ORDER

PATRICK J. SCHILTZ, District Judge.

Defendant Milton Rucker is charged with four crimes: (1) theft of government property; (2) conspiracy to commit bank fraud; (3) aggravated identity theft; and (4) being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm. This matter is before the Court on Rucker's objections1 to Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan's November 9, 2011 Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). Judge Boylan recommends denying Rucker's motions to suppress evidence. Based on a de novo review, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3), the Court overrules Rucker's objections and denies his motions to suppress.

Most of Rucker's arguments are adequately addressed by Judge Boylan's R&R. (Indeed, Rucker's objection consists almost entirely of long quotations from the R&R.) Rucker makes only one point that is not addressed in the R&R: that the nighttime execution of the warrants rendered the searches invalid.2

The warrant applications requested, and the warrants explicitly granted, authorization to conduct nighttime searches. See Ex. 1 at 3-4; Ex. 2 at 3-4. Nevertheless, Rucker argues that the nighttime searches were unlawful. Rucker first argues that the nighttime searches violated Minn. Stat. § 626.14. Whether or not the search was valid under state law, however, is irrelevant: "[F]ederal courts do not suppress evidence seized by state officers in conformity with the Fourth Amendment because of state law violations." United States v. Appelquist, 145 F.3d 976, 978 (8th Cir. 1998).

Rucker next argues that the nighttime searches violated the Fourth Amendment.3 The Court rejects this argument. The warrant applications recite facts indicating a strong likelihood that a stolen handgun was inside the residence or the car. See Ex. 1 at 2; Ex. 2 at 2. Although the Court has been unable to locate any authority precisely on point, the Court believes that the need to locate the stolen handgun provided an adequate public-safety justification for the nighttime searches.4

Rucker faults the warrant applications for failing to state that officers had already conducted a protective sweep of the apartment. That is true, but the applications did state that the suspects were in custody and that the apartment had been secured and locked. See Ex. 1 at 2-3; Ex. 2 at 2-3. It is difficult to know why the additional information about the protective sweep would have mattered to the issuing judge, and there is no evidence that officers intentionally or recklessly withheld this information in order to mislead that judge. Cf. United States v. Mashek, 606 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2010) (recklessness may be inferred where omitted information would have been clearly critical to the finding of probable cause).

Moreover, even if the nighttime execution of the search warrants violated the Fourth Amendment, suppression of the evidence is not warranted unless the defendant was prejudiced or there was a reckless disregard of applicable procedure, neither of which is true in this case. See United States v. Harris, 324 F.3d 602, 606 (8th Cir. 2003). Finally, the Court finds that the officers' actions were based on a good-faith belief in the validity of the warrant — which, again, specifically authorized the officers to conduct a nighttime search. Thus, even if the Court is incorrect — and the nighttime search was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment — suppression of the evidence is not required. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).

The Court therefore adopts the R&R and denies Rucker's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrants.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court OVERRULES Rucker's objections [Docket Nos. 81, 84] and ADOPTS the November 9, 2011 R&R [Docket No. 76]. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: