GREGORY F. KISHEL, CHIEF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.
This adversary proceeding was commenced in the Chapter 11 cases of Debtor Petters Company, Inc., and the other Debtor-entities related to it. It is before the court for a ruling on an issue posed by Defendants Opportunity Finance, LLC, et al (collectively, "the Opportunity Finance defendants") in their motion for dismissal.
The underlying cases were commenced in October, 2008, after the collapse of a massive Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Thomas J. Petters, the principal of the Debtors. This adversary proceeding was one of some 200 in a docket of avoidance litigation commenced in the cases. It is one of the most prominent within the docket — both for the magnitude of the judgment sought by the Trustee and in the scope and complexity of the subject matter, i.e. hundreds of transactions that featured the subject transfers.
Early in this litigation, the Opportunity Finance defendants moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) in lieu of filing an answer. Numerous defendants in other adversary proceedings in the docket did the same.
This adversary proceeding was among a small number that presented substantial legal issues distinct to it — more involved and specific to particular parties-defendant.
Around the same time, another proceeding was judicially assigned higher priority for litigation, trial, and decision: a motion the Trustee brought in the main cases, for the substantive consolidation of the estates of all of the Debtors but one.
The Opportunity Finance defendants and other respondents took appeals from that order. They elected to have the appeals proceed in the district court. Judge Patrick J. Schiltz was assigned to the appeals.
Some months after the appeal to the district court was made, the Trustee began asserting in this adversary proceeding that one of the keystone aspects of the Opportunity Finance defendants' motion for dismissal was ripe for decision due to the grant of substantive consolidation. That point was the defense's contention that the Trustee had no litigable claim against them for avoidance of fraudulent transfers under Minnesota state law, as to payments that had been made by the Debtor-entities that had no statutorily-qualified creditors when they were put into bankruptcy. On such transfers, the Opportunity Finance defendants insisted, the Trustee lacked a figurative predecessor from which to take the derivative standing under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) that he asserted when he invoked Minnesota state law as a substantive basis for avoidance. For the Trustee's case against the Opportunity Finance defendants, the Debtor-transferors in question were PC Funding, LLC and SPF Funding, LLC.
The Opportunity Finance defendants resisted having this issue scheduled for submission. At various times they suggested that proceeding here would infringe on appellate jurisdiction due to an overlap of issues; at others they cited "prudential considerations" to argue for deferral until the issue of the ultimate forum was resolved through their motion for withdrawal of reference.
However, the issue was set for argument.
Before getting into the merits, it is necessary to lay out the issue presented — specific to its genesis (the Trustee's pleading) and the vehicle through which it is raised (the defense's motion for dismissal).
The Trustee sued the Opportunity Finance defendants to avoid transfers of
The Trustee sues the Opportunity Finance defendants on claims of fraudulent transfer. In part, he relies on the Minnesota enactment of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("MUFTA"), Minn.Stat. §§ 513.41-513.51 (2014), via the empowerment of 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).
For such empowerment, however, § 544(b) requires a trustee to prove that the debtor for whose estate he sues, in fact had a creditor of the sort identified in the statute, one with a right to payment from the debtor, in order for the trustee to invoke the same state-law avoidance remedies that such a creditor could have used on the date of the bankruptcy filing and in the absence of the bankruptcy filing. In re Petters Company, Inc., 494 B.R. at 440-441; In re Petters Company, Inc., 495 B.R. at 895-896. To make a more concrete
Absent such a predicate creditor, a trustee lacks derivative standing to sue under § 544(b). In re Wintz Cos., 230 B.R. 848, 859 (8th Cir. BAP1999). And further, to meet the plausibility standard for fact-pleading under current Supreme Court precedent,
When the Trustee originally sued out this adversary proceeding, the pleading addressed to this point was minimal:
Complaint [Dkt. No. 1, 40].
Complaint [Dkt. No. 1, 12].
This clearly did not pass muster under the second memorandum and the requirement under its ruling # 6A, that a specific predicate creditor be identified in pleading. 495 B.R. at 900-901.
After the second memorandum was issued, the Trustee filed his Second Amended Complaint in May, 2014. Its pleading on the predicate-creditor issue was markedly different. For the legal structure of his fact-pleading, the Trustee now relied entirely on the fact that substantive consolidation had been ordered in the meantime:
Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 83, 71].
