JOHN R. TUNHEIM, Chief District Judge.
On August 28, 2015, Arctic Cat Inc. and Polaris Industries Inc. filed a stipulation to stay the consolidated cases in this action, pending resolution of inter partes review ("IPR") before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB"). On September 1, 2015, United States Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel denied the stipulation to stay. In response, the parties submitted a joint motion for reconsideration. In an order dated September 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion. The parties timely filed a joint appeal from the Magistrate Judge's order denying their joint motion for reconsideration. Although the Court sympathizes with the Magistrate Judge's order, the Court will reverse the order and will stay the consolidated cases.
The three consolidated cases in this action were commenced in December 2013 and September 2014. (Compl., Dec. 19, 2013, Docket No. 1;
In February 2015, the PTAB instituted IPR
On August 28, 2015, Arctic Cat and Polaris filed a stipulation to stay the consolidated cases pending resolution of the IPR process. (Parties' Stipulation for Stay of Cases, Aug. 28, 2015, Docket No. 125.) On September 1, 2015, the Magistrate Judge denied the stipulation. (Order, Sept. 1, 2015, Docket No. 127.) The parties filed a joint motion for reconsideration. (Letter to Magistrate Judge, Sept. 1, 2015, Docket No. 128.). The Magistrate Judge denied the motion to reconsider concluding that a stay would be "inappropriate and inefficient." (Order ("Second Order") at 2, Sept. 3, 2015, Docket No. 129.) The Magistrate Judge noted that the oldest of the consolidated cases had "been pending since 2013" and that the most recent had "already been pending for a year." (Id.) If a stay were granted, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that it could "delay the consolidated cases for up to two years." (Id.)
The parties jointly filed this appeal, seeking to reverse the Magistrate Judge's order denying their motion for reconsideration. (Joint Appeal From Order Den. Stipulated Mot. to Stay Litigation, Sept. 14, 2015, Docket No. 140.) The parties argue that the Magistrate Judge did not properly consider the efficiencies that could be gained from granting a stay pending IPR. (Id. at 1-2.)
A district court's review of a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive matter is "extremely deferential." Roble v. Celestica Corp., 627 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1014 (D. Minn. 2007); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980). The Court will reverse such an order only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); D. Minn. LR 72.2(a)(3). For an order to be clearly erroneous, the district court must have a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Lisdahl v. Mayo Found., 633 F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
It is well recognized that the District Court has the "inherent power to stay the proceedings of an action, so as to control our docket, to conserve judicial resources, and to provide for the just determination of cases which pend before us." Kemp v. Tyson Seafood Group, Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 961, 964 (D. Minn. 1998). This includes "the authority to order a stay of litigation pending the reexamination of a patent by the PTO." Polaris Indus., Inc. v. BRP U.S. Inc., No. 12-1405, 2012 WL 5331227, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 29, 2012). "A district court is not required to stay judicial resolution merely because reexamination proceedings have been instituted; rather the decision whether to grant the stay is a matter for the discretion of the district court." Regalo Int'l, LLC v. DEX Prods., Inc., No. 08-4206, 2009 WL 2951107, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 2009). "Yet courts `routinely' grant such stays where the circumstances warrant." Card Tech. Corp. v. DataCard Corp., No. 05-2546, 2007 WL 551615, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2007) (quoting CNS, Inc. v. Silver Eagle Labs, Inc., No. 04-968, 2004 WL 3631121, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2004)).
In determining whether to grant a stay pending IPR, district courts generally consider three factors:
Dane Techs., Inc. v. Gatekeeper Sys., Inc., No 12-2730, 2013 WL 4483355, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2013) (quoting Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co. Ltd., No. 09-3601, 2010 WL 3023529, at *2 (D. Minn. July 30, 2010)).
The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge's order denying the parties' joint motion for reconsideration was clearly erroneous because all three factors of the above-cited test are satisfied. Accordingly, the Court will grant the parties' joint appeal and will stay the consolidated cases. In taking this action, the Court recognizes the legitimacy of the Magistrate Judge's concern — this matter has indeed been pending for over two years. It is late in the process for such a stay. The Court will grant a stay, but with the clear expectation that the parties are using the IPR process in good faith in order to narrow or resolve the consolidated cases, and
The first factor for determining the appropriateness of a stay pending IPR is "whether the non-movant will suffer undue prejudice from a stay." Dane Techs., Inc., 2013 WL 4483355, at *2. In applying this factor, courts will generally "deny a request for a stay where . . . [it] will do nothing but delay the proceedings." Id. (citing Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., No. 05-831, 2007 WL 1582677, at *1 (D. Minn. May 30, 2007)). The key inquiry, however, is not merely whether there would be a delay. Instead, the key inquiry is whether this delay would prejudice or tactically disadvantage the non-moving party. See id. at *2-3 (denying a motion to stay pending IPR in part because the delay could prejudice the non-movant); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Dupont Dow Elastomers LLC, No. 03-3364, 2005 WL 2216317, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2005) (granting a motion to stay pending PTO reexamination in part because the delay would not prejudice the non-moving party).
Here, there is no non-moving party — Arctic Cat and Polaris have jointly requested that the consolidated cases be stayed pending IPR. There is no risk of prejudice or tactical disadvantage, even with a two year delay.
The second factor for determining the appropriateness of a stay is whether it would "simplify the issues in the litigation and facilitate the trial of that case." See, e.g., Dane Techs., Inc., 2013 WL 4483355, at *1. Courts have cited numerous benefits associated with granting a stay pending IPR, including:
3M Innovative Props. Co., 2005 WL 2216317, at *2.
Here, the Court finds that a stay pending IPR will likely simplify the litigation and facilitate trial. Most significantly, all 17 disputed claim terms are at issue in the IPR proceeding and petitions. If a stay is not granted, both the Court and the parties may expend needless resources on claims that will ultimately be amended or declared invalid. Staying the consolidated cases will promote judicial economy and efficiency.
The third and final factor for determining the appropriateness of a stay is the stage of litigation. Specifically, "[c]ourts hesitate to stay litigation where the case has proceeded through discovery or even reached the `trial ready' phase." Polaris Indus., Inc. v. BRP U.S. Inc., No. 12-01405, 2012 WL 5331227, at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 29, 2012) (citing Ecolab, Inc., 2007 WL 1582677, at *2-3).
In the instant action, discovery is still in its early stages. Fact discovery is to be completed by March 1, 2016, expert discovery is to be completed by September 1, 2016, and the trial ready date is January 1, 2017. Indeed, only one deposition has been taken and the parties have approximately 195 hours of combined deposition time remaining. Based on the present stage of litigation, the Court finds that a stay is appropriate.
Despite a well-reasoned determination by the Magistrate Judge, the Court finds, due to the joint stipulation of the parties, that the consolidated cases should be stayed pending resolution f IPR.
Based on the foregoing, and the records, files, and proceedings herein, the Court
1. The Magistrate Judge's orders denying the stipulation for stay of cases [Docket No. 127] and denying the parties' joint motion for reconsideration [Docket No. 129] are
2. This consolidated action is hereby
3. The stay shall be lifted 10 days after the PTAB's last decision regarding the currently requested or instituted IPRs, or the last decision on any appeals taken from the IPR proceedings, whichever is later.
4. Within 10 days after a final written determination by the PTAB of the challenged claims of the '405 Patent, the parties shall submit to the Court a joint written report outlining the status of the case.
5. Within 10 days after the PTAB issues a decision whether to institute IPR on the challenged claims of the '028 Patent, the parties shall submit to the Court a joint written report outlining the status of the case.
6. Within 10 days after the PTAB issues a decision whether to institute IPR on the challenged claims of the '719 Patent, the parties shall submit to the Court a joint written report outlining the status of the case.
7. Within 10 days after the PTAB issues a final written determination on the challenged claims of the '028 Patent, the parties shall submit to the Court a joint written report outlining the status of the case.
8. Within 10 days after the PTAB issues a final written determination on the challenged claims of the '719 Patent, the parties shall submit to the Court a joint written report outlining the status of the case.
9. Within 10 days after either party appeals any decision by the PTAB, the parties shall submit to the Court a joint written report outlining the status of the case.
10. Within 10 days after the resolution of any appeal taken from any decision by the PTAB, the parties shall submit to the Court a joint written report outlining the status of the case.
11. Either party may move to lift the stay prior to the date provided for in this Order. To the extent either party moves to lift the stay, the moving party must provide at least 30 days of notice of its intent to move to lift the stay to the opposing party, during which time the parties must fulfill their meet and confer obligations under Local Rule 37.1.
12. The fact that a stay has been sought and entered shall not be relied upon by either party as a basis to argue against entry of an equitable remedy.