PHILLIP J. GREEN, Magistrate Judge.
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
Plaintiff was 45 years of age on her alleged disability onset date. (PageID.251). She successfully completed high school and worked previously as a mail clerk. (PageID.60). Plaintiff applied for benefits on December 24, 2015, alleging that she had been disabled since June 15, 2015, due to Crohn's disease, supraventricular tachycardia, bone deficiency, colitis, migraines, liver, kidney, and ovarian cysts, depression, anxiety, sleeping difficulty, chronic fatigue, and a fatty liver. (PageID.251-61, 275).
Plaintiff's applications were denied, after which time she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.99-249). Following an administrative hearing, ALJ Donna Grit, in an opinion dated May 21, 2018, determined that Plaintiff did not qualify for disability benefits. (PageID.46-62, 68-97). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.32-37). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff's insured status expired on March 31, 2018. (PageID.49). Accordingly, to be eligible for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish that she became disabled prior to the expiration of her insured status. See 42 U.S.C. § 423; Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1182 (6th Cir. 1990).
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from: (1) Crohn's disease/ulcerative colitis and (2) status-post thyroidectomy/thyroid cancer, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.49-52). With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform sedentary work subject to the following limitations: (1) she can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps/stairs; (2) she cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and (3) she cannot be exposed to extremes of heat, cold, or humidity. (PageID.52).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform, her limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform
This standard requires more than mere intuition or conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant can perform specific jobs in the national economy. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. Accordingly, ALJs routinely question vocational experts in an attempt to determine whether there exist a significant number of jobs which a particular claimant can perform, her limitations notwithstanding. Such was the case here, as the ALJ questioned a vocational expert. The vocational expert testified that there existed approximately 165,000 jobs in the national economy which an individual with Plaintiff's RFC could perform, such limitations notwithstanding. (PageID.91-95). This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) ("[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others have deemed `significant'"). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits.
In addition to Plaintiff's statements and hearing testimony, the administrative record contained copies of Plaintiff's medical treatment records. The ALJ described this evidence as follows:
On June 1, 2017, an ultrasound of the right upper quadrant of the abdomen indicated severe hepatic steatosis (Exhibit B-9F/111-112).
(PageID.54-57).
On December 22, 2015, Dr. Brian Phillips completed a report regarding Plaintiff's ability to perform physical activities. (PageID.420-23). The doctor reported that Plaintiff was limited to a greater extent than the ALJ recognized. For example, the doctor reported that during an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff can stand/walk for less than two hours and sit for "about" two hours. (PageID.422). The doctor reported that Plaintiff required a sit/stand option and could only occasionally lift or carry any weight. (PageID.422). The ALJ afforded only "partial weight" to Dr. Phillips' opinion. (PageID.57-58). Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ failed to afford appropriate weight to the opinions of her treating physician.
The treating physician doctrine recognizes that medical professionals who have a long history of caring for a claimant and his maladies generally possess significant insight into her medical condition. See Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). An ALJ must, therefore, give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source if: (1) the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and (2) the opinion is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record. Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527).
Such deference is appropriate, however, only where the particular opinion is based upon sufficient medical data. Miller v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citation omitted). The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician where such is unsupported by the medical record, merely states a conclusion, or is contradicted by substantial medical evidence. See Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528; Cutlip v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1994).
If an ALJ accords less than controlling weight to a treating sources opinion, the ALJ must give good reasons for doing so. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. Such reasons must be supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating sources medical opinion and the reasons for that weight. This requirement ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the rule. Ibid. (citation omitted). Simply stating that the physicians opinions are not well-supported by any objective findings and are inconsistent with other credible evidence is, without more, too ambiguous to permit meaningful review of the ALJ's assessment. Id. at 376-77.
If the ALJ affords less than controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion, the ALJ must still determine the weight to be afforded such. Id. at 376. In doing so, the ALJ must consider the following factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of the examination, (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) supportability of the opinion, (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the specialization of the treating source, and (6) other relevant factors. Ibid. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). While the ALJ is not required to explicitly discuss each of these factors, the record must nevertheless reflect that the ALJ considered those factors relevant to his assessment. See, e.g., Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007); Undheim v. Barnhart, 214 Fed. Appx. 448, 450 (5th Cir., Jan. 19, 2007).
In support of her position, Plaintiff advances two arguments, neither of which are persuasive. First, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for highlighting an internal inconsistency in Dr. Phillips' opinion. The doctor reported that Plaintiff needed to periodically walk throughout the workday. (PageID.422). Specifically, the doctor reported that every ten minutes, Plaintiff "must" walk for ten minutes. (PageID.422). As the ALJ observed, this would require Plaintiff to spend approximately half the workday walking. (PageID.58). As the ALJ further observed, this is inconsistent with the doctor's assertion that during an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff can stand/walk for "less than 2 hours." (PageID.58, 422). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding the doctor's statements to be conflict. The Court disagrees as the inherent contradiction in the competing statements is obvious. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ's reliance on boilerplate language fails to permit meaningful review of the ALJ's analysis. Specifically, Plaintiff points to the following statement by the ALJ:
(PageID.57).
Plaintiff is correct that this language is vague and fails to articulate the reasons why the ALJ discounted Dr. Phillips' opinion. Were this the totality of the ALJ's analysis, Plaintiff might very well be entitled to relief. But, immediately following the language quoted above, the ALJ discussed at length the specific reasons why she discounted the doctor's opinion. (PageID.57-58). The ALJ's assessment in this regard is supported by substantial evidence. This argument is, therefore, rejected.
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal the District Court's order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
