SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Objection to Recommendation to Dismiss ("Objections") [Doc. No. 76] to Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung's July 15, 2015 Report and Recommendation ("R & R") [Doc. No. 75] granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [Doc. Nos. 13, 18, 30, 40], dismissing the State of Minnesota and the Department of Corrections ("DOC") as an arm of the State of Minnesota, and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state claims, including Plaintiff's Minnesota Government Data Practices Act ("MGDPA") claim against Defendant Moen, dismissing these state claims without prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules Plaintiff's objections and adopts the R & R in its entirety.
The factual and procedural background of this case is well documented in the R & R and is incorporated herein by reference. (R & R at 712-20 [Doc. No. 75].) In general terms, this case involves information distributed to various communities regarding Plaintiff Ronald Ernst's sex offender status. Plaintiff is required to register as a sex offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166 as he was convicted of a gross-misdemeanor offense which mandates registration. See Ernst v. State, No. A03-63, 2003 WL 23023992, at *1 n. 1 (Minn.App. Dec. 30, 2003).
In 1984, Plaintiff plead guilty to a charge of Criminal Attempt to Commit Sexual Assault on a Child in the State of Colorado. (R & R at 713-14.) The child was eleven (11) years old, but the Plaintiff asserts he only touched the child on the abdomen. (Id.; see also Objections at 3 [Doc. No. 76] (describing what is presumably the conduct underlying the 1984 conviction).)
In 1997, Plaintiff was charged with several criminal charges (collectively, "1997 Charges") in Scott County, Minnesota including felony indecent exposure. (R & R at 714.) See Ernst, 2003 WL 23023992, at *1. Although several of the charges were dismissed, Plaintiff plead guilty to one count of felony indecent exposure for exposing himself to a minor child. (R & R at 714.) See Ernst, 2003 WL 23023992, at *1. Subsequently, it was determined errors in the pre-sentencing investigation resulted in an unwarranted felony enhancement and the indecent-exposure offense was reduced to a gross misdemeanor. (R & R at 714.) See Ernst, 2003 WL 23023992, at *1.
Prior to his release from incarceration on the indecent-exposure conviction, Plaintiff claims he completed a Minnesota Department of Public Safety Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Sex Offender Notification and Registration Form — Minnesota Statute 243.166. (R & R at 714-15.) However, after his release, he discovered his "Staff social worker" had allegedly altered this form to include the dismissed charges from Scott County. (Id.) He also claims this same social worker told him that if the felony indecent-exposure had
In 2001, Plaintiff was arrested and convicted in Minnesota for failure to register as a predatory offender. (Id. at 714-15.) Soon after, in 2002, Plaintiff received a Level III designation from the Minnesota Department of Corrections' end-of-confinement review committee ("ECRC"). (Id. at 715.) See Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 3.
In February 2010, Defendant Jon Hinchliff ("Hinchliff"), an officer with the Minneapolis Police Department, publicly distributed a fact sheet
In March 2010, Defendant Ed Hanson ("Hanson"), a detective with the Bloomington Police Department, also distributed fact sheets regarding Plaintiff's sex offender status. (Id. at 715.) These fact sheets described Plaintiff's charged offenses, including the 1997 Charges, and including those that were ultimately dismissed. (Id.) Plaintiff again disputes the accuracy of the information contained on this fact sheet and also claims to have received a threatening phone call from a Bloomington resident. (Id. at 715-16.)
In April 2010, Plaintiff requested and received "a stack of papers" from the DOC constituting his file with that agency. (Id. at 715.) This included a 2002 End of Confinement Risk Assessment issued by the ECRC; a 2002 Sex Offender Risk Assessment Recommendation prepared by Defendant Jack Rusinoff ("Rusinoff") for the ECRC; a 1999 Risk Level Recommendation prepared by Defendant Dwight Close ("Close") for the ECRC; and a 2010 memorandum from Defendant Jeremy Britzius ("Britzius")
Also in 2010, the ECRC re-assessed the Plaintiff and issued a new Risk Assessment Report. (Id. at 718.) Plaintiff alleges that as part of this re-assessment, he questioned whether Defendant Michelle Murphy ("Murphy") was going to use the "false `official'" documents in the DOC's file.
Plaintiff appealed the ECRC's Risk Assessment Report and the matter was heard by Defendant Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Barbara Neilson ("ALJ Neilson"). (Id. at 718.) In affirming the ECRC's decision, ALJ Neilson made numerous findings and discussed Plaintiff's 1984 conviction as well as the DOC Documents.
Plaintiff moved to Center City Minnesota in February 2011. (Id.) A public meeting was held at which information about the Plaintiff was presented by Defendant Patricia Moen ("Moen"), a Minnesota state official. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Moen not only disseminated false information about his offense history, but also required he provide his cell phone number, which was then made publicly available. (Id. at 718-19.) Plaintiff later claims he received a threatening phone call. (Id. at 718.) In addition to being a continuation of the conspiracy against him and a violation of his constitutional rights, Plaintiff contends the public dissemination of his cell phone constitutes a violation of the MGDPA. (Id.)
In July 2011, Plaintiff moved back to Minneapolis and registered with the Minneapolis Police Department. (Id.) Hinchliff again issued a fact sheet to the public which Plaintiff claims contained both old and new false statements about his criminal history and victim type.
Sometime in 2013, Plaintiff moved to Hilltop, Minnesota. (Id. at 719.) In July 2013, Defendant Scott Nadeau ("Nadeau"), Chief of Police for the Columbia Heights Police Department, distributed a letter to residents informing them of a community meeting about Plaintiff. (Id.) Included with this letter was another fact sheet about Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff contends this fact sheet contained false information about him in violation of his constitutional rights. (Id.)
Precisely what claims Plaintiff asserts are unclear. (See R & R at 719.) Liberally construing the Plaintiff's Complaint, he claims all Defendants in their individual and official capacities violated his Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspired to violate his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and defamed him. (See id. at 719-20.) See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004) ("pro se complaints are to be construed liberally"). Plaintiff also raises a claim against Moen for violation of the MGDPA, Minn.Stat. § 13.01 et seq. (See R & R at 719-20.) Plaintiff asks for $500,000 in compensatory damages from each Defendant as well as
After extensively reviewing the facts and law related to the Plaintiff's claims, see generally R & R, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Defendants' motions to dismiss be granted and any remaining state claims, including the MGDPA claim, be dismissed without prejudice. (Id. at 742-43.) The Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff's claims against ALJ Neilson be dismissed on the grounds of judicial immunity. (Id. at 721-22.) The Magistrate Judge further recommended that Plaintiff's federal claims against the State Defendants be dismissed on the following bases: (1) the Eleventh Amendment (id. at 722-23); (2) the fact that none of the State Defendants were federal defendants (id. at 723); (3) failure to plead any facts related to cruel and unusual punishment (id. at 724); (4) failure to identify a protected liberty or property interest (id. at 724-25); (5) failure to allege any conscious-shocking conduct (id. at 724-26); and (6) failure to allege facts sufficient to meet both the agreement and purpose elements of conspiracy (id. at 727-28). The Magistrate Judge similarly recommended that Plaintiff's state defamation claims be dismissed because they fell outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations. (Id. at 728-29.) Finally, the R & R recommended that Plaintiff's MGDPA claim against Defendant Moen be dismissed, without prejudice, as it was a state law claim, id. at 729-30, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. (Id. at 742-43.)
The Magistrate Judge then examined Plaintiff's claims against the Columbia Heights Defendants. (Id. at 730-37.) The R & R first noted that Plaintiff's service on the City of Columbia Heights was insufficient, id. at 730-31, but considered the merits of Plaintiff's federal claims nonetheless. (Id. at 731.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff's federal claims against the Columbia Heights Defendants failed for the same reasons his federal claims failed as to the State Defendants, id. at 731-32, 733-34, and because Plaintiff failed to identify any government policy leading to the alleged violations of his constitutional and civil rights. (Id. at 732-33.) Finally, the R & R concluded that Plaintiff's state defamation claims against the Columbia Heights Defendants should be dismissed because those defendants were entitled to absolute immunity as to their actions compiling and distributing the fact sheets regarding Plaintiff. (Id. at 734-37.)
The Magistrate Judge next examined Plaintiff's claims against the Minneapolis Defendants. (Id. at 737-42.) For the same reasons that Plaintiff's federal claims against the State Defendants be dismissed, the R & R recommended that Plaintiff's federal claims against the Minneapolis Defendants be dismissed. (Id. at 737-39.) The R & R recommended that Plaintiff's state defamation claim be dismissed as time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations. (Id. at 739-40.)
Lastly, the Magistrate Judge considered Plaintiff's claims against the Bloomington Defendants. (Id. at 739-42.) For the same reasons that Plaintiff's federal claims against the State Defendants should be dismissed, the R & R recommended that Plaintiff's federal claims against the Bloomington Defendants be dismissed. (Id. at 740-42.) The R & R further recommended that Plaintiff's state claim for defamation be dismissed as time-barred
Plaintiff filed his objections to the R & R in a timely fashion. (See Objections.) The various Defendants all filed timely responses claiming that Plaintiff failed to raise any meritorious legal or factual arguments in his objections. (Columbia Heights and Bloomington Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Objections at 1 [Doc. No. 77]; Defendant Minneapolis' Response to Plaintiff's Objections at 2 [Doc. No. 79]; State Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Objections at 1 [Doc. No. 81].) Plaintiff subsequently filed three (3) documents which the Court construes as replies to the Defendants' responses (collectively, "Replies").
A district court must make an independent evaluation of those portions of an R & R to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(b); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b). Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) requires parties to "serve and file specific written objections to a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations...." The specific portions of the report and recommendation objected to should be identified and the bases for those objections provided.
Although difficult to discern precisely what Plaintiff's objections are, the Court construes his objections to the R & R as follows: (1) that the allegedly incorrect information about the Plaintiff contained in Britzius' memorandum was not properly considered (Objections at 3); (2) that the R & R's recommendation to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy claim against Murphy was erroneous (id.); (3) that the R & R improperly dismissed Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy and MGDPA claims against Moen (id.); (4) that the R & R erred by recommending dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against ALJ Neilson (id. at 3-4); (5) that the R & R's conclusions regarding service on Nadeau were incorrect, that Plaintiff's defamation claim against Nadeau is within the statute of limitations, and that the recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the other Columbia Heights Defendants was improper (id. at 4); (6) that the R & R did not review the exhibits to Plaintiff's Complaint under the appropriate standard when considering a motion to dismiss (id.); (7) that the R & R applied the wrong statute of limitations to Plaintiff's defamation claims against the State Defendants (id. at 5); and (8) a generalized objection, consisting of a recitation of the Plaintiff's claims and alleged facts. (See generally id. at 1-3, 5-6; Replies [Doc Nos. 83, 84, 85]; Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 86].)
