ELLEN S. CARMODY, Magistrate Judge.
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is
The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
Plaintiff was 39 years of age on her alleged disability onset date. (PageID.180). She successfully completed high school and worked previously as a mail clerk. (PageID.52, 65). Plaintiff applied for benefits on April 25, 2014, alleging that she had been disabled since June 30, 2005, due to "emotional impairments" and "memory problems." (PageID.180-95, 224). Plaintiff's application was denied, after which time she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.114-78).
On December 18, 2015, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ James Prothro with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (PageID.87-112). The ALJ held a supplemental hearing on February 24, 2016, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. (PageID.59-86). In a written decision dated March 31, 2016, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (PageID.44-54). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.32-37). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff's insured status expired on December 32, 2010. (PageID.46). To be eligible for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish that she became disabled prior to the expiration of her insured status. See 42 U.S.C. § 423; Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1182 (6th Cir. 1990).
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from: (1) borderline intellectual functioning; (2) adjustment disorder; (3) anxiety disorder; and (4) depression, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.46-48). With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform work subject to the following limitations: (1) she is limited to simple, routine tasks; (2) she can engage in only occasional public contact; and (3) cannot perform fast-paced work. (PageID.48).
Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work as a mail clerk.
The record before the ALJ contained just twenty (20) pages of medical treatment records. (PageID.315-43). The ALJ described this evidence, as well as Plaintiff's statements and testimony, as follows:
(PageID.49-50).
The Listing of Impairments, detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, identifies various impairments which, if present to the severity detailed therein, result in a finding that the claimant is disabled. Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to relief on the ground that the ALJ "failed to properly consider Listing 12.05(C)." Section 12.05 of the Listing provides, in relevant part, the following:
20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.05 (2015).
Plaintiff asserts that she satisfies section 12.05(C). As the ALJ recognized, testing conducted in June 2014 indicated that Plaintiff possessed a full-scale IQ of 67. As the ALJ further concluded, however, Plaintiff does not satisfy Section 12.05 of the Listings because she "demonstrated no limitation in adaptive functioning prior to age 22" as required by this Listing. An impairment satisfies a listing, however, "only when it manifests the specific findings described in all of the medical criteria for that particular impairment." Lambert v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2013 WL 5375298 at *8 (W.D. Mich., Sept. 25, 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(d) and 416.925(d)).
Plaintiff argues that had the ALJ more fully developed the record, "she would have met the requirements for Listing 12.05(C)." However, Plaintiff has failed to identify any additional evidence which would support a different result. Plaintiff bears "the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is entitled to disability benefits." Trandafir v. Commissioner of Social Security, 58 Fed. Appx. 113, 115 (6th Cir., Jan. 31, 2003). As the relevant Social Security regulations make clear, it is the claimant's responsibility to provide the evidence necessary to evaluate her claim for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512 and 404.1514. As the Supreme Court has observed, "[i]t is not unreasonable to require the claimant, who is in a better position to provide information about his own medical condition, to do so." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5.
Only under "special circumstances, i.e., when a claimant is without counsel, is not capable of presenting an effective case, and is unfamiliar with hearing procedures, does an ALJ have a special, heightened duty to develop the record." Trandafir, 58 Fed. Appx. at 115 (emphasis added); Nabours v. Commissioner of Social Security, 50 Fed. Appx. 272, 275 (6th Cir., Nov. 4, 2002). In support of her argument that she satisfied these "special circumstances," Plaintiff has overstated and mischaracterized the record. For example, Plaintiff asserts that she testified to the ALJ that "she needed guidance from the bus drivers when using public transportation." (ECF No. 10 at PageID.392). What Plaintiff actually stated to the ALJ was that "the bus drivers will help you if you don't know" where you are going. (PageID.72). However, Plaintiff did not state or even suggest that she was unable to use public transportation. While the meager evidence in this matter indicates that Plaintiff is certainly limited in her ability to function, the record does not suggest that Plaintiff was incapable of advocating her cause.
