OPINION

HUGH W. BRENNEMAN, Jr., Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying his claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI).

Plaintiff was born on July 1, 1976 (AR 171).1 On July 29, 2007, he suffered an injury when he fell over six feet, landing on his back (AR 175). As a result of this accident, plaintiff underwent lumbar fusion surgery on August 25, 2008 (AR 18). Plaintiff filed for DIB and SSI, claiming to have been disabled since the July 2007 accident (AR 171). Plaintiff identified his disabling conditions as a spinal injury, surgery and removal of L4, L5 and S1, and installation of steel gages in his back (AR 174).

Plaintiff completed a GED and had additional classes in computer literacy, electronic assembly and soldering (AR 182). He had previous employment as a chef in a deli, a coop worker at a chicken farm, a general laborer, a machine operator, an assembler, an inspector and a painter (AR 176). An administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewed plaintiff's claim de novo and entered a decision granting benefits in part on August 16, 2011 (AR 11-29). The ALJ found that plaintiff was disabled from July 29, 2007 through November 4, 2009, but had medically improved as of November 5, 2009, and was not disabled as of that date (AR 29). This decision, which was later approved by the Appeals Council, has become the final decision of the Commissioner and is now before the Court for review.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

This court's review of the Commissioner's decision is typically focused on determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cutlip v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). A determination of substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 925 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1990).

The scope of this review is limited to an examination of the record only. This Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact that the record also contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as there is substantial support for that decision in the record. Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). Even if the reviewing court would resolve the dispute differently, the Commissioner's decision must stand if it is supported by substantial evidence. Young, 925 F.2d at 147.

A claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in order to be entitled to benefits. A disability is established by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505; Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). In applying the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a five-step analysis:

Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work through step four. Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). However, at step five of the inquiry, "the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant's residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile." Id. If it is determined that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in the evaluation process, further review is not necessary. Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).

If a claimant is found disabled at any point in the process, as in this case, the ALJ must also determine if the disability continued through the date of the decision. Under the regulations, an ALJ conducts an analysis to determine whether a claimant has experienced medical improvement2:

Love v. Commissioner of Social Security, 605 F.Supp.2d 893, 904 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (footnotes omitted). Where a claimant seeks DIB, the medical improvement analysis initially asks whether the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity. Id. at fn. 1; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(1).

"The federal court's standard of review for SSI cases mirrors the standard applied in social security disability cases." D'Angelo v. Commissioner of Social Security, 475 F.Supp.2d 716, 719 (W.D. Mich. 2007). "The proper inquiry in an application for SSI benefits is whether the plaintiff was disabled on or after her application date." Casey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993).

II. ALJ'S DECISION

A. July 29, 2007 through November 4, 2009

The ALJ initially found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of July 29, 2007 and that he met the insured status requirements under the Social Security Act through September 30, 2010 (AR 15). Second, the ALJ found that from July 29, 2007 through November 4, 2009, plaintiff had severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, post lumbar fusion; depression; and a mood disorder with chronic pain (AR 15). At the third step, the ALJ found that from July 29, 2007 through November 4, 2009, plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (AR 15). Specifically, plaintiff did not meet the requirements of Listings 1.04 (disorders of the spine) or 12.04 (affective disorders) (AR 15-16).

The ALJ decided at the fourth step that from July 29, 2007 through November 4, 2009:

(AR 16). The ALJ also found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work during this time period (AR 20).

At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that from July 29, 2007 through November 4, 2009, there were no jobs that existed in significant numbers in the regional economy that plaintiff could perform considering his age, education, work experience and RFC (AR 20). Therefore, the ALJ found that plaintiff was under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, from July 29, 2007 through November 4, 2009 (AR 21).

