ELLEN S. CARMODY, Magistrate Judge.
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff's son is not entitled to Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. On June 24, 2015, the parties agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. (ECF No. 10).
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record, and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that R.H. is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons articulated herein, the Commissioner's decision is
The Court's jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making his decision, and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and the Commissioner's findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984).
As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). The standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
Plaintiff's son, R.H., was born on March 21, 2003. (PageID.150). On August 14, 2012, Plaintiff submitted an application for disability benefits, asserting that R.H. has been disabled since December 11, 2011, due to depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), asthma, anxiety, attention deficit disorder (ADD), and anger. (PageID.150-58, 187). This application was denied, after which time Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.94-148). On September 5, 2013, ALJ Douglas Johnson conducted an administrative hearing at which Plaintiff and R.H. testified. (PageID.68-92). In a written decision dated November 26, 2013, the ALJ determined that R.H. was not entitled to disability benefits. (PageID.53-63). The Appeals Council declined to review this determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.35-40). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Federal law provides that an "individual under the age of 18" will be considered disabled if he "has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). To determine whether a child satisfies this standard, the Commissioner must evaluate the claim pursuant to a three-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924.
In the first step, if the ALJ determines that the child is engaged in substantial gainful activity she cannot be found to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b); Elam v. Commissioner of Social Security, 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003). If the child is not engaged in substantial gainful activity the analysis proceeds to step two, at which point the ALJ must determine whether the child has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c); Elam, 348 F.3d at 125. If the ALJ determines that the child suffers from a severe impairment, or combination of impairments, the analysis proceeds to step three, at which point the ALJ must determine whether the impairment(s) "meet, medically equal, or functionally equal" one of the impairments identified in the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d); Elam, 348 F.3d at 125.
After noting that R.H. was not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ proceeded to the second step of the analysis, finding that R.H. suffered from the following severe impairments: (1) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); (2) depressive disorder; (3) headaches; and (4) asthma. (PageID.56). At the third step of the analysis, the ALJ concluded that R.H.'s impairments do not, individually or in combination, meet or medically equal any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.56). The ALJ further determined that R.H.'s impairments do not functionally equal in severity any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments. (PageID.57-63).
To determine whether a child claimant suffers from an impairment which is the functional equivalent of a listed impairment, the ALJ must evaluate how the child functions in each of six domains of functioning described as "broad areas of functioning intended to capture all of what a child can or cannot do." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a)-(b). To be considered disabled the child's impairments must result in "marked" limitations in two domains of functioning or an "extreme" limitation in one domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). The six domains of functioning are:
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1).
The ALJ found that R.H. experienced less than marked limitation in the domains of attending and completing tasks and interacting and relating with others, and no limitation in the other four domains. (PageID.57-63). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that R.H. was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act.
As noted above, to determine whether a child claimant suffers from an impairment which is the functional equivalent of a listed impairment, the ALJ must assess the child's functioning in the aforementioned domains of functioning. The regulations articulate "age group descriptors" which attempt to identify the skills and proficiencies which children should attain by certain ages. The ALJ assessed R.H.'s claim pursuant to the "school-age" age group — age 6 to attainment of age 12.
To be considered disabled, the child's impairments must result in "marked" limitations
The domain of caring for yourself considers "how well you maintain a healthy emotional and physical state, including how well you get your physical and emotional wants and needs met in appropriate ways; how you cope with stress and changes in your environment; and whether you take care of your own health, possessions, and living area." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(k). Regarding this domain, the regulations provide as follows:
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.926a(k)(2)(iv).
The ALJ determined that R.H. "has no limitation in the ability to care for himself." (PageID.62). The ALJ's analysis supporting this conclusion consists of a single sentence: "The claimant['s] mother reported that he could perform personal care independently (Ex. 12E)."
