MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RICHARD H. KYLE, District Judge.
INTRODUCTION
In June 2010, Plaintiff Valerie Mason moved from Alabama to Minnesota after accepting a job with Defendant Wipro Limited ("Wipro"). Less than two years later, she was fired. She then commenced the instant action, alleging that Wipro had made false representations to induce her to accept the job. Wipro now moves for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant its Motion.
BACKGROUND
The pertinent facts are undisputed. In June 2010, Mason was unemployed and living in Killen, Alabama. (Mason Dep. at 5-6.) She was actively job hunting while completing a business and technology degree through Walden University, an online school based in Minneapolis. (Id. at 10, 74.)
Sometime that month, Mason received a telephone call from a company called Quantix, which was representing Wipro in a job search for a "release manager." (Id. at 20.)1 The person hired for the position would be placed on an account at one of Wipro's clients, Best Buy. (Id.) Mason later spoke by telephone with Meetu Budholia, a Wipro human resources employee, who asked her to submit a resume to the manager of the Best Buy account, Francis Barbosa. (Id. at 21-22.) Budholia informed Mason that Best Buy had a "long-term contract" with Wipro and the anticipated position would be located at Best Buy's headquarters in Richfield, Minnesota. (Id. at 21, 23, 28.) This was appealing to Mason, as she had previously lived in Minnesota for 20 years and would not have to "worry about learning the lay of the land." (Id. at 53-54.)
Mason then had a telephone interview with Barbosa. (Id. at 23-24.) He informed her that the "expected role with Wipro would be long-term, lasting for the duration of the Best Buy contract." (Barbosa Aff. ¶ 5.) He also suggested that a "portfolio management" position might be better suited to her skills than a "release manager" position, and Mason offered to compose a job description for such a position. (Mason Dep. at 25.) Barbosa informed her that if she were hired, Wipro would create an information-technology team under her management to work on the Best Buy account, and she would not be required to travel outside the Minneapolis area to perform her job. (Barbosa Aff. ¶¶ 10-11.)
Mason asked Barbosa what tools Wipro was using to manage the Best Buy account, and he informed her the company was using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. (Mason Dep. at 25.) When she stated that she could not be successful in the anticipated job without a "professional portfolio management tool," Barbosa told her that Wipro "did have HPPM," referring to Hewlett Packard software for "portfolio management," but only parts of the software had been implemented by Wipro and he was unaware of all the details concerning that implementation. (Id. at 25-26.) Mason stated that the availability of HPPM "would be great, that would help me to be successful there." (Id. at 25.)
Mason then spoke again with Budholia by phone, discussing the job description she had drafted. (Id. at 30.) Budholia reported that Barbosa liked what he had seen and was interested in Mason "being part of the team." (Id.) The two discussed the possibility of reimbursement for relocation expenses if Mason were to accept the position, and Budholia asked Mason to complete a formal Wipro job application. (Id. at 31-33.) Mason subsequently spoke with Barbosa by phone and she again "walked through" the job description she had drafted. Barbosa thought the description was "right on" and did not foresee any necessary changes. (Id. at 45-47.) Mason later completed a formal job application and discussed with Budholia possible start dates, as Barbosa wanted her to start the week after Independence Day. (Id. at 39.)
In late June, Wipro sent Mason a proposed employment agreement (the "Agreement") by e-mail. (Id. at 40 & Exs. 6-7.) She carefully reviewed the Agreement, understood it, and asked questions where she had concerns. (Id. at 41.) She also requested certain changes be made to the Agreement, particularly with regard to the base salary for the position. (Id. at 41-43.) She noted her preliminary approval to Budholia and, before leaving Alabama for Minnesota, she received a final version of the Agreement and advised Budholia that it was acceptable. (Id. at 49.) She signed the Agreement upon her arrival in Minnesota. (Id.)2
The Agreement contained several critical provisions. First, it provided that Mason's employment with Wipro was "for no specified period" and would be "at will." (Agreement § 1.) Second, it provided that while Mason was being hired for the position of "senior manager," she could be required to perform "such other position(s) as the Company's Management may determine from time to time," and to undertake duties beyond those customary to her designated position. (Id. §§ 2.1, 2.2.) Third, it specified that Mason "may be required to work from a different" location than Best Buy's headquarters and "will be required to travel from time to time in the performance of [her] duties." (Id. § 2.4 (emphasis added).)3 Fourth, and finally, the Agreement provided that it was "the entire agreement between the parties with respect to [Mason's] Employment and supersedes all prior agreements, understandings and communications between the parties." (Id. § 8.6.)
Ultimately, things did not go as planned for Mason at Wipro. She contends that she was not given the responsibilities or tasks she had been promised and that the company failed to provide her with a "fully functional" HPPM. (Barbosa Aff. ¶ 9; Mason Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) She also contends that Wipro did not create an information-technology team under her leadership. (Mason Decl. ¶ 5.)
In August or September 2011, Mason was removed from the Best Buy account. (Mason Dep. at 83.) She was told to look for other positions within the company, but the only ones available required extensive travel or relocation to India. (Mason Decl. ¶ 6.) After refusing to accept such a position, her employment was terminated in December 2011. (Id. ¶ 7.)
Mason commenced the instant action in March 2012 in the Hennepin County, Minnesota District Court; Wipro later removed the action to this Court. The Complaint alleges that Wipro violated Minnesota Statutes § 181.64 (Count I)4 by making a number of false representations concerning her position at the company, which induced her to move to Minnesota. She also asserts a claim for promissory estoppel (Count II) based on those same representations. With discovery complete, Wipro now moves for summary judgment. The Motion has been fully briefed, the Court heard oral argument on February 20, 2013, and it is now ripe for disposition.
STANDARD OF DECISION
Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. Id. at 322; Whisenhunt v. Sw. Bell Tel., 573 F.3d 565, 568 (8th Cir. 2009). The Court must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Weitz Co., LLC v. Lloyd's of London, 574 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2009); Carraher v. Target Corp., 503 F.3d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Wingate v. Gage Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 34, 528 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (8th Cir. 2008).
ANALYSIS
Mason's Complaint asserts claims based on "misrepresentations" that purportedly induced her to accept a job with Wipro and move to Minnesota. The claims fail for two similar, but independently sufficient, reasons.
I. No evidence of reliance
In the Complaint, Mason noted five specific "misrepresentations" allegedly made by Wipro that induced her to accept employment: (1) the position would be long-term;
(2) she would utilize a "very specific skill set" in information technology; (3) HPPM would be available for her use in the position; (4) an information-technology team would be created under her leadership; and (5) she would not be required to travel for her job. (Compl. ¶ 6(a)-(e).) In her deposition, however, she was asked what had "caused her to accept the position with Wipro," and the tenor of her claims changed. Contrary to the assertions in her Complaint, she testified that she took the position because (1) it matched her abilities and was a "good fit" for her skills, (2) she had lived in Minnesota before and would not have to acclimate to the area, (3) the salary was appealing, (4) Walden University is located here, and (5) she had previously worked on a Best Buy account and "knew the culture" there. (Mason Dep. at 52-54.) She could recall no other reasons for accepting the position. (Id. at 54.)
This testimony is fatal. Each of Mason's claims requires proof of reliance,5 but by her own admission, the "misrepresentations" specified in the Complaint did not factor into her decision to accept the job and move to Minnesota. In addition, none of the "new" matters discussed in her deposition can fairly be construed as a misrepresentation — indeed, most had nothing to do with Wipro at all, such as Walden University being located here or the fact she had previously resided in the area. Simply put, Mason's deposition testimony undermines her assertion that she relied upon Wipro's "misrepresentations," including the particular ones specified in the Complaint.
Apparently recognizing the damage done by her deposition, Mason has submitted a Declaration in opposition to Wipro's Motion that rehashes the allegedly false promises spelled out in her Complaint. (See Mason Decl. ¶ 1(a)-(e).)6 But this will not save her claims — a plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment simply by submitting an affidavit or declaration that "contradict[s] [her] own earlier [deposition] testimony." Am. Airlines, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Inc., 114 F.3d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1997). Mason was pointedly asked in her deposition to provide all the reasons she accepted the job with Wipro, and she failed to mention any of the alleged misrepresentations now listed in her Declaration. She cannot subvert her own deposition testimony with a belated affidavit to avoid dismissal.7
II. Any purported reliance was unreasonable
Even if the Court were to consider the "misrepresentations" Mason now points to, its analysis would not change. And this is because all of the so-called misrepresentations are undermined by the terms of the Agreement.