Ultimately, the R & R recommended granting all of the Defendants' motions to dismiss. (R & R at 742-43.) As described above, Plaintiff's generalized objections to the R & R challenge this recommendation. Thus, an examination of the standard by which a motion to dismiss is granted is warranted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint present "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To meet this standard, and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Although a complaint is not required to contain detailed factual allegations, "[a] pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a "sheer possibility." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir.2009) (citation omitted). It is not, however, a "probability requirement." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts is improbable, and `that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'"
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Several principles guide courts in determining whether a complaint meets this standard. First, the court must take the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir.2009). This tenet does not apply, however, to legal conclusions or "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" such allegations may properly be set aside. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In addition, some factual allegations may be so indeterminate that they require "further factual enhancement" in order to state a claim. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955.) Finally, the complaint "should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible." Braden, 588 F.3d at 594.
Evaluation of a complaint upon a motion to dismiss is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation omitted). A court may consider the complaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
The Magistrate Judge employed precisely this standard when considering the Defendants' motions to dismiss. (See R & R at 713, n. 3 and n. 5, 719-21.) Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff's objections assert the wrong standard was applied, those objections are overruled.
Plaintiff objects that the Britzius memorandum regarding Plaintiff's 2010 risk level reassessment, which Plaintiff alleges contains false information, was not properly considered by the R & R. (Objections at 3.) However, the R & R explicitly addresses Plaintiff's claims related to this memorandum and the allegedly false information it contains. (R & R at 717-18.) The allegedly false information is not actually from the Britzius memorandum, but comes from two (2) pages of Close's report which were "sandwiched in between" the pages of Britzius' memorandum in the Plaintiff's exhibits. (Id. at 717, n. 7.) Britzius' memorandum does not contain the allegedly false information that Plaintiff claims it does. (See id. at 717-18.)
Notably, in considering Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the State Defendants, the R & R states "[a]ccepting the allegations in the Complaint as true ... the statements made by Close, Rusinoff, and Britzius, and Moen,
Plaintiff asserts that "Defendant Murphy is keeping to [sic] conspiracy alive" by using the reports of Close, Britzius, and Rusinoff in assessing Plaintiff's Risk Level, despite knowing information within those reports is false. (Objections at 3.) The Court construes this as an objection to the dismissal of Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy claim against Murphy.
To establish a conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must prove: 1) the existence of a conspiracy; 2) a purpose in the conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights; 3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and 4) injury. R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1144 (D.Minn. 2012). The purpose element requires a showing of some "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id. at 1145 (citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff offered nothing more than a general allegation that a conspiracy existed among the Defendants. (See R & R at 727-28; Compl. at 6, 11, 15, 16, 18-19 [Doc. No. 1]; Am. Compl. at 2 [Doc. No. 51]) He presented no particulars on how any of the Defendants agreed to violate his civil rights. (See R & R at 727-28.) Nor did Plaintiff allege facts to satisfy the purpose element for a conspiracy, see R & R at 728, considering sex offender status is not a suspect classification. See Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006) (sex offender status not suspect classification). Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against Murphy is properly dismissed on this record. Plaintiff's objection is overruled.
Plaintiff asserts "Defendant Moen is just as guilty as the rest"
For the same reasons discussed in Sect. II(C) above, dismissal of Plaintiff's conspiracy charge against Moen is appropriate and the Plaintiff's objection is overruled.
Moen, as an individual, cannot face a claim for violation of the MGDPA because that statute does not impose individual liability. Minn.Stat. § 13.08, subd. 8 (directing that claims may be brought against a "responsible authority or government entity"); Evenstad v. Herberg, 994 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005 (D.Minn.2014); Walker v. Scott Cnty., 518 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn.Ct.App. 1994). Nor could Plaintiff bring a claim in federal court against Moen in her official capacity as it would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Evenstad, 994 F.Supp.2d at 1006 (dismissing MGDPA claim because the MGDPA does not indicate an intent by Minnesota to subject itself to suit in federal court); see also Soto v. John Defendants 1-5, No. CIV. 13-640 (DWF/SER), 2014 WL 1607615, at *12 (D.Minn. Apr. 15, 2014) aff'd sub nom. Soto v. Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 581 Fed.Appx. 606 (8th Cir. 2014) (barring state law claims against state employees in their official capacity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment). As the Magistrate Judge noted, Plaintiff is free to bring his MGDPA claim against Moen in
Plaintiff asserts "ALJ Neilson is the biggest violator" because she "lied" in her decision upholding Plaintiff's 2010 risk level determination by making certain findings as to the Plaintiff's conduct underlying his 1984 conviction. (Objections at 4.) Furthermore, Plaintiff claims ALJ Neilson's use of this allegedly false information is a violation of his "Due Process Right's [sic] and Equal Protection Rights," and that by using such information ALJ Neilson is "continuing the conspiracy...." (Id. at 5.) The Court construes this as an objection to the R & R's recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against ALJ Neilson.
State judicial officers are entitled to judicial immunity against claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as long as they are acting within their judicial capacity and do not act in "complete absence of all jurisdiction." Tennant v. Anderson, 453 Fed.Appx. 657, 658 (8th Cir.2011) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991)). ALJ Neilson was plainly acting within her judicial capacity and jurisdiction when she upheld the ECRC's risk level determination regarding the Plaintiff. (See R & R at 721-22.) Importantly, even if ALJ Neilson's statements were erroneous
Plaintiff's objection related to the alleged intent behind ALJ Neilson's statements and the inaccurate nature of those statements is misplaced. Even assuming everything Plaintiff asserts were true, ALJ Neilson is entitled to judicial immunity, meaning Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed. (See R & R at 720-22.) Plaintiff's objection is overruled.
Plaintiff appears to assert numerous objections to the R & R's recommendation
Plaintiff contends "Nadeau was properly served as is evident by the response of his Attorney Ryan M. Zipf...." (Objections at 4.) The Court construes this as an objection to the R & R's conclusions regarding service on the Columbia Heights Defendants. (See R & R at 730-31.)
The Magistrate Judge declined to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the Columbia Heights Defendants on the basis of insufficient service and instead considered the merits of those claims. (R & R at 730-31.) This Court agrees with that decision, rendering the issue of service moot. However, because the Plaintiff appears to directly challenge the R & R's findings related to service, see Objections at 4, the Court will review those findings.
Plaintiff misconstrues the R & R's findings on the issue of service. Nadeau was in-fact served. (See R & R at 730-31.) However, the problem is that service on Nadeau was not effective as to the other Columbia Heights Defendants whom Plaintiff's claims are properly asserted against. (See id. at 731.)
Municipal police departments, such as the Columbia Heights Police Department, are not entities subject to suit. Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 805 F.Supp.2d 712, 719 (D.Minn.2011). Instead, they are departments or subdivisions of their city government. See Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir.1992). There is no evidence Plaintiff served the Columbia Heights Police Department. (R & R at 730-31.) Even if Plaintiff had properly served this entity, the issue would be moot as the Columbia Heights Police Department is not subject to suit.
Municipalities, like the City of Columbia Heights, may be served through their chief executive officer or city clerk.
Failure to comply with service requirements can, at the discretion of the court, serve as the basis for dismissal under Fed.
Plaintiff asserts, "The Court can dismiss the defamation claim, if it seems [sic] fit, except for Nadeau, as his actions are within" the two-year statute of limitations. (Objections at 4.) The Court construes this as an objection to the R & R's recommendation that Plaintiff's defamation claim against the Columbia Heights Defendants be dismissed. (See R & R at 733-37.)
The Magistrate Judge explicitly noted that the alleged defamatory statements made by the Columbia Heights Defendants
Finally, Plaintiff further contends that "the Court cannot dismiss the other claims of Plaintiff Ernst," because they relate to Plaintiff's civil rights and the Columbia Heights Defendants' violation of those rights. (Objections at 4.) The Court construes this as a general objection to the R & R's recommendation that Plaintiff's federal claims against the Columbia Heights Defendants be dismissed.
Plaintiff offers no authority for his contention that because his claims related to his civil rights, they may not be dismissed. This Court can find no support for such an argument. Rather, Plaintiff's constitutional and civil rights claims must "contain sufficient factual allegations to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'" to avoid a motion to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir.2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955). As the R & R plainly describes, Plaintiff's constitutional and civil rights claims fail to meet this standard. (R & R at 731-34.) Plaintiff's objection is overruled.
Plaintiff asserts he "has stated a claim" but that "Counsel" has a belief "this case can be dismissed through false and untruthful statements" that "omit the actual facts...." (Objections at 4.) "The Exhibits do not lie, as they are Court Documents and are factual." (Id.) The Court construes this as an objection that the Plaintiff's exhibits, which were attached to his
"In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences most favorably to the complainant." Raynor, 690 F.3d at 955. When considering a motion to dismiss, generally a court will not consider materials outside the pleadings. Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir.2015). However, courts may consider exhibits attached to the complaint and some materials that are part of the public record. Id.
The Magistrate Judge identified and used this standard when assessing the Defendants' motions to dismiss. (R & R at 713, n. 3 and n. 5, 720.) Plaintiff's exhibits were considered and frequently cited. (See generally R & R.) Plaintiff's allegations and purported facts were also taken as true. (See, e.g. id. at 721-22, 725-26, 727-28, 729, 733, 734.) This Court has similarly taken Plaintiff's allegations and facts as true, as well as considered the exhibits Plaintiff presented. Plaintiff's objection is without merit and overruled.
Plaintiff disputes that the two-year statute of limitations applies to his defamation claims against the State Defendants.