This statement is simply not accurate. Exhibit 12E, referenced by the ALJ, is a report completed by Plaintiff concerning R.H.'s activities. (PageID.228-35). A close reading of this report reveals that Plaintiff did, in fact, report that R.H. experienced difficulty caring for himself as that term is defined above. (PageID.228-35). The ALJ apparently agrees with this assessment because, as noted below, the ALJ cited this very same exhibit to support the conclusion that R.H. "has difficulty completing his school assignments and requires additional supervision for his home chores." (PageID.60).
The ALJ's reasoning is also woefully insufficient. While the ALJ is not obligated to address every item of evidence in the record, he is required to "articulate, at some minimum level, his analysis of the evidence to allow the appellate court to trace the path of his reasoning." Connour v. Barnhart, 42 Fed. Appx. 823, 828 (6th Cir., July 23, 2002) (citation omitted). Despite the fact that this particular domain concerns a variety of behaviors and skills, the ALJ failed to address the evidence in any meaningful way and instead simply asserted a conclusion based upon an inaccurate assessment of a single piece of evidence. In sum, the ALJ's conclusion that R.H. experiences no limitation in this domain of functioning is not supported by substantial evidence.
The domain of attending and completing tasks refers to "how well you are able to focus and maintain your attention, and how well you begin, carry through, and finish your activities, including the pace at which you perform activities and the ease with which you change them." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h). With respect the skills a child should possess in this particular domain, the regulations provide as follows:
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.926a(h)(2)(iv).
Examples of limitations with respect to this domain include: (1) You are easily startled, distracted, or overreactive to sounds, sights, movements, or touch; (2) You are slow to focus on, or fail to complete activities of interest to you, e.g., games or art projects; (3) You repeatedly become sidetracked from your activities or you frequently interrupt others; (4) You are easily frustrated and give up on tasks, including ones you are capable of completing; and (5) You require extra supervision to keep you engaged in an activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.926a(h)(3)(i)-(v).
The ALJ concluded that R.H. experienced less than marked limitations in this particular domain. (PageID.59-60). Specifically, the ALJ stated the following:
(PageID.60).
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ noted only two items of evidence neither of which are cited as support for the ALJ's conclusion. The ALJ's analysis in support of his conclusion, consists of two sentences neither of which are supported by citation to the record. Moreover, the ALJ offers no explanation or analysis how the evidence to which he cites supports his conclusion. Simply put, the ALJ has failed to meaningfully discuss the evidence or articulate a rationale for his conclusion that can be assessed by this Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ's conclusion that R.H. experiences less than marked limitation in this domain of functioning is not supported by substantial evidence.
The domain of interacting and relating to others considers "how well you initiate and sustain emotional connections with others, develop and use the language of your community, cooperate with others, comply with rules, respond to criticism, and respect and take care of the possessions of others." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(i). Regarding this domain, the regulations provide as follows:
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.926a(i)(2)(iv).
The ALJ concluded that R.H. experienced less than marked limitations in this particular domain. (PageID.60-61). Specifically, the ALJ stated the following:
(PageID.61).
The ALJ's analysis suffers from the same shortcomings identified immediately above. The ALJ has failed to meaningfully discuss the evidence or sufficiently articulate a basis for his conclusion. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ's conclusion that R.H. experiences less than marked limitation in this domain of functioning is not supported by substantial evidence.
While the Court finds that the ALJ's decision fails to comply with the relevant legal standards, R.H. can be awarded benefits only if "all essential factual issues have been resolved" and "the record adequately establishes [his] entitlement to benefits." Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); see also, Brooks v. Commissioner of Social Security, 531 Fed. Appx. 636, 644 (6th Cir., Aug. 6, 2013). This latter requirement is satisfied "where the proof of disability is overwhelming or where proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking." Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176; see also, Brooks, 531 Fed. Appx. at 644. Evaluation of R.H.'s claim requires the resolution of certain factual disputes which this Court is neither competent nor authorized to undertake in the first instance. Moreover, there does not exist compelling evidence that he is disabled. Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for further administrative action.
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is