In turn, the text of paragraphs 78 and 79 of the Second Amended Complaint is new to the historical sequence of the Trustee's pleading. The two paragraphs run a total of 27 pages. Within them the Trustee identifies (in tabular format and separate narrative) multiple creditors toward satisfying the predicate-creditor requirement. PC Funding and SPF Funding are never mentioned in these paragraphs; and there is no indication that they were ever in contractual privity with or otherwise indebted to any of the proffered predicate creditors. On the other hand, one or the other of PC Funding and SPF Funding is named as the transferor of money to the Opportunity Finance defendants, solely or in the conjunctive with PCI, at multiple points throughout ¶¶ 113-130 of the Second Amended Complaint.
Now, the point of this discussion. In the original motion for dismissal, the issue was framed as follows: was the Trustee's pleaded case for avoidance under Minnesota law fatally deficient, not only for the failure to identify a predicate creditor on the face of the complaint, but for the de facto and de jure lack of such a creditor as to the Debtors that actually made the transfers he would have avoided? This, of course, went to the Trustee's first pleading.
Under the amendment made in light of substantive consolidation, the issue is differently framed: can the Trustee use creditors whose pre-petition claims lay against some of the Debtor-entities whose estates were substantively consolidated, to satisfy the predicate-creditor requirement for the avoidance of transfers that were actually made by other Debtor-entities, when the transferor-Debtor lacked any third-party creditors of its own, not related to it, as of the relevant date?
This issue is framed differently, but it has the same considerations as the original. This is because it descends from the same root-requirement of substantive law: under § 544(b) a plaintiff-trustee must derive his avoidance power from a predicate creditor that is legally-cognizable as a creditor under non-bankruptcy law. But the driving mechanism is different, because
The Trustee never overtly concedes that his case would fail on that threshold, were it not for this possible transference of creditor-standing.
Funding had any consensual, contractual creditors when bankruptcy petitions were filed for them, and thus had no predicate creditor for § 544(b).
So, on to the issue on its merits.
One indisputable threshold point: such a transference of predicate-creditor status could not be justified under the Bankruptcy Code alone, applying general principles of statutory construction. Partly by negative inference and partly by positive statutory prescription, a claim in bankruptcy must be based on a right to payment, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), that was enforceable prepetition under an agreement or applicable nonbankruptcy law, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1), and was enforceable against the debtor that is in bankruptcy in the case in which the claim's allowability is at issue, id. See In re Polaroid Corp., 543 B.R. 888, 898-899 (Bankr.D.Minn.2016).
Thus, despite the nominal, structural relatedness of PCI, PC Funding, and SPF Funding as parent and subsidiaries, creditors with claims allowable originally against the separate bankruptcy estate of PCI would not function in that status, as predicate creditors on which the Trustee could assert standing to avoid PC Funding's or SPF Funding's transfers of their own property. See In re Petters Co., Inc., 494 B.R. at 440-441 and In re Petters Co., Inc., 495 B.R. 895-896 (for trustee to invoke state law of fraudulent transfer under § 544(b), there must be an actual unsecured creditor of the debtor in the bankruptcy case in which trustee is suing, that holds an allowable unsecured claim against that debtor's bankruptcy estate, and that could have sued the transferee under same law of fraudulent transfer).
But now, after the grant of substantive consolidation as to PCI and all of its SPE-subsidiaries, the Trustee argues that he is empowered to sue in avoidance of transfers made by SPE-subsidiaries PC Funding and SPF Funding. He asserts that he now has a standing derivative of creditors holding claims allowable on account of debt that PCI owed those creditors before PCI's bankruptcy filing, as a consequence of the consolidation.
And what rationale does the Trustee give, to support such a transference of predicate-creditor standing? Well, the grant of substantive consolidation . . . did something.
If the Trustee's notion is correct, the question is, what did substantive consolidation do, to get him there? Whatever the answer is — and even if it is "nothing" — it starts in the general law; and then it gets specific to these cases.
Substantive consolidation is a judicially crafted remedy that can be traced back to Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 61 S.Ct. 904, 85 L.Ed. 1293 (1941). It was created and developed entirely on considerations of equity; it is applied only in bankruptcy cases; and it is used exclusively to support the administrative function in bankruptcy.