Defamation is a common-law claim. See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 327-28 (Minn.2000) ("The common law claim of defamation at civil law ... redress[es] though injuries to reputation caused by the publication of false information damaging to another's reputation."); Glenn v. Daddy Rocks, Inc., 171 F.Supp.2d 943, 948 (D.Minn.2001) (applying Minnesota law to defendant's defamation counterclaim). "[A] cause of action under state law is, of course, governed by the applicable state law limitations period, even when such a claim is heard in federal court." Firstcom, Inc. v. Qwest Commc'ns, 618 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1010 (D.Minn.2007) aff'd sub nom. Firstcom, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 555 F.3d 669 (8th Cir.2009). Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) sets a two-year statute of limitations on actions for "libel and slander." See Issaenko v. Univ. of Minnesota, 57 F.Supp.3d 985, 1029 (D.Minn.2014) ("Under Minnesota law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to claims for defamation."). Plaintiff's defamation claim against the State Defendants is a state law claim and the two-year statute of limitations applies.
Plaintiff, in numerous documents, essentially restates his claims and allegations against the various Defendants. (See Objections at 1-3, 5-6; Replies [Doc. Nos. 83, 84, 85]; Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 86].) The Court construes this as a general objection that the R & R failed to consider Plaintiff's claims and allegations.
Plaintiff's claims and allegations were extensively examined in the R & R. (See generally R & R.) As detailed above, the Magistrate Judge applied the appropriate legal standards when assessing Plaintiff's claims. Merely restating what Plaintiff previously asserted in his pleadings does not constitute a viable objection to the R & R. See Carlone v. Heat & Frost Insulators & Allied Workers Local 34, No. 14-CV-579 (SRN/JSM), 2014 WL 5438493, at *6 (D.Minn. Oct. 23, 2014) (overruling Plaintiff's objection which was merely a restatement of claims alleged in her complaint when the magistrate judge addressed those claims). Plaintiff's objection is overruled.
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
Ronald R. Ernst, Plaintiff,
v.
Jon Hinchliff, Dwight Close, Jeremy Britzius, Jack Rusinoff, Ed Hanson, Barbara L. Neilson, ADL,
TONY N. LEUNG, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the Court, United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung, on four motions to dismiss: Defendants Close, Britzius, Rusinoff, Neilson, Moen and Murphy's ("State Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13); Defendants
A hearing was held.
Based upon the record, memoranda, and the proceedings herein,
This case concerns information distributed to communities regarding Plaintiff. Plaintiff "is required to register as a sex offender under Minn.Stat. § 243.166 (1996) because he was charged with a felony and was convicted of a gross-misdemeanor offense arising out of the same set of circumstances."
In 1984, Plaintiff was charged with and pleaded guilty to Criminal Attempt to Commit Sexual Assault on a Child in the State of Colorado. (Compl. at 7; Exs. at 14-15.
In 1997, Plaintiff was charged with "several criminal counts," including at least one charge of felony indecent exposure in state district court in Scott County, Minnesota. (Compl. at 8, 10; see Exs. at 3-9; ECF No. 1-3 at 3-4.) See Ernst, 2003 WL 23023992, at *1. According to Plaintiff, the charged offenses were a culmination of incidents.
Plaintiff states that he was renting a basement room from a woman who had two children, a 13-year-old daughter and a 15-year-old son. (Compl. at 8.) Upon returning home from being out of town, Plaintiff discovered that the lock on his bedroom door had been broken off. (Compl. at 8.) The son told Plaintiff that his mother had broken the lock "to see what she could find" and found adult magazines under Plaintiff's mattress and adult movies in Plaintiff's dresser. (Compl. at 10.) When the mother left for work, the son and a friend of his looked through the magazines and the friend watched the videos. (Compl. at 10.) Around the same time, the daughter "saw the penis of Plaintiff, even though it was not intentional." (Compl. at 9.)
Plaintiff pleaded guilty to one count of felony indecent exposure for "expos[ing] his private parts" to a minor child. (Exs. at 3; see Compl. at 9; Exs. at 23-24; ECF No. 13 at 4-5.) See Ernst, 2003 WL 23023992, at *1. The other charges were dismissed. (See Compl. at 9; ECF No. 1-3 at 4.) See Ernst, 2003 WL 23023992, at *1. Subsequently, it was determined that there were errors in the pre-sentence investigation and Plaintiff did not have the requisite prior conviction for felony enhancement. (Compl. at 9, 11; see Exs. at 3-9, 23-24.) As a result, the indecent-exposure offense was reduced to a gross misdemeanor. (Compl. at 9; Exs. at 23-24; ECF No. 1-3 at 4-5.) See Ernst, 2003 WL 23023992, at *1.
Before he was "releas[ed] from custody" in connection with the indecent-exposure offense, Plaintiff was given a Minnesota Department of Public Safety Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Sex Offender Notification and Registration Form — Minnesota Statute 243.166 form to complete. (Compl. at 11; Exs. at 27.) Plaintiff "filled out the [form], dated it and signed [it]." (Compl. at 11.) Plaintiff later discovered that his "Staff social worker" had "add[ed] the dismissed charges from Scott County to show that [Plaintiff] was convict[ed] of other criminal behavior." (Compl. at 11-12.) The "Charges/Petitions" section of the form states, "(Charged @ Felony Ind. exp.) Gross Mis. Indec. Exposure." (Exs. at 27.) The "Victim Information" section of the form states that Plaintiff's victims are ages 14, 15, and 16; both male and female; and were neighborhood children. (Exs. at 27.) In the "M.O." section, the form states, "Subject exposed his penis to a 13 yr old Female, made a Sexual phone call to a 14 yr old girl and showed pornographic video's [sic] to (2) 15 yr old boys." (Exs. at 27.)
According to Plaintiff, his social worker also told him that if the felony indecentexposure charge had been dismissed "and recharged at the gross misdemeanor level, at what [Plaintiff] was sentenced, then [Plaintiff] would not have to register." (Compl. at 12.)
"In 2001, [Plaintiff] was arrested for failure to register, after argu[ing] with the Minnesota [Bureau of Criminal Apprehension] that he did not have to register as he
In 2002, Plaintiff was given a Level III designation by the Minnesota Department of Corrections's end-of-confinement review committee ("ECRC"). (Compl. at 13; see Exs. at 28-34.) See Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 3 ("The commissioner of corrections shall establish and administer end-of-confinement review committees at each state correctional facility and at each state treatment facility where predatory offenders are confined. The committees shall assess on a case-by-case basis the public risk posed by predatory offenders who are about to be released from confinement."). Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing. (Compl. at 13.)
In February 2010, while acting under color of law, Hinchliff "passed out a [fact sheet
(Exs. at 10.)
Plaintiff states that he "did not have any sexual contact with that 11 year old girl" and Hinchliff
(Compl. at 7-8.) Plaintiff further states that he "has no convictions involving any minor aged males. His victim pool is not minor aged females. [He] has two convictions of minor aged females." (Compl. at 8.) Plaintiff states that, by including charges on the fact sheet that were dismissed, Hinchliff violated Plaintiff's due process rights. (Compl. at 10.)
In March 2010, Hanson "of the Bloomington Police Department sent out [fact sheets] to the public about the presence of [Plaintiff] in[] the community." (Compl. at 10; see Exs. at 2.) The "Offense" section of this fact sheet states: "Offender exposed himself to a 13 year old female. He also made a sexual phone call to a 14 year old female. He also showed pornographic videos to (2) 15 year old boys. The offender was a neighbor to his victims." (Exs. at 2.)
Plaintiff states that the statements regarding the phone call and pornographic videos are false because those charges were dismissed. (Compl. at 9.) Plaintiff states that "Hanson is trying to tell the
In April 2010, Plaintiff requested copies of his file from the Minnesota Department of Corrections ("DOC") in order "to find answers to this illegal Level [III] designation." (Compl. at 13.) Plaintiff received "a stack of papers" containing "many damaging statements that were not true." (Compl. at 13.) This "stack of papers" included, among other things, a 2002 End of Confinement Review Risk Assessment Report issued by the ECRC (Exs. at 28-30); a 2002 Sex Offender Risk Assessment Recommendation prepared by Rusinoff for the ECRC (Exs. at 31-34); a 1999 Risk Level Recommendation prepared by Close for the ECRC (Exs. at 36-37); and a 2010 memorandum to the ECRC by Britzius regarding Plaintiff's risk-level-reduction request (Exs. at 35, 38).
Plaintiff states that Rusinoff made false statements in both the 2002 Risk Assessment Report and Risk Assessment Recommendation. (Compl. at 14.)
The Risk Assessment Report states that "[Plaintiff's] behavior includes entering security apartments without permission and befriending families before exposing." (Exs. at 29.) The Risk Assessment Report also states that Plaintiff's "[p]redatory offense behavior" includes "abducting or attempting to abduct a victim." (Exs. at 29.) Plaintiff states that "[t]his is the farthest from the truth, as [he] has never been investigated for abduction, or even charged with those offenses." (Compl. at 14.)
Plaintiff challenges four statements in Rusinoff's Risk Assessment Recommendation. First, Plaintiff challenges the statement that "[t]he victims have been females ranging in age from 10 to young adults...." (Exs. at 32.) Plaintiff states that "[t]his is false as [he] has never been charged with a 10 year old victim." (Compl. at 14.) Second, Plaintiff challenges the statement that "[h]is prior adult felony record contains a conviction for Sexual Assault on a Child (1984)," (Exs. at 32), again asserting that sexual contact did not occur, (Compl. at 14; see Compl. at 7). Third, Plaintiff challenges the statement that "[h]e has a total of 25 sex related convictions...." (Exs. at 33.) Plaintiff states that this statement is "[v]ery untrue, as there is [sic] 10 misdemeanors before 1980, a felony attempt in 1984, a gross misdemeanor in 1997, and a misdemeanor in 2001." (Compl. at 14.) Plaintiff states that the pre-1980 convictions "were [for] charges of `Streaking' when at that timeframe in history, it was the fad." (Compl. at 11.) The fourth statement concerns Rusinoff's characterization of the physical nature of Plaintiff's offenses. In the Risk Assessment Recommendation, Rusinoff states, "Although [Plaintiff's] sexual offenses have not included physical assault, they do include some touch offenses...." (Exs. at 33; see also Exs. at 32 ("Most of [Plaintiff's] sex offense charges have been non-contact offenses, but he has engaged in sexual touching behavior when the opportunity presented itself."). Plaintiff states that "Rusinoff contradicts his own statements by says [sic] that [P]laintiff has no physical offenses, but puts in statements that [P]laintiff touched the vagina area of an 11 year old female." (Compl. at 14; see Exs. at 32 ("[Plaintiff] befriended a family, and he
Plaintiff states that Rusinoff "lies continuously in all of his papers, thereby violati[ng] the Constitutional Right[s] of [Plaintiff], as he lists behavior for which [Plaintiff] has never been charged with. This pattern is the same as the other defendants in this action, to state that the plaintiff is a person of predatory multiple behaviors." (Compl. at 14.)
