JOHN R. TUNHEIM, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Isabelle Atem, worked for defendant, Accurate Homecare, LLC ("Accurate"), for a little over one year before resigning in May 2011. Atem alleges that Accurate engaged in racial and national origin discrimination and pregnancy/sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A et seq. Atem also brings claims for hostile work environment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and constructive discharge. Accurate moves to dismiss all of Atem's claims. The Court will grant in part Accurate's motion to dismiss because Atem failed to adequately plead claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. The Court will deny in part Accurate's motion to dismiss because Atem adequately alleges claims for race and national origin discrimination and pregnancy/sex discrimination in violation of Title VII or the MHRA.
Atem is a Cameroonian American nurse. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 9, Apr. 19, 2013, Docket No. 1.) Atem began working for Accurate in December 2009, and during her employment she provided care exclusively for one patient, "GS." (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) GS requires 24-hour nursing care by a registered nurse. (Id. ¶ 10.) A personal care attendant ("PCA") assists the nurse in caring for GS for four hours each day. (Id.)
Atem alleges that in spite of being named employee of the month in February 2010 and February 2012 (id. ¶ 11), she was treated differently than Caucasian employees. For example, in August 2010, Atem left GS in the care of a PCA, Andrea,
In August 2010, Atem corrected the behavior of a different PCA, Robin, to better conform with patient care standards. (Id. ¶ 14.) Robin, a Caucasian woman, complained to Accurate that Atem was harassing her on the job and refused to continue to work with Atem. (Id. ¶ 15.) Accurate noted in Atem's file that she was not "getting along with other staff and care providers." (Id.) Accurate did not discipline Robin. (Id. ¶ 44.)
In October 2010, Atem called a third party, Pinnacle, to report that the facilities used by GS were not clean. (Id. ¶ 17.) When Pinnacle did not send someone to clean the facilities, Atem called a manager at Pinnacle. (Id.) The manager apologized and `stated that the next time it happened" Atem should call him directly. (Id.) When another "incident" occurred, Atem called the manager. (Id.) A Caucasian employee of Pinnacle later called Accurate and complained that Atem was "demanding and condescending." (Id. ¶ 18.) Atem contends that this complaint was "documented against" her. (Id.)
Atem also generally alleges that Accurate did not "respond to requests for supplies made by African and African American employees" but that it did respond to similar requests by Caucasian employees. (Id. ¶ 48.) In the same vein, Atem alleges that she could not reach management by phone and "had to go through white employees to reach management." (Id. ¶ 60.)
In early 2011, Atem became pregnant. (See id. ¶ 19.) In April 2011, Accurate organized a care conference for GS. (Id. ¶ 20.) Atem was unable to attend this conference but alleges that during the conference "an [Accurate] manager said that if pregnant nurses could not do their jobs, they would not be allowed to continue to work." (Id.) Also in April 2011, one of Atem's co-workers informed her that Accurate was recruiting other nurses to work Atem's shift, and Atem was asked to train two other nurses to care for GS. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) During this same period, Atem alleged that another nurse who was pregnant was "taken off her work schedule." (Id. ¶ 21.)
Atem alleges that a co-worker told her that her name was not on the following month's schedule. (Id. ¶ 22.) After receiving this information, Atem tendered her two week notice to Accurate on May 12, 2011. (Id.)
On May 15, 2011, Atem was scheduled to work from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. (Id. ¶ 23.) After arriving at work, Atem began to feel ill, and she called Accurate and informed them she "was sick and needed to leave work." (Id.) Accurate did not send another nurse to replace Atem. (Id.) Atem called Accurate again around 1 p.m. and was told that they had been unable to find a replacement but were still looking for someone. (Id. ¶ 24.) When no replacement arrived, Atem called Accurate again shortly after 6 p.m. and stated that she really needed to leave. (Id.) Atem alleges that Accurate "informed her that she could leave if the client and the other nurse consented that she could leave." (Id.) Atem does not identify "the other nurse," but she alleges that "the other nurse consented" to her leaving. (Id.) Atem left around 6:15 pm.
On May 16, 2011, before her scheduled resignation took effect, Accurate removed Atem from the schedule "on the grounds that she had a poor job performance, and that she had left a patient without prior approval." (Id ¶ 25.) Although Atem tried to contact Accurate to discuss her removal from the schedule, her calls were not returned. (Id. ¶ 26.) Atem alleges that she was "terminated for violating [Accurate's] policy." (Id. ¶ 46.)
On November 10, 2011, Atem filed a Charge of Discrimination
On March 5, 2013 — before the MDHR or EEOC issued a decision — the MDHR issued a notice that Atem had withdrawn her Charge in order to exercise her right to seek redress through civil action. (Janeiro Decl., Ex. 2, May 10, 2013, Docket No. 8.) Atem also withdrew her EEOC Charge. (See id.)
On April 19, 2013, Atem filed her Complaint in this Court. Atem brings claims for racial and national origin discrimination and pregnancy/sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and the MHRA (Counts I-IV). Atem also brings claims for hostile work environment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and constructive discharge (Counts V-VII).