Under the analysis of several circuit courts, a grant of substantive consolidation may be tailored in its incidents, just as any equitable remedy may. In re Petters Co., Inc., 506 B.R. at 852-853. The Eighth Circuit takes this approach. In re Giller, 962 F.2d 796, 799 (8th Cir.1992) ("the bankruptcy court retains the power to order a less than complete consolidation," in the sense that causes of action for avoidance that lay in favor of the estates of individual debtors before consolidation may be expressly preserved for possible recovery in favor of the consolidated estate).
That was done here. Substantive consolidation was granted in 2013 on the following terms:
506 B.R. at 854. The refinements at Terms 3 and 4 were imposed at the Trustee's specific request (though not necessarily styled in the same text he had proffered).
The Trustee had requested both of those provisions in mind of broadly-phrased cautions in earlier case law: "substantive consolidation normally would eliminate the justification for the exercise of the trustee's avoidance power" under a constructive-fraud theory, against a defendant that had received payment from one debtor's assets on debt that was owing solely by a related debtor, In re Giller, 962 F.2d at 799; and giving retroactive effect to a grant of substantive consolidation is to be considered carefully, and if done is not to be structured automatically to the greatest benefit of the estate, In re Petters Co., Inc., 506 B.R. at 852-853 (summarizing earlier authority from circuits other than the Eighth). After he got that structure of relief, the Trustee started arguing that Giller furnished broad authority for the transference of predicate-creditor standing, given the degree of accommodation the Giller court gave to the trustee there.
It is not that easy, however. The two trustees' cases started on the same ground level, but there is a world of difference between the outcome the Giller trustee got and what the Trustee seeks here.
As a first step, both the Giller trustee and the Trustee here had to justify the
Presumably, the Giller trustee had the same basic administratively-oriented reason for getting the estates consolidated — to avoid an expensive process of tracing inter-debtor transfers to reallocate assets to their proper repose in particular estates; to avoid the unreliability of such an accounting, which would result from sloppy practices, bad record-keeping, or illegal conduct by the debtors; to save the large expense and delay that such a process would entail; to enable a single and much simpler process of claims allowance. The Trustee here proved up that justification more than adequately; and he did so without serious contest from his opponents on the motion for substantive consolidation. 506 B.R. at 816-823.
But the Giller trustee's reasons for qualifying his grant of substantive consolidation were different from those of the Trustee here. The Giller trustee got the bankruptcy court to preserve each estate's causes of action for avoidance against third-party transferees, as they stood on their own legal and factual substance before consolidation. Apparently the Giller trustee sought this because he anticipated an argument from the defendants that he had sued on a constructive-fraud theory, and in particular on one sort of transaction — the use of one debtor's assets to pay debt owing by another related debtor to a third-party creditor, to which the transferor-debtor was not legally liable.
Here, the Trustee was similarly careful to insist on preserving all of the avoidance causes of action out of all of the estates, as
And yet, the strategic theory here was broader than the one that the Giller trustee used. No doubt, the Trustee also wanted to head off the same possible defense to his constructive-fraud claims, that substantive consolidation might otherwise germinate. But his larger collateral purpose for seeking substantive consolidation went to his avoidance litigation against defendants that had used SPEs as nominal intermediaries in their transacting with PCI, as contrived blocks to the very avoidance claims that the Trustee has brought now. To carry that out, the Trustee argues that the outside, post-petition event of substantive consolidation had a direct effect on his cases for those causes of action. As he would have it, the pooling of claims into a single estate entitles him to use the right of avoidance that any creditor of any Debtor held against its own debtor-Debtor pre-petition, against any transferee of any of the Debtors.
As a strategic tack in the use of substantive consolidation, this is different from what the Giller trustee did. For that matter, the posture and positioning of remedies, claims, parties, and stages in litigation in these cases is materially different from those presented in the handful of published decisions that address the effect of substantive consolidation on particular claims in trustees' litigation or the propriety of imposing substantive consolidation when its proponent expressly intends such a collateral effect.
It is crucial to note one distinction at the outset. As it was originally conceived, substantive consolidation was largely justified toward the conservation of estate assets,
However, that is an asset-oriented rationale for allowing consolidation in the first instance. Here, the Trustee seeks to parlay an accomplished substantive consolidation collaterally, to the estate's advantage in a different part of his administration: his pursuit of rights of recovery in avoidance that are vested in and asserted by bankruptcy estates.
