GORDON J. QUIST, District Judge.
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to "screen out" petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Petitioner Mark Anthony Johnson is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Following a jury trial in the Oakland County Circuit Court in Docket No. 314166, Petitioner was convicted of five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC III), and one count of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving penetration. In Docket No. 314170, Petitioner was also convicted following a jury trial of possession with intent to deliver marijuana.
On December 21, 2012, the court sentenced Petitioner, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, to concurrent prison terms of 50 to 80 years for each CSC I conviction, 50 to 80 years for his CSC III conviction, 20 to 50 years for his assault conviction, and 22 months to 15 years for his possession with intent to deliver conviction. Petitioner appealed his convictions and the Michigan Court Appeals consolidated the appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions in an opinion dated April 22, 2014, which rejected Petitioner's insufficiency of the evidence arguments. (ECF No. 15-13, PageID.1051-1056.) The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on October 28, 2014. (ECF No. 15-14, PageID.1218.) Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner did not file a collateral attack in the state courts.
Petitioner originally filed his habeas corpus petition on January 28, 2016, alleging that:
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6-16.)
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, in part, that Petitioner failed to exhaust two of his four claims. On January 6, 2017, the Court denied Respondent's motion to dismiss and ordered Petitioner to show cause why he was entitled to a stay of the proceedings in order to exhaust his unexhausted claims in state court. Petitioner complied and the Court granted Petitioner a stay so that he could exhaust his state court remedies with regard to his unexhausted claims.
On October 25, 2018, Petitioner filed his amended habeas corpus petition, raising the same four claims for relief that were raised in his original petition and asserting that he has exhausted his state court remedies as to all of the claims. (Am. Pet., ECF No. 26, PageID.1359-1363.) Petitioner also filed a brief in support, a copy of the trial court's opinion and order denying Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment, and a copy of the Michigan Supreme Court's order denying Petitioner's delayed application for leave to appeal. (ECF No. 26-1 and ECF No. 26-2.) Petitioner's application for leave to appeal the November 29, 2017, orders of the Michigan Court of Appeals was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court on July 27, 2018. (ECF No. 26-2, PageID.1412.)
This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). The AEDPA "prevents federal habeas `retrials'" and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is "intentionally difficult to meet." Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (internal quotation omitted).
The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court may consider only the holdings, and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381-82; Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 578-79 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, "clearly established Federal law" does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Miller v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 565 U.S. at 38).
A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). "To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to `show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). In other words, "[w]here the precise contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in their adjudication of a prisoner's claims." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 424 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).
The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 656. This presumption of correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981); Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).
In Petitioner's first claim for habeas corpus relief, he asserts that his criminal sexual conduct convictions are not supported by legally sufficient evidence. A § 2254 challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is governed by the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), which is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Issues of credibility may not be reviewed by the habeas court under this standard. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1993). Rather, the habeas court is required to examine the evidence supporting the conviction, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, with specific reference to the elements of the crime as established by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Allen v. Redman, 858 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988).
The Jackson v. Virginia standard "gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Moreover, because both the Jackson standard and AEDPA apply to Petitioner's claims, "the law commands deference at two levels in this case: First, deference should be given to the trier-of-fact's verdict, as contemplated by Jackson; second, deference should be given to the Michigan Court of Appeals' consideration of the trier-of-fact's verdict, as dictated by AEDPA." Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2008). This standard erects "`a nearly insurmountable hurdle'" for petitioners who seek habeas relief on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Oros, 578 F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Petitioner raised this claim in his appeal of right. In addressing this issue, the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence presented at trial:
(ECF No. 15-12, PageID.1052-1053.)
In addressing whether the evidence was sufficient to support Petitioner's convictions, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted:
(ECF No. 15-12, PageID.1054-1055 (footnote omitted).)
Petitioner claims that the Court should evaluate the quality of the evidence against him. Petitioner states that the complainants in his criminal case made allegations without any substantiating evidence. Petitioner further contends that complainants were not reliable witnesses because they were drug addicts and prostitutes. However, as noted above, it is for the trier of fact "to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Petitioner improperly asks this Court to usurp the role of the jury as the trier of fact. Giving proper deference to the trier-of-fact's verdict and to the Michigan Court of Appeals' consideration of the trier-of-fact's verdict, as dictated by AEDPA, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to support his claim that his criminal sexual conduct convictions are not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Therefore, Petitioner's first claim for relief is properly denied for lack of merit.
In Petitioner's second claim for relief, he asserts that his conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. In addressing this claim on appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals applied the Jackson standard, stating:
(ECF No. 15-12, PageID.1055-56.)
