OPINION

RAY KENT, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner) which denied her claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplement security income (SSI).

Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of July 19, 2013. PageID.321. She identified her disabling conditions as: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); degenerative disc disease; severe back pain; lumbar spine impairment; anxiety; depression; right should impairment; and disassociative disorder. PageID.310. Prior to applying for DIB and SSI, plaintiff earned a GED and had past employment as a clerk/cashier, factory worker, and home health aide. PageID.312. Administrative law judge (ALJ) Kleber reviewed plaintiff's claim de novo and entered a written decision denying benefits on July 22, 2016. PageID.50-70.

In reaching her determination, ALJ Kleber noted that plaintiff filed applications for disability benefits in the past, with her most recent filing on September 6, 2011. PageID.50. This filing resulted in ALJ Lyman's decision denying benefits on July 18, 2013. Id. ALJ Kleber addressed the effect of this prior decision under Acquiescence Rulings 98-3(6) and 98-4(6), concluding that

PageID.50-51. ALJ Kleber's July 22, 2016 decision, which was later approved by the Appeals Council, has become the final decision of the Commissioner and is now before the Court for review.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is typically focused on determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cutlip v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). A determination of substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 925 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1990).

The scope of this review is limited to an examination of the record only. This Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact that the record also contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as there is substantial support for that decision in the record. Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). Even if the reviewing court would resolve the dispute differently, the Commissioner's decision must stand if it is supported by substantial evidence. Young, 925 F.2d at 147.

A claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in order to be entitled to benefits. A disability is established by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505 and 416.905; Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). In applying the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a five-step analysis:

Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work through step four. Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). However, at step five of the inquiry, "the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant's residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile." Id. If it is determined that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in the evaluation process, further review is not necessary. Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).

"The federal court's standard of review for SSI cases mirrors the standard applied in social security disability cases." D'Angelo v. Commissioner of Social Security, 475 F.Supp.2d 716, 719 (W.D. Mich. 2007). "The proper inquiry in an application for SSI benefits is whether the plaintiff was disabled on or after her application date." Casey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993).

II. ALJ's DECISION

Plaintiff's claim failed at the fifth step of the evaluation. At the first step, ALJ Kleber found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of July 19, 2013, and met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2016. PageID.53. At the second step, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

Id. At the third step, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. PageID.55.

ALJ Kleber decided at the fourth step that:

PageID.58.

The ALJ also found that plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as a cashier and retail clerk, because "[t]his work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Ms. Grames' residual functional capacity." PageID.68.

Although ALJ Kleber found that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work, she proceeded to the fifth step and determined that plaintiff could perform a significant number of unskilled jobs at the light medium exertional level in the national economy. PageID.69-70. Specifically, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform the requirements of light and unskilled occupations such as electrical accessories assembler (42,000 jobs nationally), hand packager/bagger (134,000 jobs nationally), and inspector/hand packager (48,600 jobs nationally). PageID.69-70. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 19, 2013 (the alleged onset date) through July 22, 2016 (the date of the decision). PageID.70.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff set forth two issues on appeal:

A. The ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical opinion evidence of plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Dale D'Mello, M.D.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly gave little weight to Dr. D'Mello's opinions. A treating physician's medical opinions and diagnoses are entitled to great weight in evaluating plaintiff's alleged disability. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001). "In general, the opinions of treating physicians are accorded greater weight than those of physicians who examine claimants only once." Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 529-30 (6th Cir. 1997). "The treating physician doctrine is based on the assumption that a medical professional who has dealt with a claimant and his maladies over a long period of time will have a deeper insight into the medical condition of the claimant than will a person who has examined a claimant but once, or who has only seen the claimant's medical records." Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(c)(2) and 416.927(c)(2) ("Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations").

Under the regulations, a treating source's opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant's impairment must be given controlling weight if the Commissioner finds that: (1) the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques; and (2) the opinion is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record. See Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2013); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(c)(2) and 416.927(c)(2). Finally, the ALJ must articulate good reasons for not crediting the opinion of a treating source. See Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(c)(2) and 416.927(c)(2) ("[w]e will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source's opinion").

Here, the ALJ performed an extensive review of Dr. D'Mello's opinions expressed in two documents.1 With respect to the doctor's first opinion, the ALJ stated as follows:

PageID.65-66.

The ALJ evaluated Dr. D'Mello's second opinion (provided about 13 months later) as follows:

PageID.66-67.

Upon reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the ALJ gave good reasons for the weight assigned the Dr. D'Mello's opinions. See Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the ALJ did not err by stating that "the final responsibility for deciding the issue of residual functional capacity and the ultimate issue of disability is reserved to the Commissioner." These are the ALJ's functions. "Although physicians opine on a claimant's residual functional capacity to work, ultimate responsibility for capacity-to-work determinations belongs to the Commissioner." Nejat v. Commissioner of Social Security, 359 Fed. Appx. 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2009). In addition, the ALJ is not bound by a physician's conclusion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) and 416.927(d)(1) ("[a] statement by a medical source that you are `disabled' or `unable to work' does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled"). The determination of disability is the prerogative of the Commissioner, not the treating physician. See Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365, 367 (6th Cir. 1984).