In 1999, Close completed a Risk Level Recommendation for the ECRC. (Exs. at 36-37.) Plaintiff states that Close has "continued the pattern of false statements" by "listing the same false statements as Rusinoff." (Compl. at 15.) Plaintiff asserts that DOC personnel "have [c]onspired to act against the plaintiff by disclosing false statements in State of Minnesota files." (Compl. at 15.)
Close's Risk Level Recommendation includes a "Prior History" section with "Misdemeanor/Gross Misdemeanor" and "Felony" subgroups. (Exs. at 36-37.) There are two felonies listed: the 1984 "Sexual Assault on a Child," which again references Plaintiff touching the "genital area" of an 11-year-old girl, and a 1992 "Attempted Larceny" in Wisconsin. (Exs. at 37.) Plaintiff states that, with respect to the 1984 "Sexual Assault on a Child offense[,]... this have been proven before in other Exhibits that this Criminal behavio[r] of touching in the vagina did not occ[u]r." (Compl. at 15.) Plaintiff further states:
(Compl. at 15.)
Plaintiff asserts that "Britzius has continued the written assault on Plaintiff ... by stating that [he] has touched females sexually, and ... has exposed to females from 10 to young adult" in his 2010 memorandum regarding Plaintiff's risk-level-reduction request. (Compl. at 15.) Plaintiff "challenge[s Britzius] to show the Court a charge involving a 10 year old." (Compl. at 15.) Plaintiff states:
(Compl. at 15.)
Britzius's memo, however, does not explicitly reference a charge involving a "10 year old" or young adults.
In 2010, the ECRC evaluated Plaintiff and issued another Risk Assessment Report. (Exs. at 55-56.) Murphy was the ECRC chairperson at the time. (Compl. at 16; Exs. at 55-56.) Plaintiff asserts that, at the meeting to determine his risk level, he "questioned Murphy if she was going to use the `FALSE' `OFFICIAL' documents that were in the file. Murphy stated that she could use whatever she wanted. Murphy told [Plaintiff], [`]The Minnesota Legislature gave us the [a]uthority to do whatever we want.[`]" (Compl. at 16-17.) Plaintiff asserts that
(Compl. at 17.)
Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he Minnesota Legislature does not give anybody the right to violate anyone's Constitutional Rights." (Compl. at 17.) Plaintiff assert that "Murphy cannot justif[iably] use the illegal documents from[] Rusinoff, Close, Britzius, [his social worker] and the D.O.C. person who made up the previous [p]re-sent[en]ce [r]eports, but she did, [a]cting under `COLOR OF LAW.'" (Compl. at 17.)
Plaintiff appealed the Level III designation and the matter was heard by Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Neilson with the Office of Administrative Hearings. (Exs. at 39-54.) Plaintiff has attached the first 16 pages of ALJ Neilson's decision affirming the Level III designation.
In February 2011, Plaintiff moved to Center City, Minnesota. (Compl. at 16.) A public meeting was held at which Moen "discuss[ed] information about [Plaintiff]." (Compl. at 16.) Plaintiff asserts:
(Compl. at 16 (citation omitted); see Exs. at 57.) Plaintiff states that, "[a]bout an hour after the meeting, [he] received a phone call on his cell phone, by an unknown male," wanting Plaintiff to meet him at the intersection of a highway and a county road. (Compl. at 16.)
Plaintiff moved back to Minneapolis and registered with the Minneapolis Police Department in July 2011. (Compl. at 17.) While acting under color of law, "Hinchliff again issued a [fact sheet] to the public, stating ... the same [i]llegal statements of his prior [fact sheets]." (Compl. at 17; see Compl. at 18.) This fact sheet, however, stated that "the age of alleged victims[] is now 13-14 male and female." (Compl. at 17.) Plaintiff asserts that Hinchliff perpetuated the false statements of male victims and "sexual contact with minor females, of which [Plaintiff] has no convictions." (Compl. at 17.) Plaintiff asserts that Hinchliff told him he received the information "from the Internet." (Compl. at 17.) Plaintiff contends that this "means that the [DOC] is changing this false information and posting it online," violating his constitutional rights. (Compl. at 17-18.) The Complaint does not contain a copy of the 2011 fact sheet. (See Compl. at 7-8, 17-18; Exs. at 10, 26.)
At some point in 2013, Plaintiff moved to Hilltop, Minnesota. (Exs. at 59-60.) On or about July 15, 2013, Scott Nadeau, the Chief of Police for the Columbia Heights Police Department, sent out a letter to residents notifying them of a community meeting regarding Plaintiff. (Exs. at 59.) The letter included a fact sheet. (Exs. at 60.) Among other things, the fact sheet included a section listing the applicable "Registration statute(s)" as "617.23, 617.24 & 609.3451." (Exs. at 60.) The fact sheet also stated that Plaintiff "has a history of sexual conduct and contact with primarily minor victims (female and male, age 13-14). Contact has included fondling. Conduct has included indecent exposure and showing pornography to victims. Offender was known to victims." (Exs. at 60.)
Plaintiff asserts that he has "only the one conviction, 617.23(b)(1)," "no convictions for any of the other listed charges, and does not have any convictions for sexual contact." (Compl. at 20.) Plaintiff asserts that "[t]hese false statements and printing papers are a direct violation of Federal Law, and the violation of the Constitutional Rights of Plaintiff ..., 11th Amend[.], U.S.C.A., and 5th, 8th, and 14th Amendments of violation [sic] his Due Process Rights, and the `RIGHT' to be treated fairly as all others." (Compl. at 20.)
As best as this Court is able to tell, Plaintiff brings claims against all Defendants in their individual and official capacities for violations of his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy to violate his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and defamation. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004) ("pro se complaints are to be construed liberally"). Plaintiff also brings a claim against Moen for violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act ("MGDPA"), Minn.Stat. § 13.01 et seq. Plaintiff also requests that this Court "[o]rder the expiration of the [i]llegal [r]egistration that is in place."
All Defendants have moved for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The State Defendants have also asserted a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) due to the passing of the statute of limitations. Additionally, the Columbia Heights, Minneapolis, and Bloomington Defendants have asserted service deficiencies. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5).
"To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to `State a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "[A]lthough a complaint need not contain `detailed factual allegations,' it must contain facts with enough specificity `to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" United States ex rel. Raynor v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin., Corp., 690 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require `detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."). "A pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Similarly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. "In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences most favorably to the complainant." Raynor, 690 F.3d at 955.
Further, "[i]n evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, [courts] hold a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir.2014) (quotation omitted). But, "[a]lthough pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, `they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.'" Stringer v. St. James R-1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Stone, 364 F.3d at 914). As the Eighth Circuit has explained, "[w]hen we say that a pro se complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Stone, 364 F.3d at 915.
The State Defendants assert that (1) Plaintiff's defamation claims are barred by a two-year statute of limitations and, in any event, the statements are protected by qualified privilege and absolute privilege; (2) not only do Plaintiff's civil-rights claims fail as a matter of law, but the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the State Defendants in their official capacities and the State Defendants are otherwise entitled to qualified immunity and common-law official immunity; (3) ALJ Neilson is entitled to judicial immunity; and (4) should
The State Defendants assert that judicial immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against ALJ Neilson. (State Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 23.) The State Defendants asserts that all actions complained of were done in ALJ Neilson's judicial capacity and within her jurisdiction. (State Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 24-25.)
"A judge is immune from suit, including suits brought under section 1983 to recover for alleged deprivation of civil rights, in all but two narrow sets of circumstances." Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir.2012) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991)). "First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. (quotation omitted). Judicial immunity is immunity from suit, and "applies to suits for injunctive relief as well as claims for money damages." Edlund v. Montgomery, 355 F.Supp.2d 987, 990 (D.Minn.2005).
"An act is a judicial act if it is one normally performed by a judge and if the complaining party is dealing with the judge in his judicial capacity." Schottel, 687 F.3d at 373 (quotation omitted). The rendering of a written decision following the administrative hearing on Plaintiff's Level III designation was a quintessential judicial act performed by ALJ Neilson. See Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 6(c) ("After the hearing is concluded, the [ALJ] shall decide whether the [ECRC's] risk assessment determination was erroneous and, based on this decision, shall either uphold or modify the [ECRC's] determination. The [ALJ's] decision shall be in writing and shall include the [ALJ's] reasons for the decision."); see also Schottel, 687 F.3d at 373 (holding a hearing on a motion, ruling on the motion, and requiring certain conditions be met before granting the motion "are all acts normally performed by a judge").
With respect to jurisdiction, "[t]he Supreme Court has instructed [courts] to construe broadly `the scope of the judge's jurisdiction ... where the issue is the immunity of a judge.'" Schottel, 687 F.3d at 373 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). "This narrow exception to the doctrine of judicial immunity applies only when a judge hears a case that is clearly beyond her judicial authority, such as a probate judge trying a criminal case." Edlund, 355 F.Supp.2d at 990 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 & n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1099). "Thus, a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Schottel, 687 F.3d at 373 (quotation omitted). Minnesota law explicitly states that challenges to an ECRC's risk-level determination are to be heard by an ALJ and, following a hearing, the ALJ shall issue a written decision on whether to uphold the ECRC's determination. Minn. Stat. § 244.052, subd. 6. ALJ Neilson was plainly acting within the scope of her jurisdiction.
Plaintiff responds that ALJ Neilson cannot put false statements in her decision and claim judicial immunity, and ALJ Neilson is "continu[ing] the written assault against [Plaintiff]." (Pl.'s Obj. at 5, 7, ECF No. 62; see Pl.'s Obj. at 8-9.) Plaintiff
Accordingly, the Court recommends that all claims against ALJ Neilson be dismissed.
The State Defendants assert that they are immune from any claims for monetary damages brought against them in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment. (State Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 20-21.)