B. Since November 5, 2009

After the ALJ found that plaintiff was disabled, she applied the medical improvement analysis and concluded that medical improvement occurred as of November 5, 2009 (AR 23).3 Having previously found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of July 29, 2007 (AR 15), the ALJ found that plaintiff still had the same severe impairments, i.e., degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, post lumbar fusion; depression; and a mood disorder with chronic pain, and that plaintiff still did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (AR 15, 21). Specifically, plaintiff did not meet the requirements of Listings 1.04 (disorders of the spine) or 12.04 (affective disorders) (AR 21-23).

The ALJ determined that medical improvement had occurred as of November 5, 2009, based upon the results of plaintiff's consultative examination with Michael Jacobson, D.O. (AR 23). The ALJ found that the medical improvement was related to plaintiff's ability to work and that plaintiff's RFC had increased as follows:

(AR 23). Despite the increased RFC, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work (AR 27).

Finally, the ALJ determined that since November 5, 2009, plaintiff could perform a range of light work (AR 28-29). This work included the following jobs in the regional economy (Michigan): small parts assembler (5,800 jobs); packer/sorter (4,500 jobs); and general clerk (6,000 jobs) (AR 28). The ALJ noted that all of these jobs are unskilled and sedentary (AR 28). On this basis, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's disability ended on November 5, 2009 (AR 29).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raised three issues on appeal:

A. Is there substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's burden to establish that the claimant's condition has improved to the point that he has the RFC to perform substantial gainful activity?

1. Physical RFC

The ALJ determined that plaintiff's disability ceased on November 5, 2009, the date he underwent a consultative examination with Dr. Jacobson (AR 23). The doctor summarized plaintiff's condition as follows:

(AR 561).

The ALJ relied on Dr. Jacobson's opinion as the basis for finding medical improvement:

(AR 23).

Plaintiff contends that his physical condition did not improve as of November 5, 2009. Specifically, plaintiff contends that Dr. Jacobson did not perform a functional assessment, and that "[t]here is certainly nothing in the opinion of Dr. Jacobson that provides any substantial evidence that the claimant can frequently lift ten pounds, or sit for most of an eight hour day." Plaintiff's Brief at p. 10. Plaintiff's position is somewhat disingenuous. As noted by the ALJ, it was plaintiff who reported to Dr. Jacobson that he only needed a cane to walk over uneven surfaces or for more than 100 feet and that he could lift 15 pounds (AR 559). Furthermore, on testing, the doctor found that plaintiff had normal range of motion for his dorsolumbar spine and that plaintiff's motor strength was "5/5", that plaintiff's sensation remained intact, that plaintiff's reflexes were present and symmetrical and that plaintiff was "alert and oriented times three" (AR 560).

The ALJ translated Dr. Jacobson's findings into the November 5, 2009 RFC, which included the following improvements: (1) plaintiff could now perform light work rather than sedentary work; (2) plaintiff could now stand for at least two hours and sit about six hours total in an eight hour workday; (3) plaintiff could now walk up to 100 feet without a cane; and (4) it was no longer necessary for plaintiff to take unscheduled breaks (AR 16, 23). Accordingly, plaintiff's claim of error will be denied.

2. Mental RFC

Plaintiff's mental RFC remained unchanged after November 5, 2009, i.e., he was still limited to performing "simple, routine, repetitive tasks" (AR 16, 23). Plaintiff relies on the opinions of licensed psychologist, Douglas W. Bentley, Ed.D. who examined plaintiff on February 18, 2010 (AR 602-05), to support his claim that he suffered from severe and disabling mental limitations after that date.

The ALJ summarized Dr. Bentley's findings as follows:

(AR 24).

The ALJ evaluated Dr. Bentley's opinion as follows:

(AR 27). In finding that plaintiff was not disabled, the ALJ gave great weight to the December 28, 2009 opinion of a non-examining state agency psychologist, Fred Greaves, Ed.D. who reviewed plaintiff's medical records and determined that plaintiff was only partially credible and capable of performing simple, routine tasks within his physical limitations (AR 579).