Here, the ALJ could properly give Dr. D'Mello's opinions little weight. Dr. D'Mello's March 2015 opinions were expressed in a check-mark format with no real explanations. The Sixth Circuit has "previously declined to give significant weight to rudimentary indications that lack an accompanying explanation", pointing out that "[f]orm reports in which a physician's obligation is only to check a box or fill in a blank are weak evidence at best." Hernandez v. Commissioner of Social Security, 644 Fed. Appx. 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2016), quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir.1993). As the ALJ noted, one of the few explanations to appear in the doctor's opinion was the legal conclusion that plaintiff was "unable to work." PageID.681. See Crisp v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 790 F.2d. 450, 452 (6th Cir. 1986) (a physician's statement such as that the claimant was not "capable of engaging in any substantial work activity" is a legal conclusion that is not binding on the Commissioner). Similarly, the doctor's April 25, 2016 letter states that the legal conclusion that plaintiff "is incapable of working." PageID.723.

Plaintiff also contends that ALJ improperly relied on the opinion of a nonexamining psychologist whose review of the record on February 4, 2015 did not include all of plaintiff's medical records in this matter. Plaintiff appears to be referring to Mark Garner, Ph. D. The ALJ addressed Dr. Garner's opinions as follows:

PageID.65. An ALJ can give significant weight to the opinion of a non-examining source who has not viewed the entire record, provided that the ALJ gives "some indication" that he "at least considered" that the source did not review the entire record. Kepke v. Commissioner of Social Security, 636 Fed. Appx. 625, 632 (6th Cir. 2016), quoting Blakley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 581 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2009). "In other words, the record must give some indication that the ALJ subjected such an opinion to scrutiny." Kepke, 636 Fed. Appx. at 632. Here, the ALJ subjected Dr. Garner's opinion to scrutiny. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim of error will be denied.

B. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate plaintiff's testimony.

Next, plaintiff contends that the ALJ's credibility determination with respect to her mental impairments is not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's Brief (ECF No. 9, PageID.836). In this regard, plaintiff claims that "the ALJ erred by selectively citing normal mental status findings while ignoring the abnormal findings that are consistent with a finding of disability" and "also erred by relying heavily on [plaintiff's] statements that she is able to perform some activities of daily living." Id.

An ALJ may discount a claimant's credibility where the ALJ "finds contradictions among the medical records, claimant's testimony, and other evidence." Walters, 127 F.3d at 531. "It [i]s for the [Commissioner] and his examiner, as the fact-finders, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and weigh and evaluate their testimony." Heston, 245 F.3d at 536, quoting Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1972). The court "may not disturb" an ALJ's credibility determination "absent [a] compelling reason." Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001). The threshold for overturning an ALJ's credibility determination on appeal is so high, that the Sixth Circuit has expressed the opinion that "[t]he ALJ's credibility findings are unchallengeable," Payne v. Commissioner of Social Security, 402 Fed. Appx. 109, 113 (6th Cir. 2010), and that "[o]n appeal, we will not disturb a credibility determination made by the ALJ, the finder of fact... [w]e will not try the case anew, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility." Sullenger v. Commissioner of Social Security, 255 Fed. Appx. 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, an ALJ's credibility determinations regarding subjective complaints must be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security, 486 F.3d 234, 249 (6th Cir. 2007).

The ALJ noted plaintiff's claims regarding her mental impairments:

PageID.59.

The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ALJ's credibility determination. See Smith, 307 F.3d at 379. The ALJ's credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Court will not engage in a de novo review of the record to address plaintiff's contention that the ALJ ignored her abnormal mental findings in determining her credibility. See Sullenger, 255 Fed. Appx. at 995. In this regard, the ALJ did not ignore plaintiff's mental impairments, finding that while plaintiff "has received various forms of treatment for the allegedly disabling mental symptoms" and "that the treatment has been generally successful in controlling those symptoms when she followed prescribed treatment." PageID.63.

The ALJ did not err by concluding that plaintiff "described daily activities, which are not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations." PageID.63. In this regard, the ALJ found that:

PageID.63-64.

"An ALJ may also consider household and social activities engaged in by the claimant in evaluating a claimant's assertions of pain or ailments." Walters, 127 F.3d 525, 532 (6th Cir. 1997). While plaintiff may not have engaged vigorously in all of these activities, such endeavors are not indicative of an invalid, incapable of performing sedentary types of work. See, e.g., Pasco v. Commissioner of Social Security, 137 Fed. Appx. 828, 846 (6th Cir. 2005) (substantial evidence supported finding that plaintiff was not disabled where plaintiff could "engage in daily activities such as housekeeping, doing laundry, and maintaining a neat, attractive appearance" and could "engage in reading and playing cards on a regular basis, both of which require some concentration") (footnote omitted); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1993) (a claimant's ability to perform household and social activities on a daily basis is contrary to a finding of disability); Gist v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 352, 358 (6th Cir. 1984) (a claimant's capacity to perform daily activities on a regular basis will militate against a finding of disability). Accordingly, plaintiff's claim of error will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

The ALJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner's decision will be AFFIRMED pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be issued forthwith.