Reviewing a complaint under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court considers all facts alleged in the complaint as true to determine if the complaint states a "claim to relief that is plausible on its face." See, e.g., Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8
Title VII requires that before a plaintiff file a lawsuit alleging discrimination, she must file a timely charge with the EEOC or a state or local agency with authority to seek relief. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 850 (8
In her Charge, Atem alleged discrimination on the basis of race but did not explicitly allege discrimination on the basis of national origin. The Court concludes that Atem's national origin discrimination claims are reasonably related to the race discrimination claims brought in her Charge. The allegations for the race and national origin discrimination claims are virtually identical. Atem's national origin claims could be considered to have "grow[n] out of" her racial discrimination charge. Id. The Court will, therefore, deny Accurate's motion to dismiss Atem's national origin discrimination claims on the basis of exhaustion.
Accurate asks the Court to analyze Atem's discrimination claims under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). "The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however, is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002); see also Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 927 (8
Atem alleges that she is the victim of racial discrimination in violation of both Title VII and the MHRA. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-56.) "The same analysis applies to both MHRA and Title VII claims." Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8
Atem also alleges that she is the victim of pregnancy/sex discrimination in violation of both Title VII and the MHRA. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-56.) As noted above, Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual "because of" or "on the basis of" sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. "The terms `because of sex' or `on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Atem alleges that she became pregnant after working for Accurate for about a year. Atem also alleges that she was treated differently after she became pregnant and that Accurate treated non-pregnant employees differently from pregnant employees. Again accepting all of Atem's statements as true and drawing reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court concludes that Atem has met the pleading requirements at the motion to dismiss stage. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6). The Court again cautions Atem that she will have to meet a more stringent standard at the summary judgment stage.
Atem also brings a claim for "hostile work environment." (Compl. ¶¶ 58-62.) A plaintiff can bring a Title VII claim for race or sex discrimination in the form of a hostile work environment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). Hostile work environment harassment occurs when "the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit has explained that:
Blakley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 648 F.3d 921, 933 (8
In pleading her hostile work environment claim, Atem makes two allegations that are race-related: (1) that she was not treated "as [Accurate] treat[ed] other non-black employees" (Compl. ¶ 59); and (2) that she "had to go through white employees to reach management" (id. ¶ 60). Atem also alleges that when she was ill — potentially because of her pregnancy — Accurate did not timely find a replacement for her (id. ¶ 61) and that Accurate removed pregnant women from the schedule (id. ¶ 59). None of the facts alleged in Atem's complaint would amount to "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, [or] insult" that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to show that Accurate had "an abusive working environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. Nor does Atem plead any facts that are consistent with the Court drawing a reasonable inference that Atem's working environment rose to the level of being hostile or abusive. Because Atem fails to adequately allege discrimination in the form of a hostile work environment, the Court will grant Accurate's motion to dismiss this claim.
Atem contends that Accurate is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for "complaining about nurses who were pregnant," for stating "that pregnant nurses could not perform their jobs" and for "disciplining Ms. Atem when she complied with [Accurate's] directives." (Compl. ¶ 64.) Atem alleges that she suffered severe emotional distress. (Id. ¶¶ 65-66.) Under Minnesota law, to make out a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (3) the conduct must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983). The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is "sharply limited to cases involving particularly egregious facts." Id. at 439. Further, to be actionable, a defendant's conduct must be "so atrocious that it passes the boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community." Id.
Although Atem alleges that "[t]he conduct by [Accurate] was intentional or reckless," (Compl. ¶ 65), she does not allege any facts to support this allegation. Moreover, Atem does not identify any conduct by Accurate that "passes the bounds of decency," Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439. In short, Atem's allegations regarding Accurate's conduct are the type of "legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" that the Court is not "bound to accept." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Atem's allegations that she suffered "severe" emotional distress are also inadequate. (Compl. ¶ 66.) Atem alleges that she suffered "sleepless nights, headaches, blurry vision, dizziness, and light headedness." (Id. ¶ 65.) Even accepting these allegations as true, they are insufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Besett v. Wadena Cnty., Civ. No. 10-934, 2010 WL 5439720, at *17 (D. Minn. Dec. 7, 2010) (collecting cases). None of these symptoms support Atem's allegation that her distress was "so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it." (Compl. ¶ 66.) See Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 440 (finding the evidence insufficient to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where the plaintiff alleged that he had been depressed, vomited, had stomach disorders, a skin rash, and high blood pressure). Because Atem fails to adequately allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court will dismiss this claim.
Atem also brings a claim for constructive discharge, alleging that "she was going to be terminated" and that Accurate had "the intention" of firing her because she was pregnant. (Compl. ¶¶ 68-74.) "A constructive discharge arises only when a reasonable person would find the conditions of employment intolerable." Tidwell v. Meyer's Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 494 (8
In this case, Atem tendered her resignation after (1) finding out that Accurate had hired new nurses whom she had been asked to train, (2) overhearing another nurse ask a patient when Atem would be replaced, and (3) hearing that another pregnant nurse had received a reduction in hours.
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein,