JOHN R. TUNHEIM, District Judge.
In 2010, Plaintiff Geoffory O. Thornes acquired the J.A. Tyrholm Building in downtown Waldorf, Minnesota. Part of the roof had collapsed, but Thornes intended to make the necessary repairs and ultimately preserve it as a historical building. The City of Waldorf ("the City"), however, was concerned about the building's structural problems and the dangers they posed to pedestrians. In January 2011, the City gave Thornes until July 1, 2011 to make all of the necessary repairs. This was the beginning of several years of back and forth between Thornes and the City, which ultimately led the City to pass a resolution for the demolition of the building and to seek an order from a Minnesota state district court to enforce the resolution. In the midst of the state court proceeding, Thornes brought this action against the City and various individual city officials (collectively, "Defendants"), in which he alleges, among other things, that Defendants violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Thornes' claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the state court already determined that the building was hazardous and authorized the City to demolish it. The Court concludes that res judicata bars Thornes' claims because he could have fully and fairly litigated them in the state court proceeding. The Court will therefore dismiss the action with prejudice.
Plaintiff Geoffory O. Thornes purchased the "Historic J.A. Tyrholm Building" (the "Tyrholm Building") in downtown Waldorf on November 9, 2010 for one dollar. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3, Aug. 14, 2013, Docket No. 31.) The building was substantially damaged when Thornes bought the property: "the gable roof section had fallen onto the loft floor due to weak trusses and heavy snow load." (Id. ¶ 2.)
On January 11, 2011, the City sent Thornes a letter stating that the City Council voted at its January 10, 2011 meeting that Thornes had until July 1, 2011 to have the "building completely repaired so as not to cause any safety issues for the residents of the community if they wish to walk by." (Id., Ex. C.) The letter also stated that the City Council wanted to "view the building and have you explain what exactly it is you are planning to do and the timeframe you are looking at." (Id., Ex. C.) Thornes replied to the City Clerk, Defendant Judith Kohout, in a letter dated February 10, 2011. (Id., Ex. E.) He explained the precautions he had taken to keep pedestrians safe, and that because the "roof, thankfully, has collapsed
Meanwhile, Thornes declared a historical restoration of the building and underwent efforts to develop community support, ideas, and funding for the project. (Id. ¶ 7-8.) This involved posting a notice on four bulletin boards along Main Street in Waldorf, which Thornes alleges that the City Clerk has admitted to removing soon after he posted them. (Id. ¶ 8.) He also placed an "Idea/Guest Book" in the City library, which he alleges the City Clerk removed and has not returned. (Id.)
On June 16, 2011, the City sent a letter requesting an update on repair efforts. (Id. Ex. H.) The letter summarized Thornes' and the City Council's past interactions regarding the building going back to October 2010, when the City Council inquired about a timeframe and contractors for repairs, which the letter asserted Thornes had still not supplied to the Council. (Id., Ex. H.) The letter stated that at the June 13, 2011 Council meeting, Thornes was "asked again to come back to our next meeting on July 11, 2011 and be prepared with a timetable or status reports on your progress" and reiterated the Council's request "to know how many hours you anticipate putting in this summer." (Id., Ex. H.) On July 11, 2011 — after the City's proposed July 1 deadline — Thornes responded to the City's June 16 letter. (Id., Ex. I.) He requested copies of all conversations the City claimed to have had with him and asserted his right to know if he was being recorded at City Council meetings. (Id., Ex. I.) He also stated that the City Clerk had informed him that she had taken down fliers he had posted about the building and questioned the propriety of that, observing also that "[t]he
Thornes alleges that, "throughout the spring and summer months of 2011," he "performed substantial restoration and cleanup work" on the building, including a "major improvement [which] was to shore up and brace the upper storefront wall, thereby alleviating any public safety issues for the residents of the community." (Id. ¶ 13.) He also alleges that he "re-claimed approximately 16,000 lbs. . . . of quality lumber during the warmer months of 2010 and 2011 from dismantled buildings," and that he stacked the lumber in three locations within the building for future restoration work. (Id. ¶ 14.)
On March 5, 2012 the City sent Thornes a letter informing him that, "pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 463.15, the Waldorf City Council intends to discuss at its City Council meeting on April 9, 2012 . . . the hazardous and substandard nature of your building . . . . The ultimate passage of a resolution ordering you to make specific repairs to your property will be discussed." (Id., Ex. L.) The letter warned that "[i]f such repairs [we]re not made, the City of Waldorf w[ould] seek a court order to demolish and raze the structure." (Id., Ex. L.) The City sent Thornes another letter on March 20, 2012, inviting Thornes to a "Public Hearing regarding the building you own in Waldorf" on April 9, 2012, which would be "to discuss the options the City has, based on Minnesota Statutes, to deal with the hazardous conditions of your building and the fact that it has been without a roof since the Winter of 2009/2010." (Id., Ex. M.) The letter further stated that "[w]e have discussed this situation, in person and in writing, with you on numerous occasions and nothing much has been accomplished" and that the "Council will make a decision" at the April 9, 2012 meeting and that "[a] resolution regarding their decision will be voted on at that time." (Id., Ex. M.)
Thornes responded to the City's letters on April 4, 2012, stating that, until he received the March letters, he "had assumed work completed thus far was adequate," again raising issues about the recording of City Council meetings, and asserting that "[t]here is no basis for the April 9, 2012 `Public Hearing'" and listing several reasons. (Id., Ex. N.) His reasons centered around both his assertions about the structural integrity of the building's roof and the historic nature of the building and community support for preserving it for historic purposes. (See id., Ex. N.) Finally, he asked that the City "
The City nevertheless proceeded with the public hearing on April 9 during which it adopted Resolution Number 81 ("Resolution 81"), in which the City Council declared the building "to be a hazardous building." (Id., Ex. P.) The resolution listed nine reasons for the designation as hazardous, including (1) the lack of roof, (2) the boarded up front of the building, (3) black mold in the interior, (4) the fact that progress toward restoration had been "mostly cosmetic rather than structural," (5) the danger the building posed to children, (6) the fact that Thornes had been given two deadlines, (7) the fact that the windows lacked glass, (8) lumber and debris inside the building, (9) the possibility of rodents in the vacant building. (Id., Ex. P.) The resolution also stated that "a motion for summary enforcement of the order will be made to the District Court of Waseca County." (Id., Ex. P.) Thornes was present for this meeting and alleges that he "
On May 18, 2012, the City sent a letter to Thornes indicating its desire to purchase the building and offering $5,000, which the City believed was "a generous offer based on the property's recently assessed value." (Id., Ex. Q.) Thornes declined the offer in a letter dated May 24, 2012. (Id., Ex. R.) In his decline letter he characterized the City's offer as "simply another `policy or procedure' you . . . have to attempt to deprive myself of my Constitutional rights as a property owner" and listed corrections to Resolution 81. (Id., Ex. R.)
On October 16, 2012, the City sent Thornes a letter advising him that the City had retained Defendant Fred Gruhlke, a licensed building official, to complete an assessment of the building. (Id., Ex. T.) The letter explained that, after receiving Gruhlke's report, the City Council approved Resolution Number 2012-84 ("Resolution 84"), which declared the property hazardous pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 463.15 and 463.261,
On February 7, 2013, the City filed a motion with the Waseca County District Court to enforce its order, of which Thornes received notice. (Id. ¶ 31; see also id., Ex. CC at 26.)
On March 7, 2013 — the day before the scheduled hearing in Waseca County District Court — Thornes filed the instant action in federal court against the City and various individual defendants, including the former and current Mayors, City Council members, and the City Clerk. (Compl., March 7, 2013, Docket No. 1.) The complaint included allegations that the City and individual defendants violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and conversion. (Id.) The Waseca County hearing proceeded on March 8, 2013, which Thornes attended. (See Ex., 2B (Waseca County District Court Am. Findings of Fact and Order for Summ. J.) at 10, Dec. 9, 2013, Docket No. 43; Reply, Ex. 1 (Waseca County District Court Am. Findings of Fact and Order for Summ. J.) at 1, Dec. 11, 2013, Docket No. 44.)
On April 4, 2013, the Waseca County District Court issued an Amended Findings of Fact and Order for Summary Judgment, declaring the building to be hazardous and ordering the City to enforce Resolution 84 and "remove and raze the hazardous building as the Resolution details with full authority of this Court." (State Court Findings and Order at 6-7.) The court observed that the City Clerk had "described how the City Council had numerous council meetings and contact with [Thornes] over the years in an attempt to address the conditions on [Thornes]'s property," and that the building inspector "testified that he was able to conduct his inspection without going on [Thornes]'s property." (Id. ¶¶ 20, 23.) The Mayor testified that "the City Council voted on the Resolution based on the Report of Gruhlke and based on information gathered at several meetings of the City Council over multiple years." (Id. ¶ 26.)
Also on April 4, 2013, the Waseca County District Court received a request from Thornes for permission to file a Motion for Reconsideration. (See Reply, Ex. 2 at 1.) The court denied Thornes' request on the basis that "motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express permission of the court" which will be granted "only upon a showing that intervening legal developments have occurred" or "where the earlier decision is shown to be palpably wrong in some respect." (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).) The court determined that Thornes had failed to demonstrate either circumstance and denied Thornes' request. (Id. at 2-3.) Thornes did not seek to appeal the Waseca County District Court's order for summary enforcement. In June 2013 the Tyrholm Building was razed, as authorized by the Waseca County District Court Order. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-42.)