Plaintiff contends that his low Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") scores4 assigned by Dr. Bentley are evidence of his severe limitations. Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 10-12. Plaintiff's claim fails to the extent he relies on the low GAF score to establish his disability claim. The Sixth Circuit has rejected the proposition that a determination of disability can be based solely on the unsupported, subjective determination of a GAF score. See Rutter v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 95-1581, 1996 WL 397424 at *2 (6th Cir. July 15, 1996). A GAF score "may have little or no bearing on the subject's social and occupational functioning." Kornecky v. Commissioner of Social Security, 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 511 (6th Cir.2006). In addition, "[t]he GAF scale... does not have a direct correlation to the severity requirements in our mental disorders listings." Oliver v. Commissioner of Social Security, 415 Fed. Appx. 681, 684 (6th Cir. 2011), quoting Response to Comment, Final Rules on Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, 65 FR 50746, 50764-65 (Aug. 21, 2000). As the Sixth Circuit explained in Kennedy v. Astrue, 247 Fed. Appx.761 (6th Cir.2007):

Kennedy, 247 Fed. Appx. at 766. In short, there are no "statutory, regulatory, or other authority requiring the ALJ to put stock in a GAF score in the first place." Kornecky, 167 Fed. Appx. at 511. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish disability relying solely on the low GAF scores assigned by Dr. Bentley.

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly relied on the findings of the nonexamining psychologist, Dr. Greaves. Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 10-12. As a general rule, the Commissioner gives more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant rather than to the opinion of a source who has not examined the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1) and 416.927(c)(1). However, an ALJ may rely on the opinions of the state agency physicians who reviewed plaintiff's file. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i) and 416.927(e)(2)(i)(state agency medical consultants and other program physicians are "highly qualified physicians . . . who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation"). See Carter v. Commissioner of Social Security, 36 Fed.Appx. 190, 191 (6th Cir. 2002) ("a non-examining physician's opinion may be accepted over that of examining doctors when the non-examining physician clearly states the reasons for his differing opinion," citing Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir.1994)). See also, Fletcher v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 99-5902, 2000 WL 687658 (6th Cir. May 19, 2000) (rejecting per se rule that opinion of non-examining medical source cannot constitute substantial evidence when those opinions are contradicted by the opinions of examining but non-treating consultants); SSR 96-6p ("In appropriate circumstances, opinions from State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians and psychologists may be entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources"). Here, the ALJ could properly discount Dr. Bentley's opinion and give more weight to the opinion of the non-examining psychologist, Dr. Greaves, who had the opportunity to review and consider all of plaintiff's medical evidence (AR 27). Plaintiff's claim of error will be denied.

B. Has the Commissioner committed legal error in the consideration of non-examining physician testimony requiring reversal?

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by relying on the evidence presented by the "non-examining staff medical experts" rather then "the opinions of treating providers." Plaintiff's Brief at p. 14. Plaintiff, however, fails to point to any particular treating providers that the ALJ improperly evaluated. It is not enough for plaintiff to simply raise this issue without identifying the treating physicians, their opinions and the ALJ's evaluation of those opinions. A court need not make the lawyer's case by scouring the party's various submissions to piece together appropriate arguments. Little v. Cox's Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1995). "[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in a most skeletal way, leaving the court to. . . put flesh on its bones." McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the court deems this argument waived.

C. Has the Commissioner committed legal error in taking administrative notice of facts not in evidence?

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed legal error because she took "administrative notice of facts not in evidence" while evaluating plaintiff's credibility. An ALJ may discount a claimant's credibility where the ALJ "finds contradictions among the medical records, claimant's testimony, and other evidence." Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). "It [i]s for the [Commissioner] and his examiner, as the fact-finders, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and weigh and evaluate their testimony." Heston, 245 F.3d at 536, quoting Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1972). The court "may not disturb" an ALJ's credibility determination "absent [a] compelling reason." Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001). The threshold for overturning an ALJ's credibility determination on appeal is so high, that in recent years, the Sixth Circuit has expressed the opinion that "[t]he ALJ's credibility findings are unchallengeable," Payne v. Commissioner of Social Security, 402 Fed. Appx. 109, 113 (6th Cir. 2010), and that "[o]n appeal, we will not disturb a credibility determination made by the ALJ, the finder of fact... [w]e will not try the case anew, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility." Sullenger v. Commissioner of Social Security, 255 Fed. Appx. 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, an ALJ's credibility determinations regarding subjective complaints must be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security, 486 F.3d 234, 249 (6th Cir. 2007).

