jeffrey D. Recknagel, M.D., restricted him to no reaching overhead, no reaching over 18 inches from his body and no lifting of greater than 20 pounds (AR 175-76).
Approximately six months later, on November 10, 2009, plaintiff's long-time family physician, Paul Wagner, D.O., completed a residual functional capacity (RFC) form in which he identified a number of restrictions (AR 1322-26). Plaintiff could sit for 1 to 2 hours at a time; stand for 10 minutes; and walk 5 to 10 minutes (AR 1323). During an 8-hour workday, plaintiff could sit a total of 4 to 5 hours; stand 10 minutes; and walk 5 to 10 minutes (AR 1323). Plaintiff also needed to change position between sitting and standing every 15 minutes (AR 1323). Plaintiff has been limited in these activities since 1997 (AR 1323).
Plaintiff contends that the restrictions identified by Dr. Wagner were work preclusive, based upon the vocational expert's (VE's) testimony given during step five of the sequential evaluation. Plaintiff's Brief at p. 2. At step five, the ALJ determines whether the claimant possesses the capacity to perform substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. This determination must be supported by substantial evidence that the plaintiff has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs. Varley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). This evidence may be produced through the testimony of a VE in response to a hypothetical question which accurately portrays the claimant's physical and mental limitations. See Webb v. Commissioner of Social Security, 368 F.3d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2004); Varley, 820 F.2d at 779. However, a hypothetical question need only include those limitations which the ALJ accepts as credible. See Blacha v. Secretary of Health and Human Services., 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990). See also Stanley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services., 39 F.3d 115, 118 (6th Cir. 1994) ("the ALJ is not obliged to incorporate unsubstantiated complaints into his hypotheticals").
Here, the ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the VE which restricted the hypothetical person to activities consistent with plaintiff's RFC (AR 17, 49). Based on this hypothetical question, the VE identified 49,000 jobs that such a person could perform (AR 49-50). After the ALJ established this vocational evidence, plaintiff's counsel posed an additional hypothetical question to the VE, which would assumed that the hypothetical person "needed to recline for approximately two out of eight hours" each day (AR 50). The VE testified that this additional restriction would eliminate the 49,000 jobs identified in the ALJ's hypothetical question (AR 50).
Plaintiff's claim is without merit. In his brief, plaintiff suggests that Dr. Wagner identified certain work-preclusive limitations (i.e., sitting four to five hours out of an 8-hour workday and standing/walking less than one hour out of an 8-hour workday) and that the VE adopted these limitations. Plaintiff's Brief at p. 2. Plaintiff, however, has mis-characterized the VE's testimony. The VE did not address a hypothetical individual with the restrictions identified by Dr. Wagner. According to the VE, the work-preclusive limitation would be plaintiff's need to recline for approximately two out of eight hours (AR 50). Dr. Wagner did not identify a "need to recline." Rather, it was plaintiff who testified that he may sleep in a recliner for two hours during a day (AR 46). Accordingly, plaintiff's claim of error arising from the VE's testimony will be denied.
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to adopt Dr. Wagner's RFC assessment as it pertained to his orthopedic conditions. A treating physician's medical opinions and diagnoses are entitled to great weight in evaluating plaintiff's alleged disability. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001). "In general, the opinions of treating physicians are accorded greater weight than those of physicians who examine claimants only once." Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 529-30 (6th Cir. 1997). The agency regulations provide that if the Commissioner finds that a treating medical source's opinion on the issues of the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record, [the Commissioner] will give it controlling weight." Walters, 127 F.3d at 530, quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). But an ALJ is not bound by the conclusory statements of doctors, particularly where the statements are unsupported by detailed objective criteria and documentation. Buxton, 246 F.3d at 773; Cohen v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). In summary, the opinions of a treating physician "are only accorded great weight when they are supported by sufficient clinical findings and are consistent with the evidence." Cutlip v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 287 (6th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526. Finally, the ALJ must articulate good reasons for not crediting the opinion of a treating source. See Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (because the opinion of a treating source is entitled to controlling weight under certain circumstances, the ALJ must articulate good reasons for not crediting the opinion of a treating source under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).
The ALJ found that plaintiff had a severe impairment of right shoulder glenohumeral degenerative arthritis and adopted the restrictions identified by plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Recknagel, on May 7, 2009 (AR 15-19, 175-76). The ALJ also found, however, that plaintiff's knee problems did not limit his ability to perform basic work activities (AR 16). The ALJ addressed Dr. Wagner's treatment of this condition as follows:
(AR 16, 18).
Finally, the ALJ found no objective medical evidence that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome posed more than "minimal limitations" (AR 16). The ALJ addressed this issue in pertinent part as follows:
(AR 16).
The ALJ has articulated good reasons for not crediting Dr. Wagner's opinions, particularly regarding the limitations on plaintiff's knees and wrists. The ALJ adopted the restrictions assigned by plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon with respect to the shoulders. "It is within the authority of the ALJ to resolve any conflicts among the opinions of treating and examining physicians." Jenkins v. Chater, 76 F.3d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1996). The ALJ could properly defer to the opinions of the orthopedic surgeon as a specialist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5) ("[w]e generally give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist"). With respect to plaintiff's knee problems, the ALJ noted the lack of records supporting plaintiff's claim for a total knee replacement (AR 16).
With respect to the wrist, the ALJ found no objective medical record indicating a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome (AR 16). Plaintiff has submitted a copy of a letter to the ALJ dated November 12, 2009 (five days before the administrative hearing), which included a nerve conduction study performed on November 30, 2007. See NC-stat onCall Report (docket no. 10). The study was included in the administrative record (AR 1295-1299). While the study was "abnormal" and "consistent with a mild bilateral median neuropathy at the wrist," it did not include a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome (AR 1295-99). In addition, the study included various disclaimers, e.g., the study "does not imply that all listed neuropathies are clinically relevant" and advised that the results "should be clinically correlated" by a doctor (AR 1298). While the ALJ did not specifically address the study in his decision, this does not amount to an error requiring reversal. The Commissioner must provide a statement of evidence and reasons on which the decision is based. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1). However, it is unnecessary for the ALJ to address every piece of medical evidence. See Heston, 245 F.3d at 534-35 (ALJ's failure to discuss a doctor's report was harmless error because the reviewing court should consider all of the evidence in the record). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision rejecting plaintiff's claim that he was disabled due to carpal tunnel syndrome.
The ALJ's determination of plaintiff's residual functional capacity, taken together with the testimony of the vocational expert, provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that there are a significant number of jobs in the relevant economy that plaintiff can perform. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision will be affirmed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion shall be issued forthwith.
