RAY KENT, Magistrate Judge.
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Daniel Bates is presently incarcerated at the Chippewa Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan. On January 9, 2014, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to: (1) a charge that he committed first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(b), with his niece; and (2) a charge that he committed second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520c(1)(a), with his stepdaughter. On February 5, 2014, Judge Joyce Draganchuk of the Ingham County Circuit Court, sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 9 to 40 years on the CSC-I conviction and 5 to 15 years on the CSC-II conviction.
Petitioner, with the assistance of his appointed appellate counsel, filed a motion in the trial court for specific enforcement of a plea agreement containing terms other than those set forth on the record at the plea hearing. Petitioner argued that the parties had reached agreement on other terms, specifically entry of a plea of guilty to one count of CSC-I with no sentencing cap, at the preliminary examination. On August 13, 2014, Judge Draganchuk, reviewed the preliminary examination record of the discussion regarding terms of a guilty plea agreement. Judge Draganchuk concluded that there were offers and counter-offers; however, there was never an offer followed by acceptance. (Motion Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 12-5, PageID.179-180.) Accordingly, she determined that there had been no plea agreement other than the agreement reflected on the record at the plea hearing. (Id.)
Petitioner sought leave to appeal the trial court's determination in the Michigan Court of Appeals. That court denied leave for lack of merit in the grounds presented by order entered December 8, 2014. (Mich. Ct. App. Ord., ECF No. 12-6, PageID.182.) Petitioner then sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. The supreme court denied leave by order entered July 28, 2015. (Mich. Ord., ECF No. 12-7, PageID.224.) Plaintiff then filed his habeas corpus petition raising the same issue he raised in the state appellate courts, albeit with slightly different wording: did the trial court violate Petitioner's due process for failing to judicially enforce an order of specific enforcement? (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7)
On April 24, 2017, Respondent filed an answer to the petition, (ECF No. 11.), along with the state-court record, pursuant to Rule 5, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, (ECF No. 12). Respondent contends that Petitioner's habeas claim has no merit. Upon review and applying the standards required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PUB. L. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214 (AEDPA), I find that Petitioner's claim is without merit. Accordingly, I recommend that the petition be denied.
Petitioner was charged with multiple counts of CSC-I and CSC-II relating to his actions with his niece, his niece's friend, and his stepdaughter. At the July 18, 2013 preliminary examination, the prosecutor put on the record the plea negotiations that had occurred to that point:
(Prelim. Exam. Tr., ECF No. 12-2, PageID.88-89.) Petitioner's counsel then indicated that Petitioner would be willing to accept the previous offer of entering a plea of guilty to one count of CSC-I with no cap. (Id., PageId.89.) The prosecutor expressed her reluctance to go forward with that offer and risk Petitioner's changing his mind at the circuit court if he succeeded in dumping his counsel and getting new counsel, without preserving the testimony of the witness who had traveled from California. (Id., PageID.90.)
Petitioner's counsel then tried to nail down the terms under which the parties would proceed with the preliminary examination with only the testimony of the California witness:
(Id., PageID.91.) The prosecutor indicated that she could not "say that about the offer . . . ." (Id.) She was willing to limit the preliminary examination to the one witness if Petitioner would waive the hearing on the counts relating to the other two witnesses and, then, she would discuss the offer with her supervisors. (Id., PageID.92.) Petitioner's counsel discussed that prospect with Petitioner. (Id.) They decided to proceed with the full preliminary examination with all three witnesses. (Id.) Put differently, they were unwilling to accept the prosecutor's terms with respect to waiver of the preliminary examination on the charges relating to two of the three victims. The court proceeded with the preliminary examination and bound the matter over to circuit court.
Petitioner's prosecution continued in the circuit court for months. He did not decide to enter a plea until shortly before the trial scheduled for January 13, 2014. (Cir. Ct. Docket, ECF No. 12-1.) At the plea hearing, Judge Draganchuk had the prosecutor read the two charges to which Petitioner would be entering his plea of guilty. (Plea Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 12-3, PageID.150-152.) Judge Draganchuk confirmed that Petitioner understood the charges and the maximum penalties. (Id., PageID.152.) She confirmed that Petitioner had consulted with counsel. (Id.) She determined that Petitioner had no questions. (Id., PageID.152-153.) She reviewed with Petitioner the rights he would be giving up by pleading guilty and confirmed that he understood them. (Id., PageID. 153-154.)
Judge Draganchuk invited the prosecutor to review the terms of the plea agreement.
This exchange followed:
(Id., PageID.154-155.) Petitioner then described the actions that established his guilt with regard to the two counts. (Id., PageID.155-157.) Judge Draganchuk accepted the plea as accurate, supported by the testimony, and "understandingly and voluntarily made without undue influence, threats, or promises of leniency." (Id., PageID.157.)
After sentencing, Petitioner's appellate counsel moved to specifically enforce the plea agreement terms that were discussed at the preliminary examination. The trial court denied the motion:
(Mot. Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 12-5, PageID.179-180.)
Petitioner now claims that he is constitutionally entitled to specific enforcement of the plea agreement terms that were discussed during the preliminary examination hearing.
This action is governed by the AEDPA. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). The AEDPA "prevents federal habeas `retrials'" and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). The AEDPA has "drastically changed" the nature of habeas review. Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is "intentionally difficult to meet." Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court may consider only the "clearly established" holdings, and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655. In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Lopez v. Smith, 135 S.Ct. 1, 3 (2014); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655. Moreover, "clearly established Federal law" does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the statecourt adjudication on the merits. Miller v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44).