"The sovereign immunity enjoyed by states and recognized in the Eleventh Amendment bars private parties from bringing actions for damages against unconsenting states in federal courts." Thomas v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 447 F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2006). The Eleventh Amendment effectively "immunizes from suit a `state agency or official if immunity will protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequence as a judgment against the State itself.'" King v. Dingle, 702 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1068 (D.Minn.2010) (quoting Hadley v. N. Ark. Cmty. Tech. Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir.1996) (internal quotation omitted)). "Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars actions, in Federal Court, which seek monetary damages from individual State Officers, in their official capacities, ... for the recovery of money from the state." Id. at 1069 (quotation omitted). Moreover, "[w]hile under the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, state officials may be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief without violating the Eleventh Amendment, the same doctrine does not extend to states or state agencies." Monroe v. Arkansas State University, 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir.2007) (citing 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)); accord Harris v. McSwain, 417 Fed.Appx. 594, 595 (8th Cir.2011) (per curiam) ("Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states and state agencies for any kind of relief.").
The State Defendants did not move for the dismissal of the State of Minnesota or the DOC on grounds of sovereign immunity. (See State Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 1, 20-21.) Nevertheless, "sovereign immunity is a threshold jurisdictional matter and a jurisdictional prerequisite" and "may be raised sua sponte by the court." Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp. v. Malaterre, 633 F.3d 680, 686 (8th Cir.2011) (quotations omitted); accord Lors v. Dean, 746 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir.2014) (raising the issue of state sovereign immunity sua sponte). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks any relief from the State of Minnesota or the DOC as an arm of the State of Minnesota, his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Monroe, 495 F.3d at 594; Harris, 417 Fed.Appx. at 595; see Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1084 ("Eleventh
To the extent that monetary damages are being sought from the State Defendants in their official capacities, such damages are not recoverable and the Court recommends that these claims be dismissed. Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1084; Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916, 942 (D.Minn.2014) ("[T]o the extent Plaintiffs may seek any such monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, the Court agrees that monetary damages are not recoverable."); Hodgson v. Fabian, No. 08-cv-5120 (JNE/SRN), 2009 WL 2972862, at *6 (D.Minn. Sept. 10, 2009) ("It is well-settled that in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the Eleventh Amendment precludes an award of money damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity. A plaintiff may maintain an action against a government official if the complaint seeks only injunctive or prospective relief." (citations omitted)), aff'd, 378 Fed.Appx. 592 (8th Cir.2010); see also Minn.Stat. § 1.05 (waiver of immunity for violations of certain federal statutes). The claims for monetary damages against the State Defendants in their individual capacities or for prospective relief in their official capacities (other than ALJ Neilson as previously discussed), however, are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Monroe, 495 F.3d at 594; Karsjens, 6 F.Supp.3d at 942; Hodgson, 2009 WL 2972862, at *6.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff brings claims against the State Defendants for violations of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Alexander v. Hedback, 718 F.3d 762, 765 (8th Cir.2013); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff appears to be asserting a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (See Compl. at 4, 8, 12, 20; Pl.'s Obj. at 2, 34.) Among other things, the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. A claim brought pursuant to the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause "is unsustainable against ... non-federal government defendants." Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir.2013) (citing Warren v. Gov't Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 611 F.2d 1229, 1232 (8th Cir.1980)). Therefore, the Court agrees with the State Defendants that any Fifth Amendment claims against the State Defendants should be dismissed. (State Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 14.)
Plaintiff has also asserted violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment has been applied in several contexts, including sentencing, see, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ("The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment `guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.'" (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005))), and conditions of a prisoner's confinement, see, e.g., Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir.2011) ("[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." (alteration in original) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993))).
Plaintiff has not pleaded facts from which this Court can plausibly infer that certain acts of the State Defendants amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Smithrud, 746 F.3d at 397. In fact, it is not clear to this Court what particular cruel and unusual punishment Plaintiff is alleging that he suffered. Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims based on the Eighth Amendment be dismissed with respect to the State Defendants for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff alleges that the State Defendants have violated his rights to due process. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that states do not deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir.2010) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1); accord Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 424 (8th Cir.1999).
Singleton, 176 F.3d at 424 (quotations and citations omitted); accord Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) ("A procedural due process claim is reviewed in two steps. The first is whether [the plaintiff] has been deprived of a protected liberty or property interest.").
Plaintiff's due process claims are fatally flawed because Plaintiff has not identified a protected liberty or property interest. As best as this Court is able to tell, Plaintiff is asserting protected interests in the right "to be free from false accusations" and the "[r]ight[] to be free of [h]arassment." (Compl. at 8, 16.) "A person's reputation, alone, is not a protected liberty or property interest." Kroupa v. Nielsen, 731 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 2013); accord Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 644 (8th Cir.2003) ("Damage to reputation alone, however, is not sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the due process clause." (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976))). "The Constitution does not protect against all intrusions on one's peace of mind. Fear or emotional injury which results solely from verbal harassment or idle threats is generally not sufficient to constitute an invasion of an
Further, Plaintiff has not alleged the type of conscious-shocking conduct required for a substantive-due process violation. "The theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases." Mills, 614 F.3d at 498 (quotation omitted). "Such a high standard is necessary `lest the Constitution be demoted ... to a font of tort law.'" Der, 825 F.Supp.2d at 998 (alteration in original) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)). "A plaintiff must establish the government action complained of is truly irrational, that is something more than arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law. Truly irrational conduct is conscience shocking in a constitutional sense." Mills, 614 F.3d at 498 (quotations and citation omitted). "Because the conscience-shocking standard is intended to limit substantive due process liability, it is an issue of law for the judge, not a question of fact for the jury." Sitzes v. City of West Memphis Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 467 (8th Cir.2010) (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff disagrees with how Close, Rusinoff, Britzius, and Moen recount his criminal history, summarize victim information, and characterize his behavior. Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true as this Court must, errors may have occurred in the drafting process and there is an argument to be made that the language used should have been more precise. See Sitzes, 606 F.3d at 466 ("[N]egligent conduct ... is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process." (quotation omitted)). But, the Court cannot conclude that the statements made by Close, Rusinoff, Britzius, and Moen, even if at times inaccurate, shock the conscience or were made in an arbitrary or capricious fashion. See id. at 468. While the length of Plaintiff's criminal history, the number of offenses, and multiple jurisdictions involved undoubtedly complicated the task of those charged with interpreting, summarizing, and analyzing the information, accuracy is important. Greater care should be taken. But, this is insufficient to state a constitutional claim.
Nor was Murphy's reliance on the documents prepared by Close, Rusinoff, and Britzius so irrational, arbitrary or capricious that such reliance rose to the level of a substantive-due process violation. See Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 3(b) (requiring ECRC to prepare risk assessment), (c) (describing ECRC's access to certain private data for purposes of assessment). Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff believed Murphy and the ECRC's risk-level determination was irrational, arbitrary, or capricious, he could seek administrative review of that determination by an ALJ, which Plaintiff in fact did here without success. See id. subd. 6.
The Court is particularly concerned about the allegation that Moen revealed Plaintiff's cellphone number during a community notification meeting. Plaintiff is correct that Minnesota's registration statute does not require him to provide his phone number. See Minn.Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4a (requiring address information and vehicle information). Further, information provided in accordance with the registration statute is private data under the MGDPA. Minn.Stat. § 243.166, subd. 7(a); see Minn.Stat. § 299C.093 (information on registered predatory offenders contained in database maintained by Bureau of Criminal Apprehension for law enforcement agencies is "private data on individuals"). The information provided may be disclosed for "law enforcement and corrections purposes," Minn.Stat. §§ 243.166,
It is difficult for this Court to see how the disclosure of Plaintiff's cell phone number at a community notification meeting serves a law-enforcement or corrections purpose, protects the public, or counteracts any dangerousness posed by Plaintiff. Such disclosure in fact seems to be inviting the type of harassment that Plaintiff experienced shortly after the meeting. But, even if Moen violated state law by disclosing Plaintiff's cellphone number, a violation of state law is not sufficient to state a substantive-due-process claim.
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment be dismissed with respect to the State Defendants for failure to state a claim.
The State Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff's claim that they conspired to violate his civil rights, arguing that Plaintiff "fails to plead facts which would show a meeting of the minds between the State Defendants." (State Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 12.)
Following the States Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Amended Complaint," wherein he seeks to add "more factual basis" to his conspiracy claim. ("Am. Compl.," ECF No. 51.) The "Amended Complaint" was filed within the 21-day period proscribed in Fed. R. Civ. 15(a)(1)(B), which permits a plaintiff to amend his pleading as a matter of course within "21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b)." The State Defendants oppose the filing of this "Amended Complaint," asserting that the "Amended Complaint" fails to comply with this Court's Local Rule that "any amended pleading must be complete in itself and must not incorporate by reference any prior pleading," D. Minn. LR 15.1(a), and any amendment would be futile. (State Defs.' Mem. Opp. "Am. Compl." at 1-2, ECF No. 55.)
The State Defendants are correct that Plaintiff's "Amended Complaint" does not comport with D. Minn. LR 15.1. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's pro se status, Plaintiff is still bound to comply with the Local Rules of this Court. See Meehan v. United Consumers Club Franchising Corp., 312 F.3d 909, 914 (8th Cir.2002) ("All civil litigants are required to follow applicable procedural rules."); Lindstedt v. City of Granby, 238 F.3d 933, 937 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) ("A pro se litigant is bound
As stated above, Local Rule 15.1 requires that "any amended pleading ... be complete in itself and ... not incorporate by reference any prior pleading." D. Minn. LR 15.1(a). Plaintiff's "Amended Complaint" seeks to add factual allegations to his Complaint, but is not a complete pleading in itself. But, for the reasons stated below, even if the Court were to consider the additional allegations in the "Amended Complaint" in conjunction with those in the Complaint, Plaintiff's conspiracy claim still fails as a matter of law. See Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir.1992) ("Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, we treat facts set out in this filing as de facto amendments to the complaint.").
"To establish a conspiracy under [42 U.S.C.] § 1985(3), [Plaintiff] must prove: (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) that the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive him of his civil rights; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) injury." McDonald v. City of Saint Paul, 679 F.3d 698, 706 (8th Cir.2012); accord Davis v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 685 F.3d 675, 684 (8th Cir.2012); Adams v. Minn. Dep't of Corrs., No. 14-cv-0977 (MJD/TNL), 2015 WL 774197, at *8 (D.Minn. Feb. 24, 2015). "The `purpose' element of the conspiracy requires that the plaintiff prove a class-based `invidiously discriminatory animus.'" City of Omaha Employees Betterment Ass'n v. City of Omaha, 883 F.2d 650, 652 (8th Cir.1989) [hereinafter City of Omaha] (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 102 n. 10, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971)); accord McDonald, 679 F.3d at 706 ("McDonald also must show that the conspiracy is fueled by some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." (quotation omitted)).
