MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER UPON RECONSIDERATION OF PREVIOUS ORDER

JOHN R. TUNHEIM, District Judge.

Defendant Local No. 638 of the Miscellaneous Drivers, Helper & Warehousemen's Union ("Local 638") moves this Court to reconsider the Court's denial of its motion for summary judgment on Gopher News Company's ("Gopher") cross-claims. The Court originally found it had jurisdiction over the cross-claims due to plaintiffs' asserted contractual violation. However, in the same Order, the Court dismissed the contract violation claim due to plaintiffs' failure to file within the statute of limitations period. Therefore, the Court's original basis for jurisdiction over the cross-claim was negated by the dismissal. On reconsideration, the Court finds it has no jurisdiction over Gopher's cross-claims due to Garmon pre-emption and dismisses the claim.

BACKGROUND

Steven Gerhardson, Ron Hanek, Mike Johnson, and Jim Costello (collectively, "plaintiffs") are delivery drivers for Gopher and members of Local No. 638. In early 2007, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund ("Central States"), Gopher's multiemployer pension plan, expelled Gopher from the plan for violating the plan's "adverse selection" rule. Plaintiffs brought an action against Local 638, Gopher, and Central States for breach of the duty of fair representation, breach of the collective bargaining agreement, and breach of fiduciary duty. (Am. Compl., Docket No. 54.) Gopher and Local 638 brought cross-claims against each other for fraud and indemnification. (Docket Nos. 18, 65.) On March 31, 2011, this Court issued an Order granting Central States, Local 638, and Gopher's motions for summary judgment as to Counts 1, 2, and 3 of plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, effectively dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims. (Docket No. 178 ("Order").) In the same Order, the Court denied Gopher and Local 638's cross-motions for summary judgment on Gopher's cross-claims against Local 638. (Id.) Local 638 requested leave to file a motion to reconsider its motion for summary judgment on the cross-claims, which this Court granted. The precise question for reconsideration is whether the Order, dismissing plaintiffs' breach of contract claim over which this Court had jurisdiction pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Relations Management Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), stripped this Court of jurisdiction over Gopher's cross-claims against Local 638. (See Order, Docket No. 178.)

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a court "to correct manifest errors of law. . . . Such motions cannot in any case be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during pendency of the summary judgment motion." Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Here, the request for reconsideration regards the denial of a motion for summary judgment — an order that is not usually appealable as it is interlocutory. Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 355 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Wright v. S. Ark. Reg. Health Ctr., Inc., 800 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1986)). "The district court has the inherent power to reconsider and modify an interlocutory order any time prior to the entry of judgment." Murr Plumbing, Inc. v. Scherer Bros. Fin. Servs. Co., 48 F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, a Court must always address jurisdictional deficiencies no matter when they present themselves in the timeline of a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that is lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."). The issue before the Court is whether the Court improperly determined that Garmon pre-emption did not apply to Gopher's cross-claims, thereby conferring upon the Court subject-matter jurisdiction. This issue was more fully briefed by the parties in their moving papers, and upon reconsideration, the Court determines that its previous determination was incorrect.

II. GARMON PRE-EMPTION

The intent of Congress in passing the nation's labor laws, including the LMRA was to

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 191 (1978) (emphasis added). As a result, pre-emption often bars a federal court from hearing a case or claim in deference to the Board's exclusive jurisdiction. "[P]reemption is an important tool to effectuate labor policies. If preemption were not available, a fundamental purpose underlying federal labor law and its uniform policies would be invalidated. . . ." United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850, 872 (7th Cir. 1998).

In its motion for summary judgment, Local 638 argued the Court had no jurisdiction over the cross-claim under the Garmon standard of pre-emption. Garmon pre-emption confers exclusive primary jurisdiction to the Board over claims that "arguably" constitute an unfair labor practice. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). Gopher's cross-claim essentially alleges Local 638 committed fraud in the collective bargaining process by not disclosing the terms of the pension. (See First Am. Answer, Countercl. and Cross-cl., Counts I-IV, Docket No. 15.) An allegation of fraud during collective bargaining is considered an unfair labor practice and therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB under Garmon. See Rozay's Transfer v. Local Freight Drivers, Local 208, 850 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Because the union's nondisclosure is arguably an unfair labor practice, insofar as it constituted a failure to bargain in good faith, the . . . district court was deprived of jurisdiction by the Garmon preemption doctrine.").

