MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.
Dwight Laughlin was convicted and sentenced to prison in 1993 by the Newton County circuit court for burglary and property damage crimes occurring in the United States post office in Neosho. Under the United States Constitution, if a state cedes jurisdiction over federal property in the state, the United States has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving offenses committed on that federal property.
When the United States acquired the land to build the Neosho post office, the state of Missouri by statute ceded jurisdiction over the land to the federal government. Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution deprives Missouri's courts of the authority to enforce state laws on this federal property.
Following his conviction, Laughlin filed a Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion, alleging that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over him. He argued that his crimes occurring in the Neosho post office were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. His claim was denied, and his counsel at the time did not raise the claim on appeal. More than fifteen years later, Laughlin, pro se, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. This Court issued a writ of habeas corpus to determine whether the criminal conviction was void because the state court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter.
The state asserts that the issue of jurisdiction was litigated years ago and that Laughlin is bound by the judgment and by his failure to raise the matter on appeal. In a criminal case in which the court lacked the authority to try the defendant, the defendant's failure to appeal the issue in the earlier proceeding cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court whose jurisdiction was void from the beginning.
Laughlin is ordered discharged.
Dwight Laughlin is currently serving an aggregate 40-year sentence for his 1993 convictions for first-degree burglary and first-degree property damage. As to the burglary count, the prosecutor charged that Laughlin "knowingly entered unlawfully in a building, located at 101 E. Hickory, Neosho, Missouri and owned by the United States Postal Service...." As to the property damage count, the prosecutor charged that Laughlin "knowingly damaged a safe, which property was owned by the United States Postal Service...." Laughlin also was charged as a prior and persistent offender. A jury found Laughlin guilty of the charged crimes, and Laughlin was sentenced to the department of corrections for 30 years on the burglary count and 10 years on the property damage count, with the sentences to be served consecutively.
Laughlin appealed his conviction, and while that appeal was pending, he filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 29.15. In his Rule 29.15 motion, Laughlin raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that "the trial court did
Laughlin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the circuit court's jurisdiction in November 2009. After Laughlin sought relief in the circuit court and in the court of appeals, this Court granted a writ of habeas corpus in March 2010.
Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear and decide a case. Missouri circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases under article V, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253 n. 6 (2009). But no state, including Missouri, can grant subject matter jurisdiction to its courts to hear matters that federal law places under the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id.
The United States purchased the Neosho post office in 1933 and continuously has owned it since then. Under Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution, the United States gains exclusive authority over the land if that jurisdiction is ceded by the state; this provision grants to the federal government:
By enacting section 12.010, RSMo 2000,
Missouri does not have jurisdiction over land or a building that is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. As James Madison explained in The Federalist No. 43, Article I, section 8, clause 17, in addition to providing for purchase of land for the "seat of government," also explicitly provided for other land to be purchased for federal purposes for "needful buildings" and that the state in which the land was located had to agree by cession of the land. The necessity for federal jurisdiction of such land and buildings, Madison said, "is not less evident" than the need for federal control of the seat of government. "The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, require that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State," he said. The federal-state, or federalist, principle is preserved by the need for the state's agreement. "All objections and scruples are here also obviated by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned in every such establishment." THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
Article I, section 8, clause 17 has since been interpreted by state and federal courts in the manner envisioned by Madison. The United States Supreme Court has noted that a state must cede jurisdiction to the United States for the state no longer to have jurisdiction; it is not enough for the United States simply to purchase land within the state. "The consent of the states to the purchase of lands within them for the special purposes named, is, however, essential, under the constitution, to the transfer to the general government, with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion," the Court said in Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 531, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885). "Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor." Id. (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has held a state's cession of jurisdiction does not have to be absolute. See, e.g., Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930) ("[T]he state undoubtedly may cede her jurisdiction to the United States and may make the cession either absolute or qualified as to her may appear desirable, provided the qualification is consistent with the purposes for which the reservation is maintained and is accepted by the United States. And, where such a cession is made and accepted, it will be determinative of the jurisdiction of both the United States and the state within the reservation.").
"When the United States acquires title to lands, which are purchased by the consent of the legislature within which they are situated, ... the Federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all State authority." United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 143, 50 S.Ct. 284, 74 L.Ed. 761
The Federalist No. 43 and these cases make it clear that the state of Missouri could have chosen not to cede criminal jurisdiction to the United States. If the state had not done so, the state of Missouri could prosecute Laughlin for burglary and property damage just as if he had committed his crimes on any other property in the state. See Lowe, 114 U.S. at 531, 5 S.Ct. 995. By enacting section 12.020, however, the state chose to give exclusive federal jurisdiction over the Neosho post office, reserving only the right to serve civil and criminal process. See Heard, 270 F.Supp. at 200. No reservation was made for crimes occurring on the land. Therefore, the state of Missouri had no jurisdiction to prosecute Laughlin in this case.