Additionally, "the plaintiff must allege with particularity and specifically demonstrate with material facts that the defendants reached an agreement. [H]e can satisfy this burden by pointing to at least some facts which would suggest that [the defendants] reached an understanding to violate [his] rights." City of Omaha, 883 F.2d at 652 (quotation and citation omitted).
Steshenko v. Albee, 42 F.Supp.3d 1281, 1294 (N.D.Cal.2014).
The State Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts "demonstrat[ing] that any of the State Defendants reached an agreement to conspire against [him]" and "supporting how any of the State Defendants were involved in relation to any alleged conspiracy with anyone else." (State Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 13.) Indeed, in the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges only that a conspiracy existed among the Defendants "to drive from the State of Minnesota what these [Defendants] deem to be unwanted and [p]redatory persons from the [S]tate." (Compl. at 6; see Compl. at 11, 15, 16, 18-19.) In the "Amended Complaint," Plaintiff adds:
("Am. Compl." at 2.) These allegations do not state with particularity how the State Defendants, or any defendant for that matter, reached an agreement or understanding with each other or with any other defendant to violate Plaintiff's civil rights, especially considering that the acts Close, Rusinoff, Britzius, Murphy, and Moen allegedly committed did not involve the creation of any fact sheet regarding Plaintiff. See Davis, 685 F.3d at 685; City of Omaha, 883 F.2d at 652; Steshenko, 42 F.Supp.3d at 1294. Absent any facts plausibly showing an agreement or understanding reached by the State Defendants with each other or with any other defendant, Plaintiff's conspiracy claim is merely conclusory. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Adams, 2015 WL 774197, at *9; Steshenko, 42 F.Supp.3d at 1294 (dismissing § 1985(3) claim where plaintiff "plead[ed] no facts to support his conspiracy claim" and provided only conclusory allegation that defendants conspired to violate his civil rights).
Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts satisfying the "purpose" element, namely, that he was the victim of some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. See Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir.2006) (sex offender status not suspect classification); see also Hines v. Jenks, 89 Fed.Appx. 189, 191 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Sex offenders are not members of a suspect class....").
Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's § 1985 claims against the State Defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The remaining claims against the State Defendants consistent of Plaintiff's defamation claims and the MGDPA claim against Moen.
Plaintiff's defamation claims against the State Defendants are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to such claims. See Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) (actions for libel and slander "shall be commenced within two years"); Songa v. Sunrise Senior Living Invs., 22 F.Supp.3d 939, 942 (D.Minn.2014) ("In Minnesota, claims for defamation ... are subject to a two-year statute of limitations."); McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn.App.1989) ("The statute of limitations governing defamation claims is two years."); see also Shepard v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 509 Fed.Appx. 556, 556 (8th Cir.2013) (per curiam). The latest defamatory statement by the State Defendants was allegedly made by Moen in 2011, more than two years before Plaintiff filed the instant action in 2014. While Plaintiff states that he did not discover the false statements until accessing his file in 2010, (see Compl. at 13; Pl.'s Obj. at 1-2), "[l]ack of knowledge of a defamatory publication will not toll the statute of limitations; the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of publication." McGaa, 441 N.W.2d at 825.
Plaintiff argues that he has five years in which to bring his defamation claims because "this action is not filed in State Court, but in Federal Court for Defendant[s'] actions[] in violating the Plaintiff's Constitutional Right[s]. The timeframe to file a [c]ivil[-]right[s] claim under 42 USCA [§] 1983[] is five (5) years[] from the initial onset of illegal activity."
Plaintiff alleges that Moen disclosed Plaintiff's "privileged information[] in violation of State Law," namely, his cellphone number, at a 2011 community meeting. (Compl. at 16; see "Am. Compl." at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of that disclosure, he received a phone call that evening about an hour after the meeting from an unknown individual "want[ing] to meet with [him] at Hwy. 95, and a County road." (Compl. at 16; see "Am. Compl." at 4.) As mentioned above, information provided by a predatory offender in accordance with the registration statute is private data under Minnesota law. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 7(a). Giving Plaintiff's Complaint the benefits of liberal construction accorded to pro se litigations, the Court construes these allegations as asserting a claim for disclosure of private data under the MGDPA.
Whereas a defamation claim must be brought within two years, a MGDPA claim must be brought within six years. Manteuffel v. City of North St. Paul, 570 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Minn.App.1997). Thus, Plaintiff's MGDPA claim against Moen in her individual and official capacities is timely.
A claim for violation of the MGDPA, however, cannot be asserted against Moen individually. Minn.Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1 (stating action for damages may be brought against "a responsible authority or government entity which violates any provision of this chapter"); Evenstad v. Herberg, 994 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005 (D.Minn. 2014); accord Walker v. Scott Cnty., 518 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn.App.1994) ("[T]he [MGDPA] does not impose civil liability on individuals."). And, as previously discussed in Section IV(B)(1), "[b]ecause the State of Minnesota has not specified an intent to subject itself to suit in federal court under the MGDPA, [Plaintiff]'s claim [against Moen in her official capacity] ... must be dismissed." Evenstad, 994 F.Supp.2d at 1006 (noting absence of "in federal court" language in waiver contained in Minn.Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1, and concluding "MGDPA does not express a clear and unequivocal intent to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity"); see Soto v. John Defendants 1-5, No. 13-cv-640 (DWF/SER), 2014 WL 1607615, at *12 (D.Minn. Apr. 15, 2014) ("[T]o the extent Soto alleges a violation of state law as the basis for his claim for monetary or prospective relief, his claim fails because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state for an alleged violation of its own laws."). Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's MGDPA claim against Moen in her official
The Columbia Heights Defendants also move for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Additionally, the Columbia Heights Defendants assert that the Columbia Heights Police Department is not a proper party and Plaintiff has not properly served the City of Columbia Heights. The Columbia Heights Defendants also oppose Plaintiff's attempt to amend his Complaint and assert that, because Plaintiff did not timely respond to their motion to dismiss, the motion should be considered unopposed. (Columbia Heights Defs.' Reply at 1-3, ECF No. 57.) Plaintiff did file an untimely response. (Pl.'s Reply, ECF No. 65). See D. Minn. LR 7.1(c)(2) (responsive memorandum and supporting documents due within 21 days after the filing of a dispositive motion). While Plaintiff did not timely respond to the Columbia Heights Defendants' motion, the Court has considered the arguments raised in Plaintiff's untimely memorandum as well as those arguments raised in his responsive memorandum to the State Defendant's motions that pertain to the Columbia Heights Defendants in the interests of completeness.
Plaintiff has sued the Columbia Heights Police Department, not the City of Columbia Heights. (Compl. at 3.) "Municipal police departments are not legal entities subject to suit." Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 805 F.Supp.2d 712, 719 (D.Minn. 2011) (citing cases); see Ketchum, 974 F.2d at 82 ("The West Memphis Police Department and West Memphis Paramedic Services are not juridicial entities suable as such. They are simply departments or subdivisions of the City government."); Henke v. City of Orono, No. 14-cv-1681 (DSD/HB), 2014 WL 5475020, at *1 n. 1 (D.Minn. Oct. 29, 2014) ("The Orono Police Department, as a city agency, is not subject to suit."). There is no evidence in the record that either the Columbia Heights Police Department or the City of Columbia Heights were ever served in this matter. (See ECF Nos. 3, 8 (summons returned executed).)
While Nadeau was served, such service of process was not effective as to the City of Columbia Heights as Nadeau, the Columbia Heights Police Department's Chief of Police, (Exs. at 59), is neither the chief executive officer nor the city clerk for the City of Columbia Heights. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 4(j)(2) (municipality may be served by delivering summons and complaint to its chief executive officer or in a manner prescribed by state law); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(e)(2) (municipality may be served through its chief executive officer or clerk).
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that service of process on the City of Columbia Heights was in fact effectuated. See 3M Co. v. Darlet-Marchante-Techologie SA, No. 08-cv-827 (JNE/SRN), 2009 WL 1228245, at *3 (D.Minn. May 5, 2009) ("On a motion to dismiss brought under... Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5), insufficiency of service of process, the plaintiff must establish prima facie evidence that there was sufficient ... service of process."). For these service-of-process deficiencies alone, the Court would be within its discretion to
But, for the reasons that follow, even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff's federal claims against the Columbia Heights Police Department as being brought against the City of Columbia Heights itself, these claims still fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Mosley v. Reeves, 99 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1053-54 (E.D.Mo.2000) ("Given the liberal construction accorded to pro se complaints, the Court will construe plaintiff's claims against [the Poplar Bluff Police Department] to be against the City of Poplar Bluff, which is the proper suable entity here.").
For the same reasons the Court identified above with respect to the State Defendants in Section IV(B)(2), Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Nadeau individually under § 1983. Nadeau is employed by the City of Columbia Heights, not the federal government, and therefore any due-process claim under the Fifth Amendment fails. See Hess, 714 F.3d at 1053. Plaintiff has not identified what cruel and unusual punishment Nadeau allegedly subjected him to and thus has not pleaded a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Plaintiff has not identified a protected liberty or property interest and thus he cannot sustain a claim for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff has also arguably raised an equal-protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against Nadeau. (See Compl. at 20; Pl.'s Obj. at 3-4; Pl.'s Reply at 3.) "In general, the Equal Protection Clause requires that state actors treat similarly situated people alike." McDonald, 679 F.3d at 705 (quotation omitted). "The first step in an equal protection
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Nadeau in his individual capacity be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against Nadeau in his individual and official capacities. "A suit against a governmental actor in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity itself." Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir.2007). Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff's claims against Nadeau in his official capacity as well as those brought against the Columbia Heights Police Department, see supra Section V(A), as being asserted against the City of Columbia Heights.
"In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court held that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 if an `action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.'" Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir.2010) (citation omitted) (quoting 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). "A governmental entity cannot be held vicariously liable for its agent's acts under § 1983." Brockinton, 503 F.3d at 674 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018); accord Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir.2013) ("Although the Supreme Court has held that a municipality is a person that can be liable under § 1983, it is well established that a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor." (quotation omitted)).