A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). "To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to `show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Woods, 2015 WL 1400852, at *3 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). In other words, "[w]here the precise contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in their adjudication of a prisoner's claims." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1705 (2014) (quotations marks omitted).
The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 656. This presumption of correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981); Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).
Petitioner contends that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement when she failed to abide by the terms that were discussed at the preliminary examination. The Sixth Circuit has recognized that a state prosecutor's breach of a plea bargain is a violation of the federal constitution cognizable on habeas review. Dixon v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 121, 123 (6th Cir. 1984). The government may not openly breach a plea agreement. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984) ("[W]hen the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand[.]"). As the Supreme Court stated in Mabry, "`when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.'" Id. at 509 (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).
Plea agreements must comply with due process. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 16 (1987) (plea agreements must be construed in light of the rights and obligations created by the Constitution). But, plea agreements are governed by more than the requirements of due process because they are contractual in nature. See United States v. Herrera, 928 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The language in Santobello) has established the principle that a plea bargain is contractual in nature. The Supreme Court in Santobello used terminology which rests at the core of contract law: `mutually binding promises freely given in exchange for valid consideration.'") (citations omitted). The content of a plea agreement and what the parties agreed to is a question of fact. United States v. Lukse, 286 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2002). In interpreting and enforcing them, courts use traditional principles of contract law. See Smith v. Stegall, 385 F.3d 993, 999 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Federal courts interpreting and enforcing federal plea agreements apply traditional "federal" contract law principles. Herrera, 928 F.2d at 773.
To prevail on his claim that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement, Petitioner must show that the agreement included the terms that were discussed at the preliminary examination. To the extent the existence of a state court plea agreement, or the determination of its terms, is a matter of state law, the issue was resolved conclusively by Judge Draganchuk when she concluded that the plea bargain discussions at the preliminary examination did not establish an agreement. It is not the province of a federal habeas court to re-examine state-law determinations on state-law questions. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. The decision of the state courts on a state-law issue is binding on a federal court. See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983). The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has recognized "`that a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.'" Stumpf v. Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 746 n.6 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76).
Even if the existence and terms of the plea agreement depend on applying federal law, Petitioner has failed to show a breach. The "traditional principles of contract law" that govern interpretation and enforcement of federal plea agreements require a "`meeting of the minds.'" United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613-614 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Ricks, 398 F. App'x 135, 137 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. McLeod, No. 2:06-cr-27, 2008 WL 114789, *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 9, 2008).
Judge Draganchuk's findings at the close of the hearing on Petitioner's motion demonstrate that there was no meeting of the minds here. Those factual determinations are presumed to be correct. Petitioner has failed to rebut that presumption with any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence. To the contrary, Judge Draganchuk's findings are well-supported on the record. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's determination that he is not entitled to specific enforcement of the plea terms discussed at the preliminary examination is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.
Under settled Sixth Circuit authority, Petitioner's responses to the trial judge, given under oath at the plea hearing, preclude a subsequent assertion that the circumstances were different than he represented at the hearing. In Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1986), the trial court inquired concerning the terms of any plea bargain, received a response from the prosecutor on the record, and received denials from defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the defendant concerning the existence of any other terms. The Sixth Circuit held that where the trial court has scrupulously followed the required procedure, "the defendant is bound by his statements in response to that court's inquiry." 781 F.2d at 90 (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 526 F.2d 690, 696-97 (5th Cir. 1976)). The Sixth Circuit, noting the obvious, observed that a trial judge cannot possibly administer a plea agreement, if it consists of "secret terms known only to the parties." Id. at 90. Furthermore, because defendant's later claim of a secret agreement was negated by the trial record; no evidentiary hearing was required. Id. at 92. The court again addressed this issue in Warner v. United States, 975 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1993), also section 2255 cases. In Todaro, the defendant attempted to attack his guilty plea, claiming that his attorney had promised him that he would be sentenced to probation if he pled guilty. The defendant had testified at the plea colloquy, however, that no other promises had been made to him, other than those stated in the plea agreement. 982 F.2d at 1026. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit was again faced with a situation in which a defendant's post-conviction allegations were directly contrary to his statements at the plea hearing. Relying on Baker, the court reiterated its earlier holding, under which a defendant is bound by his statements in response to the trial court's inquiry, where there has been a careful plea colloquy. In Warner, the Sixth Circuit likewise rejected claims of attorney promises in the face of defendant's flat denial of promises at the plea, holding that the petitioner's statements "estopped" him from relying on undisclosed promises. 975 F.2d at 1210.
Petitioner's suggestion that he believed his agreement with the prosecutor contemplated that he was pleading guilty to one count of CSC-I with no sentencing cap, is directly contradicted by virtually every statement he made after being sworn in at the plea hearing. Petitioner is not free to so blithely disregard his sworn testimony. The trial court's acceptance and enforcement of the plea agreement as the prosecutor, Petitioner's counsel, and Petitioner represented its terms, is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.
Even though I have concluded that Petitioner's habeas petition should be denied, under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must also determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must "engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim" to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467.
I have examined Petitioner's claim under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Under Slack, to warrant a grant of the certificate, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Id. "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner's claim. Id.
I find that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court's denial of Petitioner's claim would be debatable or wrong. Therefore, I recommend that a certificate of appealability should be denied.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that the habeas corpus petition be denied. I further recommend that a certificate of appealability be denied.