On August 14, 2013, Thornes filed an amended complaint in this action. (See generally id.) The Amended Complaint, although not a model of clarity, includes three general categories of claims. (See id. at 14-18.)
Defendants answered the amended complaint, and have now moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Mot. for J. on Pleadings, Nov. 13, 2013, Docket No. 34; Answer, Aug. 21, 2013, Docket No. 33.) First, they argue that Thornes' claims are barred by res judicata because the Waseca County District Court judgment was a final judgment on the merits and Thornes did not pursue any appeal, was based on proper jurisdiction, and involved the same parties and same claims as this action. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for J. on Pleadings at 7, Nov. 13, 2013, Docket No. 36.) They argue in the alternative that his claims are precluded by collateral estoppel. (Id. at 8-9.) Second, Defendants argue that they are entitled to various forms of immunity: quasi-judicial immunity for all defendants, absolute immunity for the elected officials, and qualified immunity for individual defendants. (Id. at 9-10.) Finally, they argue that Thornes' state law conversion claim is not actionable and barred by statutory immunity. (Id. at 12.) In his response, Thornes first notes that Defendants have failed to respond to several of his discovery requests. (Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for J. on Pleadings at 2, Dec. 9, 2013, Docket No. 40.) He appears to argue, presumably in response to Defendants' res judicata argument, that the Waseca County action is not complete because he raised fraud claims in his motion for reconsideration that went unaddressed and there is "no Statute of Limitation concerning fraud." (Id. at 4.) Also in response to Defendants' res judicata argument, Thornes argues that at least one element is not met because the causes of action in the two cases are not the same because he is raising constitutional claims that were not present in the Waseca County action. (Id. at 5.) Finally, he also makes several responses to Defendants' immunity and conversion arguments. (Id. at 6-7.)
Reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court applies the same standard as under a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8
In ascertaining the preclusive effect of a judgment, "[t]he law of the forum that rendered the first judgment controls the res judicata analysis." St. Jude Med. S. C., Inc. v. Cormier, 745 F.3d 325, 327 (8
Under Minnesota law, res judicata operates to bar subsequent litigation when "(1) the earlier claim involved the same set of factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties or their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; [and] (4) the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter." Minch Family LLLP v. Buffalo-Red River Watershed Dist., 628 F.3d 960, 966 (8
There can be little dispute regarding the application of the second and third res judicata factors here. With regard to the second factor, the parties in the Waseca County action were Thornes and the City of Waldorf; the parties in this action are Thornes and the City of Waldorf and various current and former City Council members, Mayors, and the City Clerk, who qualify as "privies" of the City. See Minch Family, 628 F.3d at 966 (under Minnesota law second factor is "the earlier claim involved the same parties or their privies"); Ruple v. City of Vermillion, S.D., 714 F.2d 860, 862 (8
It is a closer question, however, whether that judgment adequately encompassed the issues raised in this action such that it bars the proceedings here. This implicates the first and fourth factors of the res judicata test under Minnesota law. The first — whether the earlier action involved the same set of factual circumstances — is not limited to situations in which both actions involved identical claims. Rather, "[t]he doctrine of res judicata dictates that any right, fact, or matter expressly or directly adjudicated on the merits before a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusively settled and `may not be relitigated by the parties to the previous action, whether the claim, demand, purpose or subject matter would or would not be the same as that in the previous litigation.'" King v. Hoover Grp., Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 223 (8
Certainly, the specific
Here, Thornes had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his instant claims in the Waseca County action, even if he failed to take advantage of that opportunity. "The question of whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a matter generally focuses on whether there were significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by the nature or relationship of the parties." Joseph, 636 N.W.2d at 329 (concluding that, where party had "both the right and the opportunity to appeal," but chose not to, the fourth res judicata requirement was met); see also Gahr v. Trammel, 796 F.2d 1063, 1070 (8
The Court therefore concludes that all four requirements of res judicata are met. Because the Waseca County action involved the same factual circumstances, the same parties, and a final judgment on the merits, and because Thornes could have litigated all of the issues he now brings in this action, his instant claims are barred by res judicata. The Court will therefore dismiss all claims with prejudice. See Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., P.L.L.P., 715 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) ("Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits is an absolute bar to a second suit for the same cause of action and is conclusive, not only as to every matter actually litigated, but also as to every matter that might have been litigated."), aff'd on other grounds, 732 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 2007). Because the Court concludes that this action must be dismissed with prejudice, the Court need not address the parties' remaining arguments regarding Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein,