ORDER

STEVEN E. RAU, Magistrate Judge.

Delta Industrial Services, Inc. brought suit against Kaman Automation, Inc. and Kollmorgen Corporation. (ECF No. 1). Kollmorgen answered the complaint, (ECF No. 19), and Kaman moved to dismiss, (ECF No. 21). The following day, Delta voluntarily dismissed Kaman from this action without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). (ECF No. 27).

Now, Kollmorgen seeks to add Kaman as a third-party defendant. (ECF No. 33). Through a stipulation, Delta has consented to Kollmorgen's filing of a third-party complaint. (ECF No. 33). Kaman has moved to strike the stipulation or deny leave to Kollmorgen to file its third-party complaint. (ECF No. 35). Kaman argues that, pursuant to Rule 14(a)(1), Kollmorgen's third-party complaint is untimely and requires a motion, not a stipulation.

Courts "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The stipulation submitted by Delta and Kollmorgen is not a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Thus, as courts in this District hold, "there is no such thing as a `motion to strike'" aimed at a non-pleading. Carlson Mktg. Grp. v. Royal Indemnity Co., Case No. No. 04-cv-3368 (PJS/JJG), 2006 WL 2917173, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 2006) (Schiltz, J.) (rejecting two motions to strike aimed at affidavits filed in connection with a summary judgment motion); see also Smith v. United HealthCare Servs., Inc., 2003 WL 22047861, at *3 n.7 (D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2003) (Montgomery, J.); VanDanacker v. Main Motor Sales Co., 109 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1047 (D. Minn. 2000) (Doty, J.). Further, under Rule 14(a)(4), "[a]ny party may move to strike the third-party claim . . . ." (emphasis added). But Kaman is a non-party bystander, so it cannot invoke Rule 14(a)(4). And the third-party claim does not yet exist for the simple reason that it has not been filed. Therefore, there is no basis for Kaman's motion to strike.

Even if this Court were to consider Kaman's Rule 14 arguments, they lack merit. Rule 14 requires a prospective third-party plaintiff to obtain the court's leave before filing a third-party complaint if more than 14 days have passed after serving its original answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1).1 As Kaman's own briefing points out, this Court has "considerable discretion in deciding whether to permit a third-party complaint." Too, Inc. v. Kohl's Dept. Stores, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 138, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 352 F.2d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 1965) ("Where leave to bring in additional parties is requested, discretion rests in the trial court to determine whether relief should be granted."). "The criteria for granting a motion to amend under Rule 15 are useful in assessing a motion to add a third-party defendant." Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., Inc., 2013 WL 1502238, at *1 (D. Neb. Apr. 11, 2013). Under Rule 15, the "court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, "[a] denial of leave to amend may be justified by undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of the amendment or unfair prejudice to the opposing party." Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 833 (8th Cir. 2008).

Here, there is no undue delay. Kollmorgen seeks to bring in Kaman as a third-party plaintiff a mere five weeks after a scheduling order was issued. This litigation is still at its inception and adding Kaman will not appreciably delay proceedings.2 While it appears Kollmorgen could have moved earlier to join Kaman, Kollmorgen's request is timely under the scheduling order. There appears to be no bad faith motive in bringing this third-party complaint where it details a contractual relationship between Kaman and Delta that used Kollmorgen products modified by Kaman, thus rendering Kaman liable for damages, not Kollmorgen. There is no futility apparent on the face of the third-party complaint. Essentially, Kollmorgen is asserting Kaman is the link between it and Delta. Thus, contrary to Kaman's arguments, this does not appear to be a separate dispute from the claims asserted by Delta. Rather, all the claims appear intertwined with one another.3 Finally, this Court finds no unfair prejudice. As noted, Delta, Kollmorgen, and Kaman have interrelated relationships. It is not prejudicial for those relationships to be adjudicated in a single proceeding. While Kaman asserts it will invariably move to compel arbitration, it is not unfairly prejudicial to allow a third-party complaint to be filed merely on the grounds that the dispute could be sent to arbitration.4

In sum, this Court finds there is no basis for Kaman's motion to strike. Even if this Court were to consider the underlying arguments, they are unpersuasive. Therefore, this Court APPROVES the Stipulation to Add Third-Party Defendant, (ECF No. 33), and DENIES Non-Party Kaman Automation, Incorporated's Motion to Strike Defendant Kollmorgen's Stipulation or, Alternatively, to Deny Leave to File, (ECF No. 35). Defendant Kollmorgen Corporation shall file its third-party complaint, in substantially the same form as attached to the stipulation, (ECF No. 33), within 7 days.