Furthermore, an ALJ is not obligated to supplement the record with additional evidence unless the record as it then exists is insufficient to assess Plaintiff's residual functional capacity or otherwise resolve her claims. See, e.g., Allison v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1276950 at *5 (6th Cir., Aug. 30, 2000); Lamb v. Barnhart, 85 Fed. Appx. 52, 57 (10th Cir., Dec. 11, 2003); Haney v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3859778 at *3 (E.D. Okla., Sept. 15, 2010); Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security, 709 F.Supp.2d 248, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). As is recognized, "how much evidence to gather is a subject on which district courts must respect the Secretary's reasoned judgment." Simpson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 344 Fed. Appx. 181, 189 (6th Cir., Aug. 27, 2009). As the court further observed, to obligate the Commissioner to obtain an absolute "complete record" in each case "literally would be a formula for paralysis." Ibid.
In sum, the record before the ALJ was sufficient to adjudicate Plaintiff's claims. Moreover, aside from old school records which, as discussed below, do not support Plaintiff's disability claim, Plaintiff has failed to identify any evidence which further development of the record would have secured. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that the ALJ failed to properly develop the record. The ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff failed to satisfy Section 12.05(C) is likewise supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
A claimant's RFC represents the "most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations." Sullivan v. Commissioner of Social Security, 595 Fed. Appx. 502, 505 (6th Cir., Dec. 12, 2014); see also, Social Security Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *1 (Social Security Administration, July 2, 1996) (a claimant's RFC represents her ability to perform "work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis," defined as "8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule"). Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence.
Aside from arguing that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record, Plaintiff's argument is essentially that the ALJ should have weighed the evidence differently. This is not a proper basis for relief. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Commissioner of Social Security, 424 Fed. Appx. 411, 414 (6th Cir., Apr. 1, 2011) (the court "reviews the entire administrative record, but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ"). A review of the record reveals that the ALJ's RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
In support of her challenge to the ALJ's decision, Plaintiff submitted evidence to the Appeals Council that was not presented to the ALJ. (PageID.344-69). The Appeals Council received the evidence into the record and considered it before declining to review the ALJ's determination. Plaintiff has also submitted to this Court additional evidence that likewise was not presented to the ALJ. (ECF No. 10-1 at PageID.398-406).
This Court is precluded from considering this evidence. See, e.g., Cline v. Commissioner of Social Security, 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2007). If Plaintiff can demonstrate, however, that this evidence is new and material, and that good cause existed for not presenting it to the ALJ, the Court can remand the case for further proceedings during which this new evidence can be considered. See Cline, 96 F.3d at 148. To satisfy the materiality requirement, Plaintiff must show that there exists a reasonable probability that the Commissioner would have reached a different result if presented with the new evidence. Sizemore v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 865 F.2d 709, 711 (6th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff bears the burden of making these showings. See Hollon ex rel. Hollon v. Commissioner of Social Security, 447 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2006).
It is not reasonable to conclude that consideration of the evidence in question would have resulted in a different outcome. The treatment records Plaintiff submitted, (PageID.344-69), do not call into question the ALJ's RFC assessment. To the contrary, treatment notes dated February 12, 2015, indicate that Plaintiff, with respect to her depression and anxiety, was "doing well" on her current medication regimen. (PageID.356-57). Treatment notes dated January 12, 2016, indicate that while Plaintiff reported experiencing "situational sadness and anxiety . . . her prescribed medications seem to help address such symptoms." (PageID.365-66). Treatment notes dated March 14, 2016, likewise indicate that Plaintiff was experiencing "no anxiety and no depression" on her current medication regimen. (PageID.355). As for the educational records Plaintiff submitted with her brief, such do not support the argument that Plaintiff experienced "subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning" prior to the age of 22. Accordingly, the Court cannot consider this evidence and there exists no basis for remanding this matter for further consideration of such. This argument is, therefore, rejected.
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is