According to Mason's Declaration, she accepted the job with Wipro because she was promised (1) the position would be long-term, (2) an information-technology team would be created under her leadership, (3) she would not be required to travel, (4) a laptop computer would be provided to her, and (5) HPPM would be "purchased and fully functional."8 (Mason Decl. ¶ 1(a)-(e).) But the Agreement contained provisions directly at odds with several of these alleged misrepresentations. For example, Mason alleges that Wipro promised her a long-term position, and yet the Agreement provided that her employment was "for no specified period" and would be "at will," terminable at any time. (Agreement § 1.) Similarly, she alleges that Wipro promised she would not have to travel for her job, but the Agreement provided that she "will be required to travel from time to time in the performance of [her] duties." (Id. § 2.4 (emphasis added).) Perhaps most importantly, the Agreement contained an integration clause providing that it was "the entire agreement between the parties with respect to [Mason's] Employment and supersedes all prior agreements, understandings and communications between the parties." (Id. § 8.6.)
For these reasons, the Court concludes that even if the misrepresentations alleged by Mason were in fact made, her reliance upon them was unreasonable.9 Minnesota courts have repeatedly recognized that "[r]eliance is unreasonable as a matter of law when a `written contract provision explicitly state[s] a fact completely contradictory to the claimed misrepresentation.'" Kamboo Market, LLC v. Sherman Assocs., Inc., No. A10-1810, 2011 WL 2518972, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 27, 2011) (quoting Johnson Bldg. Co. v. River Bluff Dev. Co., 374 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)); accord, e.g., Barker v. Cnty. of Lyon, 813 N.W.2d 424, 426-27 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). Besides the direct conflicts noted above, the Agreement's integration clause scuttles any assertion that other arrangements or understandings between the parties existed beyond those specified in the Agreement. See, e.g., Crowell v. Campbell Soup Co., 264 F.3d 756, 763 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying Minnesota law) (reliance upon oral promises unreasonable where integrated contract specified that it was "the entire agreement between the parties"); Northfield Telecomms., Inc. v. Maplewood Mall Assocs., L.P., No. A07-0687, 2008 WL 853537, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2008).10
Mason offers no persuasive arguments to the contrary. She contends that the Agreement was separate from the job description she had drafted for Wipro, and it was the job description, not the Agreement, that governed the expectations for her position. (Mem. in Opp'n at 16 ("[The] Agreement does not contain any details surrounding Mason's job description nor does it outline the job duties that the parties discussed in detail prior to Mason accepting Wipro's job offer. . . . [The] Agreement and Job Description should be seen as two separate documents that must both be considered.").) This argument relates to her allegation that she was promised job responsibilities that she did not in fact receive — an assertion found in her Complaint and belatedly filed Declaration, but noticeably absent from her deposition testimony. Regardless, she has nowhere indicated how any of the items that she now complains were "misrepresented" — the expected length of her tenure, the provision of a laptop, restrictions on travel, etc. — in any way contradicts the job description. Indeed, none of these items was even mentioned therein. (See Mason Dep. Ex. 1.)
In any event, the Agreement was not as narrow as Mason contends. She argues that it said nothing about "the tasks she would be performing and the duties she would be responsible for." (Mem. in Opp'n at 17.) To the contrary, the Agreement provided that she could be required to perform "such . . . position(s) as the Company's Management may determine from time to time" and that she might have to undertake duties different from those in her designated position. (Agreement §§ 2.1, 2.2.) Her complaints about her assigned job functions, therefore, falter on this language.11
CONCLUSION
Besides those articulated above, other bases exist for granting Wipro's Motion,12 but the Court need not address them. Mason's claims suffer from two critical flaws: she has failed to create a genuine issue that she relied upon Wipro's alleged "misrepresentations," and even if she could do so, such reliance would be unreasonable as a matter of law. Accordingly, and based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that Wipro's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED, and Mason's Complaint (Doc. No. 1, Ex. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.