"T[he Eighth C]ircuit has consistently recognized a general rule that, in order for municipal liability to attach, individual liability must first be found on an underlying substantive claim." Brockinton, 503 F.3d at 674 (quotation omitted); accord Bass v. Anoka Cnty., 998 F.Supp.2d 813, 823 (D.Minn.2014) ("A municipality, however, may not be held liable for its officers' actions unless the officers are found liable on the underlying substantive claim." (quotation omitted)). Because this Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights against Nadeau, it necessarily follows that Plaintiff has failed to state a Monell claim against the City of
Moreover, in order to state a Monell claim, "a plaintiff must identify a governmental policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury to recover from a governmental entity under § 1983." Brockinton, 503 F.3d at 674 (quotation omitted); see Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F.Supp.2d 961, 969 (D.Minn.2005) ("A Section 1983 plaintiff must first identify the government policy in question."). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he "will establish connection to governmental `Policy or Custom'" and the actions taken "are contrary to ex[i]sting laws, customs, or policies." (Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff has not, however, identified the particular policies or customs at issue. A plaintiff that "allege[s] no facts in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom by [the municipality] that caused [the alleged] deprivation" fails to state a Monell claim. Ulrich v. Pope County, 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir.2013); see Smithrud, 746 F.3d at 397 (district court did not err in concluding plaintiff failed to state a Monell claim where plaintiff's complaint "ma[d]e no reference to Monell and fail[ed] to allege any of the required elements to support such a claim"). The Court concludes that Plaintiff has offered nothing more than a conclusory allegation as to the existence of a policy or custom, and thus has failed to state a Monell claim against the City of Columbia Heights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Like the State Defendants, the Columbia Heights Defendants also contend that the additional allegations in the "Amended Complaint" do not save Plaintiff's § 1985 claim and any amendment would be futile. (Columbia Heights Defs.' Reply at 1-2.)
As set forth in Section IV(B)(3)(b), even if the additional allegations contained in the "Amended Complaint" are considered, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for conspiracy to violate his civil rights under § 1985. Plaintiff has not alleged facts with particularity stating how the Columbia Heights Defendants reached an agreement with each other or any other defendant to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See City of Omaha, 883 F.2d at 652. Plaintiff states that the Columbia Heights Defendants did the same thing as the Minneapolis and Bloomington Defendants: contacted the DOC for information regarding Plaintiff and used whatever the information the DOC provided without further investigation. (Pl.'s Reply; see "Am. Compl." at 2; Pl.'s Obj. at 4.) Plaintiff points to similar wording in the respective fact sheets as proof the Defendants conspired with one another. (See Pl.'s Reply at 1-2, 5.) Plaintiff alleges, however, only that the Columbia Heights, Minneapolis, and Bloomington Defendants did the same thing — contacted the DOC for information to include in their respective fact sheets. See Adams, 2015 WL 774197, at *9. "Without any facts plausibly showing an agreement or understanding reached by [the Columbia Heights Defendants] with each other or with any other defendant in this matter, [Plaintiff's] allegation of conspiracy is merely conclusory." Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937); see Steshenko, 42 F.Supp.3d at 1294. Similarly, Plaintiff has not alleged that he was the victim of some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus and thus has not
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's § 1985 claims against the Columbia Heights Defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The allegedly defamatory statements made by the Columbia Heights Defendants occurred in 2013, within two years of the filing of the instant action. With respect to Plaintiff's defamation claims, the Columbia Heights Defendants assert that they are entitled to absolute and qualified privilege.
Under Minnesota law, state and local agencies and officials are immune from liability for disclosing information regarding predatory offenders. See Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 7 (immunity from liability). That immunity, however, "applies only to disclosure of information that is consistent with the offender's conviction history. It does not apply to disclosure of information relating to conduct for which the offender was not convicted." Id. subd. 7(c) (emphasis added).
In Semler v. Klang, a predatory offender challenged the community notices law enforcement agencies provided to the public regarding the offender's release. 743 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Minn.App.2007). The offender claimed the notices "violated his rights and constituted slander and defamation" because they included information not consistent with his conviction history, namely, a broader victim pool and conduct of which he had not been convicted. Id. at 275, 276. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the state district court that subdivision 7's statutory immunity was not available to the law enforcement agencies because they "had disclosed information relating to conduct for which [the offender] was not convicted." Id. at 278. Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true, the Columbia Heights Defendants have disclosed victim information and conduct which is not consistent with Plaintiff's conviction history. (Compl. at 20; Exs. at 60.) Thus, the Columbia Heights Defendants are not entitled to statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 7.
"Two types of privilege exist as defenses against defamation claims: absolute privilege and qualified privilege." Minke v. City of Minneapolis, 845 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Minn.2014) (citing Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn.2010)).
Id. (quotations omitted and citation omitted).
"The absolute privilege is confined to situations where the public service requires it, keeping in mind that the purpose of the privilege is not so much to protect public officials but to promote the public good, i.e., to keep the public informed of the public's business." Redwood Cnty. Tel. Co. v. Luttman, 567 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn.App.1997) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1997).
Carradine v. State, 511 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn.1994). "Because of its more robust protections, absolute privilege is not lightly granted and is confined within narrow limits. [Courts] only extend absolute privilege when public policy weighs strongly in favor of such extension." Minke, 845 N.W.2d at 182 (quotations and citations omitted). "Whether an executive officer is absolutely immune from defamation liability depends on many factors, including the nature of the function assigned to the officer and the relationship of the statements to the performance of that function." Carradine, 511 N.W.2d at 736.
The Columbia Heights Defendants assert that "[p]olice officers have absolute immunity for claims based on alleged defamatory statements made during the course of their duties," citing Carradine. (Columbia Heights Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 17.) This is somewhat an overstatement. In Carradine, the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly stated that "[t]he issue in this case, therefore is not whether police officers have absolute immunity from civil suit for all allegedly defamatory statements made in the performance of their duties." 511 N.W.2d at 736. Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court was concerned with "two much more specific issues," allegedly defamatory statements made in an arrest report and allegedly defamatory statements made to the media regarding the same arrest. Id. In 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized that "[i]n extending absolute privilege to the statements made by the state trooper in the arrest report [in Carradine], we made clear that we were not extending such privilege to all statements made by peace officers." Minke, 845 N.W.2d at 183.
Nevertheless, absolute privilege has been granted in the law-enforcement context in certain situations. In Carradine, a state trooper was entitled to absolute immunity for allegedly defamatory statements made in an arrest report. 511 N.W.2d at 736-37. The Minnesota Supreme Court "attach[ed] great significance" to the fact that (1) the preparation of such "reports accurately summarizing the circumstances leading to and surrounding the arrest" was a "key part" of the officer's job; (2) such reports were used not only within the department, but by the prosecutor in determining whether and what offenses to charge; (3) the significant role such reports can play at trial in refreshing a witness's recollection or for impeachment purposes; and (4) without such immunity, an officer may prepare a less-detailed report "that will be less useful within the department and in any subsequent prosecution and trial" out of fear of liability. Id. at 736.
At the same time, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the trooper was not entitled to "absolute immunity from civil suit for allegedly defamatory statements made in response to press inquiries" regarding the same arrest. Id. at 737. The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that
Id. at 737.
In Redwood County Telephone Co., the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered
In Minke, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the statements of a supervising sergeant in the context of a background investigation. 845 N.W.2d at 181. A former employee applied for a job with a different law enforcement agency and listed the sergeant as a contact person for his prior employment. Id. The applicant alleged that, in an interview with the law enforcement agency, the sergeant "made statements that were defamatory, including attacks on his honesty, integrity, character, work ethic, and performance." Id. (quotation omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to extend absolute privilege to the sergeant because the statements were: (1) more akin to an administrative personnel matter and did not have the judicial significance of a police report; (2) "made in the context of an employment-related background investigation in which, typically, a qualified privilege, not an absolute privilege, is recognized"; and not part of the sergeant's essential job duties, noting that the sergeant had declined to respond to an inquiry from a different agency. Id. at 183-84.
Returning to Minn.Stat. § 244.052, law enforcement agencies, such as the Columbia Heights Defendants, are required to disclose information regarding a predatory offender which, in the agency's judgment, is "relevant and necessary to protect the public and to counteract the offender's dangerousness." Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 4(a). This includes pertinent "information regarding the offender contained in the [ECRC] report." Id. "The extent of the information disclosed and the community to whom disclosure is made must relate to the level of danger posed by the offender, to the offender's pattern of offending behavior, and to the need of community members for information to enhance their individual and collective safety." Id. Disclosure of information in accordance with Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 4, requires an exercise of the law enforcement agency's judgment in determining what information to disclose. See Semler, 743 N.W.2d at 279 ("At no point does Minn.Stat. § 244.052 either mandate or forbid disclosure without reference to the disclosers' judgment as to what to disclose and to whom to disclose it.").
While absolute privilege is not something to be granted lightly, Minke, 845 N.W.2d at 182, the Court concludes that it is warranted here. "[I]t is the relationship of the statement to a job-related function of the government official that determines the absolute privilege," Redwood Cnty. Tel. Co., 567 N.W.2d at 720 (citing Carradine, 511 N.W.2d at 736). Nadeau, the Chief of Police for the City of Columbia Heights, was charged by the Minnesota legislature to provide information to the public regarding predatory offenders. All of the statements made by Nadeau in the fact sheet were in the performance of his official duties as police chief. See Redwood Cnty. Tel. Co., 567
Here, there is a "compelling public policy interest, taking into account `the nature of the function assigned to the officer and the relationship of the statements to the performance of that function.'" Minke, 845 N.W.2d at 183 (quoting Carradine, 511 N.W.2d at 736); see Bol, 561 N.W.2d at 149. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's defamation claim against Nadeau be dismissed on the basis of absolute privilege. Because Nadeau is entitled to absolute privilege, the City of Columbia Heights is similarly entitled. Carradine, 511 N.W.2d at 737; Redwood Cnty. Tel. Co., 567 N.W.2d at 721.
