PAUL L. MALONEY, District Judge.
In September 2015, Lacks Enterprises, Inc. and Lacks Home Products, LLC, filed a complaint seeking relief from an alleged breach of a settlement agreement with HD Supply, Inc., and The Home Depot, Inc.
The Court, after reviewing the pleadings, questioned why this action was not brought in the same court that previously handled the patent infringement dispute and entered an order of dismissal citing the settlement agreement.
Both parties filed responses and noted that while venue was proper in the Western District of Michigan, neither party opposed a transfer to the Eastern District. (ECF No. 33 at PageID.334 ("[D]efendants do not oppose a transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan . . . ."); ECF No. 34 at PageID.346 ("Plaintiffs do not object to the transfer of this matter to the Eastern District of Michigan.")); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ("[A] district court may transfer any civil action to any other district . . . to any district or division to which all parties have consented.").
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). "Although it is usually one of the parties that moves to transfer the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court may order transfer sua sponte provided the parties are first given the opportunity to argue their views on the issue." Hite v. Norwegian Caribbean Lines, 551 F.Supp. 390, 393 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (transferring a case from the Eastern District to the Western District of Michigan after raising the issue sua sponte); see, e.g., Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 933-34 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc); Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).
"Transfer is appropriate under § 1404(a) where: (1) venue is proper in the transferor district; (2) venue and jurisdiction are proper in the transferee district; and (3) the transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and will promote the interest of justice." Amoco Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 90 F.Supp.2d 958, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (citing Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1986)). Generally, courts in the Sixth Circuit weigh several factors. See, e.g., Reese v. CNH America LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Amoco Oil Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d at 959 (citing Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219) ("It is in the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine the weight accorded to each factor.").
"As the permissive language of the statute suggests, district courts have `broad discretion' to determine when party `convenience' or `the interests of justice' make a transfer appropriate. Only when the district court `clearly abuse[s] its discretion' in balancing these factors will we reverse." Reese, 574 F.3d at 320 (emphasis added) (citing Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994)).
The Federal Circuit has observed that transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 may be particularly appropriate in patent infringement actions. Indeed, "in a case such as this in which several highly technical factual issues are presented and the other relevant factors are in equipoise, the interest of judicial economy may favor transfer to a court that has become familiar with the issues"; and "consideration of the interest of justice, which includes judicial economy, may be determinative to a particular transfer motion, even if the convenience of the parties and witnesses might call for a different result."
Thus, the Court