PHILLIP J. GREEN, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF No. 22). Plaintiff's counsel seeks $19,398.87 in fees, as detailed in his application. Defendant has not opposed counsel's request. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that the motion be granted.
On March 24, 2015, this matter was remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 16-17). Plaintiff was subsequently awarded disability benefits, including past-due benefits of more than one-hundred thousand dollars, 25 percent of which, $34,398.87, was withheld to pay counsel. (ECF No. 22-3, PageID.504-09). Counsel submits the present motion seeking an award pursuant to the contingent fee arrangement into which he and Plaintiff entered. (ECF No. 22-3, PageID.500). According to this agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel a fee not greater than 25 percent of any past-due benefits he ultimately received. (Id.).
The Social Security Act provides that whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. 42 U.S.C. 406(b)(1)(A). There exists "a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to contingency-fee arrangements that comply with 406(b)'s 25-percent cap." Lasley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 771 F.3d 308, 309 (6th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, counsel is not automatically entitled to 25 percent of his client's past-due benefits. Instead, the Court has an independent obligation to assess the reasonableness of a request for attorney fees. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807 ("§ 406(b) calls for court review of [contingent-fee agreements] as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases"). The burden to establish that a fee request is reasonable rests with counsel. Ibid.
Counsel is seeking $19,398.87 for work performed in this Court. Counsel asserts that he will also be seeking $15,000.00 in fees for work performed before the Commissioner.
While counsel is entitled to receive a portion of Plaintiff's past-due benefits, any award pursuant to 406(b) must account for any amounts previously paid to counsel pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 795-96 (where counsel receives a fee award pursuant to both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. 406(b), he must [r]efund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee). The Court previously awarded $3,100.00 in EAJA fees, (ECF No. 20), which counsel acknowledges was ultimately paid to him pursuant to his fee agreement with Plaintiff. (ECF No. 22-2, 22-3, PageID.498, 500). Counsel acknowledges that this amount must now be refunded to Plaintiff.
For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), (ECF No. 22), be granted and counsel be awarded nineteen thousand, three hundred ninety-eight dollars and eightyseven cents ($19,398.87). The undersigned further recommends that counsel be ordered to refund to Plaintiff three thousand one hundred dollars ($3,100.00) previously awarded in EAJA fees.