Plaintiff's claims against the Minneapolis Defendants arise out of fact sheets generated in 2010 and 2011. (Compl. at 7, 17.) The Minneapolis Defendants similarly move for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Like the Columbia Heights Defendants, the Minneapolis Defendants assert that the Minneapolis Police Department is not a proper party. (Minneapolis Defs.' Mem in Supp. at 1 n. 1, ECF No. 32.) The Minneapolis Defendants also assert that Hinchliff has not been served in this matter. (Minneapolis Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 1 n. 1.) Like the State and Columbia Heights Defendants, the Minneapolis Defendants too oppose Plaintiff's attempt to amend his Complaint, and assert that any amendments are futile. (Minneapolis Defs.' Reply at 2, ECF No. 59.) And, like the Columbia Heights Defendants, the Minneapolis Defendants assert that Plaintiff's failure to respond timely to the Minneapolis Defendants' motion should warrant deeming the motion uncontested. (Minneapolis Defs.' Reply at 1-2.) While it does not appear from the record that Plaintiff directly responded to the Minneapolis Defendants' motion, the Court has considered the arguments raised in Plaintiff's responsive memorandum to the State Defendants and reply memorandum to the Columbia Heights and Bloomington Defendants applicable to the Minneapolis Defendants given Plaintiff's pro se status and in the interests of completeness.
For the reasons stated above in Section V(A) with respect to the Columbia Heights Police Department, the Court agrees with the Minneapolis Defendants that the Minneapolis Police Department is not an entity subject to suit. See Ketchum, 974 F.2d at 82; Henke, 2014 WL 5475020, at *1 n. 1; Anderson, 805 F.Supp.2d at 719. Just as before, however, the Court will construe Plaintiff's claims as if they had been brought against the City of Minneapolis itself. See Mosley, 99 F.Supp.2d at 1053-54. And, unlike the Columbia Heights Police Department, the Minneapolis Police Department was served via the city clerk, making service effective on the City of Minneapolis itself. (ECF No. 8 at 1.) See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j)(2); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(e)(2).
Hinchliff has not been served in this matter. (See ECF Nos. 3, 8 (summons returned executed).). This matter was filed in December 2014. Rule 4(m) provides that "[i]f a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the court — on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff — must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time." Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Plaintiff could be ordered to correct this deficiency. But, because the Minneapolis Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims against Hinchliff nevertheless fail as a matter of law, (Minneapolis Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 1 n. 1), and this Court agrees, the Court moves directly to the merits of the arguments.
For the same reasons identified above with respect to the State Defendants in Section IV(B)(2) and Nadeau individually in Section V(B)(1)(a), Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Hinchliff in his individual capacity. By all accounts, Hinchliff is not employed by the federal government. (See Compl. at 2, 7, 17; Minneapolis Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 11.) Therefore, any due process claim under the Fifth Amendment fails. See Hess, 714 F.3d at 1053. Plaintiff has neither identified what cruel and unusual punishment Hinchliff allegedly subjected him to nor pleaded facts from which this Court can plausibly infer that alleged acts amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and thus has not pleaded a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Smithrud, 746 F.3d at 397. Plaintiff has not identified a protected liberty or property interest and thus he cannot sustain a claim for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Hinchliff in his individual capacity be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Treating Plaintiff's claims against Hinchliff in his official capacity as well as those brought against the Minneapolis Police Department as being asserted against the City of Minneapolis, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a Monell claim against the City of Minneapolis for the reasons set forth in Section V(B)(1)(b). Plaintiff has neither alleged the violation of a constitutional right nor identified the particular policies or customs that allegedly led to the violation of his constitutional rights. See Ulrich, 715 F.3d at 1061; Brockinton, 503 F.3d at 674; Mallak, 9 F.Supp.3d at 1063; Bass, 998 F.Supp.2d at 824. Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Monell claims against the Minneapolis Defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
With respect to Plaintiff's § 1985 claim, the Minneapolis Defendants argue that "Plaintiff fails to point to at least some facts that would suggest an agreement or understanding amongst Defendants" and "fails to plead the required purpose element." (Minneapolis Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 14.) Further, as stated above, the Minneapolis Defendants assert that the additional allegations in the "Amended Complaint" do not save Plaintiff's § 1985 claim and any amendment would be futile. (Minneapolis Defs.' Reply at 2.)
This Court agrees. For the reasons set forth in Sections IV(B)(3)(b) and V(B)(2), Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for conspiracy to violate his civil rights under § 1985 even if the "Amended Complaint's" additional allegations are considered. Plaintiff has not alleged facts with particularity stating how the Minneapolis Defendants reached an agreement with each other or with any other defendant to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See City of Omaha, 883 F.2d at 652; Adams, 2015 WL 774197, at *9. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that he was the victim of some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus and thus has not pleaded the "purpose" element of a § 1985 claim. See McDonald, 679 F.3d at 706. Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's § 1985 claims against the Minneapolis Defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The Minneapolis Defendants' allegedly defamatory statements were made in 2010 and 2011. For the reasons stated in Section IV(C)(1), the Court recommends that Plaintiff's defamation claims against the Minneapolis Defendants be dismissed as time-barred under Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1)'s two-year statute of limitations. See Shepard, 509 Fed.Appx. at 556; Songa, 22 F.Supp.3d at 942; McGaa, 441 N.W.2d at 825.
Plaintiff's claims against the Bloomington Defendants are based on a fact sheet issued in 2010. (Compl. at 9-10; Exs. at
For the reasons stated above in Section V(A) with respect to the Columbia Heights Police Department, the Court agrees with the Bloomington Defendants that the Bloomington Police Department is not an entity subject to suit. (Bloomington Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 2 n. 1, ECF No. 42; Bloomington Defs.' Reply at 3, ECF No. 63). See Ketchum, 974 F.2d at 82; Henke, 2014 WL 5475020, at *1 n. 1; Anderson, 805 F.Supp.2d at 719. Just as before, however, the Court will construe Plaintiff's claims as if they had been brought against the City of Bloomington itself. See Mosley, 99 F.Supp.2d at 1053-54. And, like the Minneapolis Police Department, the Bloomington Police Department was served via the city clerk, making service effective on the City of Bloomington itself. (ECF No. 8 at 3.) See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j)(2); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(e)(2).
Like Hinchliff, see supra Section VI(B), Hanson has not been served in this matter. (See ECF Nos. 3, 8 (summons returned executed).) Again, Plaintiff could be ordered to correct this deficiency. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 4(m). But, because the Bloomington Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims against Hanson nevertheless fail as a matter of law, (Bloomington Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 2 n. 1), and this Court agrees, the Court moves directly to the merits of the arguments.
For the same reasons identified above with respect to the State Defendants in Section IV(B)(2), Nadeau individually in Section V(B)(1)(a), and Hinchliff individually in Section VI(C)(1)(a), Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Hinchliff in his individual capacity. Hanson is a detective with the Bloomington Police Department; he is not employed by the federal government. (Exs. at 2.) Accordingly, any due process claim under the Fifth Amendment fails. See Hess, 714 F.3d at 1053. Plaintiff has neither identified what cruel and unusual punishment Hanson allegedly subjected him to nor pleaded facts from which this Court can plausibly infer that alleged acts amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and thus has not pleaded a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Smithrud, 746 F.3d at 397. Plaintiff has not identified a protected liberty or property interest and thus he cannot sustain a claim for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Hanson in his individual capacity be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Treating Plaintiff's claims against Hanson in his official capacity as well as those brought against the Bloomington Police Department as being asserted against the City of Bloomington, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a Monell claim against the City of Bloomington for the reasons set forth in Section V(B)(1)(b). Plaintiff has neither alleged the violation of a constitutional right nor identified the particular policies or customs that allegedly led to the violation of his constitutional rights. See Ulrich, 715 F.3d at 1061; Brockinton, 503 F.3d at 674; Mallak, 9 F.Supp.3d at 1063; Bass, 998 F.Supp.2d at 824. Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Monell claims against the Bloomington Defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Echoing the arguments of the State, Columbia Heights, and Minneapolis Defendants, the Bloomington Defendants contend "Plaintiff's perfunctory and conclusory allegations are insufficient to allege a conspiracy claim"; Plaintiff has "fail[ed] to allege any facts showing that a Bloomington Defendant entered into a `meeting of the minds' with a[] conspirator to violate his rights"; and "Plaintiff[]... has failed to prove an underlying deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege to support a Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim." (Bloomington Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 13; accord Bloomington Defs.' Reply at 3.) The Bloomington Defendants also contend that "Plaintiff's conclusory allegations in his [`]Amended Complaint[`] still fail to state a conspiracy claim as a matter of law" and any amendment would be futile. (Bloomington Defs.' Reply at 4; accord Bloomington Defs.' Reply at 1.)
For the reasons set forth in Sections IV(B)(3)(b) and V(B)(2), Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for conspiracy to violate his civil rights under § 1985 even if the "Amended Complaint's" additional allegations are considered. Plaintiff has not alleged facts with particularity stating how the Bloomington Defendants reached an agreement with each other or with any other defendant to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See City of Omaha, 883 F.2d at 652; Adams, 2015 WL 774197, at *9. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that he was the victim of some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus and thus has not pleaded the "purpose" element of a § 1985 claim. See McDonald, 679 F.3d at 706. Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's
The Bloomington Defendants' allegedly defamatory statements were made in 2010. For the reasons stated in Section IV(C)(1), the Court recommends that Plaintiff's defamation claims against the Bloomington Defendants be dismissed as time-barred under Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1)'s two-year statute of limitations. See Shepard, 509 Fed.Appx. at 556; Songa, 22 F.Supp.3d at 942; McGaa, 441 N.W.2d at 825.
This Court has jurisdiction over the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) based on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. (See Compl. at 4.) Section 1343 provides for original jurisdiction over actions addressing the deprivation of civil rights. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a). Section 1367 generally provides that "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Section 1367 also permits a district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Id. § 1367(c)(3). "`A district court's decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it has original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.'" Crest Const. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 359 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 640, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 173 L.Ed.2d 843 (2009)). "When a district court dismisses federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the balance of interests will usually point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims." Streambend Props. II, LLC v. Ivy Tower Minneapolis, LLC, 781 F.3d 1003, 1016-17 (8th Cir.2015) (quotation omitted).
This Court has recommended that all of Plaintiff's federal civil-rights claims be dismissed. There are no claims remaining over which this Court has original jurisdiction. In the event that Plaintiff's federal claims are dismissed, the State Defendants have asked that this Court not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims. (State Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 26.)
To the extent Plaintiff may be able to pursue a MGDPA claim or any other state claim
Based on the foregoing and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
Filed July 27, 2015.
