ELLEN S. CARMODY, Magistrate Judge.
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is
The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
Plaintiff was 46 years of age on her alleged disability onset date. (PageID.354). She possesses a ninth grade education and worked previously as a retail cashier and fast food worker. (PageID.68, 85). Plaintiff applied for benefits on October 7, 2013, alleging that she had been disabled since February 6, 2011, due to scoliosis, depression, Bell's palsy, carpal tunnel syndrome, anxiety, hip and knee pain, arthritis, kidney stones, asthma, and low blood pressure. (PageID.354-66, 188-89). Plaintiff's applications were denied, after which time she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.178-200). Following a May 20, 2015 hearing, ALJ Lawrence Blatnik denied Plaintiff's claim. (PageID.131-52, 204-15). The Appeals Council subsequently remanded the matter to the ALJ. (PageID.220-23).
On November 8, 2016, ALJ Blatnik conducted a second hearing at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. (PageID.78-130). In a written decision dated January 24, 2017, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (PageID.60-71). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.41-45). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from: (1) peripheral neuropathy; (2) degenerative disc disease and scoliosis of the lumbar spine; (3) osteoarthritis; (4) asthma; (5) sleep apnea; and (6) obesity, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.63).
With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform light work subject to the following limitations: (1) she requires the option to alternate to standing for 3-5 minutes after one hour of sitting and to alternate to sitting for 3-5 minutes after every 30-45 minutes of standing/walking; (2) she can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; (3) she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (4) she must avoid all exposure to unprotected heights or moving parts; (5) she can tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold or heat, humidity, or wetness; and (6) must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, and other pulmonary irritants. (PageID.64).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform, her limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, "a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs" is needed to meet the burden. O'Banner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). This standard requires more than mere intuition or conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant can perform specific jobs in the national economy. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. Accordingly, ALJs routinely question vocational experts in an attempt to determine whether there exist a significant number of jobs which a particular claimant can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. Such was the case here, as the ALJ questioned a vocational expert.
The vocational expert testified that there existed approximately 480,000 jobs in the national economy which an individual with Plaintiff's RFC could perform, such limitations notwithstanding. (PageID.112-16). This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) ("[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others have deemed `significant'"). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits.
The ALJ discussed the medical evidence at great length. Specifically, the ALJ stated as follows:
(PageID.65-68).
A claimant's RFC represents the "most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations." Sullivan v. Commissioner of Social Security, 595 Fed. Appx. 502, 505 (6th Cir., Dec. 12, 2014); see also, Social Security Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *1 (Social Security Administration, July 2, 1996) (a claimant's RFC represents her ability to perform "work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis," defined as "8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule"). As noted above, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff can perform a limited range of light work. Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence.
While the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from several severe impairments, the ALJ failed to find that Plaintiff's alleged carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a severe impairment. Defendant expressly concedes that "the ALJ erred in finding that carpal tunnel syndrome was not a medically determinable impairment for plaintiff." (ECF No. 11 at PageID.712). Defendant further argues, however, that this error is harmless because Plaintiff has failed to establish that "her carpal tunnel syndrome, either by itself or in combination with any other medically determinable impairment(s), resulted in a more limited RFC than the one the ALJ set forth." (ECF No. 11 at PageID.712). The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff underwent carpal tunnel surgery on her right hand when she was approximately 30 years old. (PageID.548, 675). A number of years later, Plaintiff began to again experience carpal tunnel symptoms. On March 10, 2015, Plaintiff reported to Dr. R. Scott Lazzara that she was suffering carpal tunnel syndrome. (PageID.548). Following an examination, the doctor reported that Plaintiff could perform handling, fingering, and feeling activities only one-third to two-thirds of the workday. (PageID.555). An examination of Plaintiff's hands and wrists, conducted on October 17, 2016, revealed a positive Phalen's Test.
While the record does not support the argument that Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome renders her unable to work, the record likewise does not support the ALJ's RFC assessment which contains no limitations for such. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. Because the vocational expert's testimony was premised upon a faulty RFC determination, the ALJ's reliance thereon does not constitute substantial evidence. See Cline v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1996) (while the ALJ may rely upon responses to hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert, such questions must accurately portray the claimant's impairments).
While the Court finds that the ALJ's decision fails to comply with the relevant legal standards, Plaintiff can be awarded benefits only if "all essential factual issues have been resolved" and "the record adequately establishes [her] entitlement to benefits." Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); see also, Brooks v. Commissioner of Social Security, 531 Fed. Appx. 636, 644 (6th Cir., Aug. 6, 2013). This latter requirement is satisfied "where the proof of disability is overwhelming or where proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking." Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176; see also, Brooks, 531 Fed. Appx. at 644. Evaluation of Plaintiff's claim requires the resolution of factual disputes which this Court is neither competent nor authorized to undertake in the first instance. Moreover, there does not exist compelling evidence that Plaintiff is disabled. Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for further administrative action.
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is