The implications of substantive consolidation here do not concern the current assets of those estates. The statutory powers on which a trustee sues to avoid and recover are not themselves assets of the estate, i.e. property of the estate. They can lead to the post-petition recapture of property that would have passed into the estate had it not been transferred pre-petition; and upon avoidance, at latest on post-judgment realization, any property recovered becomes property of the estate. In re Arzt, 252 B.R. 138, 141 (8th Cir. BAP2000).of estate).
This distinction is fundamental and crucial when it comes to the Trustee's post-consolidation standing under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) to avoid particular transfers alleged to be fraudulent. Clearly, the assets held by individual estates (as successors to their linked debtors) become fungible upon substantive consolidation, in that their cumulated value is now distributed to the members of a cumulated body of creditors. Giller establishes, that, not least in its out-come: it enabled the assets from one preconsolidation estate to be used for the administrative expenses anticipated for the recovery on rights of action that had been held by a different pre-consolidation estate. But the rights of avoidance held by the individual estates before consolidation are not assets. What does substantive consolidation do to them?
In a superficial way, substantive consolidation does bring rights of avoidance together, in a goal-centered sense. As property of the consolidated estate upon recovery, the ultimate realization on them goes to the benefit of the single post-consolidated
The Trustee argues that it does, in the transference of standing that he postulates. Whether that is correct doubles back to how substantive consolidation functioned in the Debtors' cases, at a more fundamental level.
As the Trustee would have it, the key event to be recognized in consequence of substantive consolidation would be a "complete merger of legal entities." He sees this "merger" reflected in the "consolid[ation of] the assets and liabilities of multiple debtors[,] . . . treating them as if the liabilities were owed by, and the assets held by, a single legal entity." The concept here might be termed a "merger treatment" — i.e. the post-consolidation estate and all of its attributes including rights of avoidance are to be "treated" as if the post-consolidation estate was the surviving entity of something like a corporate merger. The previous existence of the individual bankruptcy estates would be considered irrelevant, because they and all of their attributes would have been merged into the new "single legal entity."
As the Trustee envisions it, all of the legal attributes of the estates, and in particular a trustee's empowerments to avoid individual transfers, become polymorphous through the act of substantive consolidation; they run to the benefit of all of the creditors whose claims are pooled against the "single legal entity," and they can be asserted in the right and on the standing of absolutely any of those creditors against any transferee that transacted with any and every debtor-entity.
The Trustee's assertion is largely conclusory. The whole construct has several deep flaws, and the discordance has three sources.
The first is that the argument ignores the separate pre-petition existence of the Debtors as entities themselves, and the estates (ultimately the one consolidated estate) as entities created only by operation of law on the bankruptcy filings. The Debtors had their own historical and separate existence pre-petition; the creation of a bankruptcy estate did not terminate that existence for any of them.
The second comes out of the text and tenor of the original order for substantive consolidation, which must be strictly construed in the effect to be given to it. The argument fails to acknowledge that the consolidation as ordered did not change the status or structure of the Debtor-entities as separate persons under non-bankruptcy law. It only altered the structure of the bankruptcy estates that were associated with those Debtor-entities. And how, exactly, did that work under the retrojection effected by Term 3 of the consolidation order?
The answer involves a sequence of changes, because the Debtors' bankruptcy filings were not done simultaneously. More importantly, Terms 2 through 4 left undisturbed the existence and legal personality of the underlying pre-petition Debtor-entities. It happened in this wise:
The third source is the underlying substantive law that continues to govern
This third aspect takes the analysis to the central nature of the Trustee's empowerment under § 544(b). To be used by a trustee pursuant to § 544(b), avoidance powers under state law must be factually anchored in an actual pre-bankruptcy past: the transfer must have been made by the debtor-entity that then went into bankruptcy through the case in which the trustee sues, and a specific creditor of that debtor must have had a right under state law to sue in avoidance, at the time the debtor was put into bankruptcy.
First, the historical facts of action and status do not change. Here, an SPE-subsidiary of PCI was the transferor; and any cause of action for the avoidance of any payment of money by that SPE-subsidiary is still to be treated with it as the transferor. The pre-petition debt structures of all of the Debtors did not change from what they were, when each one was put into bankruptcy.
