JOHN R. TUNHEIM, District Judge.
Antwoyn Spencer and Derrick Spencer ("the Spencers") were found guilty by a jury of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. They were then sentenced to prison terms. On April 15, 2011, this Court issued an order denying the Spencers' motions to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Spencer, 2011 WL 1478973, at *1-3 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2011). The Spencers have now filed motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) claiming that this Court should overturn its April 15 Order because it contains clear errors of law. Because the Spencers' Rule 60(b) motions are second or successive habeas petitions, the Court will dismiss the motions.
The Court must determine if it has jurisdiction to hear these motions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a district court may not hear a motion without preauthorization from the court of appeals if the motion is, in substance, a "second or successive" habeas petition.
A motion is a second or successive habeas petition "if it attacks the federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits, since alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005); see also Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 933 (8
The Court finds that the Spencers' Rule 60(b) motions are second or successive habeas petitions. In its April 15 order, this Court fully considered and denied the Spencers' initial habeas petitions on the merits. See Spencer, 2011 WL 1478973, at *1-3. The Spencers' Rule 60(b) motions attack the substance of the April 15 habeas order and, therefore, are second or successive habeas petitions. See, e.g., Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 532; Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8
Because these motions are second or successive, AEDPA requires the Spencers to obtain preauthorization from the Eighth Circuit prior to their filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The Spencers have not sought preauthorization. Indeed, this Court already denied an attempt by the Spencers to file a second or successive petition without preauthorization. Spencer, 2011 WL 3610110, at *2.
The Court may grant a certificate of appealability only where a petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Copeland v. Washington, 232 F.3d 969, 977 (8
Based on the foregoing, all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
1. Antwoyn Spencer's Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b) [Docket No. 385] is
2. Derrick Spencer's Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b) [Docket No. 388] is
3. The Court does not certify for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) the issues raised in Defendants' motions.