PAUL L. MALONEY, District Judge.
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to "screen out" petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Petitioner William Chance Stephens is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the Kinross Correctional Facility (KCF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. Following a five-day jury trial in the Van Buren County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.321. The underlying facts at trial, as described by the Michigan Court of Appeals, are as follows:
(Mich. Ct. App. Op., ECF No. 1-2, PageID.29-30.) On June 23, 2014, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of 11 years, 10 months to 22 years, 6 months.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following issues in the brief filed by appellate counsel:
(Br. in Supp. of Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.15-16.) Petitioner filed a pro per Standard 4 brief, see Mich. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2004-06, in which he raised additional claims:
(Id., PageID.16-17.) In a lengthy, unpublished opinion issued on December 10, 2015, the court of appeals denied all appellate grounds and affirmed the conviction. (Mich. Ct. App., ECF No. 1-2, PageID.29-36.)
Petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, raising all six grounds presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals. In addition, he filed two motions, seeking to add two additional issues:
(Br. in Supp. of Pet, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.18.) In an order issued on June 28, 2016, the supreme court granted the motions to add issues and addressed the application for leave to appeal. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to determine if it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional mandatory requirement of the sentencing guidelines. If so, the trial court was instructed to resentence Petitioner. The supreme court denied leave to appeal on the remaining issues. (6/28/16 Mich. Order, ECF No. 1-3, PageID.38.)
Petitioner chose to forego resentencing in the trial court. On February 8, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the Van Buren County Circuit Court. In his motion, Petitioner raised two issues:
(Br. in Supp. of Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19.) The trial court denied the motion on March 17, 2017, concluding that the first issue was procedurally barred because it could have been raised on appeal, Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3), and the second issue was procedurally barred because it was raised on direct appeal and decided against Petitioner, Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(2). The court concluded that Petitioner had failed to show either cause and prejudice or actual innocence sufficient to overcome the procedural bar. (3/17/17 Cir. Ct. Op. & Order, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.40-46.) Ten days later, Petitioner filed a motion to amend his motion for relief from judgment. In addition, on April 6, 2017, he filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 17, 2017, order denying relief from judgment. The trial court denied both motions in an order issued on April 26, 2017. (4/26/17 Cir. Ct. Order, ECF No. 1-5, PageID.48-50.)
Petitioner sought leave to appeal to both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting three issues:
(Br. in Supp. of Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19-20.) The court of appeals denied leave to appeal on September 15, 2017, and the supreme court denied leave to appeal on July 3, 2018.
Petitioner, through counsel filed his habeas corpus petition on November 1, 2018. The petition raises one ground for relief, as follows:
(Br. in Supp. of Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.10.)
This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). The AEDPA "prevents federal habeas `retrials'" and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is "intentionally difficult to meet." Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (internal quotation omitted).
The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court may consider only the holdings, and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381-82; Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 578-79 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, "clearly established Federal law" does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Miller v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 565 U.S. at 38).
A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). "To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to `show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). In other words, "[w]here the precise contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in their adjudication of a prisoner's claims." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 424 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).
The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 656. This presumption of correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981); Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).
Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an appropriate jury instruction on self-defense. According to Petitioner's brief in support of the petition, the trial court gave the following instructions regarding self-defense:
(Br. in Supp. of Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.13-15 (quoting Tr IV, 16-18 (emphasis added by Petitioner).) Petitioner argues that the italicized paragraph and phrase concerning the duty to retreat should not have been given, because Michigan Criminal Jury Instruction 7.16 states that the paragraph "`should not be given if the duty to retreat is not in dispute.'" (Br. in Supp. of Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.13 (quoting Mich. Crim. Jury Instruction 7.16).) In addition, Petitioner asserts that, absent an instruction that the hotel room was Petitioner's "home" for purposes of the instructions, the instruction was incomplete. Petitioner maintains that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the instruction as given and failing to insist on a supplemental instruction that the hotel room was Petitioner's home for purposes of the duty to retreat.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-prong test by which to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must prove: (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome. A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. The defendant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)); see also Nagi v. United States, 90 F.3d 130, 135 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that counsel's strategic decisions were hard to attack). The court must determine whether, in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time of counsel's actions, "the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Even if a court determines that counsel's performance was outside that range, the defendant is not entitled to relief if counsel's error had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 691.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized, when a federal court reviews a state court's application of Strickland under § 2254(d), the deferential standard of Strickland is "doubly" deferential. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (citing Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)); see also Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 13 (2013); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011). In those circumstances, the question before the habeas court is "whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard." Id.; Jackson v. Houk, 687 F.3d 723, 740-41 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that the "Supreme Court has recently again underlined the difficulty of prevailing on a Strickland claim in the context of habeas and AEDPA. . . .") (citing Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102).
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's claim on the ground that the jury instruction, as given, properly reflected Michigan law:
(12/10/15 Mich. Ct. App. Op., ECF No. 1-2, PageID.33.)
Petitioner cites no established Supreme Court precedent in support of his claim that the jury instruction was improper. Nor could he make such a showing. In Phillips v. Million, 374 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2004), the Sixth Circuit recognized that no clearly established Supreme Court precedent requires a state court to issue an instruction on self-defense, id. at 397-98, much less what such an instruction must say.
Instead, Petitioner's arguments about the adequacy of the self-defense instruction are based solely on state law. He argues only (1) that the Michigan model criminal jury instructions advised that the "duty to retreat" instruction not be given under the circumstances of his case and (2) that, under Michigan law, he was entitled to a special instruction that the motel room qualified as Petitioner's "home" for purposes of the self-defense instruction.
Applying state law, the court of appeals concluded that the jury instruction was proper. It is not the province of a federal habeas court to re-examine state-law determinations on state-law questions. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (observing that the Supreme Court has "stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law") (internal quotations and citations omitted).) The decision of the state courts on a state-law issue is binding on a federal court. See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983). The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has recognized "`that a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.'" Stumpf v. Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 746 n.6 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76). See also Thomas v. Stephenson, 898 F.3d 693, 700 n.1 (6th Cir. 2018) (same).
Because the jury instruction, as given, properly captured Michigan law on self-defense, any objection by counsel would have been futile. Counsel's failure to make a frivolous or meritless motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Smith v. Bradshaw, 591 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 2010); O'Hara v. Brigano, 499 F.3d 492, 506 (6th Cir. 2007); Chegwidden v. Kapture, 92 F. App'x 309, 311 (6th Cir. 2004); Harris v. United States, 204 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2000).
As a consequence, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective with respect to the jury instruction on self-defense — much less to overcome the double deference owed to the determination of the Michigan Court of Appeals.
In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner's application pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court's dismissal of Petitioner's action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is "somewhat anomalous" for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm'r of Corr. of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was "intrinsically contradictory" to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must "engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim" to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner's claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Id. "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner's claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court's dismissal of Petitioner's claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
The Court will enter a judgment and order consistent with this opinion.