Second, the governing law stays the same. The transferor itself must have had a predicate creditor at the time that transferor went into bankruptcy, a creditor with a claim against the transferor that was
Third, after substantive consolidation the transferor-entity itself continues to exist, as a legal person that is in bankruptcy, until its existence is terminated under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Substantive consolidation only works a consolidation of bankruptcy estates, the fictive legal entities that came into existence solely by operation of law upon the filing of a petition for relief as to their associated debtors.
This is why the Trustee's likening of substantive consolidation to a merger is overstated, and even misleading. The notion is no more than an analogy, and one of very limited scope at that. Substantive consolidation applies only to the estates as entities that arise in a bankruptcy case; and in its application as an equitable remedy it cannot alter or circumvent the positive substantive prescriptions of the Bankruptcy Code. To give a trustee standing to use state-law fraudulent transfer remedies against pre-petition transfers by a specific debtor, § 544(b) requires the presence in the case of a specific creditor that could have used the same remedies to avoid those very transfers. If the debtor-transferor had no such creditors, the gap is not retroactively filled by a substantive consolidation of that debtor's bankruptcy estate with others, even if the other cases feature allowable creditor-claims that would qualify their holders as predicate creditors for the use of avoidance remedies against transfers by their own debtors. As a remedy effective only within a bankruptcy case and the administration of its estate, substantive consolidation cannot reach with legal effect back in time before the date on which a case was commenced — or at least, back beyond the first filing for a debtor in a group of related debtors.
Equity, through the vehicle of substantive consolidation, does not lie to recast such creditors into qualifying predicate creditors for the avoidance of transfers made by debtors that were not their own. The law still requires the trustee's standing to be anchored in the actual history of the transferor-debtor, and substantive consolidation does not and could not remake that history.
There is an alternate view of how substantive consolidation affects rights of avoidance under § 544(b). It might be termed, somewhat imprecisely, an "asset treatment." While (as previously noted) a
That outcome, however, would be the only consequence of a grant of substantive consolidation, as to rights of avoidance held within the pre-consolidation estates. Consolidation of the bankruptcy estates would not affect the substantive merits of any right of avoidance brought into the pooling of the estates' fortunes.
This notion of the consequence of substantive consolidation resonates with the underlying nature of the remedy, and with the relief specifically ordered in these cases in 2013. Necessarily, it limits the scope of the Trustee's derivative power to avoid fraudulent transfer using state law, to Congress's original contemplation when § 544(b) was structured. By staying within those bounds, it embodies the restraint that the Supreme Court has cautioned for the use of equitable power in bankruptcy's processes, for three decades.
This is the appropriate way to envision and treat what happened to the Trustee's case and standing as to transfers that debtors PC Funding and SPF Funding made to the Opportunity Finance defendants, as a consequence of the grant of substantive consolidation in 2013. The answer is, nothing. The Trustee still has the same case, and the same standing or lack thereof, as to any particular transfer that he did before that consolidation.
At the Trustee's request, the issue just treated was split out from others raised by the Opportunity Finance defendants in their motion for dismissal, and put before the court for a ruling. The rationale for that ruling has just been memorialized. A full disposition of the Opportunity Finance defendants' motion for dismissal cannot be made yet, because other issues remain pending. So, call this memorandum a reprise of what was done to address the mass of "common issues" in the main litigation
11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Such substantive authority can include fraudulent transfer statutes. E.g., In re Marlar, 267 F.3d 749, 755-756 (8th Cir.2001); In re Popkin & Stern, 223 F.3d 764, 769 n. 11 (8th Cir.2000); In re Estate of Graven, 64 F.3d 453, 456 n. 5 (8th Cir.1995); In re Graven, 936 F.2d 378, 383 n. 7 (8th Cir.1991); In re DLC, Ltd., 295 B.R. 593, 601 (8th Cir. BAP 2003). MUFTA was the statutory source of fraudulent-transfer law in Minnesota when the Trustee commenced this adversary proceeding. In 2015 the Minnesota legislature amended and retitled MUFTA using a new uniform law, the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.2015 Minn. Laws, ch. 17. The amendment, however, applies only to transactions that occur after August 1, 2015. 2015 Minn. Laws, ch. 17, ¶ 13. Thus, MUFTA's provisions still apply to this adversary proceeding.
Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation [BKY 08-45257, Dkt. No. 3263], § 8.3, confirmed April 15, 2016 [Dkt. No. 3305].