Petitioner asserts that the guilty verdict on his possession with intent charge was irrational and unsupported. Although Petitioner states that the prosecution failed to present evidence showing that Petitioner had the intent to deliver because there were no witnesses to drug sales or deals, and no scales, weapons, or money were discovered, the Michigan Court of Appeals specifically found that, based on the evidence at trial, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Petitioner was guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. As noted above by the Michigan Court of Appeals, circumstantial evidence, such as the activity at Petitioner's house, and the packaging of the marijuana, supported the inference that Petitioner intended to sell the marijuana. In addition, the Michigan Court of Appeals properly noted that the jury was in the best position to resolve the conflict between the witnesses' testimonies at trial.
Because issues of credibility may not be reviewed by the habeas court under the standard set forth in Jackson, this Court is bound by the jury's conclusion that Petitioner intended to deliver the marijuana. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401-02. The decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals in this case is not contrary to, nor does it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Nor is the decision based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner's second claim for habeas corpus relief is properly denied.
In Petitioner's third claim for relief, he claims that the trial judge was biased against him at trial and during sentencing. "Due process requires a fair trial before a judge without actual bias against the defendant or an interest in the outcome of his particular case." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.") (emphasis added)). However, because of the difficulty in determining "whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias," the courts look to "whether, as an objective matter, the average judge in [that judge's] position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias." Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016) (internal quotations omitted); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009). The Supreme Court has recognized constitutionally impermissible, objective indicia of bias in the following types of cases: (1) those cases in which the judge "has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a [particular] conclusion," Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1997) (subsequently expanded to include even indirect pecuniary interest, see Railey v. Webb, 540 F.3d 393, 399-400 (6th Cir. 2008)); (2) certain contempt cases, such as those in which the "judge becomes personally embroiled with the contemnor," Murchison, 349 U.S. at 141 (subsequently clarified to involve cases in which the judge suffers a severe personal insult or attack from the contemnor); and (3) cases in which a judge had prior involvement in the case as a prosecutor, Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 53 (1975)). The courts indulge "a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing, inter alia, Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47). "The presumption of impartiality stems not merely from the judicial-bias caselaw, [] but from the more generally applicable presumption that judges know the law and apply it in making their decisions, see Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 532 n.4 (1997), and the even more generally applicable presumption of regularity, see Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30B31." Coley, 706 F.3d at 751.
Petitioner's claim of judicial bias is based solely on the judge's rulings during his trial and sentencing. In his motion for relief from judgment, Petitioner supported his judicial bias claim by pointing to a letter from the trial judge's judicial assistant rejecting his motion to have counsel withdraw on the basis that he was represented by an attorney, so the motion to withdraw had to be filed by his attorney. Petitioner also pointed to another letter from the trial judge's judicial assistant rejecting a subsequent motion to withdraw as improper and because Petitioner was no longer being represented by the same attorney. Finally, Petitioner referenced the transcript of the sentencing hearing, at which the court held him in contempt for disrupting the proceedings. (ECF No. 26-2, PageID.1415-16.) The trial court was unpersuaded by Petitioner's argument and the denial of Petitioner's judicial bias claim was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court.
In Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994),
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56. Petitioner fails to allege facts showing that the trial judge was biased against him in any constitutionally significant manner. Therefore, Petitioner's third claim for relief is properly denied.
Finally, Petitioner claims that errors in the arrest warrant deprived the state court of jurisdiction. Petitioner asserts that the fact that the warrant was not signed by the assistant prosecutor or the complaining witness and did not contain the district court judge's bar number violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a federal habeas court must make two distinct inquiries before determining whether to address a Fourth Amendment claim. Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 1982). First, the habeas court must determine whether the state procedural mechanism presents the opportunity to raise a Fourth Amendment claim. Id. Second, the habeas court must determine whether presentation of the claim was in fact frustrated because of a failure of that mechanism. Id.; see also Abdul-Mateen v. Hofbauer, 2000 WL 687653, at *3 (6th Cir. May 19, 2000) (unpublished table disposition) (noting that "this inquiry is not meant to be a case by case review of state court determinations").
Michigan provides criminal defendants with a procedure to fully and fairly present Fourth Amendment claims by means of an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v. Walker (On Reh'g), 132 N.W.2d 87 (Mich. 1965). See People v. Snider, 608 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Wiejecha, 165 N.W.2d 642, 488 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (noting that Walker involved the admissibility into evidence of an allegedly involuntary confession). Petitioner fails to provide any reason why he would have been prevented from raising his Fourth Amendment claim in the context of a Walker hearing. Therefore, the Court need not address Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim.
In addition, the Court notes that Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim is entirely lacking in merit. As noted by the Circuit Court in Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment:
(ECF No. 26-2, PageID.1431-32.) Because Petitioner's claim regarding his arrest warrant is not properly before this Court, and because it lacks any merit, this claim will be denied.
In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner's application pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court's dismissal of Petitioner's action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is "somewhat anomalous" for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm'r of Corr. of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was "intrinsically contradictory" to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must "engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim" to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner's claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Id. "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner's claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court's dismissal of Petitioner's claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
The Court will enter a judgment and order consistent with this opinion.