1. Plaintiff's lack of medical treatment and failure to take prescribed medication

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed error because she did not account for plaintiff's lack of health insurance. Plaintiff does not set forth any particular finding by the ALJ to support this claim, stating only that:

Plaintiff's Brief at p. 4. Presumably, plaintiff is referring to these passages which appear at page 26 of the administrative record:

(AR 17) (emphasis added).

Pursuant to SSR 96-7p, an ALJ cannot draw inferences about a claimant's failure to obtain medical treatment for alleged symptoms without first considering an explanation for that failure:

SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *7-8 (July 2, 1996).

The ALJ's decision discounted plaintiff's credibility because he did not seek medication or treatment from November 5, 2009 through the Spring of 2010 (AR 26). Contrary to plaintiff's claim, there is no evidence that plaintiff lacked health insurance during any of that time period, with the exception of May and June 2010. Plaintiff's only evidence on this issue comes from two medical records from May and June 2010 in which plaintiff stated to personnel at Ionia County Community Mental Health (CMH) that he did not have health insurance (AR 618, 623). It is noteworthy that plaintiff made those statements while he was receiving treatment at CMH (AR 25, 618, 623). Records reflect that during his June 2010 visit to CMH, plaintiff was referred to Montcalm Area Health Center/Cherry Street Services for additional treatment (AR 623). This record indicates that plaintiff had access to some level of health care even for the short time he was not insured.

In addition, the ALJ questioned plaintiff about his use of pain medication and why he did not take Vicodin as prescribed (AR 65-67, 69-71). Plaintiff stated that he did not take prescribed pain medication because in his words, "I really don't like the idea of pills and that" (AR 65). Plaintiff also provided extensive testimony regarding his use of marijuana. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff had recently obtained a medical marijuana card and smoked marijuana for his back pain (AR 71). Plaintiff gave conflicting testimony regarding the reasons why his treating physician, Dr. Loren Smith, stopped his Vicodin prescription. First, plaintiff testified that Dr. Smith would not prescribe plaintiff Vicodin after the doctor found marijuana in his urine (AR 65). Second, plaintiff suggested that Dr. Smith took him off of Vicodin because he was addicted to the medication (AR 65-66). Third, plaintiff testified that when Dr. Smith found out that plaintiff was smoking marijuana (before he "was legal"), the doctor took him off Vicodin, and told plaintiff that "if you're already taking [marijuana] for chronic back pain then you don't need [Vicodin]" (AR 71).

Plaintiff also testified that while the marijuana helped him relax it did not do much for the pain:

(AR 66).

Based on this line of questioning, the ALJ considered plaintiff's explanations regarding his failure to pursue treatment and take prescribed medication. While plaintiff stated a preference for smoking marijuana over taking Vicodin pills (even though the marijuana did not provide much relief from his pain), plaintiff never claimed that he was unable to obtain treatment due to a lack of insurance. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim of error will be denied.

2. Plaintiff's demeanor

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ ignored the serious limitations of the medical examiners and treaters because of the ALJ's observations of plaintiff at the hearing. The ALJ addressed plaintiff's demeanor as follows:

(AR 26). The ALJ could properly address plaintiff's demeanor at the hearing. It is well established that "[t]he ALJ is charged with the responsibility of observing the demeanor and credibility of witnesses therefore his conclusions should be highly regarded." Bradley v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1988). This claim of error will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

The ALJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision will be affirmed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be issued forthwith.