MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING ORDER OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE ON MOTIONS TO COMPEL

JOHN R. TUNHEIM, District Judge.

This is a breach of contract action that is being tried as a bifurcated trial at the parties' request. In the liability phase of the trial, the jury found that defendant Mayo Clinic ("Mayo") breached a Confidential Separation Agreement it had entered into with plaintiff Dr. Deepak Kademani. The Agreement provided that if "either party breaches any of its obligations hereunder, then the prevailing party . . . shall be entitled to recover . . . his . . . reasonable attorney's fees . . . ." (Fourth Aff. of Adrianna H. Shannon, Ex. 5 at 6, Oct. 23, 2012, Docket No. 436.) Thus, an issue at the damages phase of the trial will be the amount of attorneys' fees Kademani is entitled to recover.

Kademani sought information regarding Mayo's attorneys' fees and Mayo opposed the discovery requests on relevance grounds. (See Def.'s Memo. in Resp., Oct. 3, 2012, Docket No. 397.) Kademani moved the Court to compel Mayo to produce the requested information (Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, Sept. 26, 2012, Docket No. 389), and United States Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel granted Kademani's motion "[t]o the extent [Kademani] seeks to compel production of [Mayo]'s original billing records in this case (including those of in-house counsel)." (Order, Oct. 18, 2012, Docket No. 422.) The matter is currently before the Court on Mayo's objections to the Magistrate Judge's order. Because Mayo's billing records are potentially relevant to the reasonableness of Kademani's fees, and because the reasonableness of Kademani's fees will be an issue at the damages phase of the trial, the Court will affirm the Magistrate Judge's order because it was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review applicable to an appeal of a Magistrate Judge's order on nondispositive pretrial matters is extremely deferential. Roble v. Celestica Corp., 627 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1014 (D. Minn. 2007). This Court will reverse such an order only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); D. Minn. LR 72.2(a).

II. DISCOVERABILITY OF MAYO'S BILLING RECORDS

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for discovery of "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The rules governing discovery are to be interpreted broadly and liberally. See Credit Lyonnais, S.A. v. SGC Int'l, Inc., 160 F.3d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1998). Information is generally discoverable "unless it is clear that the information sought has no bearing upon the subject matter of the action." See Sinco, Inc. v. B & O Mfg., Inc., Civ. No. 03-5277, 2005 WL 1432202, at *1 (D. Minn. May 23, 2005). The Court is, however, required to limit discovery if "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).

A wide range of factors bear on the reasonableness of a prevailing party's fees. See Zoll v. E. Allamakee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 588 F.2d 246, 252 n.11 (8th Cir. 1978). Many courts have held that a non-prevailing party's attorneys' fees are relevant to the reasonableness of a prevailing party's attorneys' fees.1 The Court recognizes that an opposing party's fees and hours are far from dispositive of the reasonableness of a prevailing party's fees and hours.2 Nonetheless, Mayo's billing records in the present case may have some bearing on the reasonableness of Kademani's fees and hours because, among other reasons, the two sides worked on identical factual and legal issues and the attorneys work in the same legal market.

Mayo contends that an opponent's billing records are discoverable only if the opponent challenges the reasonableness of the prevailing party's hourly rates or number of hours worked, and the Court acknowledges that some courts have recognized this rule with varying degrees of strictness.3 In the present case, Mayo assures the Court that it will not challenge the reasonableness of the hourly rate or number of hours submitted by Kademani's counsel, so long as those hours are sufficiently related to the breach of contract claim on which Kademani prevailed. (See Def.'s Objections at 1-3, Nov. 1, 2012, Docket No. 444.) However, the Court is not persuaded that Mayo's self-imposed limitation renders its billing records undiscoverable.

The burden of proof remains on Kademani to establish that his requested fees are reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Mayo does not suggest that its concessions will bind the finder of fact or establish, as a matter of law, that Kademani's hourly rate or number of hours are reasonable. Thus, as far as the Court can tell at this juncture, although Mayo will not contest the reasonableness of the hourly rates or number of hours sufficiently related to the claim on which Kademani prevailed, the jury will still be asked to determine the reasonableness of Kademani's requested fees.4 And for the reasons explained above, an opposing party's billing records for a case may have some bearing on the reasonableness of a prevailing party's billing records for the same case. If the reasonableness of the prevailing party's fees is at issue, as appears to be the case here, the opposing party's billing records are potentially relevant whether or not the opposing party objects to the reasonableness of the prevailing party's fees. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge's order compelling Mayo to produce its billing records for the present case was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.5

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court OVERRULES Mayo's objections [Docket No. 444] and AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge's Order [Docket No. 422] dated October 18, 2012.