The state argues that it has jurisdiction over Laughlin because his mens rea to commit his crimes was formed before he stepped onto the Neosho post office's land and because the results of his crime affected events in the state of Missouri. Section 541.191.1, RSMo Supp.1993, provides:
The state asserts that Laughlin's possession of the instrumentalities of his crime— a scanner set to the Neosho police frequency, a flashlight, a crowbar, a pipe wrench, screwdrivers, a hammer and a metal punch—shows that he formed the "knowingly" element of burglary and property damage while in the state of Missouri. But the statute requires "conduct constituting any element of the offense," and a defendant's mens rea is not conduct, nor is possession of the instrumentalities of his crime an element of the offense. The state also notes that Laughlin's crimes resulted in the local police being summoned to the post office to arrest Laughlin and that the burglary would have affected the state of Missouri.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, no state can enact a law that infringes on the supremacy
A Missouri statute cannot grant subject matter jurisdiction to its courts for cases that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The circuit court had no jurisdiction to try Laughlin for these crimes.
"Relief in habeas corpus is available `when a person is held in detention in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government.'" State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Mo. banc 2010) (quoting State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Mo. banc 2001)). Rule 29.15 and Rule 24.035 post-conviction motions for relief are "designed to provide a `single unitary, post-conviction remedy, to be used in place of other remedies,' including the writ of habeas corpus." Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d at 214 (quoting Wiglesworth v. Wyrick, 531 S.W.2d 713, 715-16 (Mo. banc 1976)) (emphasis omitted). However, subsequent habeas relief is not barred when the petitioner can demonstrate:
Zinna, 301 S.W.3d at 516-17 (quoting Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d 721, 725 (Mo. banc 2002)) (emphasis added).
The state, however, argues that because Laughlin previously raised his jurisdictional claim in a Rule 29.15 motion, he now is barred from bringing his claim through a subsequent petition for habeas corpus. Rule 29.15(b) (1993), however, states that the rule "provides the exclusive
The parties do not cite, and the Court is unable to find, any criminal case that has held that the parties in the litigation—the state and its defendant— can confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court that does not have it.
Under the applicable law, the Neosho post office is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Laughlin's previous post-conviction motion on the matter does not preclude him from habeas relief here. A collateral attack of a state court's subject matter jurisdiction is allowed when the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. No preclusion doctrine can confer jurisdiction on a state court whose judgment was void from the beginning.
Laughlin was convicted by a state court without the jurisdiction to do so. Neither the passage of time nor his previous counsel's failure to raise the issue in an earlier appeal can suffice to confer jurisdiction on the Newton County circuit court. Laughlin is ordered discharged.
All concur.
Current section 12.010 originally was enacted with slightly different language in 1889. See 1889 Mo. Laws 51, section 39.
For lands purchased prior to February 1, 1940, the United States is presumed to have accepted jurisdiction. See 40 U.S.C. section 3112(c) (formerly 40 U.S.C. section 255), which sets out a presumption against acceptance of jurisdiction by the United States. However, this statute does not apply to land acquisitions by the United States prior to February 1, 1940. See United States v. Heard, 270 F.Supp. 198, 200 (W.D.Mo.1967) (citing Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885)) ("Since the lands were acquired by the United States prior to February 1, 1940, acceptance of the jurisdiction by the United States is presumed.").
Current section 12.020 originally was enacted with slightly different language in 1883. See 1883 Mo. Laws 129, section 1.
U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
In Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that a state court civil judgment resolving a property dispute between two private parties could not be attacked collaterally by one of the parties who fully had litigated the matter. Durfee involved a fully litigated factual finding by a Nebraska court that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the disputed land was in Nebraska; this finding precluded Missouri courts from considering a collateral attack on the Nebraska court's jurisdiction on the factual basis that the disputed river-bottom land was in Missouri. This is not an exception that would apply in this case, nor is there any such exception found in criminal cases. Neither Durfee, nor this Court's decision in Sexton v. Jenkins & Assocs., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 270 (Mo. banc 2004), can be applied to subject matter jurisdiction in criminal cases. Durfee and Sexton were civil cases, where it was appropriate to apply a preclusion doctrine to private parties who had engaged the court system fully on the question of jurisdiction. Laughlin's case, by contrast, was a criminal case. As between the civil parties, Durfee and Duke, enough is enough. The same cannot be said of Laughlin's case in which the state is characterizing the feeble attempt by Laughlin's counsel as full and fair litigation of an issue that is not subject to preclusion. The authority of a criminal court to deprive Laughlin of his liberty cannot be granted by a litigant's consent as inferred from his counsel's failure to appeal. Further, the Durfee court recognized the limitations of its decision by noting that any decision a court rendered as between the private parties did not affect any future litigation between the states. Durfee, 375 U.S. at 115, 84 S.Ct. 242 ("Nothing there decided, and nothing that could be decided in litigation between the same parties or their privies in Missouri, could bind either Missouri or Nebraska with respect to any controversy they might have, now or in the future, as to the location of the boundary between them, or as to their respective sovereignty over the land in question.").