However, Gopher argued that the Court had concurrent jurisdiction under the carve out principle of § 301. See id. at 1325. Section 301 gives a federal court jurisdiction to hear claims of a violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Under the carve out, a federal court has concurrent jurisdiction over "cases involving conduct that is both an unfair labor practice and a violation of a collective bargaining agreement. . . ." Rozay's Transfer, 850 F.2d at 1326 (emphasis added). In the instant case, as the plaintiffs had asserted a contractual violation, the Court found it had jurisdiction "to adjudicate related issues of contract validity such as fraud." (Order at 16, Docket No. 178 (citing Trustees of the Twin Cities Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 330 (8th Cir. 2006).)

On reconsideration, Local 638 points to the United States Supreme Court decision in Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., Avco Corp. v. UAW, 523 U.S. 653 (1998). The Textron Court considered the jurisdictional status of claims that, standing alone, would not confer federal jurisdiction in the absence of a plaintiff asserting a contractual violation; at issue in Textron was a declaratory judgment, with a contract violation the anticipated defense. Id. at 655. The Textron Court described § 301 as "erect[ing] a gateway through which parties may pass into federal court; once they have entered, it does not restrict the legal landscape they may traverse." Id. at 658. Therefore, if a plaintiff alleges violation of a labor contract, a federal court may hear, for example, an affirmative defense alleging the contract is invalid due to unfair labor practices committed in the signing. Id. at 658. The Court found that anticipated defenses did not suffice to confer jurisdiction. Id. at 659-60. As a result of this pleading deficiency, the matter fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Id. at 661-62.

In the instant case, the plaintiffs alleged a contract violation, therefore the parties passed through Textron's gateway and the remainder of the Textron Court's reasoning is unavailing. However, when the Court dismissed the contract claim as untimely, the jurisdictional landscape of the case changed. The dismissal of plaintiffs' contract claim divested the Court of the jurisdiction to hear the claims over which Congress clearly intended the Board to have exclusive jurisdiction — unfair labor practices. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245. The Supreme Court has articulated two limited exceptions to Garmon pre-emption: where the activity is only of peripheral concern to the NLRA or for conduct that "touches interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [the court] could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." U.S.W. v. St. Gabriel's Hosp., 871 F.Supp. 335, 340 (D. Minn. 1994) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). An allegation of an unfair labor practice does not fit these limited exceptions. As a result, federal "courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the [LMRA] that these determinations be left in the first instance to the . . . Board." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-45.

Gopher argues that even if the dismissal strips the Court of jurisdiction over the cross-claim, the Court has discretion to keep the cross-claim, similar to the discretion conferred over state law matters under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See McLain v. Andersen Corp., 567 F.3d 956, 965 (8th Cir. 2009). The Court disagrees. Congress' intent in creating the Board and granting it exclusive jurisdiction was to consolidate certain types of claims for the purpose of creating a uniform national labor policy. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 U.S. at 191. This goal is a greater purpose than judicial economy, at the heart of § 1367's permissive standard for federal jurisdiction. Gopher has pointed to no case, and the Court is not independently aware of any, where a court dismissed the § 301 claim but maintained other claims under the carve out principle. Most of the § 1367 cases on which Gopher relies involve cases where the federal court decided both federal and state claims at the same time, rather than dismissing the federal claims and maintaining the state claims for future proceedings. See Quinn v. Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB, 470 F.3d 1240, 1248 (8th Cir. 2006); Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., No. 09-1384, 2011 WL 494941, at *3 n.3 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2011).

As a result, the Court can find no basis to conclude that a federal court has the same kind of discretion under the § 301 carve out as it does over supplemental state claims under § 1367. Further, even if it did have such discretion, the Court declines to exercise it since the entirety of plaintiffs' complaint has been dismissed.1 Therefore, the Court now dismisses the cross-claim.

ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Local 638's Motion to Reconsider [Docket No. 200] is GRANTED.

2. Item Number 2 of the Court's Order dated March 31, 2011 [Docket No. 178] granting in part and denying in part Local 638's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 107] is VACATED.

3. Local 638's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 107] is GRANTED. Defendant Gopher News Company's cross-claims against Local 638 [Docket No. 9] are DISMISSED.

4. Local 638's Cross-claim against Gopher News Company [Docket No. 11] is DENIED as moot.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.