OPINION
ELLEN S. CARMODY, Magistrate Judge.
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is vacated and the matter remanded for further factual findings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff was 56 years of age on his alleged disability onset date. (PageID.296). He successfully completed college and worked previously as a teacher aide and assistant principal. (PageID.75, 89). Plaintiff applied for benefits on September 29, 2015, alleging that he had been disabled since July 22, 2015, due to demyelinating polyneuropathy, nervous system disorder, radicular lumbar pain and trauma, prostate cancer, chronic and major depression, suspected autoimmune disease, degeneration of spinal discs, weakness, and loss of function in extremities. (PageID.296-97, 331). Plaintiff's application was denied, after which time he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.185-294).
On October 18, 2017, ALJ Donna Grit conducted a hearing with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (PageID.82-119). In a written decision dated December 5, 2017, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (PageID.48-76). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.31-36). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ'S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and he can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from: (1) degenerative changes of the lumbar, thoracic, and cervical spine; (2) status post cervical fusion; (3) carpal tunnel syndrome; (4) lower extremity neuropathy; (5) right shoulder degenerative changes; (6) history of right shoulder rotator cuff tear repair surgery/bilateral shoulder tendinitis; and (7) history of prostate cancer, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.52-59).
With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform sedentary work subject to the following limitations: (1) he cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (2) he cannot crawl and can only occasionally stoop, crouch, balance, kneel, and climb ramps/stairs; (3) he can frequently perform handling and fingering activities; (4) he can occasionally reach bilaterally; (5) he can occasionally be exposed to extreme cold; and (6) he cannot use vibratory hand tools. (PageID.59). Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was still capable of performing his past relevant work as a teacher aide. Accordingly, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim for benefits.
I. The ALJ's Step II Findings are not Supported by Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ's conclusion that he does not suffer from a severe emotional impairment is not supported by substantial evidence. A severe impairment is defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities," 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c), and which lasts or can be expected to last "for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Basic work activities include: (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b); see also, Despins v. Commissioner of Social Security, 257 Fed. Appx. 923, 929 n.2 (6th Cir., Dec. 14, 2007).
An impairment "can be considered not severe only if it is a slight abnormality that minimally affects work ability regardless of age, education, and experience." Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security, 486 F.3d 234, 243 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 862 (6th Cir.1988)); see also, Williamson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 796 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1986) (an impairment is less than severe only if it is a "slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education and work experience").
Step two of the sequential disability process is considered a "de minimus hurdle" designed to subject to dismissal only those claims which are "totally groundless" from a medical standpoint. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 243 n.2; Despins, 257 Fed. Appx. at 929; Higgs, 880 F.2d at 860. As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, "this lenient interpretation of the severity requirement in part represents the courts' response to the Secretary's questionable practice in the early 1980s of using the step two regulation to deny meritorious claims without proper vocational analysis." Long v. Apfel, 1 Fed. Appx. 326, 331 (6th Cir., Jan. 9, 2001) (quoting Higgs, 880 F.2d at 862).
The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety and has experienced "suicidal thoughts" as well as "disorganized thoughts and impaired memory." (PageID.53). The ALJ also noted that, from December 2015 through May 2017, Plaintiff repeatedly exhibited anxiety, fear, and nervousness. (PageID.53). The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff had been prescribed medication to treat his depression and anxiety. (PageID.53). As the ALJ also noted, however, the record contains evidence that Plaintiff has, at times, exhibited less serious symptoms of emotional impairment. While this evidence is certainly relevant to an assessment of the extent to which Plaintiff is limited by his emotional impairments, such does not support the conclusion, given the other evidence, that Plaintiff's emotional impairments are neither severe nor impose any functional limitations. In sum, while the degree of limitation imposed by Plaintiff's emotional impairments is subject to reasonable debate, it is not reasonable to conclude that Plaintiff's emotional impairments do not limit his ability to perform basic work activities. Accordingly, the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff does not suffer from any severe emotional impairment is not supported by substantial evidence.
Furthermore, the harmless error standard articulated in Maziarz v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 837 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1987), is inapplicable in this circumstance. At step two of the sequential disability analysis articulated above, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment. In Maziarz, the court held that where the ALJ finds the presence of a severe impairment at step two and proceeds to continue through the remaining steps of the analysis, the alleged failure to identify as severe some other impairment constitutes harmless error so long as the ALJ considered the entire medical record in rendering his decision. Id. at 244; see also, Kirkland v. Commissioner of Social Security, 528 Fed. Appx. 425, 427 (6th Cir., May 22, 2013) ("so long as the ALJ considers all the individual's impairments, the failure to find additional severe impairments ... does not constitute reversible error"). Here, the ALJ's RFC finding contains no non-exertional limitations from which the Court concludes that the ALJ failed to properly consider Plaintiff's emotional impairments when assessing his RFC. Thus, the ALJ's failure to find that Plaintiff suffered from a severe emotional impairment is not harmless. See Mish v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2011 WL 836750 at *1-2 (W.D. Mich., Mar. 4, 2011). This failure likewise leads to the conclusion that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
While the Court finds that the ALJ's decision fails to comply with the relevant legal standards, Plaintiff can be awarded benefits only if "all essential factual issues have been resolved" and "the record adequately establishes [his] entitlement to benefits." Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); see also, Brooks v. Commissioner of Social Security, 531 Fed. Appx. 636, 644 (6th Cir., Aug. 6, 2013). This latter requirement is satisfied "where the proof of disability is overwhelming or where proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking." Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176; see also, Brooks, 531 Fed. Appx. at 644.
Evaluation of Plaintiff's claim requires the resolution of certain factual disputes which this Court is neither competent nor authorized to undertake in the first instance. Moreover, there does not exist compelling evidence that Plaintiff is disabled. Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for further factual findings, including but not necessarily limited to, an accurate assessment of the severe impairments from which Plaintiff suffers, an assessment of his residual functional capacity, and a determination as to whether there exists a significant number of jobs which Plaintiff is capable of performing despite his limitations.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is vacated and the matter remanded for further factual findings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will enter.
